Common ends, divergent means: US and Austalian responses to proliferation (chemical, biological, missile)

Abstract

Western governments have focused increasing attention over the past decade on combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated means of delivery. However, there has been relatively little scholarly examination of their individual anti-proliferation strategies, and virtually no meaningful attempt at comparison. The extant literature on proliferation therefore fails to illuminate the national preferences among influential supplier states that presumably have shaped international efforts to curb proliferation. This gap in knowledge fosters assumptions about the 'likemindedness' of Western responses to proliferation that essentially remain untested. This dissertation promotes and contributes to a nascent research agenda focusing on responses to proliferation at the national level by comprehensively examining the policies of two pivotal members of the Western anti-proliferation coalition. It addresses the central questions of how and why two close strategic allies and dedicated anti-proliferation partners might disagree on the means by which to achieve common anti-proliferation goals. The study constructs an original analytic framework by which to categorise and examine national responses to proliferation. It then utilises this framework as the basis for discrete empirical investigations of the anti-proliferation policies of the United States and Australia since the mid-1980s in the areas of chemical weapons (CW), biological weapons (BW), and missiles. Using a structured, comparative case studies methodology, it yields comprehensive comparative findings and analysis. The study's major comparative finding is that the United States and Australia have favoured markedly different, and not entirely complementary, anti-proliferation approaches. This divergence has been consistent over time and across the various proliferation areas. Its comparative analysis then infers that, because the likely explanations for this finding include causal variables that also distinguish other key supplier states - e.g. differences in the perceived geopolitical threats posed by proliferation - similar national divergence almost certainly extends to other Western governments. This in turn suggests that the superficial appearance of Western unanimity in responding to proliferation is misleading. The study concludes by suggesting that significant fissures among the national policy preferences of Western supplier states has negative implications for their ability to advance common anti-proliferation goals effectively.