Exploring PNG’s Electoral Inequality with Principal Component Analysis

Abstract

In less than perfect electoral systems, not all prospective voters have the same capacity to cast a ballot. This inequality can take many forms. Political discrimination, repression, political control of media and communications, abuse of economic power and many other factors can tilt the playing field, but the institutional design and mechanical organisation of the election is often an important source of inequality. Malapportionment can lead to some votes having greater weight than others, deficiencies in the franchise can exclude some voters, and a range of systemic, practical and organisational factors can place greater hurdles before some voters and entirely exclude others. In severely dysfunctional electoral systems, there can be substantial differences in the rights afforded to voters despite laws and regulations that attempt to implement homogeneous processes, as authorities are unable to put in practice the procedures foreseen in law. Papua New Guinea (PNG) is an important case in this respect, as its de facto electoral organisation has an extreme degree of heterogeneity. PNG’s electoral system as set out in legislation aims to achieve isonomy and minimise inequality. The franchise is universal for citizens, a process exists for addressing malapportionment which is designed to be extremely resistant to gerrymandering, the voting process is simple and, if followed, contains several checks. In practice, however, electoral authorities often lack the capacity to implement these systems, security is inadequate, and enforcement of electoral rules is rare in comparison to the frequency and seriousness of offences. Although the PNG electoral system is in theory centrally administered, in practice there is a substantial degree of improvisation, decentralisation and informalisation. This does not proceed everywhere at the same pace or in the same direction, leading to deep and complex geographical inequalities.