The centrality of pork amidst weak institutions: Presidents and the persistence of particularism in Post-Marcos Philippines (1986-2016)

Abstract

Pork barrelling, the common term for targeted spending driven by electoral incentives, is practiced across many countries. Prior studies have focused on projects directed to constituencies whose support is critical for incumbent parties or politicians to secure electoral victory. Other studies have examined the demand side, arguing that the pork barrel results from the expectation of voters that politicians should 'bring home the bacon'. This dissertation departs from most previous studies by focusing on the motivations of the president, who in the Philippine context is the primary dispenser of pork barrel resources. Unlike most countries in the world, the practice of pork barrelling in the Philippines has been long and continuous. Starting from the early 1920s, when pork was distributed exclusively as a collective good, there has been significant evolution as well as variation in the components of the pork barrel, the modes by which it has been distributed and the motivations behind its deployment. At one level, this study provides a typology of the practice of pork barrelling as it has evolved over time: cursorily from 1922 until 1986, and, in greater depth, across five administrations from the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 through the end of the presidency of Benigno S. Aquino in 2015. It finds that congressional pork barrel involves very significant monetary resources in the Philippines, viewed in comparative terms, and a powerful means by which presidents (with their potent array of budget powers) can exert leverage over legislators. More surprisingly, however, the study reveals that congressional pork is generally the least substantial of three major types of pork--the other two of which are directly controlled and dispensed by presidents.

The study then proceeds to challenge major presumptions within the comparative politics literature. Matthew Shugart argues that in systems where a president is bestowed with strong constitutional powers, amidst weak parties and pervasive inequality, the Chief Executive can likely be expected to curb the particularistic orientation and pork-barrelling of other politicians, specifically legislators, and instead promote collective or national goals. This assertion does not explain the persistence of pork barrelling in the Philippines, where a constitutionally strong Philippine president employs very significant budgetary powers to distribute pork to members of the legislature. This enables them to build and sustain a coalition that is essential to push a legislative agenda and/or enhance prospects for political survival. Additional resources are disbursed to politicians at subnational levels, thus providing the president with additional means of exchanging favours with governors and mayors throughout the archipelago. Within the context of weak parties and a generally ineffective bureaucracy, they have often found the diverse mechanisms of pork barrel spending critical to achieving their goals. Contra Shugart, therefore, Philippine presidents lack strong incentives to curb particularism in favour of collective or national goals. Even more telling is just how they actually depend upon the dispensing of particularism as the most important part of their toolkit of presidential power. Show more