Sensation, perception, and imagery: a study of the Buddhist epistemology of perception with particular reference to the Tattvasamgraha and the Tattvasamgrahanjika

Date

2004

Authors

Coseru, Christian

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Canberra, ACT : The Australian National University

Abstract

This dissertation examines the theory of perception as reflected in the works of two influential Buddhist philosophers, Santarakita's Tattvasamgraha and its commentary by Kamalasila, the Tattvasamgrahapanjika (ca. 750-800 C.E.). In these two works, the authors advance the notion that perception ought to be regarded as the primary source of knowledge and be restricted only to that cognition which is devoid of conceptual thought and non-erroneous. Largely following a model provided by Dharmakirti (ca. 640 C.E.), Santaraksita and Kamalasila adopt two specific viewpoints in defining the perceptual aspects of knowledge: (i) the notion that the domains of language and conceptual thought are coextensive, which can be traced back to the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (ca. 4-5th century C.E.); and (ii) a psychological perspective centred on the notion that direct, unmediated, perception is in fact possible, which finds its origins in the Abhidharma literature. For these Buddhist epistemologists, perception is not only a psychological process to be understood within the framework of classical Abhidharma psychology, but also an epistemic modality for establishing what counts as a valid source of knowledge. The authors' approach is to differentiate non-conceptual cognitions from the mass of cognitive events that is characteristic of ordinary, 'folk,' beliefs about the contents of experience. This differentiation resembles in many ways the methodology adopted by modern psychological investigations into the mechanism of perception and knowledge representation. Adopting a naturalist reading of epistemology, this dissertation argues that Buddhist philosophers did not make a radical distinction between epistemology and the psychological processes of cognition, at least not in the Western sense in which modern epistemology has drifted away from naturalist explanations. Proceeding though a detailed analysis of the textual material, this study concludes that the causal model of perceptual knowledge developed in the two works is intended to provide an empirical foundation for the Buddhist view that all phenomena arise in dependence upon a multitude of causes and conditions and are in a perpetual state of flux.

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2033-11-12