Regressive Democracy: Explaining distributive politics in Myanmar’s political transition

Abstract

Classic theories of distributive politics contend that democracy encourages politicians to improve the economic standing of the ‘median voter’ through state-led redistribution. This dissertation explains how regressive distribution endures a transition from authoritarian to partial democratic rule. Existing research on regressive democracy largely focuses on formal constitutions and laws passed during earlier regimes which privilege the interests of economic elites and constrain state-led redistribution. Drawing from literature on the path dependency of private social welfare provision this mixed-methods interpretive study shows that informal institutions can pose separate but equally pernicious impediments to the redistributive possibilities of democracy. Using the case of Myanmar, the dissertation traces ideals and practices of private, non-state welfare and redistribution—informal institutions—from their origins in the post-socialist period to their entrenchment as democratic amid political transition.

The thesis charts how an elite consensus in favour of a low-taxing yet redistributive state generated during colonial rule has shaped Myanmar’s post-independence political trajectory. Informed by oral histories and archival work, it uncovers how junta officials in government-controlled areas outsourced state redistributive functions to commercial and community actors during the post-socialist period, often in exchange for business licences and tax remissions. This system, which I term ‘authoritarian welfare capitalism’, entrenched precarity and delivered the worst social outcomes in the region. Yet the ideals and practices of private redistribution generated during this period have been reinforced by political and economic elites amid the transition to partial civilian rule since 2011. Drawing on in-depth fieldwork in provincial Myanmar, it demonstrates that informal redistributive practices have practical and normative appeal to contemporary democratic elites. Social and political activists echo official National League for Democracy (NLD) rhetoric in describing private redistribution as an efficient and morally admirable means of achieving social outcomes. The ideal of charitable donations (dana) and ‘work for others’ (parahita) achieving social equity is then enlisted by government officials to justify withholding state aid from communities said to lack commitment to the ‘democratic’ virtue of ‘self-reliance’. ‘Rights’ become contingent upon competition for worthiness with other poor communities, creating a zero-sum game that exacerbates inequality and encourages the exclusion of minorities. Meanwhile, powerful tycoons are able to legitimise their past and ongoing expropriation of land and other assets and evade proper taxation by engaging in philanthropy, especially of public goods. The endurance of informal redistributive institutions generated in the post-socialist period thus entrenches the insecurity of ordinary people while depriving the state of the taxation revenue necessary to deliver more equitable welfare outcomes. Separate to the formal constraints of constitutions and laws, the endurance of informal redistributive institutions generated during earlier regimes can impose limits on the reforms imagined and desired by democratic-era elites, entrenching economic and social inequity at the heart of democratic practice.