Papua New Guinea-Indonesia relations : a new perspective on the border conflict
Date
1989
Authors
Blaskett, Beverley Anne
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Abstract
The study of international relations theory has undergone major revision in the 1980s:
commentators have been increasingly concerned with the influence on foreign policy of
actors other than governments. In contrast to the realist approach - typified by
assumptions that states act rationally, have full control of the international relations arena
and constitute the only significant actors in inter-state relations and that domestic and
international politics are sharply separated - there is a realisation that there is a multiplicity
of variables shaping international relations, variables which are often beyond the control
of states.
Although some studies of the Papua New Guinea - Indonesia border issue express
reservations with the assumptions of realism, the prevailing interpretations of the
Indonesia - Papua New Guinea relationship have been based on realist assumptions. This
is partly because critical discussion of the dominant international relations perspective is
new; but also the realist approach purports to reveal, even if it fails to 'realistically'
deliver, 'the' predictive framework for the behaviour of states. The urgency and volatility
of the Papua New Guinea - Indonesia border issue has encouraged scholars to adopt the
realist perspective, for it has been widely accepted as utilitarian, and, far from promising
to supply a more forceful 'utilitarian' model, new theoretical studies critical of realism
have denied the possibility of finding any simple formula for analysing the behaviour of
states. It is no longer reasonable to advise states on the assumption that they constitute
the principal actors in the field (although it cannot be denied that states play significant
roles in shaping their relations with others). Accordingly, the shortcomings of the realist
approach to the analysis of the relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea
should be made apparent and new questions can be asked about the central causes of the
continuing tensions between the two states.
In the realist view, the governments of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia (in combination
with the states which together determine the geopolitical balance) are the sole actors
influencing the relationship between them; although it is clear that that relationship hinges
on events on their shared border, and that a third party - the West Papuan resistance
movement, often referred to as the OPM - is crucial to the intergovernmental relationship.
Although there is increasing evidence that realism does not offer a failsafe framework for
predicting the behaviour of states, states continue to employ a realist perspective in their
dealings with one another. More powerful states, in particular, may prefer to act as if
their power alone can determine the course of international relations. In the case of the Indonesia - Papua New Guinea border, bilateral agreements intended to eliminate tension
over the border have clearly failed to do so. This indicates the influence on the
relationship of actors outside the control of either state. Commentators have largely
accepted the position taken by Indonesia, the more powerful state, and dismiss the
possibility that both states could fail to secure the border: any such 'failure' on the part of
Papua New Guinea has been interpreted as collusion with the OPM against Indonesia; the
possibility that Indonesia (the more militarily capable state with a strong interest in border
security) could 'fail' to achieve its border security goals has not even been contemplated.
One explanation for the continuing tensions between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is
that the roots of that tension have not been properly recognised by both parties. The
border remains troublesome to both countries because of security concerns, as the OPM
continues to direct violence against the Indonesian government in an effort to win
independence for West Papua (offically the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya). Thus,
Indonesia's grievances against Papua New Guinea for allegedly collaborating with the
OPM stem from a domestic political issue.
While Papua New Guinea has recognised that it is in a vulnerable position with regard to
Indonesia, it has not always circumscribed its actions in the way demanded by Indonesia.
Perceiving that the border agreement between it and Indonesia cannot guarantee territorial
sovereignty and seeing that it has much to gain by the resolution of the border issue, it has
attempted to remove the roots of border conflict by negotiating with the OPM to persuade
the independence fighters to accept Indonesian rule. As these negotiations resulted in
failure, Papua New Guinea sought other means to confine the threat to Papua New
Guinea's sovereignty indirectly posed by the continuing discord between the OPM and
Indonesia.
Although Papua New Guinea always publicly accepted that Indonesia is sovereign in Irian
Jaya, it adopted some contradictory and secret policies intended to reduce the basic
tensions between Indonesian authority and Papuans in Irian Jaya. As many Papua New
Guineans involved in government and administration showed sympathy for the OPM, and
as inconsistencies in policy have come to light, Indonesia has found evidence of anti-
Indonesian feeling in Papua New Guinea's border policies. For example, Papua New
Guinean officials have maintained contact with OPM leaders in order to improve
intelligence and, through it, border security, yet Indonesia, not accepting the necessity of
negotiating with the leaders, has found grounds to accuse Papua New Guinea of
breaching agreements. Other less controversial attempts by Papua New Guinea to
improve border conditions through joint discussion with Indonesia on matters relating to
'balanced border development' have also met with failure. Another official strategy has been to 'broaden the relationship' with Indonesia in the hope that increased interaction
will result in increased trust and knowledge, and some enduring guarantee of friendship.
This last strategy has the virtue of being highly publicised and supported by Indonesia,
but does not redress the conditions which contribute to border conflict; its inefficacy has
been demonstrated by the continued occurrence of border violations.
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