Shakespeare's Fortune: how copyright has failed authors and why it matters

Abstract

A key policy rationale for the system of copyright is to give authors an incentive to create new works. But what if actual financial returns to authors were very poor — so poor that no rational agent could be expected to respond to the incentive? In this thesis I present data from a large sample of Australian films showing that returns are consistently poor even for ‘hit’ films. Data from other countries confirms the finding and there is evidence that returns from other forms of copyright asset such as literary works are also poor. The thesis explores how this situation can have persisted for so longwithout the system breaking down or eliciting strong protests from authors. Drawing on a survey of Australian film producers, I confirm anecdotal evidence that authors are driven by non-financial considerations as well as financial incentives. The Hollywood studios have evolved sophisticated business practices that take advantage of these non-financial motivations. In this they are following the example of London’s booksellers of the early 18th century. Does it matter that authors earn low returns from their copyright assets? Iidentify two classes of author for whom poor returns present a real obstacle to authoring — authors whose work requires independence (such as dissidents) and authors who do not have access to patronage or other forms of subsidy to offset the poor returns from copyright (such as authors from the ‘third world’). Finally, I consider possible reforms to copyright that might improve returns to authors and examine the public policy case for pursuing these reforms. Show more