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Opportunistic Repression: Managing Anti-State Dissent in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

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Berger, Dominic

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Since the collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, the Indonesian state has faced a great variety anti-state dissent, including violent secessionist insurgencies, urban mass movements, and symbolic, non-violent provocateurs. Within the new normative, institutional and political confines of the post-authoritarian polity, state officials have struggled to decide which manifestations to repress and which to tolerate. By tracing the complex processes though which dissidents become either embraced by the state, or, alternatively, the target of repression, this thesis identifies a counter-intuitive pattern: state institutions in contemporary Indonesia are inclined to target weak manifestations of dissent, while tolerating, co-opting or absorbing strong manifestations of anti-state movements. The thesis finds that this pattern, which it calls opportunistic repression, holds within three broad categories, namely Islamist, secessionist and Leftist dissent. Drawing from the literature on state-building, repression studies and securitisation theory, the thesis constructs a framework of analysis that grapples with the dynamic interplay between objectively real and subjectively constructed threats. It argues that behind seemingly warped threat perceptions and lopsided target selection lie rational political calculations: repressing symbolic dissent allows political elites to demonstrate nationalist credentials to their voters and create the appearance of an ideologically coherent and dominant state. At the same time, opportunistic target selection helps to avoid politically and materially costly confrontations with powerful challengers. The thesis thus finds that in some conditions, democratisation perversely incentivises opportunistic repression against some dissidents.

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2029-10-18