Corporate financial policy and taxation
Abstract
This thesis examines the role played by taxes on f i rm financing
decisions in a general equilibrium uncertainty setting.
The study isolates the conditions required for capital structure and
dividend policy irrelevance to the value of the corporate firm. These
conditions are relaxed to see how financial decisions are made. In the
process there is a review of past theories of optimal capital structure
choice, where most rely on leverage related costs. We present a model of
optimal firm financial policy that does not rely on leverage related
costs, but which is explained by incompleteness of securities markets .
In the presence of taxes which discriminate between securities and
investors, short-selling constraints will be required to rule out tax
arbitrage. These constraints, which may arise endogenously, will limit
the ability of investors to lever on personal account. Firm capital
structure choice then becomes a substitute for personal leverage, where
investor risk and tax preferences will matter to firm financial policy .
In subsequent chapters this analysis is used to examine two issues . The
first is to see how fully anticipated inflation rates affect t he
financing decisions of firms, and the second is to consider the role of
government ownership in firms, and in particular, the effects on
shareholders (taxpayers) of privatisation (private equity sale s) in
publicly owned firms.
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