The United States and Iraq: Limited Influence in an Asymmetrical Relationship, 2005-2014

Abstract

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and its corresponding nation building project are commonly perceived as colossal failures for the United States. Between 2003 and 2014, the United States attempted to establish a democratic and stable Iraq that would be aligned to the United States and support its interests in the Middle East. Although there are multiple explanations for the failure of these goals, this thesis addresses one component that is widely absent in scholarly literature: the relationship between the United States and Iraq's former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Throughout his tenure, Maliki weakened Iraq's democratic institutions and fuelled sectarianism, which destabilised Iraq, frustrated U.S. objectives, and laid the foundations for the successful invasion of the so-called Islamic State in 2014.

This thesis seeks to answer two questions. First, why did Prime Minister Maliki undermine U.S. goals in Iraq? Second, why were the Bush and Obama administrations unable to influence Maliki to change his behaviour to suit their preferences? The latter question is important to explore given the preponderance of American power in the relationship and Iraq's dependence on U.S. economic and military aid. However, the United States struggled to transform this power and dependency into influence over Maliki to achieve its desired objectives. The thesis examines the first question by employing the domestic level of analysis to demonstrate how Iraq's political groups, especially a coalition of Shia entities, conditioned Maliki's preferences such that they contradicted U.S. objectives. To answer the second question , the thesis employs Richard Emerson's theory of Power-Dependence Relations to explain why U.S. power did not translate into influence.

The thesis draws extensively on recently available primary material. Although the existing literature is substantive, this primary material generates new insight into the Bush and Obama administrations' perceptions on Maliki, his political landscape, and their mitigating strategies. The thesis is structured, in addition to the opening Introduction and closing Conclusion, into seven substantive chapters: Chapter I elaborates the conceptual framework, and Chapters II-VII chronologically follow, and analytically interrogate, the American Iraqi intervention from pre-war planning to the end of the Maliki premiership. Show more