Incentives for exports : a case study of Taiwan and Thailand
Abstract
Since the 1970s the contribution of exports to growth has become widely
recognized. Countries that followed 'outward-looking' development strategies have had
stronger economic growth and better income distribution than countries that followed
'inward-looking' development strategies.
Given a liberal trade regime, outward orientation will follow. Import-substituting
policies, in contrast, impose a tax on exports by increasing prices of inputs to production
(raw materials, intermediate goods and services, and machinery) above world market
prices and by bidding-up the prices of capital and labour. These increases in production
costs cannot be absorbed into higher prices in export industries competing in
international markets.
The elimination of trade-restricting policies would facilitate exports. But this
'fIrst-best' policy option is usually not regarded as possible on political grounds: groups
that benefit from protection are more concentrated and form stronger lobbies than the
more numerous but unorganized consumers who would benefit from trade liberalization.
Potential exporters are not known. Governments are more sensitive to the perceived
short-term cost of trade liberalization than to its long-term benefIts. Export incentives
are therefore frequently chosen as a 'second-best' option to offset the _ costs of import
substitution and thus make an economy more outward-looking.
This study attempts to measure the impact of export incentives on exports of
manufactured goods. To avoid the negative effects of high inflation and over-valued
exchange rates on export performance, Taiwan and Thailand where these effects were
limited, were chosen for case studies. Both economies have had low inflation and stable
real effective exchange rates since the 1960s. Both have attempted to offset the negative
effect of protection on exports with export incentives.The value of export incentives as a share of total exports is compared for Taiwan
In 1969 and Thailand in 1980. In these years the stages of development in the two
countries were similar. Protection offsets were the most important incentive for exports
in both countries. Protection offsets gradually became more effective over time. They
had a positive impact on the percentage change in the value of production and the value
of exports in Taiwan between 1969 and 1974, and on the percentage change in the value
of production in Thailand between 1980 and 1982.
But the statistical test also shows that protection offsets determine only a small
share of production and export growth. Production and export grow.th is largely
determined by other factors, notably productivity growth. The estimated positive effect
of protection offsets is statistically significant, but very small compared with the
benefits that would be expected to occur from the reduction or removal of import
restrictions.
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