Indonesian civil-military relations : the armed Forces and political Islam in transition, 1997-2004

Abstract

This thesis discusses the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. It argues that despite wide-ranging changes to Indonesia's political system, the .armed forces continue to play a significant role in politics and society. Beside the opposition of the officer corps to substantial military reform, this study points to divisions within Indonesia's civilian elite as a major factor behind the stagnation in the current civil-military transition. In order to explain Indonesia's problems in establishing democratic control over its armed forces, the thesis focuses oil deeply entrenched socio-political structures, the character of the 1998 regime change and difficulties in the process of democratic consolidation. The analysis of these three areas makes it possible to locate Indonesia's position in comparative schemes of post-authoritarian civil-military-relations. Discussing the historical legacy of military politics in Indonesia, the study exposes important structural and ideological features of the involvement of the armed forces in politics. Structurally, the territorial command. structure and the practice of self-financing have nurtured a sense of institutional autonomy in the military that post-1998 governments found difficult to overturn. Ideologically, the feeling of entitlement to political supremacy, fed by highly derogatory views on civilian leadership qualities, has survived the fall of Soeharto and continues to shape the political mindset of the officer corps. On the civilian side, long-standing divisions between major societal constituencies have hampered the development of strong political institutions and have offered. the armed forces opportunities for intervention. This thesis discusses the cleavages within Indonesia's Muslim community, particularly between traditionalist and modernist groups, as one of the most important sources of conflict in the civilian realm. The 1998 regime change also posed significant challenges to the civil-military reform process. Moderate military officers succeeded in negotiating an orderly transfer of power from Soeharto to his deputy, avoiding the complete breakdown of the authoritarian system. Consequently; residual elements of the New Order were able to extend their influence into the post-Soeharto polity and slow down initiatives for reform. The regime change also highlighted the inability of the oppositional civilian elite to seize upon the opportunities presented by Soeharto's demise. Deeply divided and anxious not to alienate Soeharto, key civilian leaders failed to present a democratic alternative to the faltering regime. When the government finally collapsed, the non-regime elite found itself excluded from executive and legislative institutions for the first 18 months of the post-Soeharto era. The conflict between Indonesia's largest socio-political groups continued throughout the post-authoritarian transition, allowing the armed forces to repair their image damaged in decades of repressive rule under the New Order. The constitutional crisis of 2001, during which conflicts between the executive and the legislature paralysed political life, led to a surge in the reputation of the armed forces in society and the elite. Subsequently, retired officers emerged as influential actors in party politics and regional as well as national elections. Ultimately, the rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in 2004 completed the successful adaptation of Indonesia's armed forces and their personnel to the new democratic framework.