Intention & practical reasoning
| dc.contributor.author | Jardine, Brian Sinclair | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-09-18T04:50:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-09-18T04:50:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1965 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Introduction- problems of interpreting ordinary language. Anscombe and Aristotle. I. INTENTIQN & PRACTICAL REASONING What is he doing? In any given case there are many possible answers to this question. There are many possible descriptions of any action and none "the" simple or obvious answer. Did he do it intentionally? The answer to this question will end on which description is substituted for x. Someone may intentionally do something whi.ch is something else, and yet not do that other thing intentionally (though is something he does). External indications may help us answer the question in practice but do not explain why the answer should be what it is. There must be something which can tell us not only whether an action is intentional, but also under what description it is so. Knowing what one is doing: Knowledge seems likely to be involved in what performs this role… | en_AU |
| dc.identifier.other | b1649572x | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/10471 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_AU | en_AU |
| dc.title | Intention & practical reasoning | en_AU |
| dc.type | Thesis (PhD) | en_AU |
| dcterms.valid | 1965 | en_AU |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Australian National University | en_AU |
| local.description.notes | This thesis has been made available through exception 200AB to the Copyright Act. | en_AU |
| local.description.refereed | Yes | en_AU |
| local.identifier.doi | 10.25911/5d78d5197b583 | |
| local.identifier.proquest | Yes | |
| local.mintdoi | mint | |
| local.type.degree | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | en_AU |