The fifteen years' crisis, Iraq 1988-2003 : a study of foreign policy Elite norms as an analytical lens on decision-making

Abstract

Explanations of the foreign policy behaviour of the United States in respect of Iraq in 2003 overwhelmingly centre on what Kenneth Waltz referred to as the ‘first image' level of analysis. According to this reasoning, the George W. Bush Administration exhibited unique qualities that, if absent, would have avoided war. This conceptualisation of the events of 2003, however, fails to acknowledge the incremental and consistent development of Iraq as a perceived threat to US interests over an extended period. This research produces a revisionist qualitative analysis of events and policy decisions leading to conflict between Iraq and the United States in 2003 by analysing the attitudes of the US foreign policy elite towards Iraq and the policy settings that ensued. The result is a fresh interpretation of the US-Iraq relationship from 1988 to 2003 - one viewed through the prism of the intersubjective normative beliefs of the US foreign policy elite as well as material US interests. In 1988, Iraq represented a valuable, if somewhat unpredictable, relationship for the pursuit of US interests. The chemical attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja forced the Reagan Administration to revise its approach. The George H.W. Bush Administration maintained the Reagan policy approach of conditional engagement with Iraq until the external shock of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait - the event prompting a dramatic response from President Bush based largely on normative as well as material considerations. The Clinton Administration inherited an Iraq of limited sovereignty and effectively contained by sanctions and inspections; nevertheless, Saddam's recalcitrance and the collapse of international support for these measures resulted in US acceptance of the principle of regime change in Baghdad. Whereas the Clinton Administration avoided comprehensive action to secure Saddam’s removal from power, the terror attacks of September 2001 altered the weighting of the normative and material factors contributing to policy decisions regarding Iraq by the George W. Bush Administration. The research finds that the aggregate of the evolution of normative beliefs about the role, values and responsibilities of the United States in respect of Iraq, and two discrete arrangements of policy settings in this period - coercive disarmament of Iraq, and covert and overt duress on the Saddam Hussein regime - resulted in funnelled, pathdependent momentum toward invasion. Show more