Respect for difference : the possibilities of pluralism

Abstract

This thesis develops a pluralist politics founded on a discursive ethics of respect for difference, in the context of a response to the liberal-communitarian debate. Drawing on and responding to the work of Iris Marion Young, Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas, Michael Walzer and Richard Rorty, I combine a communitarian concern for the embeddedness of persons in social groups with a liberal recognition of the many different groups within which we find ourselves. Chapter 1 analyses the liberal-communitarian debate as consisting of a political debate (about institutions) and a philosophical debate (about the nature of the foundations of arguments about justice). A proper understanding of these debates opens up space for a pluralist politics with communitarian foundations but without the institutionally illiberal consequences often associated with communitarianism. Chapter 2 draws upon recent feminist and communitarian discussions to give an account of human identity as constructed through membership of many crosscutting social groups defined by difference. A concern for our situatedness need not lead to a communitarian politics as ordinarily understood, since our commitments may arise out of our membership of any number of different social groups and not just the ethnic or national communities that have been the primary focus of the liberal-communitarian debate. Chapter 3 engages with the work of contemporary liberal theorists on the significance of cultural difference. I argue that the relation between culture and liberty is much stronger than liberals have generally allowed. I conclude that liberal arguments fail in the face of a proper account of the relation between our particular commitments and the liberties we have reason to prefer. A liberal politics can never be more than a pragmatic solution to the problems of social life in a world filled with competing conceptions of the good. Chapter 4 addresses the accusation of relativism often levelled against communitarian views. I argue that liberals have greatly exaggerated the negative consequences of adopting a communitarian position and the benefits of a liberal one. The question remains, however, why we should continue to engage in argument in the absence of impartial reasons available to all rational persons. I suggest that alternative foundations for an ethical politics may be found in the respect with which the philosophical communitarian may respond when confronted by disagreement. Chapter 5 investigates and expands upon the nature of this respect, which I characterise as a dialogical attitude of sensitivity towards the specificity of the other. I argue that while the consequences of such respect cannot be determined outside of the context of a particular ethical encounter, a general description is possible by drawing on its role in arguments about justice across difference. I develop such a description and argue that this respect is best understood as a relation between different social groups. Finally, I sketch an outline of a social order in which disputes about justice are settled by argument under conditions of "respect for difference". The result is a form of context-sensitive pluralism that would provide a multiplicity of heterogenous public spheres in which individuals are able to express and maintain different aspects of their identity. Show more