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Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Miller, Nolan; Pratt, John W; Zeckhauser, Richard J.; Johnson, Scott


We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents'...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2007
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005


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