The corrigibility of moral judgements

Abstract

I argue that if one allows that the question: 'Why should one be concerned about the interests of people other than oneself or the group of which one is a member?', is one that can properly be asked, then one must admit that the position of any particular selfish :person or any particular selfish group is rationally on all fours with any unselfish position. Chapter I I discuss the view that if E does to NE something that is contrary to NE’s interests, then E is rationally required to justify his action, and that it is possible to determine whether E does justify it (or, at any rate, fails to justify it) without thereby making a moral commitment which is itself in need of justification. In reply I argue that this argument only works if E and his objector have made the same relevant moral commitments. That is to say, the objector's claim that E’s action is not justified, while it may not itself be a moral judgement (e.g. he may simply be saying that E is inconsistent), does presuppose a certain moral commitment, and if E has not made the same commitment then the objector's argument will be unsuccessful, (i.e E is not rationally required to agree with it).