Reputational risk and environmental performance auditing in the public sector : framing and overflows in the audit process

Abstract

This thesis examines environmental performance auditing and reputational risk in the public sector, through a study of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). Previous studies in the performance auditing literature and the environmental auditing literature have not examined the process which links audits to reputational risk for auditees. In addressing that gap, this thesis also investigates the ANAO's back-stage processes for performance auditing which are not well-documented in the public domain. Using the theoretical framework of framing (Goffman, 1974) and overflows (Callon, 1998), this thesis initially examines how environmental performance auditing is framed or understood by auditors and their various audiences. It uses five frames identified from the environmental auditing and performance auditing literature, namely an assistance frame, an improvement frame, a public interest frame, a risk management frame and a political frame. The thesis then investigates how framing disputes (overflows) generate reputational risk to government, particularly through public debate involving the media and political opposition. Finally the thesis reviews how reputational risk is managed by bureaucrats and government members of Parliament. This thesis studies general performance auditing processes within the ANAO and specifically examines the ANAO's performance audits of the Home Insulation Program (HIP) and the Green Loans Program. It analyses documents prepared by: the ANAO, including audit reports, better practice guides, annual reports, annual work programs and speeches by senior managers; Parliament, including the Hansard and reports of Parliamentary committees; and the media. It also employs semi-structured interviews with representatives from the ANAO, audited agencies, the media and the Parliament, including the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA). This thesis renders several significant conclusions. First, the roles performed by performance auditors are more fluid and complex than the structuralist classifications employed in ealier studies (Pollitt, 2003). Fluidity of auditors' roles and compatability between frames allows auditors to relate to different audiences through different frames. Second, the frame(s) emphasised by the Opposition and media underscore their role in a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. The alternative accounts of an audit produced by the Opposition and the media provide important counter-perspectives to the audit report prepared by auditors. Third, the ANAO's performance audits manage reputational risk to the government by proactively auditing progams which have been identified as carrying risks to service delivery. The iterative and transparent nature of the ANAO's relationship with audited agencies enables agencies to correct issues before the final audit report is released and this effectively diminishes reputational risk to government. Fourth, the ANAO's performance auditing framework evolves through historical decisions made by the Auditor-General. Those decisions become codified in the ANAO's documents and are subsequently used to train new auditors and shape their understanding of performance auditing. Finally, many performance audits are ignored by the general public, media and Parliament because they fail to address contentious issues. However, this may not trouble the ANAO since it is primarily concerned with improving performance in the public sector. Show more