Federal conciliation and arbitration in Australia 1967-1981

Abstract

This thesis examines major developments in the determination of wages and conditions by the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission between 1967 and 1981. A theoretical framework based on contemporary Marxist theories of the state is used to analyse changes in the Commission's decision-making strategies. It is argued that the Commission's activities are limited by the conditions of existence of different policy forms. These limits are explained in terms of the contradictions encountered by state apparatuses in capitalist social formations. The major contradiction is derived from the conflict betweenthe reproduction of private accumulation and capitalist relations, and the maintenance of the legitimacy of existing political and economic relations. The theoretical framework suggests that state apparatuses which are central to class struggle in capitalist social formations will be characterised by inconsistent, opportunistic policies. While seeking to pursue policies which maintain conditions favourable to capital accumulation, state apparatuses at times take actions in response to struggles between capital and labour or within classes which are injurious to or.e or more parties, who may seek remedies which contradict the original action. It is argued that this theoretical framework provides considerable insight into the long term development of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. Although the Commission pursued an overall policy of wage restraint, its high degree of internal autonomy allowed rapid escalation to occur in response to industrial action by key sectors of the subordinate classes. The Commission sought to maintain considerable flexibility in order to deal with the incompatible demands made by trade unions, private employers and governments, and discouraged attempts to limit its options. It is shown that seeking to manage class conflict, the Commission is prepared to contravene its own decisions, and that when the Commission works within rigidly defined principles, its effectiveness is reduced. A detailed analysis is made of both national and industry decisions in order to trace the development of policy through the different "tiers" of wage fixation. Special attention is given to the relationship between the Commission and the federal government, in order to demonstrate the operation of contradictions within the state. It is concluded that although the state seeks to manage class conflicts in order to maintain capitalist social relations, it does not invariably act in favour of capital in specific conflicts, and that inconsistent actions are a regular, normal aspect of state activities. Show more