General Katsura Taro and the Japanese Empire in East Asia, 1874-1913
Date
1989
Authors
Lone, Stewart
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Abstract
General Katsura Tarö was a key figure in the development of Japan’s first national army, acted as
colonial governor-general in Taiwan, developed what is now Takushoku University as a school for
Japanese overseas administrators and businessmen, and, as prime minister for most of the period
1901-1913, took his country to alliance with Britain, war with Russia, and finally annexation of Korea.
He was a political general who made the transition to full statesman. Ironically, however, on the point of
introducing his own political party, he was crippled by the public’s intolerance of continuing military
intrusion in Japanese politics.
This thesis borrows Katsura’s life in order to investigate the relationship between Japan’s army,
society, and empire in a period of extremely rapid change. The focus is on Japan’s overseas expansion,
viewed a a kind of "social imperialism"; that is, that the creation of a conscript army was intended to
regiment the people and prevent disorder, and that the employment of this army in overseas expansion
was further designed to maintain domestic economic progress and divert outwards potentially disruptive
social tensions.
It is argued, however, that the inherent weaknesses of imperialism, involving expanded military
force to defend overseas interests, heated competition between the army and navy for limited budgetary
resources, and rising international discord, ultimately exacerbated the domestic pressures such expansion
was intended to assuage, and that Katsura was unusual among army leaders in sufficiently perceiving this
concertina relationship to adopt a revised approach to foreign policy. He came to emphasise economic
development of overseas possessions over and above the military factor, and adopted a British-style
business attitude towards imperialism. This is evident in his establishment of the Oriental Development
Company in Korea, his willingness to consider joint American-Japanese development in Manchuria, his
frequent rejection of inflationary army expansion after 1905, and his assumption of the office of finance
minister in his own second cabinet (1908-1911).
This study examines Japan’s military and foreign policies in the Meiji period, giving particular
attention to China, Korea and Taiwan. It investigates the position of the army within Meiji society, and
the changing relationship between the army and nascent political parties after the introduction of
constitutional government in 1890. It also charts the rivalry between the Japanese army and navy, and
within the army itself. It suggests, in conclusion, that Katsura Tarö was something of the "adaptable general" posited, but not realised, by Clausewitz, a general capable of balancing military and political
requirements. However, this balance was ultimately impossible given the extraordinary stresses,
nationally and internationally, of the late imperial age, and a viable policy of "economics first" had to
wait on Japan’s utter military defeat in 1945.
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