An essay on memory, with particular reference to the role of imagery

Abstract

I commence this essay with the question - 'How is it that memory is in fact reliable?’ - because, as we all know, memory is, in general, reliable. My first question is therefore, 'Why should any problem arise at all?’, and the answer to this question - 'Because sometimes memory does let us down; our deceptive memories seem, on the face of things, to be in no way distinguishable from our correct ones. All memories have at least an initial authority. In Chapter I l list and consider the ways in which specific memories can fail us, and show that all these specific failures simply underline the general problem - no memory can ever be self-guaranteed; no single 'kind' of memory is wholly immune from error. I therefore put forward the suggestion - at this stage very tentatively - that error may arise, when it does, from the interpretation of our memories rather than from our 'actual remembering’. In Chapter II I show that all attempts to provide rigid definitions of memory must prove fruitless because we are in fact operating with two distinct criteria, neither of which we can reasonably abandon: the present 'memory-experience' and the past state of affairs. I therefore suggest a loose 'neo-ostensive' definition based upon three independent criteria, any one of which qualifies an instance for consideration as memory: (l) 'initial authority', the feeling of belief which accompanies (or forms part of) the thought; (2) the ability to perform in certain ways which are dependent upon a knowledge of past events or knowledge gained in the past; and (3) the factual truth (as supported by independent evidence) of what is claimed to be remembered* Whether the 'ultimate criterion' of memory is the present experience or the past states of affairs I leave an open question, and I turn my attention to the analysis of memory as defined in this loose 'neo-ostensive' way. Firstly I make a distinction between distinctions. I call those distinctions which apply to memory but are not peculiar to memory 'primary' and those distinctions which 'lie within' memory 'secondary', and I make the point, important for my subsequent argument, that the disposition/occurrence distinction is of the first (or primary) kind. In Chayjter III I consider the relationships between remembering events, remembering individuals, and remembering qualities of individuals. I attempt to show that these distinctions are dependent upon our points of interest rather than upon anything in the memories themselves; they are distinctions in what we are claiming to remember rather than in what or how we are remembering. I then consider the relationships between remembering propositions and remembering sentences, and the connection of these with the memory of events and of individuals. I go on to make the distinction, central to my subsequent argument, between remembering propositions and remembering in propositions. I raise the question - 'Can we remember without either images or words?' and argue that this must be possible. Finally, I consider the distinction between recognition and recall and conclude that recognition involves memory but is not strictly a form of memory. I suggest that to remember an event is something over and above remembering any number of propositions about that event. Therefore the question whether or not some event was remembered correctly cannot rest solely upon the accuracy of the claims made about that event.