Communist nationalism in the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia : three case-studies of nationalism and internationalism in Marxist-Leninist states incongruent with the nation

Abstract

This study tests two theories of the official propagation of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in Marxist-Leninist states. Such nationalism is understood as the manipulation of a range of public pronouncements, most importantly on national history and the cultural heritage, designed to confer on states of this type 'nationalist' legitimacy. It focuses on three such states characterised by a marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state - the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia. The analysis tests the two more widely encountered and influential theories which attempt to account for this phenomenon, 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism', distinct models united by their positing of elite manipulation of extant mass national sentiment in communist societies. Bearing in mind these two theories, the study attempts to throw light on the phenomenon as it manifests itself in each of the three states. In addition, given that it has been claimed that the extent to which communist states resort to the exploitation of nationalism may be related to the ethnic structure or 'situation' of such states, the study attempts to explore whether the 'type' of state selected reveals common behavioural patterns. In this 'type' of communist state, we might assume that officially sanctioned nationalism either would not be permitted or would be held on a tighter leash than in other Marxist-Leninist societies not characterised by such lack of congruence between nation and state. On top of the disincentive presented to all communist states - that nationalism conflicts with the internationalism and class analysis of Marxism, this would be due to the possibility that (in the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia) such behaviour would threaten to alienate ethnic groups other than the Russians and the Serbs, thus potentially destabilising the political system, and in the case of the GDR, because it would risk sustaining popular identification with a wider German nation which includes an entity beyond the state's borders perceived as committed to the GDR's destruction - West Germany. The case of the USSR suggests that elements of both theories account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism, but that both are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Most importantly, they both overlook the fact that the USSR has exploited Russian nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved by the leadership at a relatively early point in the development of the Soviet state that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this decision without essential changes, being marked by relatively stable continuity rather than further 'deradicalisation' or regular 'tactical' oscillations. The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring as it does during the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following the failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce enthusiasm for, or loyalty to, the state. As with the case of the USSR, and as we might expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology, or taken the form of 'communist nationalism' rather than nationalism pure and simple. As hypothesised, the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that is, so long as the authorities took the doctrinal position that there was a single Germany whose reunification should be striven for - or encouraged a view of the nation as wider than the state. Communist Yugoslavia, where state-sponsored nationalism turns out to have been the exception rather than the rule, suggests that only the 'tactical' explanation may be satisfactory in accounting for the central leadership's occasional exploitation of, or acquiescence in, Serbian nationalism. Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history of post-war Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of such an ideological shift. The three case-studies reveal that theories of both 'deradicalisation' and 'tactics' as applied to the communist uses of nationalism are flawed and are not universally applicable. The study also reveals little apparent correlation between the ethnic 'situation' of the three states studied and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the national sentiment of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. Nevertheless, with the important exception of a communist state without a decisively dominant ethnic group such as Yugoslavia, the study suggests the at least partial accuracy of the central proposition of the 'deradicalisation' theory - that Marxist-Leninist regimes at some stage partially reconcile themselves to a range of traditional sentiments and attitudes, including nationalism, and attempt to cater for them in order to shore up their legitimacy. Aspects of the 'tactical' theory, by contrast constitute a useful description of the Yugoslav resort to 'communist nationalism', as well as fluctuations in the Soviet exploitation of the phenomenon.