Philosophical Progress: In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism

Abstract

Can there be progress in philosophy? On the one hand, it is often thought that problems in philosophy, in contrast to those in science, are perennials for which it is pointless to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the opposite view: how else to explain the panoply of books, papers, journals, conferences, graduate programmes, websites, etc.? Who is right? And what turns on who is right? This book defends a reasonable optimism about philosophical progress. Optimistic, because the author argues that, contrary to a widespread attitude of pessimism common even among professional philosophers, we have correctly answered philosophical questions in the past and therefore should expect to do so in the future; The work discusses several examples from philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Reasonable, because the optimism the author has in mind does not extend to every instance of the sort of problem called ‘philosophical’ or even to every subkind of that sort of problem.