Kant on Rational Faith and Hope

Abstract

This study concerns Kant's account of the nature and norms of Belief (or faith - Glaube) and hope (Hoffnung). It aims to better understand the non-moral aspects of this account by drawing on his account of propositional attitudes. I argue that Kantian Belief is constitutive of, and thus necessary for, pursuing ideal moral and non-moral ends, while hope is psychologically necessary for maintaining our resolve in these pursuits, for most of us, most of the time. My interpretation extracts a plausible non-metaphysical example of doctrinal (or theoretical) Belief from Kant's writings, explains the general principles that underwrite the necessity of Belief and hope for pursuing certain ends, and explains the relationship between Belief and hope. Appreciating the non-moral aspects of Kantian Belief and hope involves embracing a theory of Kant's practical attitudes larger in scope than commentators have traditionally allowed. The result, however, is a rational account of our propositional attitudes, which more accurately captures the full range of our experience as ambitious, end-directed agents.