The nature of damages in contract
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Lawson, Richard Andrew Grenville
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Lord Justice Atkin once remarked that the law of damages
is 'a branch of the law on which one is less guided by authority
laying down definite principles than on almost any other matter
that one can consider'. When Professor Goodhart later made the
same complaint he wondered why this should be so, but concluded
that there were three fundamental reasons. First, the nature
of the subject matter is such as to make it impossible to elicit
a rule capable of doing absolute justice to all concerned. For
no plaintiff is fully compensated for the breach unless he
recovers for every item of loss which stems directly or indirectly,
foreseeably or unforeseeably, from the breach. And yet, argued
Goodhart, it would plainly be intolerable for any wrongdoer to be
saddled with such extremes of liability. Second, until the basic
theories of contract, or tort, are fully worked out, it will be
impossible to develop consistent principles in the la of damages,
which after all are only part of the major substantive body of
rules. Take tort, he says, and the debate as to whether fault is
or is not an essential ingredient of liability:
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