Rational intention, rational action

Abstract

Sometimes, the intentions most promoting one's interests might result in the performance of actions not most promoting one's interests. For example, being the sort of person who intends to keep promises might most promote one's interests - since then others would be more inclined to enter into beneficial agreements with one - even though some of the resulting actions of promise-keeping do not most promote one's interests. A plausible view about the nature of rationality is that the rational intentions for an agent to have are those which most promote their interests, but what are we to say when such intentions result in the performance of actions not most promoting their interests? On the one hand, some say that since such actions are the result of intentions it is plausibly rational to have, then they too must be rational: on this view of the matter, if it is rational to have or to adopt a certain intention, then it is always rational to act upon it. On the other hand, others say that since such actions do not most promote the agent's interests, then they must be irrational: on this view of the matter, since the rational intentions are those which most promote the agent's interests, then surely the rational actions must also always be those most promoting the agent's interests. What, then, is the relation between the rationality of intention and that of action? Addressing this issue is the task for this thesis. Show more