Agreement Without Implementation: Military Bases and Alliance Tensions in Japan

Abstract

Why are some international agreements implemented while others fail? Why do some pass easily whereas others progress only slowly or cause great turmoil? In 2006, Tokyo and Washington signed an agreement to consolidate and realign US military facilities across Japan, with a major goal being to reduce alliance tensions in base-hosting communities in Japan. More than a decade later, efforts to implement this and related agreements have led to contrasting and, in some cases, quite unsatisfactory results. In Okinawa Prefecture, for example, tensions remain high and the agreement only partially implemented despite some successful land returns and unit transfers. By contrast, tensions rose briefly before falling again in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, which has seen an increase in the number of fighter aircraft at the facility it hosts.

To explain such differing outcomes, this dissertation shifts attention away from the agreements in question--the focus of much of the scholarly literature--and instead examines how alliance managers undertook the task of carrying them out. It focuses especially on how sub-national actors and their preferences have shaped the dynamics of implementation and so might account for this variation in outcomes. Using as a framework the concept of "preference incorporation," the core argument is that the manner in which alliance managers engaged with sub-national actors and incorporated or otherwise addressed their preferences is crucial to understanding why and how tensions rise and fall. Furthermore, it identifies positive and negative feedback loops as the key mechanism through which this occurs. By making this case, the dissertation not only contributes to a better understanding of the turbulent history of basing politics in Japan but also broadens our knowledge of how sub-national actors shape not only agreements the states make but also how such agreements are then actually implemented. Show more