So You Want to Publicly Shame: The Ethics of Public Shaming

Abstract

Public shaming is a powerful and widespread phenomenon. People use public shaming to punish racist behaviour, sexual misconduct, academic misconduct, dishonesty, inconsiderate public behaviour, violations of public health norms, and so on. But public shaming also inflicts severe harm on targets and their intimate relations, like their families and friends. In recent years, commentators and some philosophers have raised concerns regarding a number of ethical issues, like proportionality, standards of proof, and whether public shaming constitutes a form of objectionable vigilantism. In my thesis, "The Ethics of Public Shaming," I address some of these issues by developing an account of public shaming, what justifies it, and the rights and duties held by various individuals with respect to public shaming.

Because of the harm imposed by public shaming, human beings have rights against being publicly shamed. This is a key claim I defend in this project. Nevertheless, I also argue that some cases of public shaming can be justified by the contributors' need to defend certain vital interests. These interests include important constituents of wellbeing, like personal safety and autonomy, and contributors' interests in maintaining their moral standing within their communities - the subjective perception of their moral value within those communities. Public shaming is sometimes necessary to enforce norms which in turn safeguard these vital interests. As a result, public shaming can be justified, because it can be a form of collective self or other-defence. Drawing upon existing frameworks of justified self-defence, I go on to examine the conditions under which contributions to public shaming can be considered necessary, proportionate, and establish the relevant stakes for agents deliberating under conditions of uncertainty.