Compliance and defiance in patron-client state relationships: a case study of Pakistan’s relationship with the united states, 1947-2013

Abstract

By employing the theoretical construct of patron-client state relationships, this thesis conducts a historical analysis of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States from Pakistan’s independence in 1947 to its first successful transition from one elected government to another in 2013. Specifically, the thesis places particular emphasis on two conflicts with global implications in which the United States and Pakistan were closely aligned with each other: the covert war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989) and the ongoing war in Afghanistan since 2001 against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Throughout these two periods, the US provided billions of dollars in military and economic assistance to Pakistan in exchange for services deemed essential for the attainment of America’s vital strategic and national security objectives. On both occasions, the client regime benefited from considerable latitude provided by the patron to pursue domestic and foreign policies aimed at consolidating its own hold on power and protecting what were regarded as fundamental national interests but not necessarily serving the avowed objectives of its patron. The US-Pakistan case study serves to highlight a fundamental contradiction that can characterise strategically driven patron-client state relationships. Instead of making the client more susceptible to the patron’s influence, increased assistance by the patron can actually make the client less likely to comply with the patron’s demands. This is especially true of relationships in which the patron regards the client’s cooperation as vitally important for the attainment of the patron’s core security interests. Paradoxically for the patron, the assistance that it provides to a strategically important client can end up undermining the very reasons that led to the provision of such assistance in the first place. Chief amongst those reasons are ensuring the client’s compliance and maintaining its internal stability. At the same time, as long as the patron’s own strategic interests necessitate a degree of client cooperation, it will find itself compelled to keep the relationship going, thereby giving the client continued room to deviate from the patron’s script to an extent where it can pursue its own national interests with relative impunity, confident in the knowledge that while its defiance might lead to occasional tensions with the patron, its continuing strategic importance will prevent a complete rupture and the consequent termination of material assistance. Show more