The lobbying of Chinese elite universities

Abstract

Despite the growing research on policy lobbying in China, little is known about Chinese research universities’ perspectives, strategies and interactions with the government in their efforts to influence higher education policies and advance their individual and collective interests. Their lobbying practices have long been hidden from the public view and difficult to research. Yet, the elite Chinese research universities have accumulated capacity to exert influence, and their discreet lobbying of government institutions has in fact become prevalent and is one of the most significant parts of university–government relations. This study investigates how the leading Chinese research universities interact with the central government to influence policies of crucial importance to their operations. In particular, it explores the strategies and forms of agency the institutions develop to exploit the loopholes of a fragmented central bureaucracy, and identifies the key factors and ‘rules of the game’ that shape their lobbying behaviour and define their patterns of interaction with the state. It asks how successful they are vis-à-vis the authoritarian state in a tight regulatory environment, and the potential implications of their activism for the current political structure. My study relies on a unique set of empirical evidence which includes 48 personal interviews with university top leaders and executives from a range of leading research universities, as well as with government officials. An in-depth analysis of these interviews and other previously inaccessible materials yields remarkable findings. It reveals two salient factors framing the university–state interactions: the need and capacity to monitor, navigate and penetrate an opaque central power structure within the state bureaucracy and the regulatory environment of the higher education sector; and the contingencies that create strategic opportunities and/or major crises. When the central power structure and regulatory environment are rigid, taking advantage of or reacting to any contingencies becomes necessary for any effective actions. ‘Lobbying authoritarianism’ is the result of the hybrid nature of universities in China’s political system: they need autonomy to modernise their operations and gain international and domestic prestige while at the same time remaining dependent on the government’s ideology, financial control, and political will. Their strategic and contingent activism is unlikely to lead, singlehandedly, to any significant structural changes. Yet, through lobbying, these institutions have pushed policy boundaries and engineered incremental modifications to the system demonstrating a remarkable capacity to produce specific opportunities and influence individual decisions. Their lobbying strategies may also produce an enduring impact on policymaking, increasing officials’ reliance and acceptance of bottom-up inputs and facilitating a more inclusive and rational approach in the bureaucracy. These gradual steps may altogether lead to a more vibrant education sector, and ultimately, an evolution of the system and a more open society. This original work advances our understanding about the practices of lobbying authoritarianism and of university behaviour in this field. It also provides new insights and facilitates future research on the major phenomena of the changing role and nature of the central state and of the role and nature of the elite research universities in China. Keywords: policy, lobbying, policy influencing, lobby group, political strategies, research universities, higher education lobbying, higher education policy, Chinese governance, Chinese political system, Chinese state, state-society relations