A dominant party in a weak state : how the ruling party in Cambodia has managed to stay dominant

Abstract

Despite regular elections, political parties in some weak states have managed to stay in power for decades. Many scholars, in trying to explain such party dominance, have offered a variety of explanations, ranging from the ability of these parties to control the state, manipulate elections, and suppress opposition parties. The current literature is however limited in two aspects: (i) it tends to focus on one or a few of these factors and rarely takes a more systemic approach to see how they are inter-related, and (ii) analyses have been based on limited empirical data.

This study offers a framework called 'Party domination as a system' and a new set of empirical data on the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It suggests that party dominance in a weak state should be understood as a system of interactions that takes place among three groups of actors: (i) the dominating forces (the dominant party, the state and the elite); (ii) the countervailing forces (opposition parties and donors); and (iii) voters. To operationalize the framework, the study conducted extensive fieldwork to investigate four areas of the CPP's domination: (i) its control over the state budget; (ii) its rural administrative networks; (iii) its off-budget spending on rural infrastructure projects; and (iv) its management of decentralization.

Key to the CPP's dominance, the study found, has been its tight control over the state budget and the use of that control to accommodate elite and patronage interests. Reflecting the current fiscal centralization, elites at the central level have benefited most from such accommodation strategy. However, although there has been limited financial resources flowing down to the sub-national and local levels, the party still manages to put in place a very strong rural administrative network by ensuring its control over rural administrative domains (i.e. local authority) and traditional and religious domains (especially the pagodas).

Off-budget spending is the most fascinating finding. While the formal state budget is weak and unable to meet the people's demands, the CPP has devised a shadowy mechanism called the Party Working Group (PWG) and assigned key party officials to raise their own money to help build rural infrastructure throughout the country. Through the PWG, the CPP has been able to send repeated political messages about how this former communist party has become more pro-poor, supportive of Buddhism, and able to deliver rural development, something that the opposition parties have not been able to do. The survey conducted for this study confirms that this strategy has worked well, contributing to bigger electoral victory for the CPP.

The CPP has been cautious not only about popular legitimacy, but also its international reputation. In addition to holding regular elections and being able to substantially reduce violence during election time, the CPP-Ied government has responded to donor demands, by pushing for various institutional reforms. In doing that, however, it has been careful, learning not to let reforms undermine but strengthen its control and popular legitimacy. The findings about decentralization reform serve as evidence of how the party has done this.

The CPP's rise has been made easier by the quiescence of most Cambodian voters, who, through their experience of wars, have learnt they cannot demand much from the state. The weak and young oppositions in Cambodia leave voters with little choice other than the CPP. These oppositions, with their limited access to state resources and their vulnerability to the divide-and-rule strategies used by the CPP, are unlikely to pose any significant threat to the incumbent party in the near future.

This, however, does not give the CPP much room for complacency, for its continuous dominance will depend on its continuous adaptation. For instance, at least 40% of voters in the 2008 election did not vote for the party. In addition, from the next election on, about half of eligible voters will be those born after the Khmer Rouge, which means the Party will need to get ready to deal with a new kind of electorate who are more likely to demand more from the state and its leadership.

Reflecting on the case of the CPP, the 'Party domination as a system' framework is very useful, allowing the study to see that a party's dominance rests very much on its adaptive and learning capacity which in turns reflects its skill in strengthening its controls over the state and elite coalitions on the one hand, and strategically dealing with the countervailing force and voters on the other. In so doing, the party needs to constantly find a balance between control and legitimacy.

However, the framework alone is insufficient in generating new understanding about the underlying dynamics of dominant party politics. A good in-depth case study is also needed to generate new empirical data and contextual factors that shape a party's rise to dominance.