China and North Viet Nam, 1963-1971

Abstract

This study examines Sino-North Viet Nam State and Party relations during the nine years 1963 to 1971# primarily in the context of the conflict in Viet Nam* The policy goals of the two states, and the means used or proposed to advance these goals, are considered. Chapter One introduces the study by considering somes aspects of relations between the states and Parties from 1954 to the eve of the period being considered in detail. Chapter Two (1963 to February 1965) considers the reactions to mounting political chaos in South Viet Nam, the growing optimism for a rapid and successful conclusion to the insurgency there, China's desire to reconvene the Geneva Conference after April 1964, reactions to the Tongking Gulf incidents, the first exfiltration of North Vietnamese armed forces to South Viet Nam, and the US response. Chapter Three (1965-1968) considers the relations between China and North Viet Nam during the period of sustained bombardment of the latter state. Chinese concern for its national security is considered; Chinese refusal to agree to "united action" with the USSR and objection to Vietnamese negotiations with the US are also analysed. Chapter Four (1968 to March 1970) considers the growing strains between Chinese and North Vietnamese goals, with the latter agreeing to meet with the US in Paris for talks concerning a peaceful solution to the conflict, Chinese insistence on protracted war, the conclusion of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and the beginnings of a more "moderate" PRC line in foreign affairs after the Ninth CPC Congress. Chapter Five (March 1970 to December 1971) considers some implications of the deposition of Sihanouk, the formal extension of fighting to all ^ countries of Indo-China, the establishment of an "Indo-Chinese United Front under Chinese auspices, and DRVN reaction to Chinese moves to normalize relations with the US. while reversing it China's former views on the conflict It is concluded that the People's Republic of China has consistently sought to enhance its own national interests, while paying little if any attention to North Vietnamese interests. The DRVN has sought to reconcile the CPC and the CPSU, and the conflict in Viet Nam has provided it with an opportunity to develop an independent policy line. For both China and the DRVN, national interests are a more fundamental basis for action than an avowedly common ideology.