Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance
Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome-based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay-for-firm-performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to...[Show more]
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|Source:||Journal of Management Studies|
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