Exchange and environment : local officials and poverty alleviation policy in South India

Abstract

This thesis examines the local development officials’ implementation in Tamil Nadu of a rural poverty alleviation policy--the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP)--using resource exchange theory. Resource exchange has not been used previously in the context of local administration. I argue, however, that it offers a good explanation of the local administrator’s allocation of policy resources because it sees this allocation in terms of his political and socio-economic environment. The official’s environment in the community development block gives rise to many, sometimes conflicting, demands for the resources under his control (thus severely his time). He exchanges policy resources with the resource rich to satisfy as many of these demands as possible, and to gain valuable resources in return, such as help in implementing other policies. By exchanging resources the administrator more easily satisfies demands for resource allocations from politicians (who have some control over administrative transfers and promotions), and from senior administrators who want program targets achieved. Importantly, he also minimises the time he needs to spend with each policy. I argue that the current, "management-style" development policy and administration literature, which also reflects the attitudes of many senior administrators in India, is both a historical and a contextual. Its authors fail to explain the local official’s implementation of rural development policy, largely because they view him as acting either "pathologically" or "irrationally," rather than as responding as best he can to the most important demands arising from his environment. In terms of IRDP, which seeks to raise people’s incomes above the "poverty line" through subsidised loans for "productive assets," the block officials have of necessity ignored most of its time consuming rules of implementation. They have met IRDP’s targets by trading a large percentage of its resources to "loan brokers" who choose the program beneficiaries and complete program minutiae for the officials in exchange for other administratively-controlled resources. These brokers, many of whom have profited handsomely from IRDP, are little concerned with the poor beneficiaries’ welfare, and the latter have seldom benefited from taking ERDP loans.