A Defence of Moral Anti-Rationalism

Abstract

Morality can require us to make sacrifices. In extreme cases, it can demand that we sacrifice our happiness, our projects, our relationships and even our lives. In more mundane cases, it can forbid us from doing what we want to do. In either sort of case, we might ask: 'Why should I care about what morality demands? Why should I do what morality requires?' This thesis is a defence of moral anti-rationalism - the view that an agent can have sufficient reason, all things considered, to act immorally. I begin by setting the stage. Chapter One then discusses a particular kind of reason for action, which I call an excellence-based reason. Chapter Two and Chapter Three defend moral anti-rationalism. More specifically, I argue that both prudential reasons and excellence-based reasons can provide an agent with sufficient reason, all things considered, to act immorally. Chapter Two focuses on prudential reasons and Chapter Three focuses on excellence-based reasons. Chapter Four and Chapter Five respond to two arguments that have been given for moral rationalism - the view that, if an agent is morally required to perform an action, then they have decisive reason, all things considered, to perform that action. Chapter Four discusses what I call the blameworthiness defence of moral rationalism. Chapter Five concerns a claim that has motivated various philosophers to try to vindicate moral rationalism. This is that it would be bad if moral anti-rationalism were true, and that we have reason to hope that it is not. The arguments that I give in these chapters do not rely on my previous arguments for moral anti-rationalism. My aim is just to show that these particular arguments fail to vindicate moral rationalism.