Mollaun, Alicia Hayley
Description
The United States (US) has always used its aid program as a
strategic lever in foreign policy. In the early days of aid, it
was used to prosecute the Cold War. Now aid supports the United
States in its effort to win the war on terror. Aid is used both
to pursue short-term or “realist” objectives (e.g., to win
support for US foreign policy goals) and long-term or
“nation-building” ones (e.g. to strengthen governance). The
trade-offs and tensions between...[Show more] these goals have been examined
for the Cold War period (e.g., Seitz 2012), but not the post 9/11
one.
This research takes a case-study approach and examines US aid to
Pakistan. It is based primarily on interviews with the Pakistani
and American elite collected in Pakistan between October 2011 and
October 2013 and the United States in March 2012.
The period of research (2011-2013) is one in which the Obama
Administration tried to pivot its relationship with Pakistan away
from a focus on realist objectives (principally, the war in
Afghanistan) towards nation-building ends, for example, through a
much larger civilian aid program to improve Pakistan’s
governance and the economy. This thesis examines the success of
that pivot, and argues it was limited, on three main grounds
First, both groups of elite view Pakistan’s challenges are
mostly nation-building in nature, and particularly related to its
economy (and, in the case of the Pakistani elite, internal
security needs). But both groups nevertheless perceive that the
US still primarily wants cooperation on countering terrorism and
in Afghanistan. Second, the leverage and goodwill that US aid
provides is seen to be undermined by the pursuit of its realist
objectives. Third, US aid is seen by many in the elite as
targeted at the elite not the masses.
Some interesting differences in views between the two groups of
elite are observed. In general, more importance was attached to
nation-building objectives by US respondents than by Pakistani
respondents. For example, US respondents were more likely to
think that the US was concerned with trying to improve Pakistani
governance and was trying to influence public opinion in
Pakistan, whereas Pakistani respondents viewed US aid as much
less concerned with governance and more directed to the Pakistani
elite.
Despite these differences, which are suggestive of at least a
genuine US intent to engage in nation-building, the findings of
the thesis point to a failure by the Obama Administration to
follow through on its nation-building objectives in Pakistan.
Nation-building floundered, it is argued, because of ongoing
disputes in relation to realist goals, especially in relation to
the war on Afghanistan.
Several published studies of US-Pakistan relations argue for a
further nation-building push. In my interviews, I find
considerable support for such a position in the US elite.
However, I also find little sympathy for it on the Pakistani
side. The Pakistani elite is concerned rather to regain equality
in their relationship with the US. They see the need to put
their own house in order, but have little appetite for US
assistance. This calls into question the likely success of any
further nation-building push on the part of the US in Pakistan.
The academic contribution of this thesis is to establish the
relevance of Cold War aid analysis for the post-9/11 era. The
findings are consistent with much of the Cold War literature,
though some nuances are provided to earlier conclusions. The
policy contribution is to suggest that in cases such as Pakistan
where short-term foreign policy goals are of great importance the
US should put nation-building on the back-burner.
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