The Republican Dilemma: Liberating Republicanism, Sacrificing Pluralism

Abstract

Republican freedom is clearly different from pure negative freedom. While the former is the absence of domination - that is, the robust absence of interference you have not yourself instructed - the latter is the absence of any interference, or prevention. However, Ian Carter argues for the 'equivalent-judgments thesis', according to which these differences are irrelevant when it comes to judging how free a person is or how to promote freedom in a society. In my dissertation, I explore the differences between the two freedom concepts and consider whether Carter's equivalent-judgments thesis holds. I show that it does hold with respect to Philip Pettit's conception of republican freedom, since promoting its required level of protection against uninstructed interference is to simultaneously promote pure negative freedom. I further explore how republicans can conceptualise their freedom ideal to avoid the equivalent-judgments thesis. I show why the only possible strategy for 'liberating' republican freedom from pure negative freedom is to reduce the scope of freedom - that is, making it compatible with a wider range of interference - as that will enable republicans to make their freedom ideal require a more robust protection against interference not within this range. This robustness is measured in terms of possible worlds in which the free person enjoys the absence of such interference. By treating interference not as a source of unfreedom insofar as it makes citizens committed to protecting the remaining scope of freedom, republicans can reduce the scope of freedom for the sake of its robustness beyond what is compatible with the promotion of pure negative freedom. The problem with this move is that promoting republican freedom then involves preference-shaping to a greater extent than is compatible with the plurality of ways of life characterising modern society. Republicans therefore face a dilemma: either allow for pluralism and promote pure negative freedom or maintain a distinctly republican freedom ideal that undermines pluralism and seems unappealing under current circumstances. Although this illiberal freedom ideal appears unsuited for guiding actual political decision-making, I show how republicans can nonetheless use it a basis for evaluating modern society and for criticising citizens' lack of political engagement.