Propositions and meaning : a study of denotationist theories of logical meaning

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Pont, Kenneth Graham

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This thesis is partly an historical and partly a critical study of the philosophical view that propositions(argument components or logical meanings) are in some sense "objects" denoted by sentences. The author confines his at tent ion to theories developed during a revolutionary period in the history of logic - between the publication of Mill's A System of logic and that of Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead. Starting from Mill, the author traces the development of denotationist theories in the writings of Brentano, Meinong, Frege, and early Moore and Russell. Broadly speaking, the views discussed represent two distinct theories of the proposition. Firstly, there is the theory that propositions, in the sense of meaning-objects denoted by sentences, are identical with or can be reduced to objects denoted by words and non-sentential phrases, This theory, the author argues, carl be found in Mill and early Frege, and is most explicitly stated by Brentano. Secondly, there is the theory that the meaning-objects denoted by indicative sentences are fundamentally different from the objects denoted by words and phrases, and that propositions therefore form a distinctive class of denotata, This view is represented in the writings of later Frege, Meinong and early Russell, In the first chapter, the author discusses theories of the proposition suggested by Mill and early Frege, Firstly, he tries to bring out the conflicting strands in Mill's thought, by contrasting Mill's "official" denotationist theory of propositions with other denotationist doctrines suggested in the Logic. Secondly, the author outlines Frege's early theory of meaning, and discuses some of the difficulties that lead Frege o modify his early denotationist assumptions, The second chapter of the thesis begins with an xposition of Brentano's "intentional" theory of mental acts and objects, and then goes on to show how Brentano uses this theory in an attempt to explain the meaning of propositions "from the empirical standpoint". The author emphasises Brentano's debt to Mill, and his influence on Meinong…

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