Vietnam's evolving policy toward the South China Sea disputes, 1991-2011

Abstract

This thesis examines Vietnam's claims and policy toward the South China Sea between 1991 and 2011. It draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources to trace and account for continuity and changes in Vietnam's approach to the issue, with a particular focus on how Vietnam managed its relations with China. The study finds that in the post-Cold War period, Vietnam sought to preserve the status quo over the Paracels and Spratlys, and to advance its maritime interests using the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Though Vietnamese political elites agreed on these aims, they disagreed on the best way to handle the issue of China. The thesis argues that conservative leaders advocated a bandwagoning strategy, aiming to cultivate ties with China by coordinating foreign policy with China on the basis of ideology in return for China's protection and cooperation. On the other hand, nationalist pragmatists pushed for a hedging strategy, a dual track approach to engage China to induce its cooperation while bolstering Vietnam's relations with other major powers in order to discourage assertive actions. This difference caused Hanoi to oscillate between bandwagoning and hedging strategies to seek the best way to handle its China problem. As evidence presented in the thesis shows, the more assertive China became in its behaviour and in its language in relation to the South China Sea, the more Hanoi moved toward a hedging strategy to defend its interests. Show more