An Organisational Process Approach to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 2006 to 2016

Abstract

This thesis uses an organisational process model (OPM) under the framework of foreign policy analysis to examine China's foreign policy activities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan between 2006 and 2016. It contends that People's Republic of China (PRC) companies, financiers and government bureaucracies all have their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) which govern their behaviour in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

This study presents a comprehensive overview of PRC foreign policy actors in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It breaks down PRC foreign policy into economic and security components. In the economic sphere, Chinese firms have the strong financial backing of the state to undertake activities overseas and they are expected to support - or at least not oppose - the PRC's national interest. But as almost any economic activity overseas can be considered to be in the PRC's national interest, economic actors have significant autonomy in the running of their business activities. In the security sphere, because there are only a few actors and security policy is more sensitive, activities are more tightly controlled by the PRC central leadership.

This work counters structural realist arguments which are dominant in the academic literature on China in Central Asia. The realist argument is that nations are the primary actors in international relations and they behave according to national interest. In Central Asia, realist authors argue that China is developing economic links to build political influence and promote its security interests. This author agrees that is the intent of the PRC central leadership, however contends that there is an implementation cost, as economic actors filter vague directives from the centre through their own institutional lenses.

The realist argument assumes that the PRC's economic footprint in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has continued to grow. But between 2006 and 2016 several metrics indicated that China's economic engagement with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan started dropping. PRC loan disbursements to Tajikistan actually peaked back in 2008. In Kyrgyzstan, the last major loan announcement (as of as 2019) was in 2014, although disbursements continued after that. China-Kyrgyzstan and China-Tajikistan trade peaked in 2009 and 2014 respectively.

The gap between promise and delivery suggests constraints on PRC activities in the region. The implication is that a structural realist approach to China in Central Asia cannot explain everything.

Recipient states have agency too. Many of the projects funded by Chinese banks have long been proposed by recipient states. Concern over debt in Kyrgyzstan makes new loans politically very difficult. Both states have control over import tariff regimes, which in the period between 2006 and 2016 had significant impact on the flows of Chinese re-exports through Central Asia.

This thesis argues that many of the key economic decisions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are a function of the PRC actors' SOPs and the interests of recipient states (and their officials). This is a recipe for corruption, opacity and poor investment decisions. PRC investment in both countries has been undertaken by a small number of PRC companies seeking to escape difficult conditions in China. Chinese companies can get discounted government financing to invest almost anywhere in the world. An incredibly small number of those chose Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of lack of competition and host government sweeteners such as tax breaks in certain industries.

Empirically, this thesis draws on wide range of Chinese and Russian language material not previously used in major academic publications. This is in addition to extensive interviews and site visits conducted in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is designed to give a comprehensive view of the interactions between the host nation governments and Chinese foreign policy actors. Show more