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Rorty on Knowledge and Reality

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dc.contributor.authorDavis, Michael James
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-22T01:24:58Z
dc.date.available2021-11-22T01:24:58Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.description.abstractThe thesis identifies two strands in Rorty’s philosophy. One is an orientation towards practice in opposition to the traditional philosophical emphasis on theoretical knowledge. The other is Rorty’s anti-representationalist conception of knowledge. Rorty argues that these strands are mutually supporting, while the author argues they are incompatible. The nominal aim of Rorty’s anti-representationalism is to overcome many traditional dualisms of theoretical philosophy, such as subject and object, mind and world, and theory and practice. The thesis argues that anti-representationalism does not and cannot achieve this aim, since what is required to overcome these dualisms is the recognition of the practical basis of knowledge, with which anti-representationalism is incompatible. The author agrees with much of Rorty’s critique of foundationalist epistemology, but argues in opposition to Rorty that anti-representationalism does not follow necessarily from this critique. Where Rorty locates the error of traditional epistemology in the very notion that knowledge and language can represent the world, the author argues that this idea is benign. The fundamental problem is the desire to anchor our conceptual scheme to an external structure independently of human practice — but this idea can be rejected without abandoning the notion of representation. The thesis also looks to explain why Rorty takes anti-representationalism to follow naturally from a rejection of foundationalism. The motivation is located in Rorty’s fundamental metaphysical orientation, which is naturalistic. Anti-representationalism is the product of the wish to promote a naturalistic worldview without succumbing to scientism. In this way Rorty hopes to unite the manifest and scientific images of man. The author argues that this cannot be done from within a naturalistic metaphysics.en_AU
dc.identifier.otherb47392502
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/251915
dc.language.isoenen_AU
dc.subjectRortyen_AU
dc.subjectpragmatismen_AU
dc.subjectPeirceen_AU
dc.subjectWittgensteinen_AU
dc.subjectepistemologyen_AU
dc.subjectmetaphysicsen_AU
dc.subjectmetaphilosophyen_AU
dc.subjectphilosophy of languageen_AU
dc.subjecthistory of philosophyen_AU
dc.subjectanalytic philosophyen_AU
dc.subject20th century philosophyen_AU
dc.subjectconceptual changeen_AU
dc.subjectperceptionen_AU
dc.subjectjustificationen_AU
dc.subjectinterpretationen_AU
dc.subjectrepresentationalismen_AU
dc.subjectanti-representationalismen_AU
dc.subjectfoundationalismen_AU
dc.subjectSellarsen_AU
dc.subjectQuineen_AU
dc.titleRorty on Knowledge and Realityen_AU
dc.typeThesis (PhD)en_AU
dcterms.valid2005en_AU
local.contributor.affiliationDepartment of Philosophy, School of Humanities, The Australian National Universityen_AU
local.contributor.authoremailmdavis.colombia@gmail.comen_AU
local.contributor.authoruidu9704519
local.contributor.supervisorShearmur, Jeremy
local.contributor.supervisorcontactjeremy.shearmur@anu.edu.auen_AU
local.description.notesDeposited by Author 20.11.2021en_AU
local.identifier.doi10.25911/EHVJ-KF41
local.identifier.proquestno
local.mintdoiminten_AU
local.type.degreeDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)en_AU

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