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One size fits all? Tailoring retirement plan defaults

Butt, Adam; Donald, M. Scott; Foster, F. Douglas; Thorp, Susan; Warren, Geoffrey J.

Description

Default investment options in retirement plans are a potent influence on member choice, however little is known about how plans set them. We investigate how retirement plan providers choose default investment strategies for passive members. We interview plan executives and survey members during a review of default settings in 2013-14 prompted by a change in the regulation of the Australian retirement system. Passive plan members are different from active members in ways that matter for...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorButt, Adam
dc.contributor.authorDonald, M. Scott
dc.contributor.authorFoster, F. Douglas
dc.contributor.authorThorp, Susan
dc.contributor.authorWarren, Geoffrey J.
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-11T03:35:15Z
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/139173
dc.description.abstractDefault investment options in retirement plans are a potent influence on member choice, however little is known about how plans set them. We investigate how retirement plan providers choose default investment strategies for passive members. We interview plan executives and survey members during a review of default settings in 2013-14 prompted by a change in the regulation of the Australian retirement system. Passive plan members are different from active members in ways that matter for investment strategy. Passive members are less willing to take financial risks; they are also younger, less wealthy and more often female. Executives say they design defaults with passive members in mind, but they seem to overlook some key factors. For example, plan executives set high risk exposure in default investment strategies. Executives also assume motivations for defaulting that do not match those reported by members. Most plan executives think of passive members as uninterested in their retirement savings but passive members say they trust their plans, and lack skill rather than interest. The heterogeneity, trust and low skill of passive members make opting out of the default less likely and smart defaults more appealing.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis research was jointly funded by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation, the Australian National University, the University of Technology Sydney and UNSW Australia under CIFR Project T004. The Centre for International Finance and Regulation is funded by the Commonwealth and NSW Governments, and supported by other Consortium members.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rights© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
dc.sourceJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.subjectPensions
dc.subjectDefault
dc.subjectFinancial services
dc.subjectRegulation
dc.titleOne size fits all? Tailoring retirement plan defaults
dc.typeJournal article
local.identifier.citationvolume145
dc.date.issued2018
local.identifier.ariespublicationu6048437xPUB525
local.publisher.urlhttps://www.elsevier.com/
local.type.statusAccepted Version
local.contributor.affiliationButt, A., College of Business and Economics, The Australian National University
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage546
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage566
local.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.022
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.provenancehttp://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0167-2681/..."Author's post-print on open access repository after an embargo period of between 12 months and 48 months" from SHERPA/RoMEO site (as at 11/01/18).
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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