Ties that unbind? Ethnic identity, social rules and electorial politics in Solomon Islands

Abstract

This is a study of ethnic identity and electoral politics in Solomon Islands. The study examines when and why Solomon Islanders vote ethnically in national elections, which ethnic identities are electorally important, and how ethnic voting is associated with broader features of the country's politics. The thesis makes use of regression analysis to show existing theories of ethnic identity and electoral politics do not fit the Solomon Islands case. It then uses electorate-level case studies to develop an alternative theory of ethnic voting. This theory is then tested with further quantitative work. The argument advanced in the thesis is that ethnic identities only play an important role in electoral politics in Solomon Islands when the groups associated with them are home to social rules (informal institutions) which enable effective electoral collective action. Such rules include: norms of obligation which may make co-ethnic candidates more likely to follow up on electoral promises; rules which enhance the loyalty of the brokers candidates use in their attempts to gain votes; and rules which enable key political actors to coordinate support behind favoured candidates. Importantly, rules have to be present within ethnic groups for ethnic voting to occur. Clans commonly possess such rules and so are often electorally important groups. Language groups do not typically possess such rules and so are rarely electorally important. In the case of churches, the presence of electorally useful social rules varies between denominations. Politics in Solomon Islands is strongly clientelist. Where voters are free to choose they typically vote for the candidate they think most likely to provide individualised or localised help. The ethnic voting which comes coupled with this does not involve blind loyalties but rather the calculations of voters and political actors. Social rules associated with ethnic identities play an important role in structuring these calculations but, except in rare instances where rules are very strong, they do not perfectly determine behaviour. As a result, other factors have a major impact on voters' choices: where they are free to choose, voters will vote for candidates who are not co-ethnics if given good cause to believe they will help. On the basis of these observations I argue clientelism, rather than ethnic voting, is the source of poor political governance in Solomon Islands. I also argue that, rather than ethnic diversity itself causing political fragmentation in Solomon Islands, the cause actually lies in the absence of larger entities (social or political movements) possessing anything analogous to the social rules found in some ethnic groups. Absent such rules, effective electoral collective action is difficult. And absent large-scale electoral collective action, clientelism appears inevitable.