Australia and the European crises, 1935-1939

Abstract

The thesis attempts to assess Australian public opinion towards the Abyssinian crisis, the Spanish civil war, and Hitler’s aggressions till September 1939. Australia was far from Europe, and communications were still relatively undeveloped. There was naturally therefore in Australia a lack of interest in foreign affairs, and a wish not to be involved in the wars and disputes of Europe, The first world war, and the depression of the early 1930s, only increased such feelings. The invasion of Abyssinia by Mussolini in 1933 forced the Australian government - reluctantly - to make a decision on foreign policy. The government was more concerned with developing the country. The Prime Minister was a Catholic, and probably worried by Catholic support for Mussolini. However, the members of the United Australia Party believed that Britain would act with moderation and restraint, and continued their traditional policy of supporting her. They therefore imposed sanctions, though many probably had reservations. The Labour opposition was weakened by division within the movement between Catholics who followed the support of the Australian Church for Mussolini, and unionists who sympathised with communist ideas of the need for a stand in support of the League, The public in general, although at first reluctant to see Britain take the lead, accepted sanctions after the invasion of Abyssinia, and for a time gave greater support to the League of Nations. The failure of the League by 1936 led to a reversion to isolationism. The government, after toying with the idea of strengthening the Covenant, adopted the British attitude. The population returned to its traditional indifference to foreign affairs. The Spanish civil war did not shake the public out of its apathy. Communists and Catholics were intensely moved by the conflict, and did their best to rouse both the government and the public in general, but failed. The government followed Britain's policy of Non-Intervention, partly because it usually followed Britain, and partly because it feared for the vital route through the Red Sea, Suez canal and Mediterranean to Britain, It therefore strongly supported Chamberlain's search for an accommodation with Mussolini, and in the interests of it was willing to see Eden resign. The Anschluss in March 1938 did not provoke a different response in Australia. The government continued appeasement - directed this time towards Hitler as well as Mussolini, The public was worried, but still inclined to hope that Australia would not be involved. Communists still advocated collective security, Catholics still feared Russia more than Germany, As the Czechoslovakian crisis mounted, Australians began for the first time to feel really involved in the affairs of Europe and tension for the first time gripped the whole community. The reaction to the Munich agreement was therefore an intense - and in some quarters an unbalanced - feeling of relief. Others however, were worried by doubts. Two R.S.L. State magazines, and presumably the branches they represented, the Sydney Morning Herald, and an important radio commentator 'The Watchman' violently criticised the agreement, on the grounds of morality, prudence and strategic considerations* They had little concrete effect, for the Labour opposition in federal Parliament was still isolationist, and in the government only W*M* Hughes expressed doubts* He was by this time too old and too mistrusted on both sides of the House to lead a sustained opposition* A reaction occurred, however, between a fortnight and a month after the Munich agreement* Growing doubts of the permanence and wisdom of the agreement were strengthened by the pogrom against the Jews in November 1938* For a while the vigorous advocacy of appeasement and defence of Germany by R.G* Menzies and S*M* Bruce stayed the tide, but the German occupation of Prague ended doubts of all except a few* The death of J* Lyons in April 1939> however, left the way open for the Prime Ministership of Menzies, He continued to look for peace by negotiation until the outbreak of war. The overwhelming majority of Australians were united in support for the war in September 1939* Catholics had their doubts removed by the failure of the Anglo-Russian negotiations and the subsequent Russo-German Pact. Communists, temporarily cut off from the Comintern, adopted a stand in accordance with the policy they had been advocating for the previous three years — a collective front against further German aggression* (it was only in October, when the new communist ’line1 was sent from Moscow, that they changed to opposing the war*) For the populace in general, the issue by September 1939 was clear* After the tension of the last few months, Australians accepted the war quietly* The A,L.P,, although many of its members still adhered to their old theories of class struggle, and regarded the war as an imperialist one, accepted that the war was inevitable. The question remains whether appeasement, as some of Chamberlain1s supporters at the time and since have claimed, was essential to preserve a united Empire. Such a plea may apply to Canada and South Africa, with their non-British - if not anti-British - minorities. It does not really apply to Australia. It seems that the British government influenced Australia much more than Australia influenced the British government. The excuse of 1 the dominions1 should therefore be accepted with caution. However, if Australia had supported a stronger stand at the time of the Munich agreement, the community would have been divided. As it was, Hitler1s continual aggressions, and Chamberlain1s continual efforts to appease him, although they led to the second world war, did ensure that a united Australia went into the war in September 1939. Show more