Supererogation : definitions, features and characteristics
Abstract
The object of this thesis is to determine if and how it makes sense to exceed
one's duty or to perform acts above or beyond what one is required to do as
matters of duty. In philosophical terms therefore, this thesis will study the
definitions, features and characteristics of supererogation.
In the president's address to the 1984 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Kai Nielsen reviewed the main trends of post-war philosophical inquiry from Wittgenstein onwards and concluded that
philosophical studies were justifiable; (a) if they were "tolerably clear," (b)
if there were good grounds for believing them, and (c) if true, whether they
are important, "particularly for giving us a grip on who we are, were and who
we are to become" (Nielsen, 1985, p.lO).
The issue addressed in this thesis is whether the concept of supererogation,
as it is used in contemporary philosophical discussion is a valid one, and
whether it has any importance for our life in the world as moral agents. Part
One of this thesis puts forward a "tolerably clear" account of what is meant by
supererogation by explaining how philosophers have traditionally dealt with
the issue and how it has been debated and researched in recent years. The
variety of reasons advanced by philosophers who advocate its relevance, utility
and significance to ethical theory will be examined and the importance of the
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties to the question of supererogation will be studied. It will be shown that supererogation is compatible with neo-Aristotelianism, modern Christian theology and contemporary contract theory. Part Two analyses arguments for the case
against supererogation as held by Kant and most utilitarians. In Part Three the
impact of supererogation upon the classification of moral actions is reviewed.
In addition, it is shown how supererogation can be correctly positioned in
political contexts. Part Three concludes with a reassessment of definitional
issues identified in Part One. The purpose of this thesis is to show that
supererogation is possible and meaningful as a classification of moral acts but
that the definitions of it as proposed by supererogationist writers need improvements.
It should be noted from the outset that the study of supererogation has been neglected by modem philosophy for some time, but was recently revived, primarily by Urmson's article on "Saints and Heroes" which appeared in 1958. Since then, an active discussion has taken place in the literature, as proponents of supererogation attempt to carry their case over the objections of many other philosophers, principally utilitarians and defenders of the Kantian tradition. Because the issues discussed in this thesis remain under continuing study by philosophers of many different traditions, it must be admitted that the present work represents an attempt to arrest for the purposes of description, definition and analysis a broadening current of thought which is currently under active
development.
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