Statecraft and Pushback: Delivering China's Grand Strategy in Melanesia 2014-2022

Abstract

Contrary to claims of the South Pacific's low priority on the periphery of China's grand strategy, this thesis demonstrates that the importance of Melanesia has risen in China's calculus in the past decade. In doing so it develops Nadege Rolland's assessment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Rush Doshi's conception of China's grand strategy to provide localised accounts of how these global strategies are delivered on the ground. The argument builds on previous external analyses of variation in a grand strategy by observing change in statecraft. David Baldwin established that change in statecraft, as instrumental, goal-oriented behaviour, should be analysed through means-ends analysis. Evidence of change in the behaviour of statecraft on the ground can demonstrate a change in the grand strategic priority one country assigns to influencing another. This research analysed change in China's political, economic and security statecraft in Timor-Leste, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji between 2014-2022 through the grand strategic themes of 'concepts', 'capabilities', 'conditions' and 'conduct'.

This thesis argues that Chinese statecraft has been enhanced in Melanesia since 2017. That change accompanied the arrival of China's BRI, which offered developmental advantage to Melanesian countries. The BRI is a geoeconomic strategy which delivers non-economic outcomes for the People's Republic of China (PRC), that are increasingly paid for by non-Chinese finance. The BRI became a framework for the enhancement and integration of PRC statecraft to deliver geopolitical and geostrategic outcomes for China's grand strategy in Melanesia. However, an increase in means does not guarantee influence, particularly as the people of Melanesia become more accustomed to dealing with this rising power. There is growing evidence of Melanesians being prepared to pushback, resulting in a range of outcomes from accommodation to violence. From a Chinese perspective, statecraft should be comprehensively integrated, but also adapted to local interests, to be effective.

To understand these changes, the research collected data through 297 research interactions across six countries over eight years and analysed it through a dynamic comparison. The research identified the BRI as the causal variable for change, but discovered its influence depends on the adaptive skill of in-country representatives. While it may appear to some as 'fragmentation', adaptive behaviour is important to the successful execution of most grand strategies, and China's is no different. The research demonstrated important changes in Chinese statecraft in Melanesia over the past five years. Political statecraft was enhanced by investing experienced and centrally empowered Ambassadors, assisted by 'visit diplomacy', and supported by propaganda and united front networks. Economic statecraft saturated and dominated economic sectors through the BRI, achieving geopolitical and geostrategic objectives, and developing China's global influence. Security statecraft established a network of defence attaches and police advisers across Melanesia, seeking access to enhance force projection, extraterritoriality, and influence. Statecraft has been integrated across these domains to produce grand strategic effects.

While Chinese statecraft practitioners across Melanesia have demonstrated integration and adaptation with enhanced means, these cannot guarantee the successful delivery of grand strategy. Examples of regional pushback, calculation of national interest, provincial protection of economic security, and the securing of microeconomies and customary land by tribal power structures, increasingly create challenges for the delivery of Chinese grand strategy in Melanesia. These recent changes to Chinese statecraft indicate that either Melanesia had a higher value to Chinese grand strategy than was previously declared, or its position in China's grand strategic calculus has been raised.