Exit and voice: papers from a revisionist public choice perspective
Date
2014
Authors
Taylor, Brad
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Abstract
This thesis by papers uses rational choice theory to consider the relative
performance of individual exit and collective voice in politics, as well as the causal
relationships between exit and voice as individual strategies and institutionalised
means of controlling government behaviour. Following the methodological
approach of Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, the papers of this thesis are
examples of ‘revisionist public choice theory,’ retaining the broad framework of
rational choice while relaxing one or more of the standard assumptions generally
made by economists. In particular, the papers of this thesis consider otherregarding
preferences, non-instrumental preferences, dispositional choice,
epistemic rationality, non-efficiency evaluative standards, and non-equilibrium
dynamics. By taking a revisionist approach, I am able to steer a path between the
excessive abstraction of much public choice theory and the insufficient rigour of
much normative political theory. Jointly, the papers of this thesis contribute to
broad debates over the relative value of exit and voice in political settings, with
relevance to questions of democracy versus the market, centralism versus localism,
and bureaucracy versus market-like modes of governance. Though I cover a range
of diverse topics in this thesis, I generally argue for a strongly revisionist approach
to political analysis which sees significant behavioural differences between
individual and collective decisions while grounding all action in common
motivational assumptions.
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public choice, rational choice, revisionist public choice theory
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Thesis (PhD)
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