Indochina as a security concern of the Asean states
Abstract
From 1975 to 1981 the governments of the ASEAN states claimed
that changes in their regional strategic environment, resulting from
thee seizure of power by communist regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos, and from Vietnam's subsequent invasion and occupation of
Cambodia, seriously threatened the security of their countries.
Objectively, the most serious threat that the ASEAN states faced
as a result of the 1975 communist victories in Indochina was the
implicit challenge posed to the somewhat fragile political, social,
and economic status quo in non-communist Southeast Asia by the
emergence of this radical new political order and, potentially an
alternative developmental model, in Indochina. But the ASEAN
governments did not wish to highlight their own countries' political,
social and economic weaknesses, and for this reason did not emphasize
this type of threat. They did, however, claim that Vietnam presented
a direct military threat to the region, especially after the 1978
invasion of Cambodia. After 1978, the ASEAN governments also
expressed concern about the implications for their countries' security
of Hanoi's increasingly close military relationship with the Soviet
Union. Successive administrations in Bangkok accused the Indochinese
communist regimes of supporting revolutionary movements in Thailand,
particularly in the northeast. All ASEAN governments claimed that the
flow of refugees from Indochina after the 1975 communist victories,
and particularly in 1978-79, threatened security, especially in terms
off the possible impact on socioeconomic stability in countries
granting 'first asylum'. The ASEAN governments' declarations regarding their security
concerns did not always reflect objective threat assessments, often
exaggerating and misrepresenting the dangers posed by developments in
Indochina. To some extent this may be explained by the distorting
influence on policy-makers' perceptions of an array of 'background
factors', including the region's internal and external historical
international relationships, the foreign policies of the Indochinese
States after 1975, the policies of major extra-regional powers, and
domestic political and socioeconomic problems in the ASEAN states.
But there is also substantial evidence that some of the ASEAN
governments - - or at least factions within them - - purposely
manipulated various security threats related to Indochina, to fulfil
their own domestic and international political objectives.
From 1975 to 1978, the ASEAN governments were broadly successful
in containing and managing their security concerns with Indochina,
although this success was not due only to their skilful diplomacy.
Despite frequently declared hostility towards ASEAN and its members,
the communist Indochinese regimes displayed willingness to cooperate
with non-communist Southeast Asia in order to facilitate post-war
reconstruction. The ASEAN states' 'success' in managing their
security concerns with Indochina was reinforced by the willingness of
all parties to the intra-communist dispute, which broke out in
Indochina in 1977-78, to seek more harmonious relationships with
non-communist Southeast Asia. Moreover, it became increasingly clear
that Indochinese communism would not, in the foreseeable future,
present citizens of the ASEAN states with an attractive alternative
political and developmental model.However, the higher profile which the ASEAN governments adopted
in managing their security concerns with Indochina after the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia may have been, on balance,
counter-productive in terms of their countries' security, both in
relaxation to Indochina and more generally. In particular, the
Cambodian stalemate, to which ASEAN's policy contributed, was
detrimental to the security of the Association's members in a number
of ways, as the involvement of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia
intensified, the division between communist and non-communist
Southeast Asia hardened, ASEAN's cohesion was strained, and the ASEAN
governments' increased their defence expenditures in contrast with
their earlier emphasis on achieving security through economic and
social development.
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