SECURITY AND IDENTITY IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY:

A READING OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

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This thesis is my own original work.

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Acknowledgements

Writing this preface at the conclusion of the thesis, I am of the view that the thesis itself is but a preface to further research. But like all prefaces, it comes at the end of a lengthy journey. To consider the import of the critical theoretical debates about the nature of social and political inquiry within the confines of the discipline of International Relations has involved a challenging, and often unsettling, period of research. For a discipline that is (predominantly) concerned with the relationship among things foreign, International Relations often shows a sustained reluctance towards what it considers foreign intellectual sources. That this work could be produced in its own terms is something that owes a debt to a number of people.

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Abstract

The analysis in this thesis derives its impetus from three 'windows of opportunity' present in current academic debates. The first is the opening made possible by the wide-ranging and interdisciplinary debate over the nature of social and political inquiry. The second, both an instance of and response to the first, is the theoretical confusion that currently exists in the discipline of International Relations. The third is the confusion that exists in the literature of International Relations concerning the reasons behind the Carter administration's foreign policy 'failure'. These three openings are brought together in an account that reconceptualizes foreign policy in light of the interdisciplinary debate over the nature of social and political inquiry, offers a reinterpretation of United States foreign policy in the postwar era, and then seeks to account for the Carter administration in these new terms.

The argument in this thesis is about the problematizations which make possible our understanding of global life. It seeks to demonstrate the particular problematization that makes possible the modes of analysis in the discipline of International Relations, the particular problematization that makes possible United States foreign policy, and the particular problematization that makes possible the conventional interpretation of the Carter administration. In this context, the discussion of the Carter administration's foreign policy is not about its policy per se. Rather, it is about how its 'foreign policy' was made possible via a discursive economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a particular problematization.
It is argued that 'foreign policy' needs to be understood as a political practice which establishes the boundary between the 'domestic' and the 'international', and brings a particular manifestation of both domains into existence. Foreign policy plays an important role in the creation and maintenance of a society's identity through the transference of the differences within society to differences between societies. This is achieved via an inscription of danger (in what becomes the external realm), whereby the problems, fears and dangers of 'man' in 'domestic' society are externalized and totalized. What is at stake in foreign policy, therefore, is the defense of a particular identity through the writing of a particular understanding of security. Security, in this sense, refers to the issues involved in the inscription of danger. The thesis then brings this reconceputalization of foreign policy to bear upon postwar United States foreign policy, followed by a more detailed consideration of the Carter administration.
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Introduction

On any given day, 'the world' comprises a multitude of happenings involving a range of actors in various issues. Rainforests are being sawmilled in the Amazon, acid rain deposits the industrial wastes of the United States upon Canada, and the ozone layer is being depleted through the use of aerosols in Britain. Palestinian nationalists are fighting the Israeli army in the streets of the West Bank, Chinese students in Beijing are dying in the path of tanks and troops, and Lithuanian parliamentarians are voting for independence from the Soviet Union. The black residents of Soweto are boycotting the white businesses of Boksburg, United States agents are poisoning the coca crops of Bolivian farmers, and hundreds are dying in Venezuelan food riots. Afghan guerrillas are holding siege to Jalalabad, Ethiopian military officers are attempting a coup, and Tamil fighters are being policed by Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka. Seventy-five trillion dollars is circulating through global money markets, nuclear warheads continue to be manufactured, and millions of people face starvation.

The concerns are infinite. But our understanding of them is necessarily limited. Any attempt to describe, analyze, or theorize elements of global politics involves a fixing of issues and the privileging of some actors to the exclusion of others. Out of an endless array of issues and actors, we come to understand what constitutes 'the world' via a process of interpretation. The way we talk about global politics is thus not directly related to the existence of certain issues - their empirical status does not generate automatic understanding. Instead,
the 'reality' of global politics is mediated by representational practices. The process of interpretation requires the presentation and representation of issues in economical ways and powerful formulations. These practices do not simply reflect 'the world' - because 'the world' is too complex, diverse, and varied to be simply reflected - but serve to make 'the world'. We need, therefore, to regard the world of international relations and global politics as a 'text' which has been scripted via historically specific practices.

Textualizing international relations and global politics is a position which recognizes that the boundaries of dominant understandings and interpretations are both arbitrary and nonarbitrary: arbitrary in the sense that they are but one possibility amongst a range of possibilities, and nonarbitrary in the sense that certain social and historical practices have given rise to one way of making a world. Dominant interpretations have been established by the discipline of International Relations to limit the variety of ways of making 'the world' so that we need not explain everything all of the time before we can be understood. We talk of states and their policy makers pursuing interests and providing security. We talk of conflict and the need to

1. An example of this is the way the term "Southeast Asia" has given a fixed identity to a heterogenous region, primarily as a result of map makers responding to public demand during World War II. While the term was in use before then, the boundaries of the area were always shifting. Its self-evident status is thus the result of a variety of practices, ranging from travel writing and anthropology to warfare, none of which were intentionally coordinated. See Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp.93-94; Russell H. Finkel, "The Concept of Southeast Asia: Origins, Development, and Evaluation", South-East Asian Spectrum 4 (October 1975), pp.42-51; and Donald K. Emerson, "Southeast Asia: What's In a Name", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15 (March 1984), pp.1-21.
balance power, whether it be by military means or through economic measures. We talk of stability and the danger of anarchy. We talk of the need to seek peaceful resolutions to revolutionary situations. We talk of the rights of those who are being badly treated. Of course, the 'we' who talk in this way do so from a particular vantage point. 'We' are usually (though not exclusively) white and European, affluent and comfortable. Though 'we' may speak different languages, our way of making 'the world' shares much in common.

This way of talking, though of long standing, has been pivotal to United States foreign policy in the postwar era. It has produced an understanding of the world that privileged superpower conflict, arms races, and geopolitical competition. But dominant interpretations are subject to change and, as the end of the 1980s approaches, major change seems to be possible. Under the masthead that proclaims "the end of the cold war", new issues are being written about, new concerns articulated, and new policies championed. Whereas the middle of the decade saw a preoccupation with 'evil empires', military build-ups, proliferating terrorism, and conflicts conducted by proxy forces in distant places, the talk now is of the greenhouse effect, the future of NATO, poverty in the Third World, the threat of drugs, and the struggles for liberation and democracy.²

². Examples of this popular discourse can be found in the New York Times series which asked the question "Is the Cold War Over?" The answer came in the paper's editorial of April 3 1989 which was entitled "The Cold War is Finished." Newsweek, May 15 1989, had a cover story that deals with "After the Cold War." For the new concerns in superpower diplomacy see Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S.-Soviet Talks Turn to New Public Dangers", New York Times, May 5 1989, p.A20.
However, the period since the end of the Second World War was characterized at least as much by the presence of environmental problems, mass starvation, and the struggles for freedom, as it was by cold war issues such as conflict, competition and arms races between the superpowers. But our understanding of that period privileged the latter at the expense of the former. Concern for the global issues was not totally absent, but the way they came to be understood as problems was in terms that gave the cold war issues priority. Nor is the emphasis being accorded global issues in the late 1980s entirely new. The period from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s saw a similar emphasis in the concern for population growth, resource depletion and environmental issues.

How is it that our understandings of global life have changed in these ways? What are the discursive boundaries of U.S. foreign policy? What is at stake in these divergent interpretations? This thesis examines these issues in terms of the changes that have taken place in United States foreign policy in the postwar period. This is not to suggest that the discourse of global politics is exclusively the province of the United States. There can be no doubting, however, that the pivotal role which the United States has played in postwar global politics means that changes in the interpretations which have influenced its foreign policy have had a global effect.

To demonstrate how different interpretations of global politics have influenced United States foreign policy, the thesis takes the Carter
administration as an example. The Carter administration is an appropriate focal point for a number of reasons. It was an administration that sought to give greater priority to global issues over cold war concerns. It was an administration that eventually was unsuccessful in doing so. And it is an administration that has been interpreted as a failure in U.S. foreign policy despite considerable diplomatic achievements, including the negotiation and ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty, the mediation of the Camp David accords, the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, assisting the resolution of the Zimbabwean conflict, and the signing of a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

The Carter administration thus offers two dimensions to a consideration of the process of interpretation in understanding global politics: the interpretations offered by scholars and analysts in their consideration of the policy makers, and the interpretations developed by the policy makers themselves in their understanding of global politics and their construction of foreign policy. Just as policy makers' understandings of global politics are the outcome of interpretive practices, so too is the knowledge generated by scholars and analysts. Both of these dimensions come together to establish the boundaries of meaning, normalize certain interpretations, and exclude alternative formulations of global politics.

The analysis in this thesis derives its impetus from three 'windows of opportunity' present in current debates. The first is the opening made possible by the wide-ranging and interdisciplinary debate over
the nature of social and political inquiry. The second, both an instance of and response to the first, is the theoretical confusion that currently exists in the discipline of International Relations. The third is the confusion that exists in the literature of International Relations concerning the reasons behind the Carter administration's foreign policy 'failure'. These three openings are brought together in an account that reconceptualizes foreign policy in light of the interdisciplinary debate over the nature of social and political inquiry, offers a reinterpretation of United States foreign policy in the postwar era, and then seeks to account for the Carter administration in these new terms.

The first chapter reviews the academic literature that assesses the Carter administration's foreign policy. Inspired by the metatheoretical turn among some scholars of international relations, it sets forth the interpretations of the Carter administration's policy 'failure' that constitute the conventional narrative on the period. The first chapter thus adopts a metatheoretical position towards the discipline of International Relations that focuses on the textual processes which lie behind the normalization of a particular understanding of past events. It is a position which argues that the conventional accounts put forward in the discipline need to be seen as the product of discursive practices. These practices establish understandings which reduce the contingent factors to a dependence on the motivations of individuals, the influences of 'the world', or domestic politics. This mode of analysis, privileging agency and/or structure explanations, apart from varying greatly as to the actual motivations and influences of individuals and 'the world', leaves out much that needs to be incorporated in a
comprehensive account. These problems open up the space for an alternative conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy which can better explain the shift in the Carter administration's policy.

To lay the groundwork for this alternative conceptualization, the second chapter examines the interdisciplinary debates across the social sciences that have created the space for the adoption of a critical stance towards practices of representation. It demonstrates that forms of social and political inquiry which rely on binary opposites or dualisms have been the subject of extensive criticism within the social sciences. Examining debates in the philosophy of science which have questioned the positivist mode of explanation, the chapter argues that the style of inquiry associated with a 'postmodern' or 'poststructuralist' approach - with its concern for 'textuality' - offers the discipline of International Relations a means of considering the pivotal role of interpretation in the understanding of global politics.

The argument being made here is predicated upon the recognition that meaning and identity are constituted through a series of exclusions. The imposition of an interpretation upon the ambiguity and contingency of social life always results in an 'other' being marginalized. Meaning and identity are, therefore, always the consequence of a relationship between the 'self' and the 'other' which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own preestablished identity. In this context, the focus of social and political analysis is on how human beings problematize who they are, what they do, and the world in
which they live. The problematization that emerges in any historically specific location allows 'being' to offer itself to be thought, makes possible certain problems, and mandates a range of solutions.

The argument in this thesis is about the problematizations which make possible our understanding of global life. It seeks to demonstrate the particular problematization that makes possible the modes of analysis in the discipline of International Relations, and the particular problematization that makes possible United States foreign policy. Thus, if one were operating in terms of the "levels-of-analysis" metaphor to be found in the traditional International Relations literature, the argument in this thesis needs to be regarded at a level outside that associated with either the nation-state or the international system. The argument here is concerned with the practices that allow us to talk in terms of the nation-state and the international system, and the impact that problematization has had on our understanding of United States foreign policy, and the Carter administration in particular. In this context, the discussion of the Carter administration's foreign policy is not about its policy per se. Rather, it is about how its 'foreign policy' was made possible via a discursive economy that gave value to representational practices associated with a particular problematization.

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4. To focus on a discursive economy is to see discourse as a managed space in which some representations become dominant over others because of their value. See Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, pp.11-12; and Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. by A. M. Sheridan
The third chapter takes the poststructuralist injunction to regard theory as practice as its starting point, and analyzes the discipline of International Relations in terms of its role in the making of 'the world' (hence regarding the discipline as an object of analysis) rather than being (as often claimed) simply a window to the world and a tool for analysis. The third chapter considers the methodological self-understanding of the discipline of International Relations, and argues that the appearance of theoretical conflict and confusion disguises an historical continuity in the tradition of International Relations brought on by shared positivist metatheoretical commitments. These give form to a problematization (termed the "anarchy problematique") which incorporates a subject/object dualism, reduces contingencies to the 'secure' grounds of agency, structure or other pure presence, and privileges a reading of global politics in terms of the presence of sovereign states in an anarchic realm. However, developments within the discipline of International Relations - most particularly the turn to nonstate actors - have rendered any attempt to present the state as a pure and ahistorical presence highly problematic. Yet the continued authority of the discursive economy associated with the anarchy problematique suggests that it rests on more than certain metatheoretical premises.

Chapter Four argues that the effectiveness of the anarchy problematique is a result of its replication of wider cultural practices.

central to modernity. Following a mode of inquiry that is genealogical in intent, this chapter is concerned with how meaning and identity are created and maintained through boundary-setting procedures which construct social space. This argument focuses on how the categories of time and space are disciplined; how the state is a particular resolution of those categories; and the role the boundary-creating practices associated with the construction of the state play in the constitution of political identity through the demarcation of ‘self’ and ‘other’.

In focusing on the concept of identity, it is important to emphasize that the delineation of inside from outside which gives rise to the state is more than a spatial move. This boundary also establishes the dichotomy of community on the inside and anarchy on the outside. By creating a ‘domestic’ realm of community in contradistinction to the ‘international’ realm of anarchy and dangers to community, this boundary goes beyond merely locating individuals and endows them with a political identity, both individual and collective. The ‘other’ associated with the anarchic provides a point of differentiation against which the ‘self’ is defined and thus given identity. In other words, ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘domestic’ and ‘international’, ‘state’ and ‘system’ are all constituted via an interpretive relationship, and do not exist prior to that relationship.

This is important in distinguishing the concept of identity as used in this thesis from more traditional concepts which go some way to articulating the interactions between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ realms. For example, arguments which maintain either
that domestic influences are important in the construction of foreign policy, or that international influences play a role in structuring domestic politics, rely on granting the domestic and the international realms an existence prior to history and politics. In each case, the existence of the domestic and the international is not brought into being by foreign policy, but is regarded as a sovereign presence which exerts an influence over the other.

The argument being made here, and articulated in Chapter Four, is that 'foreign policy' needs to be understood as a political practice which establishes the boundary between the 'domestic' and the 'international', thereby bringing both domains into existence. The boundary, however, is not a clearly identifiable line, but a shifting and gray area occupied by "liminal groups" who are simultaneously 'self' and 'other'. These marginal groups (they vary from society to society but are often made up of women, ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples) serve as the points of differentiation against which the identity of the society, in which they are both present and absent, is constituted. The role foreign policy plays in the creation and maintenance of a society's identity involves the transference of the differences within society to differences between societies. This is achieved via an inscription of danger (in what becomes the external realm), whereby the problems, fears and dangers of 'man' in 'domestic' society are externalized and totalized.

This is not to suggest that the international realm is one of community rather than anarchy, where threats have to be fictitiously constructed. The argument is that both the domestic and the
international are marked by community and anarchy. The boundary between them is drawn (and redrawn) by this transfer of differences. Differences certainly do exist between societies, but they do not exist independently as ‘things-in-themselves’. Their status as ‘threats’ depends on their being scripted as such in the service of constructing and legitimating the particular society to which they pose a danger. In other words, foreign policy is a practice central to the construction and maintenance of political identity. What is at stake in foreign policy is the defense of a particular identity through the writing of a particular understanding of security. Security, in this sense, refers to the issues involved in the inscription of danger.

Conveying this argument in a written text poses a rhetorical problem of which the reader should be aware. Articulating an argument of the mutual and simultaneous co-determination of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ in writing can often seem to produce a certain recidivism with respect to traditional modes of discourse. Given the need for written argumentation to adopt a starting point, this has meant that in some of the later chapters greater attention has been placed on ‘domestic’ issues. This should not be taken to constitute a deviation from the argument. Rather, ‘domestic’ issues have been highlighted because such a focus serves to render problematic the usual systemic focus of much International Relations scholarship relevant to the issues being discussed.

The reconceptualization of foreign policy is employed in Chapter Five to consider how ‘United States foreign policy’ is a practice by
which the 'United States' is constituted. This move is made, however, not on metatheoretical grounds alone. A deconstructive analysis in the first half of Chapter Five demonstrates that a concern with the affirmation and reaffirmation of the character of United States society is prominent in many postwar foreign policy texts. If, instead of foreign policy being the process whereby threats to a pregiven domestic society are located in the external and anarchical realm, we conceive of foreign policy as being the process which brings the domestic realm into existence through the identification of dangers to that realm, we can account for the evidence that an analysis of the postwar foreign policy discourse uncovers. This analysis demonstrates that the conventional understanding of U.S. foreign policy responding to the external world as though it were a realm of necessity cannot be supported by a consideration of the foreign policy texts in the period since 1945. The many and varied threats to United States security that are evidenced in these texts require a more complex understanding of their purpose.

The particular identity that U.S. foreign policy enframed from 1945 to 1965 is the subject of the second half of Chapter Five. This period saw the range of interpretations of domestic order being controlled so that the subjectivities associated with liberal capitalist social relations of production, including the nuclear family of cold war liberalism, were dominant. Security was written in terms of dangers to this interpretation of order being located in other domestic societies. Identity, however, is never secure; it needs to be continually reinscribed, particularly in periods when it is under challenge from a variety of sources.
The period between (roughly) 1965 and 1975 saw a number of challenges to American political identity. As outlined in Chapter Six, when cold war liberalism started to fail to deliver its domestic legitimations, security had to be rewritten so that the interpretations of order could continue to be limited and controlled. The rewriting of security to at least account for interdependence - a series of developments which did not allow danger to be simply inscribed in other domestic societies because of the role those societies could have in combatting that danger through collaboration - while reproducing the basic features of American society, has been the challenge facing U.S. administrations in the post-Vietnam era. The Nixon administration originally proclaimed an end to the postwar era of international relations and sounded many of the same rhetorical signals of interdependence as Carter was later to adopt. But the policy of detente, though the criticism of it foreshadowed the dilemma that Carter would soon face, only brought upon itself half of the problem inherent in rewriting security. It altered the conception of external danger, but did not try to replace it with a new interpretation.

Interdependence and world order, on the other hand, did seek to invoke a new understanding of the dangers to domestic society. The energy crisis, pollution, famine, and nuclear proliferation (among the host of issues originally targeted for greater attention by the Carter administration) are more global in nature. The Carter administration's rewriting of security in these terms is dealt with in Chapter Seven. These dangers to order could no longer be located in other domestic
societies. When the external dangers are conceived in such a way that the required response is one of coordination and collaboration amongst states, the location of danger in other domestic societies becomes more of a hindrance than a help. The seeking of assistance from adversaries does not allow (at least as easily as before) the transfer of differences within to differences between. Locating the external danger in such a way as to continue to legitimize the domestic order thus posed a problem. As a consequence, the grounds of state legitimation that were once secure because of the displacement of danger became a site of contestation among a variety of alternative ways of ordering domestic society. Moreover, because foreign policy brings a particular manifestation of domestic society into existence, social resources will have been invested over time in its fulfilment. This means that any attempt to rewrite security encounters not only the difficulties associated with the new conception, but has to disenable the old. Caught in this bind, the Carter administration opted for a rewriting of security that neither completely established a new interpretation (or a concomitant new political identity) nor completely repudiated the old. This both prevented the mobilization of social forces in support of a rewritten security, and gave legitimacy to critics who sought to reinvigorate and reinscribe the old understandings. Considered in these terms, we can better understand how the Carter administration has been considered a 'failure' notwithstanding the diplomatic achievements mentioned above.

The struggles that ensued from the Carter administration's attempt at rewriting security through its inscription of danger, and the forces
that were eventually successful in overcoming that attempt, are the subject of Chapters Eight and Nine. In Chapter Eight, the debates over Soviet defense spending, the development of ICBM forces, and the changes to nuclear strategy, are seen as sites in which the Carter administration's rewriting of security is resisted. In each case, the textual qualities of the issues are demonstrated by the gap between the empirical referents upon which the arguments depend and the interpretations that are developed. These gaps, given the role of interpretive practices, can be explained only by appreciating that something other than a purported correspondence to 'reality' is at stake. In Chapter Nine, the resistances are detailed through a consideration of how the rewriting of security is played out in the arena of Africa policy. The victory of geopolitical representational practices over more nuanced regionalist interpretations is an instance of the reinvigoration of cold war practices that contributed to the Carter administration's 'failure'. What is particularly significant about all these issues is that they occur well before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the event that is usually regarded as constituting the external impetus to the Carter administration's policy reversals.

The fate of the Carter administration, despite its diplomatic successes, is instructive for those who seek to change United States foreign policy. The Carter administration sought to rewrite security in ways that would accommodate what it regarded as the 'new realities' of global politics, but without challenging the established American political identity. If an administration whose approach was at best mildly reformist in intent can be regarded as having embarked on a
radical redirection of U.S. policy, we can appreciate much about the nexus between security and identity. If the commitment to a power politics logic and cold war interpretation of U.S. security is so strenuously defended that even an approach like Carter's is considered illegitimate, the established cold war political identity of the United States needs to be regarded as fragile and continually in need of reinscription. This, as the conclusion very briefly considers, means that the prospect for change in U.S. foreign policy is difficult though not impossible. The prospect for change depends on a reformulation of American political identity so as to tolerate difference and diversity to an extent that danger need not be inscribed in other domestic societies.
INTRODUCTION

By most accounts, the discipline of international relations is in a confused state. Some would have it that the field is characterized by disarray with the once great theoretical orthodoxies being no more.¹ Others maintain that the discipline's theoretical battlefield is littered with debris.² Those who have sought a synthetic explanation for the increased eclecticism among international relations specialists have identified distinct "clusters" of theory,³ invoked notions of "paradigmatic" rivalry,⁴ and, in exasperation, pronounced a continuing state of theoretical chaos.⁵ More recently, the excursions of some international


relations writers have taken them into the metatheoretical domain. Assessments of this development have argued that the discipline is being restructured in line with wider debates in social and political theory; that the field is witnessing a "sustained theoretical effervescence"; and that international relations is facing a variety of "philosophical insurgencies."

While to attempt to delineate sharply this latest (meta)theoretical course in international relations would be an inherently problematic exercise, it is possible to suggest that Richard Ashley's critique of neorealism, employing a broad range of philosophical discourses to untie the assumptions and presuppositions of an important stream of American international relations scholarship, marks something of a watershed in the discipline. Ashley is far from alone in the attempt to confront international relations with some of the issues that are emerging in the interdisciplinary debates concerned with social and

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9. Richard K. Ashley. "The Poverty of Neorealism", International Organization 38 (1984), pp.225-286. Arguing that this piece marks a watershed is not to suggest that it single-handedly altered the discipline. Rather, it is to argue that in its use of "foreign" intellectual resources, it constitutes a fundamental challenge to traditional international relations scholarship that provoked, and continues to provoke, a determined response. Some support for this proposition can be found in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
political inquiry,\textsuperscript{10} but his work has become the focal point for some counter-critiques. The responses to Ashley’s critique have been many and varied,\textsuperscript{11} but one response to Ashley was particularly interesting because of its concern with the politics of the critiques of international relations theory. Bruce Andrews wrote:

What makes a nation’s attachment to its expansive global (or regional) position so obsessive? Why is a particular state leadership so anxious to flex its particular muscles in a particular way? Why does an imperial power consider its ability to exert control over the social relations that constitute an open world political economy so important? Why are a nation’s commitments to the international status quo wrapped up so tightly in the flag and sanctified accordingly? Do any of the analytic moves at hand, however trumpeted, help us comprehend the grounds on which the key acts of government foreign policy are erected, or the grounds on which they might be confronted or opposed? I am thinking, for example, of the brutal American intervention in Vietnam and, more immediately, the attempted subversion and violent harassment of Nicaragua. Those matters, those sorts of questions, are likely to ambush our little self-important academic scuffles.\textsuperscript{12}

One need not accept Andrews’s implicit assessment of United States foreign policy (though there is considerable force to his position), or his rather peremptory dismissal of Ashley’s theorizing, in order to


appreciate that the general issue of the politics of critical international relations theory is worthy of sustained investigation.

Taking up the issue of the politics of a critical social theory of international relations is an important purpose of this thesis. By considering the interdisciplinary debates across the social sciences and their implications for an understanding of the discipline of International Relations, this thesis outlines an approach to international relations theory that allows a different interpretation of international political practice, and United States foreign policy in particular, to be demonstrated via a consideration of the Carter administration's foreign policy.

Although a number of examples might have sufficed, the Carter administration provides a potentially fruitful example of the contribution a critical social theory of international relations theory might make to an understanding of United States foreign policy. On the one hand, few detailed studies of the administration's approach to, and assumptions about, international politics have been written.\textsuperscript{13} On the other, those assessments which are available, although generally agreeing that the administration was a 'failure' in foreign policy, demonstrate a marked confusion about the reasons for the administration's record. Such a confusion, outlined below, suggests that the way is open to develop an alternative conceptualization.

\textsuperscript{13} This lacunae in foreign policy analysis is recognized by Jerel A. Rosati, \textit{The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior} (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), p.3.
THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE ABOUT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Few United States administrations have attracted the opprobrium accorded the Carter administration.\textsuperscript{14} While directed to all areas of the administration's responsibilities, the criticism has been most strident when applied to the arena of foreign policy. With the administration's efforts disparagingly referred to as "the amateur hour",\textsuperscript{15} the electoral defeat of the Carter administration - the most comprehensive to befall an incumbent president\textsuperscript{16} - was seen as a repudiation of its policies in favor of the prescriptions offered by the 1980 Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan.

The Record of Reversion

The concern of this chapter is with the interpretation of the Carter administration's policy. Before proceeding to that, however, it is worth schematically setting forth elements of the policy record which indicate some of the bases from which the interpretation of 'failure' has been


derived. To this end, some of the distinctive issues that the administration originally highlighted will be considered.

The emphasis on "world order" politics, and the attention given to North-South issues in place of East-West concerns, that marked the Carter administration's attempt to rewrite U.S. security, saw particular emphasis placed on human rights, defense spending, nuclear weapons, arms sales, nuclear non-proliferation and military intervention. Each of these areas was characterized by an initial redirection of policy and then a reversion to positions that had been earlier repudiated. As Coral Bell has concluded, "Most of the initial objectives remained, late in 1980, apparently lost causes."17

* Human rights took up one-third of Carter's inaugural speech, with the President declaring in 1978 that as an issue they were "the soul" of U.S. foreign policy.18 Performance on human rights was mixed with early criticism of Soviet policy becoming muted as the SALT negotiations were given priority. Security assistance to at least eight countries was terminated because of human rights violations, but where strategic interests were deemed to be paramount - as in the case of South Korea - human rights issues did not interfere with security commitments.19

* As a candidate, Carter promised to reduce defense spending by between $5 billion and $7 billion per year. In 1978 and 1979, however, the administration had sought a 3% per annum increase in the defense budget and asked NATO allies to do the same. In FY 1981 prices, outlays in the defense budget rose from $127.6 billion in 1977 to $142.7 billion in 1981. By 1980, the five year defense budget for the U.S. had increased from $800 million


to $1.25 trillion. Carter campaigned in 1980 as the first peace-time president since World War II to have increased military spending every year in office.\textsuperscript{20}

* Carter's inaugural address promised that his administration would move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Speaking before the UN in 1977, Carter argued that despite the superpowers having increased their nuclear arsenals five-fold in the previous eight years, "we are not five times more secure". Speaking before the Business Council in 1979, however, Carter stated that "In the dangerous and uncertain world of today, the keystone of our national security is still military strength..."\textsuperscript{21}

The change in rhetoric was matched by an increase in nuclear warhead production. Having approved the go-ahead for the MX, Trident II and advanced cruise missile, Carter signed a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum in October 1980 that called for a dramatic increase in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{22}

* Carter originally called for an end to the international arms trade and promised to reduce U.S. arms sales to a level lower than the previous year for at least several years. However, arms sales increased by 20% during the first two years of the administration. By 1980, the US was selling more arms than any other country - nearly twice as much as its nearest competitor, the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{23} The Defense Department's figures for foreign military sales and military assistance show that the value of arms sales rose from $8.7 billion in FY 1977 to $13 billion in FY 1979.\textsuperscript{24}

* Nuclear non-proliferation was an important policy area, with the Carter administration proposing controls on plutonium reprocessing and other technologies capable of providing a nuclear weapons capability. But when trade-offs between non-proliferation goals and other interests were required, non-proliferation goals were sacrificed. U.S. assistance to Pakistan


\textsuperscript{23} Johansen, Jimmy Carter's National Security Policy, pp.15-16.

\textsuperscript{24} Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy, pp.43-44.
had been cut off in 1979 because of that country's nuclear program, but military assistance to Pakistan was resumed in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan despite its refusal to stop developing nuclear weapons technology. The U.S. also resumed shipments of fissionable material to India in 1980 despite the lack of non-proliferation guarantees.25

* Carter campaigned against the memory of Vietnam, and declared that he could not foresee any instance in which he would send in U.S. combat troops to intervene. Yet in Presidential Directive 18 of 1977, the initial plans for the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force were laid out, although the existence of the RDF was not announced until December 1979.26

Understanding the Carter administration's foreign policy as a failed enterprise has been established as the dominant interpretation of United States policy for the years 1977 to 1981, largely because of the reversals described above.27 The immediate task it to set the scene for an alternative reading of the Carter administration's policy by reviewing those interpretations that constitute the dominant understanding of the administration as a 'failure'.

The Sense of Something New

While the end product might have been 'failure' and disappointment,
the start of the Carter administration was associated with something of a new beginning in U.S. foreign policy, the sense that a new direction was being charted. All candidates for political office attempt to give themselves a distinctive identity by drawing contrasts with their predecessors. In the realm of foreign policy Carter was no exception, campaigning as he did against the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years of U.S. policy.\textsuperscript{28} Describing the policies of that period as "balance-of-power" politics, with an emphasis on the superpower relationship, a reliance on force, and a lack of concern for issues that stood outside the East-West spectrum, Carter sought to establish "world order" politics and a concern for "interdependence" as the trademark of his national security policy. He declared in 1976 that:

\begin{quote}
We must replace balance-of-power with world order politics. It is likely in the near future that issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of the military-security problems which have dominated international relations since World War II.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

One commentator has noted of the Carter administration's intentions that; "Even allowing for the familiar excesses of political rhetoric, [Carter] did offer the vision of a genuine departure from past diplomatic practice."\textsuperscript{30} Others agreed, noting that the Carter perspective was "virtually diametrically opposed to that previously espoused by

\textsuperscript{28} See, for example, J. A. Linger, "Europe and the Superpowers", in Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp.238-239.


\textsuperscript{30} Johansen, Jimmy Carter's National Security Policy, p.2.
Kissinger”, that "[n]ot for thirty years had there been so much new music in a presidential pronouncement on foreign policy...”, and that "it is difficult to think of any recent instance where an incoming administration tried so hard to disassociate itself from its predecessors.”

The "world order" motif was played out most prominently in the emphasis Carter sought to give to "North-South" issues in place of the traditional "East-West" concerns. Incorporating a recognition that the issues of global politics were more diversified, that the range of actors had expanded, and that trilateral if not multilateral diplomacy was the appropriate course of action, this new focus meant that the Carter administration was breaking with earlier administrations' preoccupation with a containment strategy. It was an approach widely characterized as resonating with the Wilsonian tradition of idealism.

While the majority of writers are in accord with the view that the

31. Linger, "Europe and the Superpowers", p.239.


34. Tucker, "America in Decline", p.463.


36. See McGeehan, "A New American Foreign Policy?", p.241; Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy, pp.4-11; and Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, p.301.
Carter administration at least attempted to redirect U.S. policy, there are some assessments that suggest the differences are not as great as the similarities. Girling, for example, argues that much of the North-South and trilateral emphasis of the Carter administration was equally to be found in the policy statements of the Nixon administration, with only the prominence given to human rights in the Carter administration marking a major shift in policy. Gaddis also argues that the differences are not as great, and that the undoubted attempt to portray a new direction is partly a result of the lack of substantive differences between the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policies and those of the Carter years. This perspective will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Six.

A Change for the Old

Just as the conventional interpretation of the Carter administration was of it initiating a radical new approach to U.S. foreign policy, there is a dominant understanding that this redirection was to encounter a range of obstacles that resulted in a reversion to the cold war-oriented policies of earlier administrations.

Szulc argues that by the end of the first year of the Carter administration "realism" was reasserting itself. Although some changes

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were gradual, by the final year of the administration the modifications had culminated in an almost complete reversal of the intentions behind "world order" politics. Balance-of-power politics was back in vogue. Following the announcement of the Carter Doctrine pledging that the U.S. would resist any "outside" military intervention in the Persian Gulf region, George Kennan stated that:

Never since World War II...has there been so far-reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the capital. An unsuspecting stranger, plunged in to the midst, could only conclude that the last hope of peaceful non-military solutions had been exhausted...⁴⁰

The consequence was, some argued, that the Carter administration not only restored East-West relations to the core of U.S. policy by 1980, but that it was taking a more militarist stance towards the Soviet Union than any president since Eisenhower.⁴¹ Both candidates in the 1980 presidential election promised an increase in defence spending; the election of Reagan was thus made possible in part by Carter's acceptance of policies he had earlier rejected. The magnitude of this change was not lost on observers. Stanley Hoffmann wrote:

A team that had wanted to conduct a diplomacy free from the 'inordinate fear' of communism and to play down the relationship between the superpowers ended up so preoccupied with the bipolar conflict that it had little time and energy left for anything else, except the Iranian hostage crisis.⁴²

That there were changes is not in dispute. The issue is whether the interpretation that devolves from these changes is warranted and the reasons given plausible.

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⁴¹ Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, p.307.
Explaining the change in the Carter administration's foreign policy, particularly in those areas cited above that were intrinsic to the concept of "world order" politics, has produced a plethora of accounts. Broadly speaking, however, the explanations fall into three categories: (i) those that see the role of individuals and personalities in the administration as crucial; (ii) those that consider the intractable nature of global politics as having defeated the administration's intentions; and (iii) those that resort to the flux of domestic political life as a source of explanation.

Perhaps the most persistent account of the Carter administration's failure is the impact of internal disarray upon foreign policy. The image of protracted and sustained conflict between the major foreign policy appointments - Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski as National Security Adviser - remains a dominant impression of the administration's record. Concomitant with this view is an assessment of Carter's own role and personality. If the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski could not be contained it was because Carter himself was unwilling or unable to decide which source of advice to take.

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But while the perceived vacillation between two courses of action - particularly whether or not U.S.-Soviet relations should be characterized by cooperation, competition or conflict - was argued to be a result of this indecision, there are those who argue it was a function of Carter's open-mindedness and decision-making style. Having opposed the secret, "lone ranger" style of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years, Carter wanted to free foreign policy making from the control of one person or bureaucracy. On the other hand, there are a few assessments that see Carter himself as the principal foreign policy decision-maker. Szulc, for example, reported that after dining with the President in mid-March 1977, Kissinger believed the president was in far greater command of foreign policy issues than had been previously credited, and that in fact he was the source of most of the conceptual thinking on the issues.

Notwithstanding that view, Carter's own characteristics - his "abysmal sense of politics" and "seriously deficient" public relations skills are most often cited as the reasons for his inability to take charge. This "persistent amateurism" is said to have evidenced itself in the lack of a coherent strategy, resulting in a propensity to zig-zag on foreign policy issues. At its worst, this character assessment regarded


47. Tiewes, "The Perception of Failure", pp.54-55.

Carter as "buffeted hither and yon by emotional gusts of irritation, self-righteousness, and vainglory."49 Even when his personality was assessed in a better light, the conclusion was not positive: "The foreign policy mirrored the man. Admirable goals, like his own admirable character traits, collided with one another."50

The political character of Carter administration appointees has also been cited by some as reason for the administration's failure. Described as "recycled Vietnam doves" many of the State Department officials (e.g. Anthony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, Richard Moose and Patricia Derian) supported by Vance and Vice-President Mondale, were held responsible for the effort to redirect U.S. policy.51 In the arms control field, Colin Gray regarded "analysts of this left-center" persuasion (e.g. Paul Warnke, Marshall Shulman, Walter Slocombe and Lynn Davis) as having preeminent access and influence.52

Many of the Carter administration employees had served on or been involved with the Trilateral Commission. Stanley Hoffmann has argued that the influence of the Commission was negative in terms of the effort to put a comprehensive strategy together. While the Commission


51. V. Davis, "The President and the National Security Apparatus", in Defense Policy and the President, ed. Sarkesian, p.91; and Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy, pp.12-13.

was part of the intellectual development associated with "world order" politics and interdependence themes, its approach - mirrored by the administration, he argued - was to add issues to one another to arrive at complexity rather than integrating them in an overall strategy.53

The shift in the Carter administration's national security policy from a North-South emphasis to an East-West obsession is, according to assessments that rely on individuals or personalities, a function of the rising influence of Brzezinski in the development of policy. With some international events capable of being interpreted to support Brzezinski's position, the last eighteen months of the administration saw Carter adopt a policy stance with which he was originally not comfortable.54 As LaFeber concluded, "Brzezinski seemed to be going in his own direction and pulling the President with him."55 Brzezinski was able to exercise greater influence, it is argued, because the departure from the administration of Andrew Young in August 1979 and Vance in 1980 removed major sources of opposition to his increasingly anti-Soviet position.56 But Carter's "capitulation" to Brzezinski is also thought by some to have resulted from a qualified commitment to the premises of the new diplomacy in the first place.57

54. Hill and Williams, "Conclusion", p.211.
55. LaFeber, "From Confusion to Cold War", p.11.
While the majority of analyses regard the Carter administration as plagued by personality clashes or weakness, the consequence of which was the lack of a strategic vision that could be sustained, some have argued that the administration did in fact have a coherent and internally logical foreign policy. Shoup, who argues that despite all the talk of "Vietnam doves" or appointments of a "left persuasion" the senior policy makers in the administration came from "both of the current main policy tendencies within the Establishment", believes that the haphazard impression of Carter's policy belies the overall aim of reconstructing American hegemony, using a trilateral alliance and the normalization of relations with China as a means of dealing with both the Soviet Union and the Third World.

While many assessments place the blame for failure on the personality divisions or weaknesses, another range of analyses regards these problems as merely contributing to a more substantial shortcoming. Focusing on structural conditions of global politics, it is argued that the administration's attempt to reorient policy away from East-West concerns meant that they failed to perceive the centrality of power in international relations. As Gray has stated, the new agenda of issues the Carter administration sought to highlight soon ran foul of East-West concerns:

President Carter and some of his policy advisers discovered


60. Raymond A. Moore, "The Carter Presidency and Foreign Policy", in The Carter Years, ed. Abernathy, Hill and Williams, p.73. See also Smith, "Ideals Under Seige", p.365.
painfully what any competent strategist could have told them - that the first problem for international order, in U.S. perspective, has to be the effective management of Soviet military power (and its political ramifications). President Carter was not wrong in worrying about North-South and other non-Soviet-American centric issues; his error lay in neglecting to appreciate the fact that his emerging agenda of concerns was an addition to the principal problems of U.S. security, not a substitution therefore.\footnote{Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy, p.50.}

Equally, Tucker has argued that Carter quite clearly had a world view, but "[t]he difficulty is that his view has proven irrelevant and worse. It has not responded to the often harsh realities of the world."\footnote{Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan Without Tears", The New Republic May 17 1980, p.23. See also Tucker, "America in Decline".}

While these assessments focus on ahistorical concerns about the "realities" of international politics (i.e. the unchanging primacy of power), other writers have argued that particular "realities" of the late 1970s served to demonstrate that the Carter image of the international system was seriously flawed. Moore states that Carter's policies "ran into the realities of geopolitics - Moscow's relentless military buildup, Third World adventures and invasion of Afghanistan."\footnote{Moore, "The Carter Presidency and Foreign Policy", pp.72-73.}

Some analyses that are more sympathetic to the Carter administration's efforts also maintain that the "realities" of international politics had a crucial role to play. The "realities" they focus upon, however, are in conflict with the claim that the nature of international relations was in contradistinction to the Carter image. Oye has written that the administration was "vexed and perplexed" by two related changes in the reality of global life, the diffusion of power
and the greater complexity of actors and issues:

Numerous critics of the administration frequently characterize its foreign policy as unfocused, inconsistent, unstable, and ineffective...[but] the essence of the problem is purely structural. The lack of focus of American policy is largely a consequence of the multiplication of issues affecting national interests.64

This multiplication of actors and issues was taken by the administration, Oye argues, to mean that no coherent grand strategy was possible. The administration chose to maintain the separateness of issues so that the complexity of the world would not be compromised.65 Although recognizing that the attempt was ultimately futile, the attempt of the administration to avoid recourse to traditional but simplistic notions of U.S. power was applauded by others.66 The attempt was made futile because "the age of limits and the limits of the Carter administration were mutually reinforcing."67

The final form of assessment of the Carter administration's failure in national security policy is that which ascribes responsibility to the flux of domestic political life. The increasingly conservative public mood, with interest groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger at the center of the development of a renewed cold war climate, is often


cited as the main reason for the reversion in Carter policy.\textsuperscript{68} Another explanation focuses on the institutions of American politics. With the pivotal role of the U.S. Senate in foreign affairs (particularly given the reassertion of congressional power in the 1970s)\textsuperscript{69}, the need to build coalitions for the passage of treaties was essential. Having succeeded, against considerable odds, in achieving the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1978, the administration faced the difficult task of getting a two-thirds majority in support of the SALT II accords. In this context, it is argued, the administration found itself forced to adopt the hard-line anti-Soviet position it had originally sought to eschew.\textsuperscript{70} In a similar vein, the increasing demands for a return to a militarist containment policy in 1980 made the administration give greater credence to East-West issues as a strategy for the presidential elections of that year.\textsuperscript{71}

Explaining the Reversion:

The Need for a New Interpretation

That the Carter administration at least attempted to redirect U.S. foreign policy, and that the attempt was thwarted by a range of obstacles producing a reversion to policies previously shunned, can be considered the conventional narrative of U.S. policy in the years 1977

\textsuperscript{68} See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis.

\textsuperscript{69} For a discussion of how these developments affected Carter's relations with Congress see Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency, especially Ch. 3.

\textsuperscript{70} McGeehan, "Carter's Crises", p.163.

to 1981. Considering the explanations of the conventional narrative reveals two features: (1) there are a plethora of accounts that can be grouped in terms of whether or not they give primacy to agency, structure or domestic politics; and (2) within each of these groups there is equally a range of accounts.

Those explanations that give primacy to agency range from an assessment of Carter as weak, politically naive and illiterate in foreign policy; through the argument that his commitment to an open style of policy-making and toleration of divergent opinions proved to be a handicap; to the position that he was in fact more in charge of foreign policy than anyone realized and was the source of the conceptual basis of his administration's policies. As a corollary to the analyses of Carter, the agency explanations give considerable attention to the tensions between Vance and Brzezinski, and the latter's rise to a position of increased influence.

Those explanations that give primacy to structural factors are of two contradictory kinds. One maintains that a power-politics logic is a given of international relations and a constraint on all state behavior, comprising a reality that is ignored only at considerable cost, as the Carter period is supposed to demonstrate. The other agrees with the Carter administration's assessment of international reality by suggesting that complex interdependence is actually the way the world is.

Finally, those explanations that highlight domestic political factors
propose that the role of Congress in foreign affairs, the imperatives of a presidential election campaign, or the need to accommodate the changing mood of interest groups and the electorate, are significant in the reversion to a cold war orientation for U.S. foreign policy.

While these explanations that rely on agency, structure or politics are legitimate assessments in as far as they go, there are a number of problems with them. In the first place, there are considerable contradictions within each group. How is it that those who focus on agency cannot agree whether Carter was weak or strong, ignorant or intelligent? How is it that some see incoherence and lack of a strategy where others see an internally consistent approach to U.S. power? How is it that those who maintain there is an external structured reality cannot agree as to whether it conforms to a power-politics logic or the premises of complex interdependence? And those explanations that invoke domestic political reasons claim to do no more than offer insights to limited aspects of the formulation of U.S. policy.

More importantly, however, the status of explanations that privilege either agency or structure has to be questioned. All social theories, whether or not their premises are explicit, rest upon a resolution to the issue of agency and structure; all resolve to situate agents and structures in relationship to one another. For the most part, these resolutions are reached by the privileging of either agency or structure. If agency is privileged, individuals are seen as possessing beliefs and goals and acting in accord with their self-understanding as agents. If structure is privileged, agents are seen as mechanical, possessing only
the ability to respond to external stimuli located in the "real" world.\textsuperscript{72}

Neither of these approaches is satisfactory as the basis for a comprehensive explanation. Giving agency primacy ignores the fundamental social basis of individual level factors. The social relationships by virtue of which agents acquire the particular characteristics of agency that make them individuals with certain self-understandings is ignored and foreclosed as a realm for consideration. Giving structure primacy involves focusing on agents' conformity to the logic required by that structure and as such does not allow the generation of those structures to become an issue for analysis.\textsuperscript{73}

The structurationist alternative, with its debt to scientific realism and calls for a dialectical synthesis, stands as an alternative, but it might be not so much a resolution as a deferral. The influence of scientific realism upon structurationism gives the latter, despite its calls for a dialectical synthesis, a dichotomized approach that reflects the former's ontological distinction between the natural and social sciences (see the discussion in the next chapter). As Wendt argues, "Structuration theory...conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities."\textsuperscript{74} This provides a research program for International Relations that, although combining structural and historical research, seems to depend upon the prior isolation of


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, pp.342-347.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, p.360.
political and economic structures in the domestic and international spheres. As such, it does not break with the tendency to ground explanations in exclusive domains each with its own preestablished identity.

With these points in mind, the task is to consider an alternative explanation which does not posit an ontological break between agents and structures but, rather, sees them as connected to each other in a network of practices. In addition to the fact that such an approach offers the potential for a more satisfactory account of the Carter administration's foreign policy, recent changes in social theory suggest that a style of inquiry which textualizes the domain of inquiry has considerable metatheoretical force. These changes, and the debates surrounding them, are the subject of the next chapter.
INTRODUCTION

The philosophical insurgencies that have taken place within the discipline of International Relations are both an instance of, and a response to, a wider interdisciplinary debate in the social sciences that has been underway for some time. Any attempt to characterize this multifaceted, varied and tension-riddled conversation inevitably results in an over-simplified and often crude account. The contributors to this debate come from disparate intellectual bases, have divergent interests, and exhibit different approaches. However, without wishing to suggest a premature synthesis or an intentional convergence, it is possible to argue that a number of these contributions have intersected in such a way that the last century in Western social and political theory has seen a general move towards "critical social theory", if we understand by that term a perspective that seeks to provide a critique of the (often) unstated assumptions in a theoretical tradition, and the links between theoretical traditions and social and political practice.¹ This is not to suggest it is a shift free of resistances or that it has resulted in the establishment of a new orthodoxy. Rather, to speak of a general

shift towards critical social theory is to maintain that the issues it raises cannot be avoided in any debate on the nature of social and political inquiry.

The existence of this interdisciplinary debate has been indicated by (among other developments) the proliferation of concern with "postpositivist" and "postempiricist" debates in the philosophy of science, "poststructuralism" and "postmodernism" in literary criticism, and "discourse analysis" and other language-centered approaches in the social sciences. No one conclusive position - no attempt to construct a rigorous grand theory - emerges from these fields. In fact, the very notion of there being a singular position by which to order, understand and judge human endeavour has been the major casualty of these debates. Though a recurrent theme in the cultural and intellectual practices associated with modernity, the belief that there is an Archimedean point, a naturalized foundation outside history and social practice in which analysis and action should (and indeed must) be grounded, has probably been the major point of metatheoretical intersection amongst the contributors to the interdisciplinary debate. No matter what their differences, scholars as diverse as Wittgenstein and Derrida, Kuhn and Foucault, Rorty and Lyotard, Habermas and Feyerabend, Winch and Gadamer (among others) agree on this.

There are many ways into this debate; many points at which one could make an incision into the literature and demonstrate some of the themes that are its concern. This chapter takes some of the recent debates in the philosophy of the natural sciences, identified by the term
"postempiricism", as its point of departure. The choice is, in one sense, arbitrary: any number of starting points is provided by the above mentioned scholars. It is, however, a potentially powerful starting point when considering the contribution of the interdisciplinary debate to a discipline such as International Relations. Like many if not all the social sciences, International Relations was shaped by the influence of science and technology in the development of the modern world. The potential for control and predictive capacity that the natural sciences seemed to offer for humanity's relationship to the natural world provided a model that the practitioners of social science sought to emulate.

However, the developments associated with the postempiricist debates have served to demonstrate that the conventional ( positivist) understanding of scientific procedure that the social sciences have striven - unsuccessfully - to emulate does not actually represent the conduct of scientific enquiry. Concomitant with this has been a number of broader philosophical developments which, when combined with a new understanding of science, serve to demonstrate that the influence

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2. See Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980). I want to stress that "postempiricism" is not an intellectual development that can be considered as constituting a single, well-defined tradition. Its participants are many and varied, and the appropriate metaphor of its status is probably that of a continuing conversation (as in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980)) rather than a consensus. The synthetic characterization of postempiricism that follows - as with that of positivism - is designed to provide a guide for the understanding of interdisciplinary changes, changes that might go unrecognized without such a focus. For discussions that employ the term postempiricism see D. Thomas, Naturalism and Social Science: A Post-Empiricist Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
of positivism upon the way in which all intellectual enterprises in the modern period have been viewed has resulted in a limited perspective that has served to exclude many potentials.

Nonetheless, positivism, as a general intellectual style deriving its authority from the conventional understanding of the natural sciences, continues to dominate research in the social sciences, including International Relations. If debates within the philosophy of science and social theory have demonstrated correctly that the positivist conception is limited, the theoretical foundation of all the social sciences - including International Relations - will be problematized in such a way as to allow the pursuit of a variety of new theoretical paths previously closed off.

Before proceeding to consider the postempiricist debates, something needs to be said about positivism and its place in the discipline of International Relations.

POSITIVISM: SOME GENERAL THEMES

To embark upon a discussion of positivism is to enter a minefield of

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contention about the meaning of the term. I use the term positivism here to designate a general intellectual style that still dominates contemporary academic inquiry as well as the social and political order. While few Anglo-American thinkers have regarded themselves as positivist, "the positivist temper has had a profound influence on them".4 Others acknowledge that positivism, despite almost general condemnation, remains probably the most influential stream of thought in contemporary society. McCarthy has noted that the legacy of positivism "pervades contemporary thought";5 and Alexander has described the "positivist persuasion" ("more an amorphous self-consciousness than an intellectual commitment") as "a persuasion that permeates contemporary social science".6

To understand this general intellectual style it is necessary to understand the important role of the empiricist theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge gave rise to the positivist conception of science during the great transformations of the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When generalized as a general philosophy of inquiry during the Enlightenment, this conception of knowledge became characteristic of industrialized society to this day.7

The heart of empiricism is the view that sensory experience provides

the only legitimate source of knowledge. Experience refers to direct sensory access to a reality comprising material things. As with all epistemologies, the empiricist conception of knowledge understands knowledge as deriving from a particular relationship between subject and object. In the empiricist case, that relationship is one in which there is "a subject and something that is given to or confronts that subject, phenomena, objects, the world, etc." The distinguishing feature of the empiricist relationship between subject and object is that the process takes place between a given subject and a given object.

Classical empiricism was constructed on the basis that knowledge came from direct experience of an independently existing world, and that knowledge could be understood as being generated inductively from observation of the material world. In more modern forms of empiricism, inductivism was replaced by the understanding of knowledge being generated deductively, with observations becoming subject to empirical testing.

To provide an account of the social and historical context of the development of positivism and empiricism - and the contribution of positivism and empiricism to the social and historical context - is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice to say, however, that the

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8. Hindess, Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences, p.16.


10. See Alan Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1976).

11. For a discussion of some of these issues see Margaret C. Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).
intellectual developments of the Renaissance period, of which the scientific revolution was the centerpiece, were involved in overcoming the dominance of theology, included the centering of "man" and "reason" in philosophical discourse, and saw the construction and legitimation of the state (with all the violence that entailed and allowed) as the basis for political order.

What is important for the argument here is to recognize that for all its emancipatory intent, the paradox of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge is that it was eventually transformed into a dogma of even greater proportions than the ones it originally replaced. By the end of the nineteenth century, its dominance meant that "the theory of knowledge became the philosophy of science; reason became scientific reason; and the interest of reason was either denied or equated with the technical interest in prediction and control of objectified processes".12 It is this cultural understanding of science (as "scientism") that "has set the context for the intellectual and cultural problems in the modern world."13

The shift from science as an enlightening force challenging traditional orthodoxies to the establishment of science as the orthodoxy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century is the result of two factors. First, with society increasingly scientific, all facets of social life became centered around technical control over nature and

administrative control over humans. This altered the relationship between technical and practical knowledge. Previously, in the classical tradition of politics, issues in the social and political order were practical issues, questions of the just and good life. With the rise of scientism, the sphere of the practical was absorbed by the sphere of the technical, so that political issues became questions of order and efficiency.

This created the second facet of positivism's path to orthodoxy and eventually dogmatism. With this (technical) relationship between theory and practice, positivism could not justify its own interests. If all values were subjective, then positivism's particular relationship to practical life (its commitment to science and technology and opposition to metaphysical dogma) is not rationally justifiable. On the other hand, if an interest in enlightenment is rational, then reason harbors a practical interest and is incapable of being exhausted by the terms of science and technology.¹⁴ There is, therefore, a line (albeit complex, often disparate and frequently resisted) from Enlightenment ideals to the modern forms of positivist thought. As Bernstein declares, "What were once great liberating ideas have turned into suffocating strait jackets."¹⁵

The rise of scientism means a critique of social life can use a critique of positivist epistemology as an important starting point. This has to be coupled with the recognition that in the intellectual exercise

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of working through the critiques of positivism there is a practical and moral concern. Unless one is satisfied with the current state of humanity - with its poverty, oppression and militarization - there is "some urgency to the task of political theory." We have to "elucidate and examine the most prominent paradigm of reality, its characteristic institutions, the social and political forces which stimulate and support modes of rationality, and to explore alternatives to the 'giveness' of everyday life." The postempiricist debates have demonstrated the presence of these issues and concerns in the philosophy of science.

POSTEMPIRICISM AND THE
POSITIVIST CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE

One of the most important contributions to the postempiricist debates has come from Mary Hesse. Along with the work of Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin and Paul Feyerabend, among others, Hesse has argued that the positivist conception of science has come under sustained criticism, and demonstrated the existence of a debate focusing on "the meaning, nature and scope of rationality." As Bernstein notes;

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17. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.20. For the purposes of this argument the work of Popper and the scientific realists is considered as part of a broadly defined positivist tradition. Although they incorporate much of the critiques of positivism within their positions and might therefore be considered as part of the postempiricist literature (particularly true for the scientific realists), and despite intentions to the contrary, I would argue they are ultimately influenced by or dependent upon empiricist epistemology. For discussions of Popper in this light see G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971); David Frisby, "The Popper-Adorno Controversy: The Methodological Dispute in German Sociology", Philosophy and the Social Sciences 2 (1972), pp.105-119; Ernest Gellner, Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); and C.A. Hooker, "Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy of Science: Empiricism, Popperianism
"When we stand back and view the cumulative results of the postempiricist philosophy and history of science, we realize that there has been a major transformation in our understanding of science, when compared to older rationalist, empiricist, and logical empiricist images of science." To appreciate the import of these developments, Hesse's argument needs to be detailed.

Hesse argues that the major elements of the positivist conception of science can be summarized as follows:

1. In natural science experience is taken to be objective, testable, and independent of theoretical explanation.

2. In natural science theories are artificial constructions or models, yielding explanation in the sense of a logic of hypothetico-deduction: if external nature were of such a kind, then data and experience would be as we find them.

3. In natural science the lawlike relations asserted of experience are external, both to the objects connected and to the investigator, since they are merely correlational.

4. The language of natural science is exact, formalizable, and literal; therefore meanings are univocal, and a problem of meaning arises only in the application of universal categories to particulars.

5. Meanings in natural science are separate from facts.

The positivist account of science is founded upon three assumptions

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which, coming from the basic features of empiricism, are inherent in the outline above. Firstly, naive realism: the view that there is an external world, the existence and meaning of which is independent of anything the observer does. Secondly, the assumption of a universal scientific language: the belief that this external world can be described in a language that does not presuppose anything, thereby allowing the observer to remain detached and dispassionate. Thirdly, the correspondence theory of truth: that the observer can capture the facts of the world in statements that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not.\textsuperscript{20} As Hesse argues, all these assumptions, which are present in the positivist metatheoretical discourse of International Relations, have been "subjected to damaging criticism."\textsuperscript{21}

Critiques of positivism and its relationship to the social sciences, having been prominent for over a century, are not new. So what makes the work of these authors special? The answer is that the focus of their work is directed at the conception of rationality that is at the heart of the natural sciences, which in turn has dictated the course of the social sciences.

Broadly speaking, most traditional anti-positivist critiques have argued that the model of the natural sciences is inapplicable to the social sciences given the different subject matter of the social world. These critiques included the Verstehen theories, phenomenology,

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p.vii.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
ethnomethodology, ordinary language analysis, symbolic interactionism, and all approaches understood to constitute concern with the "sociology of knowledge." Although there are undoubted differences between these approaches, they all share a fundamental objection to positivism: that the objective data of the positivist conception of knowledge simply does not exist for the human sciences, because the subject matter of the human sciences is characterized by the dominance of meaningful action.

In contradistinction to the positivist conception of science outlined in section 4, the Verstehen theorists' (which I use as an umbrella term to cover the aforementioned approaches) understanding of the human sciences has been outlined by Hesse as follows:

1. In human science data are not detachable from theory, for what counts as data are determined in the light of some theoretical interpretation, and the facts themselves have to be reconstructed in the light of interpretation.

2. In human science theories are mimetic reconstructions of the facts themselves, and the criterion of a good theory is understanding of meanings and intentions rather than deductive explanation.

3. In human science the relations asserted are internal, both because the objects studied are essentially constituted by their interrelations with one another, and also because the relations are mental, in the sense of being created by human categories of understanding recognized (or imposed?) by the investigator.

4. The language of human science is irreducibly equivocal and continually adapts itself to particulars.

5. Meanings in human science are what constitute facts, for data consist of documents, inscriptions, intentional behaviour, social rules, human artifacts, and the like, and these are inseparable from the meanings for agents.


The Verstehen theorists have contributed a great deal to the understanding of the social world, knowledge that would not have been possible had they not identified the problems with the positivist conception of science for the human sciences. There has been, however, a continuous and unresolved debate between positivism and Verstehen critiques. The perpetuation of this debate suggests that the Verstehen theorists may not have broken with positivism as completely as they intended.

The reason for this involves the fact that in seeking to distinguish the social sciences from the natural sciences, the Verstehen critics did not question the positivist account of the natural sciences - just its inapplicability to the social sciences. This acceptance of the positivist account of natural science means that positivism and Verstehen theorists "share a fundamental epistemological assumption: the opposition of subject and object."24 The positivist approach has been based on the privileging of the object side of this dualism, with the view that knowledge can only be knowledge when it is objective (i.e. when all human and historical factors are purged from it). In seeming contrast, the Verstehen theorists have privileged the subject side. Recognizing that objective knowledge in the positivist sense does not exist for the human sciences, the Verstehen theorists have emphasized the subjectivity of knowledge.25 This has established a hierarchy


between the natural and social sciences, with the natural sciences being understood as the exemplar of rationality, objectivity and truth. Positivists and Verstehen theorists are, therefore, "two sides of the same coin...The subjectivism fostered by [Verstehen] is...the counterpart of the objectivism of positivism."\(^2\)

Notwithstanding their insights, the earlier anti-positivist critiques failed to overcome positivism as they intended because in their acceptance of the positivist conception of science as the exemplar of knowledge they were ultimately positivists themselves. This failure has not been fully appreciated because the positivist/Verstehen debate has set the terms for methodological discussions in the social sciences, thus operating "as a logical straightjacket which prevents the posing of important questions necessary to the development of the field."\(^2\)\(^7\) The focus of attention has to be on how this fundamental epistemological opposition has been established as the foundation of knowledge.

It is the contribution of the postempiricist debates that they differ from the Verstehen critiques in the focus on the core of the contention between positivists and anti-positivists: the Enlightenment conception of knowledge. For the Enlightenment "the search for truth meant the search for foundations, that is, an indubitable element of human existence that can 'ground' human knowledge."\(^2\)\(^8\) Scholars in the

\(^{26}\) Ibid, pp.168-169.


\(^{28}\) Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge, p.8.
postempiricist tradition are thus concerned with the rejection of foundational thought.

In accepting the positivist conception of science, both positivists and anti-positivists have shared the Enlightenment form of rationality with its particular conceptions of "truth" and "objectivity". However, by focusing on the natural sciences and the way they proceed, postempiricist philosophy of science has demonstrated that the orthodox positivist model is not a satisfactory account of the actual conduct of science. As Thomas Kuhn has noted: "No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature."29

The very conception of knowledge that we have come to associate with the natural sciences has therefore been undermined. The new critiques of the positivist conception of science entail the rejection of the fundamental premise of the empiricist conception of knowledge - the subject/object dichotomy from which comes the belief that there is a world of phenomena independent of observers that confronts observers. The postempiricist account therefore depends upon a new understanding of the subject/object relationship as a dialectical relationship rather than a fundamental opposition. This, according to Hesse, gives rise to a conception of science involving the following principles:

1. In natural science data is (sic) not detachable from theory, for

what count as data are determined in the light of some theoretical interpretation, and the facts themselves have to be reconstructed in the light of interpretation.

2. In natural science theories are not models externally compared to nature in a hypothetico-deductive schema, they are the way the facts themselves are seen.

3. In natural science the lawlike relations asserted of experience are internal, because what count as facts are constituted by what the theory says about their interrelations with one another.

4. The language of natural science is irreducibly metaphorical and inexact, and formalizable only at the cost of distortion of the historical dynamics of scientific development and of the imaginative constructions in terms of which nature is interpreted by science.

5. Meanings in natural sciences are determined by theory; they are understood by theoretical coherence rather than by correspondence with facts.30

What has happened, as a consideration of this outline in comparison to the earlier discussion of the Verstehen theorists makes obvious, is that all the points that were made about the logic of inquiry in the human sciences in contrast to the natural sciences, have now been made about the natural sciences themselves.31 The single most important consequence of this development is that, by undermining the separation of subjects and objects, "the whole framework of thinking that poses questions with reference to...dichotomies is being called into question."32 This means that any claim to knowledge that relies on dichotomies which invoke a subject/object dualism by, for example, juxtaposing facts against values, objective knowledge versus subjective prejudice, or empirical observation in contrast to normative concerns, "is

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32. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.23.
emasculated and epistemologically unwarranted."³³

The next task is to consider very briefly the philosophical developments concomitant with, and contributing to, the rise of postempiricism. There is an important reason why the philosophical sources of postempiricism need to be considered. The sterile debate between positivists and Verstehen theorists has continued for so long because the perspective of the protagonists was too narrow - they failed to see that they shared the epistemological heart of the positivist conception of science. The significance of the developments surrounding postempiricism comes from the fact that they do not constitute another distinct tradition, but rather an understanding of rationality that probes the basis of all intellectual procedure. Instead of providing a critique (as traditionally was the case) by invoking and juxtaposing one discrete tradition against another, thereby calling a subject/object dualism into service, the developments signified by postempiricism question the very construction of traditions in dichotomized ways. Although the immediate focus here is the philosophy of science, their strength is derived from their interdisciplinary nature.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES OF POSTEMPIRICISM

For the purposes of this argument, the new critiques of positivism can be illustrated by reference to three sources. Firstly, there are the changes in analytic philosophy which have undermined the notion of a

universal scientific language and through it the correspondence theory of truth. Secondly, there are the Verstehen critiques identified above. In the same stream, though breaking out of the logical dependence on positivism's conception of science, are the hermeneutic critiques. These serve to discredit all three of positivism's assumptions. Thirdly, there is the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory, subject recently to increased interest in Anglo-American circles. In a chapter of this size it is possible to do no more than state the central points associated with each source and provide some references.

Analytic Philosophy

Analytic philosophy is a way of thinking that originally complemented the twentieth century variant of positivism, logical positivism. It revolutionized Anglo-American philosophy in the early part of this century because it focused on language. Through the appropriation of the early Wittgenstein's philosophy, which regarded language as transparent to the world, the logical positivists were able to give substance to their claim of a universal scientific language and a correspondence theory of truth. Language was understood as corresponding directly with reality, a correspondence that could be derived from observation and which provided the basis for judging truth.

34. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.20.

There has been, however, a "linguistic turn" in analytic philosophy that has given rise to a new view of the role of language. Emerging from changes in Wittgenstein's view, recent pragmatic philosophy, and Continental traditions of thought, the import of the linguistic turn is to reject overwhelmingly the notion that one can get "behind" language to what "grounds" it. Language is instead implicated in all social practice and therefore incapable of providing an "objective" description. With this conclusion, the changes in analytic philosophy converged with developments in the hermeneutic tradition.

Hermeneutics

Largely a Continental tradition of thought originally concerned with the understanding of biblical, classical and legal texts, hermeneutics developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through writers such as Dilthey as part of an effort to recover the "subjective" basis of knowledge: a recognition of the contribution of the author's internal point of view to various cultural products.


As discussed above, the Verstehen theorists were part of the early hermeneutic tradition which was ultimately positivist. It was not until a shift in hermeneutic understanding in the twentieth century, initiated by Heidegger and developed in the "philosophical hermeneutics" of Hans-Georg Gadamer, that hermeneutics offered a comprehensive critique of positivism. The principle feature of this development was that it rejected the notion that understanding was grounded in the author, regarding understanding instead as a fundamental and defining characteristic of humans. In this way, all understanding was historically conditioned, thereby making it impossible for interpreters to seek an Archimedean point outside this situation.\(^{39}\)

Gadamer's claim that hermeneutics is no longer the art of interpretation, but rather a fundamental element of what it is to be human, is submerged by the "giveness" of everyday life, the seemingly natural character of social institutions and practices. However, knowledge is not given to us as though we were passive receptors. We come to know those institutions and practices by a complex process of understanding and interpretation. Without such understanding and interpretation we would not be able to understand and communicate; in other words, we would not be human.

What Gadamer's hermeneutics does is force us to recognize that the

obvious is still an instance of understanding and interpretation, no matter how familiar it is. It forces us to "explore the invisible": we must recognize that the problem of understanding comes into play at the level of observation and description. As Gadamer states, "We are always hearing - listening to something and extracting from other things. We are interpreting in seeing, hearing, receiving...So it is obvious that there is a real primacy of interpretation."  

Critical Theory

The third source of the new critique of positivism is the tradition known as Critical Theory. Originally associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, it has been substantially developed by Jurgen Habermas. Critical Theory has always had the critique of positivism as one of its central aims, largely because of the link it sees between positivism, technical rationality, and the form of contemporary industrialized societies. Summarizing the breadth of the Critical Theory project is extremely difficult. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on but one aspect, Habermas's notion of cognitive interests, to signal Critical Theory's contribution to a comprehensive critique of positivism.


For Habermas, the role of science as the paradigm of all knowledge meant the demise of the communicative and practical dimension in the understanding of social life, the reduction of praxis to techne. This was not a problem of science per se but, rather, the universalization of science’s technical reason to the status of all reason. The task, therefore, was to develop a comprehensive theory of rationality in order to locate technical reason in its proper and limited place.43

The problem was compounded when one realizes that philosophy did not escape the impact of scientism. The guiding principle of Habermas’s critique of positivism is “that we disavow reflection is positivism.”44 Although Kant’s transcendental perspective regarded science as but one category of knowledge, the dominance of positivism by the latter half of the nineteenth century meant that this extra dimension to the theory of knowledge, the importance of epistemology over methodology, was removed.45 It is this concern with the dissolution of epistemology since Kant that leads Habermas to formulate his theory of cognitive interests.

The notion of cognitive interest seeks to radically reformulate epistemology by disclosing the source of knowledge in human life. In general terms, cognitive interests are quasi-transcendental: the human species has specific interests that have to be pursued if it is to survive,

interests that are bound to a specific form of social order. Habermas identifies three cognitive, or knowledge-constitutive, interests: (1) a technical interest in controlling nature; (2) a practical interest in furthering communication; and (3) a critical interest in reflection and emancipation. In focusing upon the interests that constitute knowledge, Habermas argues that he rejects the positivist attempt to discover a neutral and permanent framework with which to ground knowledge. As he writes, "All attempts at discovering ultimate foundations...have broken down." It is a claim that pinpoints some of the ground for one of the important, contemporary areas of contention in social theory: the debate between Habermas and Foucault over the understanding of modernity.

The philosophical developments briefly discussed here have all contributed to the demise of the three major assumptions of a positivist conception of science. The new appreciation of language, the recognition of the universal status of the process of interpretation, and the identification of knowledge-constitutive interests, mean that the notions of naive realism, a universal scientific language, and the correspondence theory of truth, are not sustainable. This is in accord with the developments within the philosophy of science. The concern of the next

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46. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.


section is to illustrate the consequences of this situation for the social sciences.

POSTEMPIRICISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The most fundamental consequence of the positivist conception of science for the social sciences has been what might be called the bifurcation of understanding. Employing an empiricist epistemology, the positivist conception of science has enshrined the notion that subjects and objects are logically independent. Reality is an object that exists independently of any subject observing it, and this independent reality is the foundation of all knowledge. The subject comes to know reality through the process of observation of this independent object, whether or not the knowledge generated by observation is achieved inductively or deductively.

This bifurcation has spawned a plethora of dichotomies and dualisms that invoke a subject/object divide and which underlie most intellectual enterprises. These dualisms include the distinctions between theory and practice, empirical and normative theory, theory and fact, individual and society, agency and structure.

Having developed in response to the (direct and indirect) influence of positivism, the social sciences should take account of the insights associated with postempiricism. Although the social sciences continue to operate for the most part along positivist lines because of the failure to accept that a comprehensive alternative can emerge out of the above
critiques, it is no longer possible to proceed innocently along such a course. The major implications of the postempiricist debates can be summarized as follows.

The fundamental emphasis of postempiricism is anti-foundationalism. The notion that there was an independent world of phenomena that confronted observers was the basic premise of empiricism and the positivist conception of science. It was thought to provide the foundation for human knowledge, a source independent of the prejudices of an observer. To advocate an anti-foundationalist position, however, is not the same as advocating that there are no foundations; i.e., that there is definitely no reality independent of human agents. In the international relations context, there are very clearly structural transformations beyond the control of individual citizens, and often beyond the direct control of governments. However, the foundationalist emphasis of positivist thought has tended to treat those transformations as products of an external reality from which our knowledge is derived. The point of the anti-foundationalist position is that there may well be an external reality, but because it is not naturally given, it cannot be the foundation of our knowledge.

In the same way that Habermas argued that we conceive of an independent reality because of the logic of the technical cognitive interest, the anti-foundationalist position argues that things are treated as "real" because, in terms of a certain logic, we have to understand them as "real". This is not, however, akin to the position (associated with symbolic interactionism) that if we define situations as real they
are therefore real in their consequences. It is a much more sophisticated argument. It stresses that the very ability to be understood and to make sense of one's situation depends upon granting "facticity" to certain social practices.\footnote{49. See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p.331.} This reorients the starting point for social research. The focus of our attention, particularly in a social and political inquiry like international relations, has to be on the intelligibility of the reality that surrounds us. We have to concern ourselves with the process by which we come to know, the way in which social practices constrain forms of knowledge, and the way in which established forms of knowledge constrain social practice.

Postempiricism is thus concerned with "an examination of the relationship between human thought and human existence."\footnote{50. Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge, p.9.} This approach is not anti-empirical. A critique of positivism such as this one is not arguing that we can do away with empirical correlation of one's argument. Postempiricism argues that there are three moments intrinsic to all theorizing: empirical correlation, interpretation, and critique. Empirical correlation or "methodological objectivism", the initial confrontation of the object by the inquiring subject, is a necessary moment in all research.\footnote{51. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.72.} Whereas positivism rationalized that was the end of the theoretical process (essentially by disguising its commitment to certain interests), it has to be recognised that this initial moment is just the beginning of a multifaceted process. As Bourdieu has argued,
this initial moment "demands its own supersession." It does so because what positivism took to be "brute" or "given" data that provided the foundation of research is itself "the product of complex processes of interpretation which have historical origins." To take it as given is to deny the process that brought about its constitution and conceive of the data as emerging from a hypostatised totality outside of individual and group history. As Bourdieu notes, objectivist knowledge must be put "back on its feet by posing the question of the (theoretical and also social) conditions which make such knowledge possible." A postempiricist perspective therefore involves a reintegration of the theoretical process, the overall picture of which is well summarized by Bernstein: "The search for empirical correlations, the task of interpreting social and political reality, and the critique of this "reality", are not three distinct types of inquiry. They are three internal moments of theorizing about social and political life."

It is possible to conclude that the broad task of an analyst operating within postempiricist parameters is to "explore the way in which background assumptions preform and structure both thought and existence." This means that researchers have to be principally concerned with the social constitution of meaning, the linguistic

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52. Ibid.
55. Ibid, p.4.
construction of reality and the historicity of knowledge.58

Most importantly, a critical research strategy entailed by the postempiricist debates has to operate in terms of a more comprehensive understanding of rationality. The positivist conception of science entails a mode of rationality that is unlike the actual conduct of science, which is more hermeneutical than positivist. In other words, the "unscientific" appearance of postempiricism has been the character of science all along.59 The postempiricist debates have demonstrated that the rationality of scientific enquiry involves argumentation, persuasion and conversion, rather than the models of deductive proof or inductive generalization. The sharing of criteria by scientists within the community requires intersubjective communication, which means that criteria are interpreted and applied to particular cases about which decisions are being made. It is not the case, as positivism would argue, that to be able to proceed rationally requires the prior establishment or identification of standards to which the parties in conflict can appeal. No conception of knowledge has ever operated on those grounds, yet the ability of humans to argue, debate and develop has not been impaired.60


60. Consider the scientific development that shaped much of the Western thought, the Copernican Revolution. Copernicus developed a cosmology that demonstrated that the sun, not the earth, was at the center of our universe. Contrary to the (positivist) view that Copernicus's theory replaced the "empty speculations" of the Aristotelian with laws which he derived from observed facts, it was the Aristotelian who "could quote numerous observational results in their favor." Paul Feyerabend, "How to be a Good Empiricist: A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological", in The Philosophy of Science, ed. P. H. Nidditch (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.13n. It was Copernican theory which, not possessing independent observational support, was
We have to realize that "giving up" recourse to ultimate foundations will not debilitate us, because we have never had those foundations in the first place.

To talk in such terms often brings forth responses indicative of what Bernstein calls the "Cartesian Anxiety". The Cartesian Anxiety is usually expressed in terms of "relativism", the idea that if there is no permanent foundation then all that can be is "irrational" or "arbitrary". It stems from the philosophy of Descartes, which maintained "the conviction that the philosopher's quest is to search for an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge." The theoretical case for adopting the postempiricist account of science is overwhelming, yet the Cartesian Anxiety raises the specter that if we abandon positivist notions - even though we recognize they are limited - we will be left with no way of distinguishing "true" from "false", or making any judgments at all. If there is no Archimedean point, this objection runs, how can we know our world?

The Cartesian Anxiety is, however, not just the product of a

inconsistent with recorded observations and entrenched theories. As Feyerabend declares; "this is how modern physics started: not as an observational enterprise but as an unsupported speculation that was inconsistent with highly confirmed laws." Ibid. This is not to suggest that Copernican theory was a flight of fancy, but simply to note that it relied on validation independent of observational support. Lakatos and Zahar state that this case is a typical example of how a history of science undermines a philosophy of science..." Imre Lakatos and E. Zahar, "Why Did Copernicus' Research Program Supersede Ptolemy's?", in The Copernican Achievement, ed. R. S. Westman (Berkeley: University of Californian Press, 1975), p.360.

61. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, pp.16-17.

62. Ibid, p.16.
philosopher's interest in epistemology but an issue with a practical-moral dimension for the conduct of everyday life. The search for objectivity stems from the suspicion that we cannot make rational judgments unless we go beyond ourselves: that if we are to proceed in society then there must be some non-subjective means of doing so. The Cartesian Anxiety is, in other words, the manifestation of the wider "quest for some fixed point, some stable rock upon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us."63 Hiding within is a broader practical issue. The resistance to the anti-foundational logic of the new positivist critiques can be understood as the fear that the Western, liberal-democratic tradition might not survive the removal of the privileging of objectivity. Given that western industrialized society has been made over by positivism, there could be the fear that once scientism is put in its place, the practices of western society could be threatened. But the solution to the Cartesian Anxiety cannot be found within the epistemological source from which it comes. So long as it is accepted that there is a potential Archimedean point, people are bound to search for what is simply not there. The quest is thus not only hopeless from the outset, it increases the anxiety. Only by exorcising the unfounded but seductive appeal that social and political life has to be organized by recourse to either one option or another, will it be possible to move towards a situation where the enormous practical issues that confront humanity in everyday life can be confronted.

63. Ibid, p.18.
To this point, this chapter has covered a great deal of often complex intellectual territory to fully establish the basis for, and the urgency of, a consideration of the theory question in International Relations. The above discussion has illustrated how positivism, in deriving its authority from the positivist conception of science, has shaped the nature of the social sciences. An examination of the debates within the philosophy of science, combined with a consideration of the philosophical sources that have contributed to them, illustrated the problems with the positivist conception of science. Any recourse to this conventional view of science as the foundation of knowledge is therefore recourse to practices that serve particular interests (interests associated with the construction of political identity). In the absence of ahistorical foundations, it has been argued that social scientists should have the social construction of meaning, the linguistic construction of reality, and the historicity of knowledge as primary concerns. The final section of this chapter seeks to sketch the intersection between these concerns and another major component of the interdisciplinary debate, poststructuralism.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM

Associated particularly (though far from exclusively) with the writings of French social theorists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, poststructuralism has much in common with the postempiricist debates outlined above. It has a similar disdain for foundationalism (usually expressed in terms of 'logocentrism' or the 'metaphysics of
presence'); shares the view that language is central to the constitution of social life (although it details this in terms of discourse and texts); and agrees that the historicity of knowledge is a major concern.

In this context, it might have been appropriate to include poststructuralism as the fourth philosophical source of postempiricism in the above discussion. The reason for not doing so is that for all the points of intersection with the postempiricist debates and the general move towards critical theory, poststructuralism argues a number of distinctions that will have considerable bearing on the analysis of international relations and foreign policy that is to follow. Most importantly, poststructuralism - particularly the work of Michel Foucault that will be at the center of this discussion - takes a different conception of the human subject than that which is at the center of most critical theory.

Whereas much of critical theory takes critique to involve the uncovering or emancipation of an already given "man" whose autonomy and freedom is bound by ideology or some such imposition, Foucault has summarized his work as having the objective of creating "a history

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of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects."67 For Foucault, the modern individual is an historical achievement. There is no "universal person" on whom power has operated. All these operations occur, but they do so by a series of complex strategic developments of which the individual is an effect.68

The thorough-going anti-foundationalism of Foucault's poststructuralism - an anti-foundationalism that encompasses "man" as well as the bases upon which social and political order is constructed - is suggested when Foucault states that "Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable for self-recognition or for understanding other men."69 This thesis, usually designated pejoratively as the "death of man", is enormously controversial and the subject of differing interpretations as to its analytical and political ramifications. The issues at stake and the literature in which they are discussed are simply too large to be the subject of any sustained analysis here. Whatever the final conclusion some may arrive at, there are enough indications in the literature to suggest that poststructuralism's focus on the constitution of different subjectivities does not have to result in the

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68. Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, pp.159-160.

political quietism or conservatism with which it is often charged.\textsuperscript{70}

Moreover, the focus on the constitution of subjectivity is in part a function of poststructuralism’s genesis in a particular political context - the events of May 1968. The failure of alternatives to overcome the reimposition of state power in France served to question "all forms of political theory and organization which sought to analyze, and act upon, the structures of society as a whole. For it was precisely such politics which seemed to have failed."\textsuperscript{71}


\textsuperscript{71} Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p.142. Events such as May 1968 were not confined to Paris; a variety of social and political developments of the era seemed to carry similar messages for those who theorized about politics and society. The Vietnam and Algerian Wars, the repression of the Prague Spring, the rise of the "new class", and experiments in self-management such as in Yugoslavia were all a part of a range of international events "that already linked the emergence of new forms of struggle to the production of a new subjectivity, if only in its critique of centralism and its qualititative claims concerning the 'quality of life'." Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.150, note 45. One prominent poststructuralist, Jean-Paul Lyotard, who argued that the postmodern era is marked by the end of metanarratives, gave the following list of events as crucial in its constitution:

...the reduction of official Marxist metanarratives, especially after the break of Peking with Moscow, the political decline of the primary world power after its failure in Vietnam, the economic recovery of certain Third World countries due to the crisis in energy and primary materials, the discovery that progress has made a sterile dump of the world, [and] the ostensibly artificial character of scientific procedures...

Foucault's focus on the constitution of the human subject is in accord with poststructuralism's concern with the binary oppositions or dualisms which structure human experience. In particular, it is concerned with the centrality of the interior/exterior binary of metaphysics whereby that which is inside is deemed to be the self, good, primary and original while the outside is the other, dangerous, secondary and derivative.\(^72\) While Derrida has approached this issue through his strategy of deconstruction - reversing the original order of the dualisms to demonstrate how the displacement of the second term is central to the first\(^73\) - Foucault pursued historical research to develop a radical critique of interiority.\(^74\) In *Discipline and Punish*, his analysis of the practices associated with prisons and the constitution of criminals and criminality, Foucault demonstrates how what is confined by the prison is as much the society outside the walls (in terms of constructing its identity by disciplining its marginal characters) as it is the prisoners on the inside.\(^75\)

The critique of interiority, with its focus on the subject, is a concomitant feature of poststructuralism's replacement of ontology by cultural practices. Practices are taken to be a conjunction of discourse and procedure which emerges in a variety of places, has multiple


\(^{74}\) Deleuze, *Foucault*, pp.96-97.

authors, is not planned as a totally coherent strategy, comprises differences, and has unintended consequences. Although subjects emerge as a result of practices, Foucault does not deny that there is a considerable element of volitional activity in social life. It is his view that "People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what they do does."  

The shift to cultural practices means that interpretation becomes central to the development of humanity, and reorients critique to an examination of the practices that make forms of experience historically possible. Most importantly, the shift to cultural practices effects a refusal to take any identity - including that of subjects - as given and unproblematic. The turn to cultural practices involves the recognition that identity is constituted through a series of exclusions, and that the identity of the subject is constituted in accord with the same principle. As White has argued, "Foucault's purpose can be described as that of elucidating how an "Other" is always pushed aside, marginalized, forcibly homogenized, and devalued, as that [Western] cognitive machinery does its work. Equally, the particular events, problems, periods, sources or styles that are recognized in history are constituted in part by the order imposed on them through an interpretation; an order always dependent upon the marginalization and exclusion of other


77. Quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, p.187.

78. Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p.86.

identities and histories. Rajchman has argued that Foucault’s histories are not histories of things, but of the terms, categories, and techniques through which certain things become at certain times the focus of a whole configuration of discussion and procedure. One might say he offers a historical answer to the philosophical question as to how such things are ‘constituted’. His answer is in terms not of transcendental conditions of experience, communication, or language, but of the emergence, at specific times, of assumptions common to a scattered body of thought and policy, and his aim is to not to ‘ground’ the experience of things but to denaturalize, defamiliarize, and distance us from it, and hence to question its raison d'etre.80

The construction of identities and histories through various practices of exclusion - in other words, the imposition of a particular conduct on a field of multiplicity and ambiguity - operates through the disciplining of time and space.81 These themes will be argued in more detail in Chapter Four, but can best be illustrated by reference to the image of the Panopticon employed in Discipline and Punish.82 The tower that stands at the center of the ideal prison is not just a mechanism that allows the prison authorities to see without being seen, but is a device through which the multiplicity is ordered and controlled (so that a particular form of conduct can be imposed) by a certain distribution of space and a certain serializing of time. The effectiveness of the Panopticon is derived from the construction of the tower in such a way that the prisoners can never be sure when they are being watched, thereby forcing them to adopt certain modes of behavior in case they are being watched.

80. Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p.51.
81. See Deleuze, Foucault, p.34.
82. See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Ch.3.
In accepting that cultural practices make forms of experience historically possible through the marginalization and exclusion of "others", any analysis of practices takes on a different form. In *The Use of Pleasure*, the second volume of his work on the history of sexuality, Foucault states that "...the proper task of a history of thought, as against a history of behaviors or representations...[is] to define the conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live."\(^83\) Analysis proceeds, therefore, not on the basis of examining behavior and ideas as foundational or causal concepts, "but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed."\(^84\)

A problematization is not something that expresses or manifests the character of some base or foundation. On the contrary, a problematization is something that has made it possible in the first place to think in terms of problems and solutions, something that "has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions."\(^85\) A problematization "develops the conditions in which possible responses can be given; it defines the elements that will


\(^84\) Ibid, p.11.

constitute what the different solutions attempt to respond to. In seeking to show how different solutions to a problem have been constructed, and made possible by the way the problem is posed in the first place, it demonstrates how different solutions result from a specific form of problematization.

A problematization can be understood as a particular ordering of the contingency, chance and indeterminacy of reality. By fixing problems in a particular way and mandating the range of possible solutions, a problematization effects the imposition of relative order on what would otherwise remain ambiguous and without meaning. In this operation of fixing, a problematization can be understood as operating with and through what Foucault terms "disciplinary power".

Emerging from his historical work on prisons and internment, Foucault argues that "disciplinary power" has as its chief function "the power to train, rather than to select or levy; or no doubt to train in order to select and levy." Being a process of enablement and not just a force of constraint, disciplinary power does not link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks to bind them together in such a way as to multiply and use them. Instead of bending all its subjects into a single, uniform mass, it separates, analyzes, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units.

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86. Ibid.

87. Michel Foucault, "The Means of Correct Training", in The Foucault Reader, ed. Rabinow, p.188.

88. Ibid.
In the regime of disciplinary power, the art of punishing that is always already present is neither a simple means of enablement or repression. It is constitutive of five distinct operations that help define and operate a problematization:

[I]t refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and the principle of the rule to be followed.

It differentiates individuals from one another in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an optimum toward which one must move.

It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the "nature" of individuals.

It introduces through this "value-giving" measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved.

Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal...

In other words, disciplinary power assists in effecting a problematization - a limitation or control on ambiguity - because it "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes."90

The effect of a problematization operating through and with disciplinary power is to objectify, and thus discipline, the ambiguity in reality.91 This objectification is achieved through inscription, the representation or enframing of people, objects and events by the power of writing. Focusing on inscription and the power of writing provides an

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89. Ibid, p.195.

90. Ibid. Emphasis in original.

91. Rajchman, *Michel Foucault*, p.84.
intersection between Foucault's work and other strands of literary theory. Literary theory's most notable contribution to social and political inquiry is the metaphor of the "text". Adopting a critical disposition towards practices of representation involves the understanding of reality as constituted by practices that impose interpretations on ambiguity. In this context, the text metaphor allows one to "read" actions and events and to foreground the process through which those situations are "written".\footnote{Michael J. Shapiro, "Literary Production as a Politicizing Practice", in Language and Politics, ed. Michael J. Shapiro (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.218. These themes are explored further in Culler, On Deconstruction.} Concomitant with the textuality of social life is the accumulation of documents, their seriation, and the organization of fields of knowledge ("disciplines"). Inscription thus makes it "possible to classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms."\footnote{Foucault, "The Means of Correct Training", p.201.}

CONCLUSION

The interdisciplinary debates underway across the social sciences have not resulted in the emergence of a new, single, grand-theoretical position from which social and political inquiry can proceed. On the contrary, they have, in their disparate ways and using their divergent sources, sought to undermine the notion of ahistorical foundations or Archimedean points upon which to ground action and analysis. This has most obviously been the case in the philosophy of science debates discussed above, where the so-called 'hard' sciences have been characterized as more hermeneutical than positivist.
The interdisciplinary debate has a two-fold consequence for a social science like International Relations. Firstly, it is no longer possible to proceed innocently maintaining the "objectivity" of one's scholarship by recourse to the "facts" or the "real world". Secondly, there has been a space created for the pursuit of research strategies with metatheoretical commitments that might have once been pejoratively labelled "subjectivist" or "idealist". Within this space there are many alternatives that could be pursued. No one single research strategy is mandated as the correct and legitimate course to follow.

This thesis employs a predominantly poststructuralist-inspired research strategy. It does so - notwithstanding that other strategies may have illuminated issues of United States foreign policy, and the Carter administration, in instructive ways - because poststructuralism offers what will be argued as a particularly appropriate point of entry to a critique of international relations theory and practice. Poststructuralism's problematization of the self, its focus on the way subjects emerge as the effects of practices, can provide a means of reconceptualizing the state and foreign policy. However, the nexus between the problematization of the self and the problematization of the state is not just an analytically convenient device. As Chapter Four will demonstrate, conceptions of "man" as the sovereign grounds of philosophical discourse are intrinsically connected to the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations.

The argument in Chapter Three concerns the way in which the discipline of International Relations should be understood, with a view
to its impact on international political practice, given the insights of poststructuralism.
Introduction

The discipline of International Relations is not a looking glass through which one can grasp the 'realities' of global politics. Just as policy makers deploy representational practices to interpret the ambiguity and complexity of global life, so do scholars and analysts of international politics. This premise comes from a poststructuralist attitude which, instead of seeing a distinction between theory and practice, sees theory as practice. There are differences, to be sure, between scholars and practitioners of international relations, but both scholars and practitioners operate via a particular problematization. They engage in practices which interpret global politics, impose a certain unity and order, and make possible the posing of a range of problems and the mandating of a range of solutions. Chapter Seven contains an analysis of the Carter administration in these terms.

How, then, might the discipline of International Relations be

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understood as a problematization? What exclusions are effected by the practices that constitute its identity? What 'others' are pushed aside, what issues are marginalized, and what concerns are normalized in its operation? To consider these issues it is necessary to examine the discipline's self-understanding. By giving attention to the tradition of international relations theory it is possible to highlight the historically constituted nature of the theory and practice of global politics, because what counts as proper scholarship helps constitute the object of inquiry.²

THE METHODOLOGICAL SELF-UNDERSTANDING OF THE DISCIPLINE

The conventional view of International Relations is that of a discipline characterized by a theoretical confusion given of the diversity of paradigms and the constant criticism of competing viewpoints.³ However, for all this diversity, there is a remarkable consensus as to what constitutes the theoretical history of International Relations. The discipline is said to have been marked by a succession of "great debates", each one of which has given way to a new orthodoxy, except


in the contemporary period, where a healthy pluralism is thought to reign.

The "great debates" are understood to comprise the clash between the 'idealism' of the discipline's first decades of existence after World War One, and the advent of 'realism' in the late 1930s and 1940s. 'Realism' is then thought to have done battle with the behavioral movement during the 1950s and 1960s in what was termed the "traditionalist-behavioralist" debates, before being, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, subject to criticism from a variety of perspectives. This most recent of periods is sometimes designated the "interparadigm" period, the "realist/globalist" debates, or the "postbehavioral" era. A brief exposition of the conventional understanding of each of these "great debates" will outline the issues involved and the approaches adopted.

'The decades of the interwar period were marked by the effort of International Relations' scholars to avert another global conflict by the application of reason to international affairs. The fundamental

4. Terms like idealism and realism which are present in both philosophical and International Relations literature, yet distinct in meaning, will be marked by single quotes when referring to their International Relations usage.

assumption of the 'idealists' was that the institutions and arrangements which characterized the relative harmony of domestic society should be replicated at the international level. The 'idealists' were of the view that because international society was becoming a "civilized club" whose members would be punished if they broke the agreed upon rules, international organizations and international law could be the guarantors of peace. Epitomized by the League of Nations, and to be found in texts such as Alfred Zimmern's The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, this perspective has sometimes been characterized as relying upon the "domestic analogy".

The international crises of the 1930s and the advent of World War Two led to the demise of the 'idealist' perspective. The inability of the League of Nations to enforce "civilized" behavior upon its member states, and of international legislation such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact to bring an end to interstate conflict, created a favorable climate in which E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis marked the intellectual shift to 'realism'. Disillusioned with 'idealism' and cynical about the prospects for the application of liberalism and morality to international

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affairs, Carr and others were not articulating a novel intellectual position. Many of the philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who wrote sporadically on international affairs (e.g. Rousseau and Hobbes) had contended that there was a qualitative difference between the domestic and international orders which meant that stability had to come before justice in the latter.9

Carr's status as the intellectual signpost for the shift to 'realism' was a product of his call for a science of international relations, where knowledge was to constitute an account of how things actually were, rather than, as the 'idealists' were alleged to have done, by ignoring the inherent and intractable features of international life and projecting onto 'reality' the wishful thinking of those who found power and conflict abhorrent. Despite this, it was not Carr who articulated in a full and coherent fashion the details of a 'realist' International Relations. More than anyone else, it was Hans Morgenthau who expressed the central tenets of 'realism' in his seminal Politics Among Nations.10


Notwithstanding the complexity and diversity of ‘realist’ writings, all shared, implicitly or explicitly, consciously or unselfconsciously, three fundamental assumptions. ‘Realists’ regarded nation-states or their agents as the most important actors in international affairs; they believed that there was a fundamental difference between domestic and international politics because of the anarchic nature of the latter; and they considered that the struggle for power and the concomitant security dilemma was the defining characteristic of the international realm. The result was an image of international affairs in which the international arena is anarchic, an autonomous realm where, with the rule of law constrained by the conflict of interests among sovereign entities, power acts as the international currency that allows independent states to exist in relative security. Such security is always tenuous and synonymous with the armed capability to back up one’s diplomacy and enforce one’s sovereignty. As Banks writes, the associated terminology - "national interest, reason of state, deterrence, power politics, legitimate self-defence, diplomatic necessity and the rest - has become the staple diet of most international relationists ever since."}

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Despite the virulence of the clash between ‘idealists’ and the ‘realists’, they shared some common precepts. Although they disagreed about the character of states and the form of inter-state relations, both can be regarded as part of what has been termed the "traditional" paradigm of international relations. Lijphart argues this paradigm revolves around the interconnected concepts of state sovereignty and international anarchy, and is bound by the metaphors of anarchy, state of nature, social contract and balance. The existence of the shared paradigm can be demonstrated by reference to Morgenthau, who rejected ‘idealism’ yet conceded that world government and collective security were still the ideals of international affairs. 13

The dominance attained by the ‘realist’ strain of the traditional paradigm is often considered to be a simple function of the new "realities" of international society in the years immediately after the Second World War, where the organization of knowledge was allegedly determined by the bipolar nature of international power. 14 However, what was interesting about the ascension of ‘realism’ to the heights of orthodoxy in the late 1940s and 1950s was that it coincided with a number of international developments that could not be immediately accommodated within its image of international society. Michael Banks has written:

Even while anticolonialism and nonalignment doctrine spread


across the Third World; while the General Assembly was debating human rights and disarmament; and while historic plans for an integrated and peaceable European Community were being worked out, teachers were presenting their students with textbooks of power and politics and editing anthologies which resurrected Machiavelli and Bismarck.\(^\text{15}\)

The intellectual force of 'realism' in the face of developments that contrasted with its image of international society is testimony to an important shift that both drew upon and contributed to 'realism's' rise to orthodoxy. Although International Relations was first institutionalized in Britain, it was not until after the Second World War that it became a fully-fledged discipline, doing so then predominantly in the United States under peculiar American influences. In the political environment of the cold war, International Relations as an American social science continued to employ the intellectual resources of 'realism' - Augustinian or Hobbesian conceptions of the nature of man as constitutive of an autonomous international realm - but for more limited purposes. Scholars narrowed their focus from broad conceptual analyses to the more restricted focus of national policies and the decision making processes of individual states.\(^\text{16}\)

International Relations flowering in the American context gave it the imprint of a particular time/space location and meant, with 'realism's' narrowing of focus, it should be considered as problem-solving theory.\(^\text{17}\) This is epitomized by the status accorded 'realist' texts such as

\(^{15}\) Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.9.


\(^{17}\) For the notion of "problem-solving" theory, see Robert W. Cox, "Social forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory", in Culture, Ideology and World Order, ed. R. B. J. Walker (Boulder: Westview
Nicholas Spykman's America's Strategy in World Politics; evidence of Michael Banks claim that the intellectual shift to 'realism' ushered in a period in which "a generation of mainstream scholars became somewhat less imaginative than political leaders."\textsuperscript{18}

Traditionalism/Behavioralism

Although able to deflect criticism in the 1950s, 'realism' did not pass without critical comment. Some found that 'realism' had given International Relations a mechanical air, where the function of statesmen was reduced to the adjustment of national power "to an almost immutable set of external 'givens'." The consequence, one critic argued, was that the 'realist' world was "a frozen universe of separate essences", behind which lay a "reactionary utopia."\textsuperscript{19} Such severe indictments were relatively rare, and even those who made them were reluctant to abandon the image of international society that the traditional paradigm promoted. However, 'realism's' resistance to criticism seemed to have come to an end later in the 1950s when the behavioral era was at its zenith in American social science. Regarded by some as the "great schism" in the modern era of International Relations,\textsuperscript{20} this debate saw behavioralist scholars condemn the 'realists' as thoroughly deficient in their understanding of what constituted

\textsuperscript{18} Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.9.

\textsuperscript{19} Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory", World Politics 11 (1959), pp.350, 352.

\textsuperscript{20} Holsti, "Along the Road to International Theory", p.341.
proper scientific procedure. Behavioralism, best reflected in work such as Morton Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics*, sought to apply Popperian notions of scientific procedure - the formulation of hypotheses, testing, falsification and prediction - to the domain of international relations.\(^{21}\) Their work was marked by a propensity for quantification and a condescending attitude to what, in the strategic studies field, Albert Wohlstetter caustically described as the "essay tradition" of the social sciences: the focus on untestable and intangible propositions of history and politics.\(^{22}\)

The behavioralists were not concerned with challenging the 'realists' image of international society - more often than not, the "scientific" research methods they advocated, especially the reliance on "hard data", accentuated the state-centric basis of 'realism'. With governments the source for much of this data, and a reluctance on the behavioralists part to consider phenomena that could not be quantified, issues and actors that fell outside a broadly defined 'realist' world were overlooked or incorporated in a secondary manner.

**Post-Behavioralism**

From the mid-1960s to the late 1970s the discipline has been

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marked by the image of competition among perspectives of the most
general kind, with the conventional wisdom being that these
perspectives coalesced into three general paradigms: "pluralist", "realist"
and "structuralist." 23 Probably the most straightforward way to enter
the conceptual confusion characteristic of these debates is through
the concept of international political economy.

The impetus behind the rise of international political economy, it is
argued, was the changing nature of global politics with the emergence
of non-state actors, economic and welfare issues, and the decline of the
zero-sum hostility that characterized the cold war. 24 As some prominent
advocates wrote: "Since international relations enquiry has not been a
very rigorous science, anomalies have been produced not so much by

23. Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.15. See
Maghroori and Ramberg, eds., Globalism versus Realism.

24. Martin Staniland, What is Political Economy? A Study of Social Theory
and Underdevelopment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) provides a
good overview of these debates. The term "international political economy" is
used here as a catch-all phrase to include the literature associated with
transnationalism, interdependence, dependency, regime analysis, hegemonic
stability theory etc. As with the articulations of the "realist" paradigms, these
divisions of intellectual labor should not be confused with distinct theoretical
approaches. See, for example, Michael P. Sullivan, "Competing Frameworks and
the Study of Contemporary International Politics", Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 7 (1978), pp.93-110. Most of the influential articles of this
period are reprinted in Maghroori and Ramberg, eds., Globalism Versus
Realism, with the essay by Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power",
a particularly good example. Other relevant literature includes Seyom Brown,
New Forces in World Politics (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1974);
Richard W. Sterling, Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974); R.W. Mansbach, Y.E. Ferguson and D.E.
Lampert, The Web of World Politics: Non-State Actors in the Global System,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976); James N. Rosenau, "Muddling,
Meddling, and Modelling: Alternative Approaches to the Study of World Politics
in an Era of Rapid Change", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 8
(1979), pp.130-144; Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of
Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University
laboratory findings as by inexplicable and/or unexpected events." These anomalies, it was argued, arose from events such as the American involvement in Vietnam, the Arab oil embargo, the prominence of multinational corporations in developing countries, and the initiatives towards detente between the superpowers.

Much of the early literature of international political economy - such as Richard Cooper's *The Economics of Interdependence* - sought to establish the empirical basis for the need to reassess the 'realist' assumptions. One of the most significant contributions to the literature in this regard came when Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye edited a special issue of *International Organization*, subsequently published in 1971 as a book entitled *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. It is a book that Robert Gilpin claims has "transformed the American discipline of international relations." The aim of the collection was to establish that there were important ramifications flowing from the emergence of transnational actors that operated in issue areas distinct

from the concerns of a power politics framework. Keohane and Nye were led to ask whether "the state-centric view, which focuses on the interstate system, [is] an adequate analytic framework for the investigation of contemporary reality?" They argued that the proliferation of transnational communication, transportation, finance and travel meant that "World politics is changing, but our conceptual paradigms have not kept pace." A number of other theorists agreed with this assessment. Puchala, for one, noted that for all the discipline's vaunted methodological sophistication its understanding of the contemporary world was probably deficient given that "theoretical development in our discipline is presently lagging behind the evolving reality of day-to-day practice in international affairs."

Keohane and Nye were to continue in their efforts to reassess 'realism', although, unlike the attempt of their 1971 work to establish a "world politics" paradigm, their later work retreated from such ambitions and settled for a more complicated view of international relations. In *Power and Interdependence*, they sought to bring together

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'realism' and the distinctive features of what they termed "complex interdependence". For Keohane and Nye, 'realism' had force as an effective instrument of policy that established a hierarchy of issues, with security politics dominating while economic and other issue areas were relegated. In contrast, complex interdependence was a condition which established no hierarchy of issues and, although not denying that there were circumstances in which force could be an instrument of policy, downplayed the applicability of military force.

The aim of Power and Interdependence was to provide a better framework for policy analysis in what they saw as a more complex world. Keohane and Nye argued that 'realism' and complex interdependence were ideal types, the value of which was that "complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism." They noted that "Without a firm theoretical underpinning, policy constructed in accord with the best blueprints for peace and world order is like the proverbial house built in shifting sand." They argued that complex interdependence provided a better template for American policy because, in changed circumstances that meant the prospects for the United States to regain its hegemonic position in the world order


35. Ibid, p.23.

36. Ibid, pp.221-222.
were marginal, the choice for U.S. policy makers "will essentially be between nonhegemonic leadership and no leadership at all."\textsuperscript{37} Although the intention was clear, the policy prescriptions that followed from complex interdependence were somewhat ambiguous. Noting that the question of power in complex interdependence had to be thought through very carefully, Keohane and Nye concluded that complex interdependence made foreign policy choices "harder", with greater emphasis needed on the formation of an agenda for world politics.\textsuperscript{38} It was a position that Walker has described as representing a "triumph of ambiguity".\textsuperscript{39} As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the mid-1970s did see the concept of complex interdependence enter the realm of public policy through the Carter administration, in which Joseph Nye, Richard Cooper and other academics of the period served.

The international political economy critiques did not go unanswered by 'realists'. Often termed "neorealism", these responses sought to demonstrate the continued salience of 'realist' assumptions in a more complex world, particularly through the reevaluation of 'realism' so as to include the economic dimension of American postwar hegemony.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p.231.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, pp.224-226, 242.


Robert Tucker, for example, attacked the notion of nonsecurity issues such as social justice; Michael Sullivan and Kenneth Waltz reasserted basic 'realist' assumptions; while Stephen Krasner sought to demonstrate that nonstate actors such as multinational corporations actually served the interest of their nation states.\textsuperscript{41}

Important in this neorealist revival was regime analysis, which came to prominence in the early 1980s and sought to explain the institutionalized patterns of behavior evident in international relations.\textsuperscript{42} The concept of regimes refers to the "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge."\textsuperscript{43} Such behavior was a potential anomaly for 'realism' which regarded international politics as primarily anarchical, marked by the absence of rules and regulations, and therefore a site of endemic conflict. The practice of international relations, however, contained a number of examples (e.g. the Law of the Sea agreements) that pointed to the increasing importance of


regularized behavior and even cooperation.

With the relative decline of U.S. economic and military capabilities after the mid-1960s, regime analysis sought to explain why, contrary to balance-of-power reasoning, the international system did not "fall apart" with the decline of the major nation. As Krasner noted; "Regimes offer one way to account for the persistence of behavior and outcomes even though basic causal factors associated with political power have changed."44 As an approach which sought to explain new developments without calling into question the foundational principles of the state-centric perspective, regime analysis sought only to make corrections to the 'realist' image of international relations rather than to supplant it.45

The development of the neorealist response was aided for some scholars by the seemingly increased prominence of military force in


45. For the argument that regime analysis constitutes a "modified realism", see Richard L. O'Meara, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 13 (1984), pp.245-264.
international relations in the late 1970s, which led to talk of a "second cold war". While the international political economy perspectives attempted to move beyond 'realism' in so far as they sought to displace power as the central organizing principle of international politics, or at least to complicate the question of power by adding dimensions other than security issues, it has been argued that the earlier international political economy literature, particularly that associated with "transnationalist" and "interdependence" perspectives, was "overtaken by events" in the late 1970s.

Not all scholars were convinced as to the import of the anomalies identified by the international political economy literature. Northedge, for example, believed the preoccupation with transnationalism to be an "American illusion." While conceding that it was "an intellectual reaction to the objective reality", Susan Strange argued that regime analysis was an example of "fadism" that overstated the shocks to the international system in the early 1970s, and drew its impetus from internal troubles within the United States that accentuated a relative decline in American capabilities. She concluded that it left international political economy "far too constrained by the self-imposed

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46. For a critical examination of these developments see Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983).


limits of the state-centered paradigm." \textsuperscript{50}

While many of the issues that the international political economy perspectives raised were adopted by 'realist' scholars and slotted into a predominantly 'realist'- or neorealist - framework, not all political economy critiques could be so accommodated. International political economy can be understood as consisting of three streams: mercantilist, liberal internationalist, and radical. While the first two can and have been made part of a "modified realism" - Gilpin's work, for example, argues that the features of interdependence derive from state policy - the third stands alone as a more comprehensive challenge to 'realism'. \textsuperscript{51}

Radical international political economy, that which is associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and other "world system" theorists, as well as more overtly Marxist analyses, stems from analyses of development and underdevelopment in the Third World. \textsuperscript{52} Formulated originally in the dependency literature, the core message of radical political economy is that one cannot explain the underdevelopment and economic dependence of ostensibly independent

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p.349.

\textsuperscript{51} Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate", pp.16-17; Staniland, What is Political Economy?, p.108. Some have sought to overcome the disjunction between realism and Marxism. For a review that stresses the interplay of 'realism' and Marxism as a source of critique for international relations theory see Andrew Linklater, "Realism, Marxism, and Critical International Theory", Review of International Studies 12 (1986), pp.301-312.

nation-states without reference to the incorporation of their economies into a global capitalist system. The challenge to 'realism' thus comes from this literature's insistence that the defining characteristic of the international system is capitalism and not anarchy.53

Whatever the intellectual force of radical political economy, and many thought it considerable, the status of International Relations as an American social science limited the impact of Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses. With the anti-communist premises of the cold war, the domestic "purges" of the McCarthy era, and the challenges for Marxism posed by Stalin, the Nazis and the Second World War, those who might have employed the Marxist paradigm in American scholarship were often removed (physically and philosophically) from the academic environment.54 The Vietnam War and the emergence of the New Left in the 1960s did something to rectify this lacunae in American social thought - most obviously in the work of the revisionist historians of the cold war - but Marxism continued to have a


diminished role as a source of critique in International Relations.\textsuperscript{55}

UNDERSTANDING THE DISCIPLINE'S SELF-UNDERSTANDING

The previous section has outlined what would be regarded by the discipline as an account of its great debates, important texts, and recent theoretical development. This "well entrenched if opaque sense of historical continuity" can be understood in a variety of ways.\textsuperscript{56} Most obviously, it could be noted that the appearance of theoretical confusion and conceptual conflict in International Relations serves to disguise the discipline's adherence to an image of international relations associated with what Lijphart termed the traditional paradigm. With the 'realist' strain of that paradigm dominant, this view argues, all attempts to overthrow it as the orthodoxy of International Relations have been without success, leading to the incorporation of the critique into a broader 'realist' perspective, or the marginalizing of the critique in the


discipline. As Vasquez concluded; "the various approaches and conceptual frameworks that have become popular in the field at different times do not constitute different paradigms but are better interpreted as elaborations of different aspects of the realist paradigm, since they do not reject the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm."

Another conclusion would be that it is not 'realism' per se that is dominant but, rather, the polarity of 'realism' and 'idealism'. In this sense, what is distinctive about the coherence of the discipline of International Relations is its propensity to structure theoretical debates in terms of well-defined and static categories, more often than not...
posed in oppositional form as dichotomies.\textsuperscript{59} This propensity is derived from the tension generated by the search for theoretical monism associated with 'realism' amid the dynamic and contingent nature of social and political reality. With monism unattainable in such a context, the only option available is to employ interpretive practices to abstract from reality and concentrate attention on the abstractions. The defence of the abstractions chosen is accomplished by demarcating the "real" from the "unreal", thereby establishing dualism as the foundation for understanding reality. The end result is "the bifurcated, abstract world of good and evil, black and white, desirable and undesirable, something to be advocated and justified, something to be relentlessly opposed, rejected."\textsuperscript{60} For International Relations, the 'realism'/idealism' dichotomy is the most powerful of these abstractions:

Not only have the major theoretical disputes in the discipline been couched in these terms, but the history of thinking about international politics in this century is conventionally organized within these categories. As something like a founding myth, this polarity has come to be treated as a relatively unproblematic ground on which major theoretical disputes can be, if not resolved, at least codified and left in peace. It has become the point beyond which metatheoretical disputes need be pursued no further. Yet this codification reduces a vast array of complex historical traditions and philosophical positions to a very simple opposition...\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory", p.69; R.N. Berki, \textit{On Political Realism} (London: J.M. Dent, 1981) p.30. The one exception to this tendency is the Martin Wight-Hedley Bull argument for a triad of traditions with Grotius as the standard bearer of the middle path between realism and idealism. However, as Walker notes of this; "...as with all appeals to a middle road, the intended compromise reinforces the legitimacy of the two poles as the limits of permitted discourse." Walker, \textit{The Prince and The Pauper"}, p.30.

\textsuperscript{60} Berki, \textit{On Political Realism}, pp.194-195.

\textsuperscript{61} Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory", pp.69-70.
In order to understand the discipline's self-understanding we must consider the practices of the discipline of International Relations through which the propensity to dualize and dichotomize operates. So long as we remain within a discourse that is oppositional in form, the continual counter assertion of one tradition against another will not be cause for self-reflection. However, if we ask "why this discourse is itself treated as the great unchanging given in the first place",62 we are led to an entirely different plane of questioning that offers the possibility of "unpacking" the historical and philosophical traditions that have been reduced to a dichotomous form.

What, then, can we say about the discipline of International Relations that allows us to understand the order and unity inherent in the theoretical debates outlined above? What is the problematization that gives coherence to the confusion of the discipline? How is the tendency to dichotomize brought about? The answer lies in the metatheoretical commitments embedded in the discipline's major texts.

There is an increasingly significant literature in International Relations that argues, among other things, that the discipline has been influenced to its detriment by a commitment to a positivist conception of knowledge.63 The significance of positivism is that, in addition to being a matrix of theoretical assumptions in its own right, it also

62. Ibid, p.82.

determines attitudes towards theory in general; that is, it provides a metatheoretical discourse. The commitment to a positivist metatheoretical discourse involves the understanding of reality as an object that exists independently of any subject observing it; that the subject comes to know reality through the process of observation of this independent object, whether or not the knowledge generated by observation is achieved inductively or deductively; and that this independent reality is the foundation of all knowledge.

A positivist metatheoretical discourse seems to predominate in the discipline. In a survey of texts prominent in the teaching of International Relations in the United States, Rosenau et. al. discovered that "the texts offer virtually no hint that what they present is other than objective reality", while Wendt (whose own position is not a complete break with positivism) has recently noted that the explicit metatheoretical statements of neorealism and world systems theory remain within an empiricist discourse. Examples of the commitment to a positivist metatheoretical discourse are not difficult to find. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, in their important introductory textbook, articulate a

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conception of theory as an intellectual tool for ordering reality: "At the simplest level, a theory - any theory - is a general explanation of certain selected phenomena set forth in a manner satisfactory to someone acquainted with the characteristics of the reality being studied." That this understanding begs a range of questions does not go unnoticed, but they declare that "The authors of this text will refrain from attempting to settle the profound questions of epistemology that have remained unsettled for centuries." The consequence is that they proceed to use a notion of theory that effectively "resolves" the epistemological issues in favor of a positivist conception without actually specifying its limitations.

Similar examples abound in the seemingly varied International Relations literature. Michael Sullivan has noted that the transnationalist and interdependence debates of the 1960s and 1970s reflected a possible misunderstanding because "Their 'picture' of the world ...may be at variance with the real world." Sullivan wrote later, although without reflecting upon his view, that underlying the exercise of assessing different views of the world "is the epistemological assumption that a real world exists and that we can know it." In their influential text, Keohane and Nye stated that it was not their

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intention to construct a model that "faithfully reflects world political reality." In the literature on international regimes, Ernst Haas noted that the many theorists "differ over...concepts that are appropriate for the description of reality," while Susan Strange, in a critique of regime analysis, believed that the interest in the area was "an intellectual reaction to the objective reality." In international political economy, Joan Spero has written that a bridge between economics and politics was necessary "if theory and analysis are to maintain touch with reality...", while Gilpin argues that "Transformations in the real world have made economics and politics more relevant to one another than in the past..."

For many, such statements will seem unexceptionable. Surely references to the "real" world and different ways of perceiving it are no more than statements of the obvious, references to what we intuitively know to be true? However, the instantaneous recognition of the "commonsense" status of these metatheoretical commitments, the belief that we are unable to conceive of an alternative process of understanding the world, is itself testimony to the dominance of positivism and its pivotal place in the identities of modernity. Our

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71. Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragoness", in International Regimes, ed. Krasner, p.341.


73. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Politics, p.3.
cultural understanding of science, and the associated influence of positivism upon the discipline, means that these assumptions and presuppositions constitute the dominant means of coping with the world and have thus escaped examination. What the postempiricist debates in the philosophy of science - and the concomitant developments in social theory, particularly poststructuralism - have demonstrated is that the isolation of these presuppositions from critical inquiry can no longer be sustained.

The propensity to dichotomize structures our understanding of global life and is sustained by the belief that the 'opposites' which are 'juxtaposed' constitute real alternatives. The Verstehen debates in social theory indicated that the appearance of difference can disguise identity, and many of the debates in International Relations have exhibited similar tendencies. For example, although the debate between the traditionalists and the behavioralists has been conventionally understood as the meeting of disparate minds, an examination of the epistemological options offered by the protagonists - the inductive British empiricism of Bull versus Kaplan's positivist conception of science - reduces it to no more than "a family feud between different versions of Anglo-American empiricism."74

The shared metatheoretical commitments give form to the problematization via which scholars and practitioners operate. The positivist metatheoretical discourse, with its subject/object dualism and

74. Walker, "Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics", pp.29, 47.
insistence on reducing contingencies to the secure ground of agency, structure or other presence, privileges a reading of global politics in terms of the state system. It helps give rise to a problematization that Ashley has termed the "anarchy problematique": international relations as being the consequence of the absence of a central agency of order combined with the presence of a multiplicity of states. The dominance of the anarchy problematique is evidenced by the fact that common to all the diverse orientations of International Relations (bar a few marginalized Marxist approaches) is the view that the discipline of International Relations is about inter-national relations. It is a view that maintains that international relations theory is that "body of general propositions that may be advanced about political relations between states, or more generally about world politics." It is a view that maintains that theory is outside the world it observes. Relations between states and world politics constitutes a given realm that cannot be theorized. When theory does attempt to get inside this world it can only do so via the internal images that people hold which affect their interpretation of reality.

The notion of taking relations between states and world politics as given involves forgetting the practices that made such an understanding


77. The classic example of this argument is Martin Wight, "Why is there No International Theory?", in Diplomatic Investigations, ed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966).
possible. The view that international relations comprises a realm of anarchy comes not from an interminable reality imparting knowledge upon passive subjects but, rather, from practices of representation that exclude or marginalize many histories, and normalize the current international order. In other words, "the appearance of global anarchy among states, far from being an eternal condition, is a social structuration taking form and moment through long-historical processes that were rich in their possibilities." The divergent theoretical traditions of International Relations, be they 'idealist', behavioralist or associated with all but the most radical streams of international political economy, operate within this problematization. The marginalization of Marxist critiques that sought to replace the state with class and anarchy with global capitalism can be explained in terms of this problematization. It allows only certain problems to be posed and only certain solutions to be considered.

The effect of this problematization in privileging a narrow reading of global politics to the exclusion of others can be demonstrated by considering how it handles the issues around non-state actors. There are two dimensions to this. Firstly, have non-state actors been excluded in terms consistent with their empirical status? In other words, has the problematization simply overlooked the existence of certain realities in global life?

Consider the "novelty" of the transnationalist and interdependence literature. This strain of international political economy that emerged in the late 1960s was premised on the notion that "World politics is changing, but our conceptual paradigms have not kept pace",79 or that "theoretical development in our discipline is presently lagging behind the evolving reality of day-to-day practice in international affairs."80 But did the world suddenly change in the later 1960s and produce a large number of novel phenomena? Were the instances that the interdependence and transnationalist literature cited as new developments - the economic power of multinational corporations and the activities of non-state actors - actually new developments not seen before the late 1960s?

In Keohane and Nye’s volume Transnational Relations and International Politics, one scholar noted that the period since the 1800s had been an era of transnationalism. The completion of the process of discovery and the export of Western technology by the imperial powers not only involved transnational relations, it was largely conducted by nongovernmental actors.81 Among the most important of these non-state actors were the European trading companies, particularly the Dutch East India Company. Exercising control over extensive non-European areas, these organizations were "semi-official bodies which enjoyed great


political influence..."\textsuperscript{82} Such organizations laid the foundations for the later development of European state control over much of the globe, but for a century or more they operated as transnational, nonstate actors. Nor was this only a European phenomenon. American multinational corporations such as the United Fruit Company (UFCO) have had a history of enormous influence in the politics of Central America, often being more significant centers of power than the states themselves.\textsuperscript{83}

The consequences for a reading of global politics have thus been more complex than the problematization simply turning a blind eye to certain issues and actors. As a result, this understanding of its impact is more comprehensive than the usual complaint that realism excludes a range of issues and actors.\textsuperscript{84} The effect of the problematization has been to marginalize accounts of exploitation and colonialism (among other histories) by constantly forcing the focus back to the position of sovereign states in an anarchic realm. Such a focus has allowed the activities of nonstate actors and the importance of nonsecurity issues - though not ignored - to be restricted to a peripheral status in the


\textsuperscript{83} Walter LaFeber, \textit{Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America} (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983). However, for all their claims about establishing a new paradigm of International Relations, scholars were careful about the degree of novelty they accorded to transnationalist phenomena. Nye, for example, conceded that transnational relations were not new, but argued the significance of the work was that for the first time actors and issues outside the 'realist' paradigm were affecting "interstate politics by altering the choices open to statesmen and the costs that must be borne for adopting various courses of action." Nye, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion", p.374.

\textsuperscript{84} An example is Michael Banks indictment that in realism, "The price of an MX missile is included; the passions of an Islamic revolutionary are not." Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", p.14.
hierarchy of concerns within the discipline. While all issues may be considered at one time or another, the way problems are posed, solutions mandated, and concerns hierarchized is a function of the interpretive practices.

The second dimension to the concern of how the problematization privileges one reading of global politics - the dimension concerned with its disciplining and hierarchizing, rather than simple ignorance, of non-state actors and issues - can be demonstrated by reference to the tension in much of the recent literature on regimes. This literature had to turn to intersubjective elements to try and explain the persistence of certain patterns of global politics despite changes in the power balances associated with the postwar world. This shift generated a tension with the positivist metatheoretical commitments of the problematization through which the regime theorists operated.

Regimes, as commonly understood, represent rules, norms and principles central to the development of actors preferences or interests. As Ruggie has argued, regimes (such as the "embedded liberalism" of the trade and money regimes associated with the Bretton Woods arrangements) are akin to language, known not by a description of their elements but by their generative grammar - the underlying principles of order and meaning that give rise to international

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85 See Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in International Regimes, ed. Krasner.
arrangements and condition their transformation. They are what Andrews has called "the language of state action."

This focus on language and generative grammar gave regimes an ontology of intersubjectivity. But the positivist metatheoretical commitments of most regime theorists do not allow for these essentially hermeneutic considerations. This tension is thus 'resolved' in favor of a state-centric reading of global politics despite the nonstate impetus to the concern in the first place. While starting from a metatheoretical position associated with ordinary language philosophy and not dissimilar to some of the themes central to the later Wittgenstein, the positivist commitments transfer the analytic orientation of regimes from a concern with the self-understandings of the actors, to the inference of intersubjective meaning (by the analysts) from actors behavior.

Although recognizing the deficiencies of the positivist commitments, Kratochwil and Ruggie argued only that this meant the problematization had to be opened up to insights from the "interpretive sciences". They noted, in terms reminiscent of the Cartesian anxiety, that their analysis should not be taken as "advocating a coup whereby

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89. Ibid, p.771.
the reign of positivist explanation is replaced by exploratory anarchy".90

The attention to non-state actors by the problematization of international relations has thus made the state-centric focus of the discipline's reading of global politics highly questionable. As Ashley argues, "the turn to nonstate actors renders radically unstable any attempt to represent a historical figure - the state or any other - as a pure presence, a sovereign identity that might be a coherent source of meaning and an agency of the power of reason in international history."91 Any depiction of the state as a sovereign identity in its own right is thus revealed as but one among many possible interpretations, all of which are possible only through "the manifestly political exclusion of others".92

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to overstate the implications of this argument for the understanding of international relations, because it goes to the very heart of how "international relations" are constituted and understood, and how the discipline of International Relations understands its own history and contemporary role. The commitment to the view that the theory of international relations was concerned with general propositions that may be advanced about the political relations among states would seem to many to be unobjectionable to the point of

90. Ibid, p.768.
91. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State", p. 234.
banality, but it 'resolves' the process of understanding global life in a particular way, through the demarcation of a theory/practice divide so that theory is outside of the world it purports to simply observe.

The postmodernist/poststructuralist approach, in contrast, sees theory as practice. In this context, international relations theory is constitutive of (though by no means solely responsible for) the understanding of global life in terms of sovereignty and anarchy, inside and outside, state and world. The 'world' we so often take for granted was not given by nature, convened by God, or constructed by statesmen: it came to be through multiple political practices related as much to the constitution of various subjectivities as to the intentional action of pregiven subjects.

The anarchy problematique invokes a positivist metatheoretical discourse. But its ability to discipline global life in ways that privilege readings of world politics in terms of the state system indicates that its effectiveness relies on more than a particular set of metatheoretical premises. How the positivist metatheoretical discourse comes to predominate over others needs to be explained by reference to wider cultural practices. Chapter Four demonstrates how the anarchy problematic in the theoretical discourse of international relations is but one instance of the pervasive cultural practices associated with foundationalism and, explicating some of the themes embedded in this conclusion, sets forth an alternative conceptualization of foreign policy. This new rendering of foreign policy will then be brought to bear on United States foreign policy, and the Carter administration in
particular, as a means of demonstrating how the anarchy problematique has given rise to dominant ways of thinking and acting.
Chapter Four

Poststructuralism, the Anarchy Problematique, and Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION

In arguing that 'reality' is the outcome of practices, a poststructuralist attitude reorients the standpoint of analysis. In place of the search for foundations, the identification of fixed entities, or the uncovering of hidden essences, analysis proceeds along lines indicated by Foucault's notion of genealogy.\(^1\) The focus becomes one of concern with how structures of history are produced, how fields of practice are demarcated and secured, and how the practices implicated in these boundary-setting procedures establish regions of silence in which alternatives to the dominant interpretation are marginalized. In particular, genealogy "disposes one to be especially attentive to historical emergence, bounding, conquest, and administration of social spaces."\(^2\)

Although stressing the ambiguity, indeterminacy, and in-principle arbitrariness of the discursive practices that establish meaning,


\(^2\) Ibid, p.409.
genealogy does not ignore the appearance of unities. Rather, its concern, given the denial of the attribution of ontological status to unity, is to bring to the foreground of analysis the social and historical practices via which certain elements have been combined so as to produce a naturalized division of social space. As a corollary to, and of equal importance with, the concern over the historical construction of social spaces, genealogy is concerned to analyze the way subjects - human agents or individuals - are themselves the effects of discursive practices that construct social space.

Bringing these concerns to the study of global politics involves approaching the international community as an arena of practice in which some subjects emerge with the status of actors, and are sustained by a variety of practices that establish the boundaries of legitimate meaning and action. The outcome is the naturalization of a particular order and the marginalization of alternatives. In the more familiar language of international relations, this approach asks the question how, in "a world of difference, change and the mobility of people, information, and social resources", the field of practice known as the international system is constructed in such a way that sovereign states are said to exist in an anarchic world, and how this particular construction is unproblematically considered normal, natural, and necessary?

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Such a question would not, in the eyes of those who would characterize themselves as traditionalists in the study of international relations, pose any problem. After all, they might argue, it is the condition of anarchy that marks the logic of the international system and which makes the existence of well-secured sovereign states necessary. However, the notion that the logic of the international system provides the reason for understanding the existence of sovereign states reverses the issue at question. This is because a traditionalist interpretation argues that international politics finds its meaning as a result of the prior existence of well-bounded domestic societies. Yet, as Giddens, for example, has argued, the development of the sovereignty of modern states depends upon the possibility of a reflexively monitored set of relations between states: "International relations' are not connections set up between preestablished states, which could maintain their sovereign power without them: they are the basis upon which the nation-state exists at all." In other words, to argue that the logic of international politics is the causal phenomenon behind the constitution of sovereign states presupposes the existence of "the very effect - the representation of a multiplicity of well-bounded states and domestic societies - that is in question."

Chapter Three argued that as a practice, the study of international relations operated in terms of a problematization (the anarchy problematique) in which the variety of perspectives said to constitute

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the great debates of the discipline rely on a positivist metatheoretical discourse. To explain how these metatheoretical premises provide the problematization with the economy and power necessary to interpret global life in a given way, the wider cultural practices which they invoke need to be considered. To approach these issues it is important to understand the role of the categories of time and space, the rise of the state as a particular resolution to those categories, and the place of boundary-creating practices in the constitution of political identity through the demarcation of 'self' and 'other'. Once these themes have been outlined, the way they form a powerful interpretative schema for the conventional understanding of international relations and foreign policy will be considered.

SPACE AND TIME

As Foucault has noted, "Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power."\(^7\) However, while time and space are indispensable categories for the understanding of the world and the self, they are not pregiven, fixed entities.\(^8\) And while time and space are fundamental to any interpretation and ordering of thought, and while the natural sciences continue to be marked by controversies over absolute and relative space, the social sciences operate for the most part with an unproblematic and almost commonsense understanding of space as a

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universal container in which objects exist and events occur. As Smith argues, "This view of space appears so self-evident that, despite its vagueness and the ambiguity that results from continually being pressed into service as a metaphor, in everyday usage we are almost unwholly critical of it. Space is simply a universal of existence." With its focus on the role of interpretation in the ordering of social existence and the constitution of social arenas and subjects, a poststructuralist attitude regards time and space as categories produced by political practices. Two examples will serve to illustrate how time and space have been constituted in different ways at different historical junctures with consequences that have extended beyond their immediate realm of concern. The purpose of these examples is simply to problematize the dominant, conventional understanding of space and time as natural and divorced from social practice.

Few articulations of space have had as much impact on human life as the way in which the cosmos has been ordered and understood. Until the sixteenth century, the structure of the universe was based upon the work of Aristotle and Ptolemy, which maintained that the earth was immobile and the center of the universe. Radiating out from the center were the other planets, the sun and the stars, each of which occupied individual spheres concentric to the earth. Adjoining the spheres were the heavens. This ordering of space had profound moral

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and political implications because it placed man at the center of the universe although under the sign of the heavens. Following the work of the astronomer Nicholas Copernicus, the "Copernican Revolution" in astronomy was a fundamental reconceptualization of the Ptolemaic interpretation of the space of the universe. Copernicus argued that instead of the sun moving around the fixed earth, it was the earth that rotated around the sun. Copernicus's heliocentric astronomy (established from mathematical calculations and in the absence of observations) had moral and political ramifications because by exchanging the places of the earth and Sun, Copernicus brought earth into the pure heavens.

Just as the articulation of space associated with Copernican astronomy, which we now take for granted as the normal and natural ordering of reality, was once considered heretical and unnatural, so too the articulation of time associated with World Standard Time and the Greenwich meridian was once an artificial and often opposed construction. It was actually railroad companies and not governments that first instituted a system of regularized time for the United States. A railroad passenger travelling from Washington to San Francisco around 1870 had to reset his/her watch more than two hundred times as he/she passed through the multiplicity of local and uncoordinated time zones. The U.S. railroads attempted to rationalize this by establishing regional time zones, but this still left some eighty different zones. It was not until representatives of twenty-five countries met in Washington at the 1884 Prime Meridian Conference that an international system of world time was devised. Greenwich was proposed as the meridian, the exact length of the day was calculated, a
precise beginning of the universal day was fixed, and twenty four time zones one hour apart were constructed to divide the earth.¹¹

The advent of World Time at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries was part of a widespread cultural transformation. Biologists explored the space perceptions of different animals; sociologists of different cultures. Artists moved away from universal perspectival space that had been dominant since the Renaissance. Novelists and the new cinema pursued the use of multiple perspectives, while the physical sciences saw the development of non-Euclidean geometry.¹² All these practices produced a rearticulation of time and space that challenged, in particular, the dominant notions of the homogeneity of space and emphasized its heterogeneity.

SPACE, TIME AND THE STATE

To understand space and time as produced by political practices is to recognize that the state cannot be a natural and preexisting entity for international relations. Although the state tends to be regarded as no more than obvious and commonsense by most, it needs to be appreciated that states are a particular construction of political space, a product of the early modern period.¹³ States are based on Galilean (as


well as Newtonian and Cartesian) conceptions of time and space. Crudely summarized, this involves the understanding of time and space as absolute entities, where space is a structure in which time is simply a measure of the movement of objects through space.\textsuperscript{14} States, as particular constructions of time and space, however, bear the historical imprint of the circumstances of their construction. As products of the early modern period, the rise of the state is concomitant with the rise of capitalism.\textsuperscript{15}

Just as the Enclosures was a particular production of space associated with the transition to capitalism, the territorial differentiation of global space into states is a consequence in part of the influence of global capital. Although capital flows are for the most part a transnational force, capital had to be immobilized in the landscape at certain junctures. Because the existence of capital is dependent on the production process, it has to come to rest in certain locations (factories, machinery, stock markets etc) in order to be reproduced. This immobilization process results in a patterned differentiation of world space.\textsuperscript{16}

A correlate of the production of space from "above" by global capital is the impact from "below" of a particular conception of sovereignty associated with the property rights intrinsic to capitalism. The

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. See Gross, "Space, Time, and Modern Culture".

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); and Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence.

\textsuperscript{16} Smith, Uneven Development, p.88.
construction of a boundary to demarcate the inside from the outside of the political container (the state) is made possible by the principle of sovereignty. This principle is related to the development of political conceptions whereby individuals become citizens through their ties to property. As Gross argues, it is not often recognized that individualism and the sovereign state were concomitant and mutually supporting developments. The development of private and public spheres was interconnected. While the individual and the state occupied separate realms, their co-existence was a case of mutual interdependence. The state was credited with freeing the individual from the bonds of tradition, while the philosophy of individualism that prospered was one that was not defined politically and thus created a private sphere.

This co-determination of individualism and the state, prominent in the nineteenth century and promoted in the twentieth, saw a convergence whereby the private ego of the individual was equated with the will of the state, thereby constructing the state as the most stable foundation of identity.

THE STATE AND POLITICAL IDENTITY:
CONSTRUCTING ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’

The conception of sovereignty which posits the individual (defined in

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part by property rights) on the inside in contradistinction to the outside, goes beyond demarcating an outside realm; it inscribes that realm as an arena of anarchy, a source of danger, and a domain that threatens the political life of the inside.

Accordingly, the specific construction of time and space associated with the rise of states does more than just demarcate boundaries in which individuals are located: it is pivotal to the construction of political identity. The division between inside and outside, between the sovereign domain and the anarchic realm beyond, is a division that constructs the notion of "self" and "other". One of the persistent themes of modern discourse (e.g. as in Aristotle's distinction between the Greeks who were inside the polis in contrast to the Orientals on the outside) has been the situation whereby the "other" provides the point of differentiation against which the "self" is defined. The differentiation between "self" and "other" is made not only in terms of different spatial and temporal locations, but also in terms of what Todorov has called an "axiological level", a level that constructs the other as good or bad, loved or hated. As Shapiro has argued, "The making of Other as something foreign is thus not an innocent exercise.

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20. For a general discussion of this theme see Anne Norton, Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).


in differentiation. It is clearly linked to how the self is understood.\textsuperscript{23} An example of this is the constitution of the "Vietcong" and the "United States" during the Vietnam War, where the former was written in policy texts (and acted upon) as colored, irrational and dangerous, while the latter was white, sober and rational.\textsuperscript{24}

The boundary between inside and outside, self and other is, however, not necessarily a clearly identifiable line that strictly delineates one realm from the other. More often than not the boundary is a diffuse, shifting and gray area marked by what has been termed "liminal" groups. These groups are ambiguous, neither wholly absorbed nor wholly rejected by societies. Their presence provides a source of identification. As Norton notes: "The recognition of liminality provides for the differentiation of self and other...Liminars serve as mirrors for nations. At once other and alike, they provide the occasion for the nation to constitute itself in reflection upon its identity."\textsuperscript{25} Chapter Five will discuss the importance of liminal groups such as women and Indians in the constitution of American identity and the role that plays in United States foreign policy. For the purpose of the argument here, an example of a liminal group is provided by Arab Israelis.

The Arab Israelis comprise a liminal group that serves to constitute

\textsuperscript{23} Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, p.101.

\textsuperscript{24} See David J. Sylvan and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Foreign Policy as Tragedy: Sending 100,000 Troops to Vietnam", Paper prepared for the XIVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, August 28 to September 1, 1988.

\textsuperscript{25} Norton, Reflections on Political Identity, p.54.
the self/other relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians.\footnote{For a discussion of the construction of Palestinian identity by various practices, including Israeli anthropology and other academic disciplines, see Edward Said, "An Ideology of Difference", Critical Inquiry 12 (1985), pp.38-58.}

Despite having full legal rights and Israeli citizenship, the Arabs who remained within the borders of the Jewish state after its declaration in 1948 continue to have the status of outsiders. As one Arab Israeli told a journalist during the Palestinian uprising; "We have an impossible situation. The Arabs see us as Jews and the Jews see us as Arabs. Sometimes even our relatives on the other side of the village laugh at us and call us 'Zionists'."\footnote{Ze'ev Chafets, "Arab Rage Inside Israel", New York Times Magazine April 3, 1988, p.26.} Significantly, the Arab Israelis refer to Israel as the "inside" while they call the occupied territories of the West Bank the "outside".

To this point, the deployment of a poststructuralist attitude has involved "un-packing" some of the themes present in the understanding of international politics as consisting of sovereign states existing in an anarchic realm. I have tried to demonstrate that the "state" as a specific resolution of time and space involves not only the construction of a boundary between inside and outside - where the former is privileged - but also the demarcation of the anarchic realm as the ground of the "other" against which the "self" is defined, both in terms of value as well as location.

By appreciating that the category "state" and the associated themes of sovereignty and political identity bear the historical mark of their
genesis it is possible to acknowledge that the disciplining of time and space in this way is arbitrary and, as a consequence, other alternatives are at least possible. This should not come as a surprise, given that we live in a world where the boundary between inside and outside, self and other, is constantly permeated. As Walker has noted, "In a world of global capital flows and Star Wars, the patterns of geopolitical space are not Cartesian." The task now is to consider how the anarchy problematique - as a problematization which differentiates, hierarchizes, and normalizes the site in which it operates - can be understood as working to produce the conventional understanding of international relations as consisting of sovereign states located in an anarchic realm.

THE PARADIGM OF SOVEREIGNTY

The anarchy problematique is effective because it replicates cultural practices that are part of a foundationalist perspective. To understand the operation of this problematization, with its focus on anarchy and the mobilization of domestic resources, Ashley's notion of the "paradigm of sovereignty" needs to be considered. The paradigm of sovereignty is not a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of a conceptual resource that man applies to make sense of the world; it is a problematization in the Foucauldian sense that serves to discipline the ambiguity and


contingency of history. But it is also more than that. Ambiguity is not disciplined by reference to a pregiven foundation. That "foundation" is constituted through the same process in which its name is invoked to discipline ambiguity. The paradigm of sovereignty refers, therefore, to these wider cultural practices of which the anarchy problematique of international relations is but one instance.

The effectiveness of the anarchy problematique lies in its replication in the theoretical discourse of international relations of a practice central to modern life, what Ashley terms the "heroic practice".30 This practice operates on the basis of a simple dichotomy; sovereignty versus anarchy. Although these terms have special significance within the discourse of international relations - a significance that depends upon their effectiveness elsewhere - sovereignty and anarchy are replicable concepts that are pivotal for the construction in various realms of mutually reinforcing dichotomies such as subject/object, inside/outside, self/other, rational/irrational, true/false, order/disorder, and so on. In each instance the former is the higher, regulative ideal to which the latter is derivative and inferior, and a source of danger to the former's existence. In each instance, "sovereignty" (or its equivalent) signifies a center of decision presiding over a "self" that is to be valued and demarcated from an external domain that cannot or will not be assimilated to the identity of the sovereign domain.

This practice is at work in most if not all realms of contemporary

life. The positivist metatheoretical discourse discussed in Chapter Three is but one instance and variation on the 'heroic practice'. In the discourses of politics its operation can be witnessed when, confronting ambiguous and indeterminate circumstances, those discourses are "disposed to recur to the ideal of a sovereign presence, whether it be an individual actor, a group, a class, or a political community. They are disposed to invoke one or other sovereign presence as an originary voice, a foundational source of truth or meaning." Most importantly, it is only those discourses of politics that replicate this heroic practice that are taken seriously as possible sources of truth and meaning. Alternative discourses that are less certain if not totally sceptical of foundations are themselves made objects of this heroic practice. If alternative discourses cannot be assimilated to some sovereign presence they often find (as in the case of poststructuralism itself) that they are designated as "anarchical" and hence themselves a problem to be solved.

The power of the heroic practice comes from the fact that the practices of modernity are constituted in large measure by the privileging of identity over difference. One of the constitutive principles of modernity is that the concept of self is defined in terms of self being divorced from, or at least able to transcend, the limits of tradition. As Kolb has argued, "The self as united and unifying becomes the center of reference" for the dominant conception of modern life in in-

31. Ibid.
dustrialized society. The normality of global politics disciplined in terms of states is achieved in part, therefore, because it is constitutive of the time and space of contemporary life.

This pivotal place of the self in modernity is recognised by understanding modern discourse as 'logocentric' or foundationalist, designating the commitment to some ultimate presence or foundation that serves as the yardstick of thought, language and experience. (Chapter Two outlined some of the themes involved in such a perspective). Although the foundation, fixed ground or Archimedean point that provides the point of reference for modern discourse varies from site to site, one particular foundation can be considered pivotal: that is the sovereign presence of reasoning 'man'. Hence the practice is known as the heroic practice. Modern philosophy, particularly through Kant, developed a mode of understanding that sought to cast off the restrictive theological epistemology of the Church and grapple with the question "What is man's status in the natural world? Is he creature or creator, or both?" Kant's resolution maintained that the individual was partly free but partly determined; but as partly free, man was independent of God, nature, and society, although aware of


34. See Ashley, "Living on Border Lines".

the limits imposed on this freedom by his self-understanding.\textsuperscript{36}

Just as concepts such as 'the state' are susceptible to multiple interpretation, so too is 'man'. While all humans share the same physiology, the identities that attach to their biological form and give them social and political significance are the effects of cultural practices. In other words, the paradigm of sovereignty serves not only to discipline man's experiences, it constructs the notion of reasoning man in the first place. It is with the notion of the paradigm of sovereignty that it is possible to appreciate the multi-faceted, dynamic, and localized practices that construct the boundary of inside and outside, establish the domain of the sovereign and the anarchic, and define the self in contradistinction to the other, whatever the realm.

The paradigm of sovereignty is, therefore, very much more than just an instance of "international relations". It includes all the practices of differentiation that discipline time and space in such a way as to delineate the realm of reasoning man and domestic society in opposition to the anarchic realm that lies outside the boundary of what comes to be the state. As Ashley argues:

It supplies a reliably invoked principle of differentiation that can be put to work to stabilize interpretations of the meaning of man in his sovereign being, the appropriate legitimations of state and state violence extending therefrom, the necessary boundaries of domestic society, and the historical contingencies that must be feared, defined as problems and dangers, and rendered proper objects of state violence in the name of the freedom of man.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Hawthorn, \textit{Enlightenment and Despair}, p.35.

\textsuperscript{37} Ashley, "Living on Border Lines", p.270.
The practice of logocentrism, particularly that form of logocentrism that centers on reasoning man, has a direct consequence for the understanding of global politics. It is the sovereign figure of man in modern discourse that provides the constitutive principle for both the state as sovereign entity, and domestic society as the object domain subordinated to the state's sovereignty. In turn, it is the privileging of the state and domestic society as the ground of identity against which the otherness of the anarchic realm is constituted that effects the problematization from which our conventional understandings of international politics in general, and security policy in particular, are derived.

In the international relations context, the paradigm of sovereignty can best be understood by regarding the practices of modern statecraft as the practices of modern mancraft. In this sense, those practices peculiar to global politics (e.g. foreign policy and the study of international relations) are not only constitutive of international relations, they are constitutive of the social entity (the state) in whose name they claim to be operating. The paradigm of sovereignty in international relations is thus "an art of domesticating the meaning of man by constructing his problems, his dangers, his fears." It is a process of inscription that disciplines by enframing man in the spatial and temporal organization of inside and outside, self and other. These

38. Ibid, p.303. Chapter Five will demonstrate how the concept of 'man' refers not just to individual identity but also to the form of domestic order, the social relations of production, and the range of subjectivities in a society.
practices of modern statecraft do not operate in terms of a domestic society that is pregiven, nor do they signify an absolute and pre-existing space from which the threats to domestic society emerge. Their very operation enframes the domestic society in whose name they claim to be operating through their claim to know the source of threats to domestic society and reasoning man. As Ashley states:

"international politics" is a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the externalization and totalization of dangers, and the mobilization of populations to control these dangers - all in the name of a social totality that is never really present, that always contains traces of the outside within, and that is never more than an effect of the practices by which total dangers are inscribed. 39

THE INSCRIPTION OF DANGER

The privileging of the sovereign over the anarchic, both in terms of the heroic practice and the discursive practices of international relations, rests upon the inscription of danger in the external realm from which the rational identity of the internal domain must be protected. Confronted with the fluidity and discontinuity of history, practices disciplined by foundationalism or the philosophy of identity impose boundaries and establish meaning through a reading of ambiguity that is concerned to identify the dangers to man. These dangers are usually located in terms of threats emerging from other domestic societies.

The dilemmas of international politics (e.g. nuclear war, inter-state conflict, environmental degradation, or the relative autonomy of global capital) are conventionally understood as being composed of threats to a pregiven, already constituted and well-bounded rational identity in the form of the state. Clearly, such threats do exist, but an understanding of them does not depend solely on their identification in the external, anarchic realm. The crisis of international politics is as much a crisis of representation as it is of external threats. The threat to the practices of international relations is principally a threat to the once stable representation of the sovereign domain. The problem is one of "the enframing and fixing of the sovereign grounds of domestic society that the modern state, as a focus of legitimate violence, may be claimed to represent."\(^{40}\)

The identification of threats in the external realm - the inscription of danger - is intrinsically linked to the crisis of representation of the sovereign domain. The sovereign domain, for all its identification as a well-ordered and rational entity, is as much a site of ambiguity and indeterminacy as the anarchic realm it is distinguished from. There are, in principle at least, a multitude of ways in which domestic society can be constituted. That, in Western experience at least, some variant of liberal capitalism has been dominant is not because it is natural, but because it is the outcome of a range of practices which limited the possibilities by focusing on certain dangers in the external realm. But these dangers do not only reside in the external realm. Threats to

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40. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State", p.255.
identity are equally prevalent in the challenges to the dominant enframing of 'man' from within. Inscribing domestic society, arriving at a representation of the state involves, therefore, a double exclusion. The interpretations of domestic society resistant to its inscription as a rational identity must be excluded from the internal realm: "In effect, differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all places and times must be converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society, understood as an identity, and a domain of anarchy, understood as at once ambiguous, indeterminate, and dangerous..."41 This first exclusion is matched by a second, the purpose of which is to "hide" the status of the first as an exclusion. For the inscription of domestic society to appear as unproblematic, it is not possible for it to be understood as having the status of one interpretation among many. All interpretations that seek to expose the inscription of "man in domestic society" as a representation that should be historicized and problematized have themselves to be excluded.

RECONCEPTUALIZING FOREIGN POLICY

Understanding the inscription of danger - the identification of external threats - as a practice implicated in the enframing and constitution of domestic society through its representation of 'man', provides a basis for reconceptualizing foreign policy as a political practice which establishes the boundaries that mark the foreign.

41. Ibid, p.257.
A poststructuralist attitude to foreign policy reorients the analytic focus from a concern of relations between states which takes place across ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the state and the international system. Conceptualized in this way, foreign policy comes to be seen as a political practice that makes "foreign" certain events and actors. Those events and actors that come to be "foreign" through the imposition of a certain interpretation are not considered as "foreign" simply because they are situated in opposition to a pregiven social entity (the state). The construction of the "foreign" is constituted by practices that also bring the "domestic" into existence. As Ashley has argued:

Foreign policy, according to this new thematization, is not so much behavior across boundaries. It is instead a specific sort of boundary-producing political performance. It is a political performance, taking place in a historically carved out social space, and having, among its important effects, the constitution and reaffirmation of socially recognizable boundaries separating fields of practice on a global scale.


43. This conception thus differs greatly from arguments which maintain either that domestic influence are important in the construction of foreign policy, or that international influences play a role in structuring domestic politics. Both these perspectives rely on granting the domestic and the international realms an existence prior to history and politics. In each case, the existence of the domestic and the international is not brought into being by foreign policy (as the argument here maintains), but is regarded as a sovereign presence which exerts an influence over the other. For an example of the traditional arguments see James N. Rosenau, ed., The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967); and Peter A. Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", International Organization 32 (1978), pp. 881-912.

Reconceptualizing foreign policy in these terms also affects the understanding of what is effective foreign policy. In this context, successful instances of modern statecraft can be understood as instances where the double exclusionary practice operates continuously in the face of resistant interpretations about 'man in domestic society'. The differences within become the differences between in such a way that the resulting domestic order is seen as natural and alternatives are marginalized.\footnote{I have written elsewhere of the process whereby Australian society was enframed as Anglo-Saxon, colonial and racist through the transposition of a threat to cultural integrity from Chinese gold diggers in the 1850s into a fear of Chinese invasion. See David Campbell, The Social Basis of Australian and New Zealand Security Policy, Peace Research Centre Monograph (Canberra: Australian National University, 1989).} Unsuccessful instances of modern statecraft are those where the double exclusionary practice does not operate, thereby allowing the recognition that the boundaries of domestic society can be disputed, so that the grounds of state legitimation become the site of political contestation about interpretations of "man in domestic society".\footnote{Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State", p.257.} In this case, the inscription of danger is not able to transfer the differences within to differences between, leaving political struggles to focus on the appropriateness of domestic policy to the dangers emerging (principally) from the external realm. These themes will be prominent in considering how the Carter administration is considered a failure.

FOREIGN POLICY AND TEXTUALITY

The understanding of textuality that informs this argument goes
well beyond the simple recognition of the role of writing and texts in the constitution of 'reality'.

However, in relating these themes to an understanding of U.S. foreign policy, it needs to be noted that U.S. foreign policy is quite literally concerned with the power of writing. Inscription and documentation are integral to the practice of U.S. foreign policy.

Foucault argues that it is "the entangled mass of 'documentation' with which a society is always bound up" which constitutes reality, thereby making it fruitless to seek some basis in an independent reality. U.S. foreign policy can be considered as having a predilection for a mass of documentation: departmental summaries, National Security Council documents, Presidential Review Memoranda, and so on, are the very substance of foreign policy. When decisions are to be made, the basis for making them is invariably some form of mediated experience.

The role of textual practices in foreign policy is nowhere clearer than in the production of intelligence assessments. The path from "raw data" to the finished intelligence report is a succession of interpretive

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48. Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p.51.

49. It is in this context that Kissinger has argued that "the conjectural element" is at the very heart of foreign policy making: "the need to gear actions to an assessment that cannot be proved true when it is made." Quoted in D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.31.
practices. The photographic representations, electronic intercepts, and human sources that are employed to collect data all rely on a variety of interpretive codes to make sense of the material with which they are confronted. Even at the stage of "raw data" there is more to the process of understanding than a simple apprehension of experience:

...the meaning and value imposed on the world is structured not by one's immediate consciousness but by the various reality-making scripts one inherits and acquires from one's surrounding cultural/linguistic condition. The pre-text of apprehension is therefore largely institutionalized and is reflected in the ready-to-hand language practices, the historically produced styles - grammars, rhetorics, and narrative structures - through which the familiar world is continuously interpreted and produced.50

These interpretive practices become even more important in the later stages of intelligence production. The several tons of paper produced each day by the U.S. intelligence community (largely through the National Security Agency) in its collection of 'data' then has to be sorted and distributed. This processing can involve language translation, deciphering, and various forms of imaging (undertaken by the unambiguously named National Photographic Interpretation Center) before it is distributed to the various branches of the intelligence community for further interpretation to aid the policy makers.51 How these interpretive practices have established discursive boundaries for the understanding and conduct of U.S. foreign policy is the subject of the next chapter.

50. Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics", in International/Intertextual Relations, ed. Der Derian and Shapiro, p.11.

51. For a description of these processes and the product which emerges from them, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985), Ch.12.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that the problematization that makes an understanding of foreign policy possible can be considered as an instance of the "paradigm of sovereignty". Disciplining time and space through the construction of a boundary that demarcates inside/outside, sovereign/anarchic, self/other, this paradigm serves to constitute the very grounds of its own legitimacy: the privileged space of domestic society in whose name it operates. In this sense, the practices of modern statecraft can be regarded as practices of modern mancraft; practices that inscribe the domain of reasoning man through their ability to identify the threats and dangers to him. This understanding of modern statecraft is therefore something that is much wider than those practices signified as "international relations" or "foreign policy". Those significations represent, therefore, specific knowledgeable practices of statecraft, the special responsibility of which is to inscribe the dangers that emerge from the anarchic realm so as to constitute the sovereign domain. In the context of a discussion of United States foreign policy, the consequence of this is that United States "foreign policy" needs to be understood as a knowledgeable practice by which the "United States" is constituted.

The following chapter will argue that the cold war, itself understood as an ensemble of practices, was constructed on the basis of the inscription of danger in one or more other domestic societies as the basis for enframing "man in the domestic society" of the United States. Given the relative power and resources of the United States, such an
inscription of danger - most obviously associated with the Soviet Union as the source of external threat - could effectively provide the grounds for the legitimation of the sovereign domain. However, with the increasing mobility of man and social resources associated with interdependence, the inscription of man in one society by the displacement of danger to another domestic society becomes problematic. When the external dangers are conceived in such a way that the required response is one of co-ordination and collaboration among states, the location of danger in other domestic societies becomes more of a hindrance than a help. The seeking of assistance from adversaries does not allow the differences within societies to be transferred to the differences between. As a consequence, the grounds of state legitimation that were once secure because of the displacement of danger become instead a site of contestation among a variety of inscriptions of "man in domestic society". This, the following chapters will argue, was the problem facing the Carter administration in its attempt to construct a "world order" politics sensitive to interdependence. To be successful the Carter administration depended upon "the inscription of man and domestic society in ways that make possible the co-ordinated displacement of anarchic dangers, not from one 'domestic society' onto others, but beyond the places and times of 'man' in every 'domestic society' of a multistate system."52 In other words, the Carter administration needed to challenge the grounds upon which political identity had been constituted in the United States - as discussed in the next chapter - and reinscribe identity so as to support its rewriting of security.

52. Ibid, p.259.
INTRODUCTION

That the behavior of the Soviet Union provides the organizing principle for United States foreign policy is an assumption common to the orthodox theory and practice of international relations in the postwar era. As one writer in this tradition has remarked:

...the essential strategic relationship of antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union constitutes a realm of necessity for U.S. policymakers. The United States is at liberty to choose among alternative policy goals and means, but it is not at liberty to choose a policy attitude of indifference toward Soviet power without expecting severely adverse consequences sooner or later.¹

This view, usually summarized by reference to the strategy of containment, has been one of "remarkable consistency over time when [United States] policies are viewed in historical perspective."² The continuity of American anxiety about the Soviet Union is evidenced, for example, by the existence of two Committees on the Present Danger (the first established in 1950; the second in 1976) and the influential


role played by policymakers such as Paul Nitze in successive administrations.³

There is more at stake in this understanding of foreign policy, however, than the simple need to respond to a "realm of necessity." As the argument in the previous chapters demonstrated, there are theoretically well-grounded reasons for understanding foreign policy as a political practice central to the construction of political identity. This nexus has been recognized by some. One scholar has written the following assessment of the relationship between the United States domestic order and the world to which it purportedly responds:

I do not think that old-fashioned cold war liberalism needs any apologies. It will need them only if new evidence shows that Soviet imperialism never existed, or no longer exists, or if somebody comes with a better alternative for dealing with it than the cold war.⁴

The author went on to argue that "Whether Soviet imperialism is a threat is a paradigm of a non-'ideological', unphilosophical, straightforwardly empirical, question" and decried the "hope that such questions can be answered by improving one's philosophical sophistication (rather than by, say, reading intelligence reports on what the Politbureau and the Soviet generals have been saying to one


another lately)..."5

This statement is a useful starting point for the argument of this chapter because its author - Richard Rorty - has been influential in the antifoundationalist debates of Anglo-American philosophy and social theory that were the subject of Chapter Two. Yet, despite the sophisticated philosophical understanding Rorty brings to his scholarship - understandings that have sought to question all givens and critique all axioms - he is prepared to argue that "Soviet imperialism" is a fact of almost unchallengeable proportions that legitimizes the cold war liberalism of U.S. politics.6 It is as if Rorty has substituted an "historical myth of the given" for the "epistemological myth of the given" he has helped undermine.7

Rorty is, of course, far from alone in granting "Soviet imperialism" an almost ontological status. But the disjunction between Rorty's antifoundationalist philosophy and neoconservative politics poses in stark relief the issue at the heart of this thesis: is it possible to provide an alternative account of postwar United States foreign policy employing the metatheoretical insights of the interdisciplinary debates in the social sciences, particularly the contribution of poststructuralism, as outlined in the previous chapter's argument of foreign policy as a

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This chapter maintains that the reconceptualization of foreign policy outlined in Chapter Four is not only theoretically well-grounded, but also provides a means of critically exploring the open-ended character of the foreign policy texts which have been important in establishing the discursive boundaries of U.S. foreign policy. To this end, the strategy employed in the first half of this chapter can be considered (in a broadly defined way) deconstructive. Just as poststructuralism is not a fixed theoretical whole that can serve as an explanatory framework, deconstruction is not a strategy that constitutes a new or superior framework that criticizes a discourse from an external standpoint. Deconstruction works within a discourse to examine the operations through which the grounds for argument are produced. In other words, "deconstruction appeals to a discourse's own terms to show how it undermines, undoes, and displaces its most central and certain voices."

The use of official foreign policy discourse could appear to pose a problem for the argument being made in this thesis. Chapter Four argued that foreign policy needs to be considered a political and representational practice which establishes the boundaries that delineate the inside from the outside, the 'domestic' from the 'foreign'.

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Foreign policy as a boundary-producing practice is thus one of the many practices of statecraft through which the domestic society is enframed and the variety of interpretations of 'man' inscribed and controlled. However, to rely on official foreign policy discourses could be to reverse the issue. To consider official discourses is to invoke implicitly boundaries that are already in place and grant permanence to the grounds which are being problematized. It is by assuming that the boundaries of the state are already in place that the state can appear as the pregiven domain which confronts the external realm. Moreover, it is this assumption that grants official foreign policy discourses the status of legitimate expressions of the state's voice and defenders of 'man' from danger. The difficulty, then, is how to study official foreign policy discourses as practices that work to enframe 'man' while at the same time not closing off the question of the enframing of official discourses themselves.

With respect to U.S. policy, one way to handle this difficulty is the use of a strategy of deconstruction. As LaCapra has noted, "the very strategy of 'deconstruction' requires that one assume a necessary complicity with dubious discourses and attempt to work through them in the articulation of significantly different possibilities." The open-ended character of the foreign policy texts allows, however, for a reversal of traditional realist concerns. By highlighting the continual concern over the status of the 'domestic' in the foreign policy texts - a

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concern at least as prominent as the traditional preoccupation with external danger - this reversal serves to problematize the status of the 'domestic'. If these issues continue to be prominent in official discourses, how is it that the supposedly pregiven domestic arena is continually in need of reaffirmation? Perhaps the concern with the external is, as the argument here maintains, a means of controlling many potential ways of enframing the internal by the inscription of danger. The presence in official discourses of references to the character of the U.S. state will help make this case.

In addition, the argument of the second half of this chapter does not rely on official foreign policy discourses. Once the 'domestic' is recognized as an arena whose boundaries are continually being rewritten and reaffirmed in foreign policy discourse, the chapter will turn to other discourses (notably American historiography) to briefly demonstrate how there has been a constant struggle within U.S. society among competing forms of identity. This focus, made possible by the deconstructive turn in the foreign policy texts, demonstrates that a boundary-producing political practice is required for these proliferating alternatives to be disciplined.

In order to organize this analysis of official U.S. foreign policy discourses, this chapter will use Gaddis's categorization of the postwar era into five periods. The argument proceeds, then, by reviewing the assessments of interests, threats and purpose evidenced in the administrations of those five periods. This overview concludes that while the strategy of containment remains dominant, it is manifested in
a variety of forms, and includes a range of alternative policies, depending upon specific circumstances. In this context, it is necessary to eschew the notion that U.S. policy simply responds to a fixed, ahistorical and external reality. By invoking a poststructuralist attitude, U.S. policy can be considered as the outcome of a specific problematization of life; a problematization that disciplines the ambiguity and contingency of history through specific resolutions of the categories of time and space, thereby mandating the range of problems to which there can be a range of solutions.

POSTWAR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

Gaddis argues that the postwar period has seen United States policy characterized by five "distinct geopolitical codes". The original formulation of containment by George Kennan gave way in 1950 to the assumptions behind NSC-68, the first document to attempt a systematic consideration of all the factors affecting U.S. national security. Eisenhower's "New Look" policy of 1953 was then replaced with the adoption of a strategy of "Flexible Response" by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in 1961. In turn, the end of the 1960s saw the beginning of a period characterized as "detente", ending in the last year of the Carter administration.¹¹

When George Kennan was asked in 1946 to interpret recent Soviet

statements, he wrote what has come to be referred to as the "Long Telegram", a diplomatic communication that set forth the basis of the policy of containment.\textsuperscript{12} Kennan argued that "The Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the maneuvers of Soviet policy..."\textsuperscript{13} Ambiguous in its characterization of Soviet "pressure" and the required policy of "counterforce", Kennan's assessment provided the basis for a number of policy alternatives. Kennan was nonetheless convinced that "it is not Russian military power that is threatening us; it is Russian political power...If it is not entirely a military threat, I doubt that it can be effectively met entirely by military means."\textsuperscript{14} Having served in diplomatic posts in the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War, Kennan discerned a broader threat. While posted in Latvia in 1931, he wrote that "the present system of Soviet Russia is unalterably opposed to our traditional system, that there can be no middle ground or compromise between the two..."\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless, Kennan argued that the circumstances confronting the United States in the late 1940s meant that a balance of power had to be restored to replace that destroyed in


\textsuperscript{13} "Mr X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Containment, ed. Etzold and Gaddis, p.87.

\textsuperscript{14} Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.40.

\textsuperscript{15} Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: From Truman to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.120.
the defeat of Germany and Japan. The policy of containment required, therefore, that certain areas of the world vital to the United States must maintain political regimes "at least favorable to the continued power and independence of our nation." Principal among these were three centers of industrial and military power outside the United States and the Soviet Union: the United Kingdom, Germany and Central Europe, and Japan. Kennan concluded his discussion of containment with a cautionary note, declaring that the United States should not become like the Soviets in the struggle with them but, rather, "have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society."

Kennan's assessment was adopted as the basis for United States policy. The newly-formed National Security Council undertook its first assessment of American foreign policy in March 1948. This document (NSC-7) began with the assertion that the communist goal was "world conquest". It then went on to argue:

Between the United States and the USSR there are in Europe and Asia areas of great potential power which if added to the existing strength of the Soviet world would enable the latter to become so superior in manpower, resources, and territory that the prospect for the survival of the United States as a free nation would be slight.

This theme remained at the center of subsequent assessments. The

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November 1948 document NSC-20/4 stated that "The gravest threat to the security of the United States...stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system." The document repeated that "Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States."¹⁹ NSC-20/4 argued, however, that the Soviet Union was not likely to resort to war with the United States to achieve its aims. Other branches of the national security bureaucracy concurred. The Joint Intelligence Staff predicted in 1945 that the Soviets would avoid conflict for five to ten years; the CIA argued in September 1947 that the Soviets would not seek to militarily conquer Western Europe, preferring instead "to gain hegemony by political and economic means;"²⁰ while Kennan argued in 1950 that there was no indication that the Soviets intended to attack the West.²¹ The United States embassy in Moscow continued to report, even throughout the Korean War, that the Soviets had no desire to engage in global conflict with the United States.²²

United States defense officials, then, clearly did not think the


²². For example, "The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State", Moscow, August 11, 1950, in FRUS 1950, Volume I, p.367.
prospect of a Soviet military attack likely, yet they remained concerned about the prospect of losing control of "Eurasia". The basis of this concern was the view that the poor and deteriorating economic conditions in Europe opened the way for anarchy which could be exploited by the Soviets to spread their influence. As Kennan had argued to the State Department in 1946, "World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue." The CIA had concluded likewise in mid-1947: "the greatest danger to the security of the United States is the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Communist elements." Kennan wrote in 1950 that the crisis that was communism "had to be viewed as a crisis of our own civilization, and the principal antidote lay in overcoming the weaknesses of our own institutions." Such assessments were the impetus behind the Marshall Plan's economic reconstruction of Europe.

The ambiguous manner in which the policy of containment had spoken of a threat enabled those advocating purely military solutions to advance their cause in the late 1940s. Kennan, despite his pivotal role in the formation of the policy of containment, was opposed to the heavy military emphasis and left the State Department in 1950. His successor

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26. See Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, Ch.2.
as head of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, presided over the drafting of a new assessment of United States security policy, the document known as NSC-68.  

NSC-68 was not, however, a repudiation of Kennan, who was consulted in the process of the document's drafting. What differences there were between Kennan and the position of NSC-68 lay in the latter's drawing the line more firmly by opposing unfriendly regimes on a global basis, rather than just in the five industrial power centers Kennan had designated as priorities.

NSC-68 argued that international politics had been "marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony." This situation was changed in the wake of the defeat of Germany and Japan by the fact that the Soviet Union, "unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world."

In this context, the United States was placed in a position diametrically opposed to the Soviet Union. The "fundamental purpose" of the United States as a nation, NSC-68 argued, is "to assure the

27. Ibid, pp.135-136.
integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual." "Three realities" flowed from this: "Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom...our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life..."30 The character of the Soviet Union, however, meant conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was unavoidable: "There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin...The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles."31

NSC-68 was not solely concerned with the Soviet threat, however. The document argued that "In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check Kremlin design, for the absence of order is becoming less and less tolerable."32 This concern to establish an ordered international environment in which the United States could survive in line with its fundamental purpose mandated two policies: "One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of 'containing' the Soviet system. These two policies

are closely interrelated and interact with one another."33 Binding these policies together was the issue of freedom: "The hopes of frustrating the Kremlin design are centered in the strategy of freedom...This strategy calls for the creation and maintenance of strength at the center..."34

Although NSC-68 may have been distinguished from earlier assessments of U.S. national security by its greater commitment to global militarism, the sentiment it expressed was not new to policymakers. President Truman, for example, had maintained in his 1947 speech announcing the decision to provide aid to Greece and Turkey (the speech in which the "Truman Doctrine" was formulated) that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples" undermined "the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."35 Moreover, subsequent national security planning documents continued to refer back to the statement of the fundamental purpose of the United States found in NSC-68.36

The early 1950s were a time of some hysteria in national security circles, with predictions of imminent war (despite continued assessments

33. Ibid, p.401.


35. Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.65.

36. See, for example, Draft Paper Prepared by Messers John Paton Davies, Jr., and Robert Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff, "NSC-79", in FRUS 1951, Volume 1, p.94.
to the contrary)\textsuperscript{37} with the Soviets common. Few, however, went so far as the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board who declared that the "free nations" were losing the battle through poor policies.\textsuperscript{38} Truman objected to all the arguments presented in this case, though he did not dispute the premise that; "The situation in which the United States finds itself today is a critical one in which survival of all free nations is threatened by the ruthless aggression of Soviet Russia. The United States and its allies are at war with the Soviets."\textsuperscript{39}

The major assessments of U.S. national security conducted in the Eisenhower years did not differ in their basic approach from those cited above. For example, NSC-5501 ("Basic National Security Policy", January 7, 1955) maintained that:

As the lines between the Communist bloc and the Western coalition have come to be more clearly drawn over the last few years, a situation has arisen in which any further Communist territorial gains would have an unfavorable impact within the free world that might be out of all proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory lost.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{38} Memorandum by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Symington) to the President, "Current History of National Planning Policy - Diplomatic, Economic and Military; and Reasons Why It Is Essential That These Three Segments of National Security Be Further Integrated", [n.d.], in FRUS 1951, Volume 1, pp.21-33.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p.21. Truman wrote at the end of the memorandum: "My dear Stu, this is [as] big a lot of Top Secret malarkey as I've ever read. Your time is wasted on such bunk as this. H.S.T." Ibid, p.33.

\textsuperscript{40} Quoted in Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment}, p.130n.
Through a planning exercise called "Operation Solarium", the Eisenhower administration undertook to examine what it considered to be all available options for U.S. national security policy, ranging from a continuation of the Truman strategy of containment through deterrence of the Soviet Union to the notion of "roll back" of Soviet influence. A fourth option was added later - negotiations with the Soviets with a strict two-year time limit. In the end, Eisenhower administration policy (summarized in NSC 162/2 of October 1953) incorporated elements of all these approaches.41

What was distinctive about the Eisenhower administration, and what was meant by the term "New Look", was a new assessment of how best to provide the means to implement its version of containment. Debate centered on the notion that the defense appropriations required to fund NSC-68's global assessment of security needs could endanger economic property at home. The epithet was that "we must not destroy what we are attempting to defend" (that being understood as freedom of choice for individuals, democratic procedures for government, and private enterprise for the economy).42 It was for this reason that Dulles proclaimed the concept of "Massive Retaliation" - because nuclear weapons offered "more bang for the buck" - to deter the Soviet Union, combined with the "Mutual Security Program" to dispense military aid to allies.43

41. Ibid, pp.145-146.
42. Ibid, pp.135-136.
The Kennedy administration's national security policy contained a range of policies that have left some commentators dogged by a feeling of ambiguity, noting that it was a combination of "sincere idealism and traditional anti-Communist fervor", "part hawk and part dove". But according to Gaddis, Kennedy's vision of the world "differed from that of his predecessors only in the greater clarity and candor with which he expressed it." In a 1960 campaign speech Kennedy declared that "The enemy is the Communist system itself - implacable, unceasing in its drive for world domination. For this is not a struggle for the supremacy of arms alone - it is also a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: Freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny." Equally, Kennedy repeated the established argument that "The interest of the United States of America is best served by preserving and protecting a world of diversity in which no one power or combination of powers can threaten the security of the United States."

Central to the Kennedy administration's policy was the notion of "Flexible Response", a strategy designed to ensure that the United States had a range of options - from diplomacy through covert operations to conventional and nuclear war - with which to respond to aggression. It was a strategy that emerged from the criticism of "Massive Retaliation", which was felt by many to offer only two choices:

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44. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, p.192.
46. Quoted in Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, p.199.
47. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.201.
humiliation or annihilation. The attention given to the issue of counterinsurgency and modernization in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, both being responses to events in the so-called "Third World", was central to "Flexible Response". Kennedy's Secretary of State Dean Rusk maintained that "if you don't pay attention to the periphery, the periphery changes. And the first thing you know, the periphery is the center...what happens in one place cannot help but affect what happens in another." This argument was enshrined in National Security Action Memorandum 124 (January 18, 1962) which called for "proper recognition throughout the U.S. government that subversive insurgency ('wars of liberation') is a form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare."

Vietnam was the event around which these strategies coalesced for the Kennedy administration. It was at one and the same time a test case for holding the line against communism (Kennedy declared that it was the "finger in the dike of communism") as well as an instance of W.W. Rostow's dictum that "Modern societies must be built and we are

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50. Quoted in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, "The New Interventionism: Low-Intensity Warfare in the 1980s and Beyond", in Low-Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p.11. This is not to suggest that there had not been earlier concern with insurgencies. See, for example, Memorandum for the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), "Collaboration with Friendly Governments on Exchange of Information Concerning Operations Against Guerrillas", Washington, May 23, 1951, in FRUS 1951, Volume I, p.82.
51. Quoted in Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, p.198.
prepared to build them."\(^{52}\) Given that both concerns were complementary, the combination was not surprising. While the United States regarded diversity in the international system as the guarantee of its interests, it was a particular kind of diversity. As Rostow argued in the draft "Basic National Security Policy" document of 1962, because it would be difficult "to envisage the survival of democratic American society as a beleaguered island in a totalitarian sea", it was therefore "in the American interest that the societies of Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America develop along lines broadly consistent with our own concepts of individual liberty and government based on consent.\(^{53}\) Intervention, as in the case of Vietnam, might be necessary, but it would be intervention in the cause of diversity not hegemony.\(^{54}\) Not that intervention and economic programs such as the "Alliance for Progress" in Latin America were the creations of the Kennedy administration - since Truman announced the Point Four program of overseas economic aid in 1949, such policies had had a place in U.S. national security policy.\(^{55}\)

The Vietnam War is usually thought to mark the end of the postwar period of international relations dominated by the United States and the strategy of containment. The American century came to an end after twenty years. Those policies that sought to adjust American policy to the new realities of global politics after the mid-

\(^{52}\) Quoted in Ibid, pp.206-207.

\(^{53}\) Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.203.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) See Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, Ch.8.
1960s will be discussed in the next chapter. Whatever changes may have evolved after the 1960s, it did not mean an end to containment themes. Carter's successor heralded a reassertion of the importance of counterinsurgency, now proclaimed under the concept of "low intensity conflict". The "Reagan Doctrine", a modernized version of Dulles's "rollback" strategy, has sought to decree a "global offensive against communism at the fringes of the Soviet empire." As one former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency has maintained, with little likelihood of a strategic nuclear confrontation between the superpowers or a conventional invasion of Europe by the Warsaw Pact, the United States faces conflict of a different sort. It is, according to former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, a case of there being "no shortage of adversaries seeking to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our interests through these shadow wars carried on by guerrillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found the weak point in our defenses." The basis of this assessment remains, as Oliver North (who was director of the NSC's Counterterrorism and Low-Intensity Warfare Group at the time of the Iran-contra scandal) declared to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world."


58. Quoted in Ibid, p.4.

59. Quoted in Ibid.
SUMMARY

Postwar United States national security policy comprises similarities and differences, and provokes conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, there seems to be great continuity when one considers that administrations as disparate as Carter’s and Truman’s expressed equal concern to preserve a stable and just international order; that Nixon and Kennan agreed that United States interests were secured when no one power ruled over the five important industrial centers; and that both the Reagan and Kennedy administrations focused on new forms of conflict outside direct superpower confrontation. On the other hand, there seems to be great diversity when one places the indiscriminate globalism of NSC-68 against the Nixon Doctrine’s concept of self-reliance; the strategy of “Massive Retaliation” of the Eisenhower years in contrast to the Kennedy administration’s policy of “Flexible Response”; and the world order approach of the Carter years in comparison to the strident anticommunism of the early Reagan period.

Conflicting interpretations (reflecting the agency/structure dichotomy discussed in Chapter One) range from the belief that United States policy reflects nothing other than the necessary accommodation to the world as it is, to the charge that American policy makers have gone out of their way to impose a new form of imperialism and hegemony on global life. These differing assessments depend upon contrasting views of the threats to the United States; whether, with respect to the Soviet Union, it is the case of the Soviet threat existing in and of itself
(although it may have been exaggerated), to the belief that "the Soviet threat was literally 'invented' by American foreign policy managers to prepare domestic public opinion for America's new imperial role." 

Has the strategy of containment been as persistent and durable as is conventionally understood? An initial answer, given the above review, would seem to be both a "yes" and a "no". Containment appears in all post-war U.S. administration policies, yet it appears in substantially different forms, manifested in a variety of policy options directed at what Gaddis has termed "universalist" and "particularist" conceptions of the United States' role in international order.

How then are we to make sense of these conflicting interpretations? How is it possible to speak of U.S. national security policy in a way that makes sense of both the continuities and disjunctions? What is clear is that it is not possible to speak in terms of recourse to a single position that maintains we can understand U.S. policy as a fixed, given

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60. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, p.ix.


62. The "universalist" approach (such as advocated by NSC-68) argued that United States interests would be best served by policies that involve the restructuring of international order in line with American understandings of what constitutes an appropriate political formation to provide stability. The "particularist" approach (evident in strategies such as the "Nixon Doctrine") advocated policies that maintained the international equilibrium whereby no single hegemon hostile to the United States could emerge. As Gaddis notes, however, and as was particularly evident during the Kennedy Administration's support for intervention in the cause of maintaining diversity, "The effect had been to push the United States into universalism by the back door." See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.29, 276.
and self-enclosed entity. United States policy has been fluid, changeable, and seemingly responsive to diverse historical circumstances and experiences. At the same time, it has demonstrated marked continuities. The Soviet threat has often been regarded as a constant, but in different contexts the threat has been variously characterized. No single conception - be it a crude realist insistence on the endemic nature of conflict in the international system, or a crude Marxist account of ideology serving political and economic interests - can satisfactorily account for the various manifestations of containment. How then can one speak in terms of diversity and continuity, difference and similarity, conflict and cooperation, at the same time, without reducing one to the other, privileging one over the other?

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS AN INSTANCE OF THE 'ANARCHY PROBLEMATIQUE'

Chapters Three and Four demonstrated how the divergent theoretical traditions in the discipline of International Relations are an instance of the anarchy problematique, a problematization that constructs the discourse of international relations around the presence of sovereign states in an anarchic environment. Given that the poststructuralist attitude of this thesis makes no distinction between theory and practice - instead regarding theory as practice - it should be expected that postwar U.S. foreign policy is constituted by the same problematization.63

63 A survey of national security officials employed in the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrated the institutional basis for the dominance of the anarchy problematique. They were found to usually hold graduate qualifications in International Relations,
A major conclusion of the above review is that, contrary to the conventional understanding of containment, the danger that the United States faces is never defined by the foreign policy texts as flowing from a constant Soviet military threat. The intelligence assessments of the immediate postwar period actually discounted the prospect of the Soviet Union resorting to war. They did not question the fundamental assumption that the Soviet Union was the United States’ major adversary, but they felt that it was more likely to use economic and political means to advance its cause. Equally important is the constant shifting characterization of the threat. Despite considerable differences in the order of magnitude of each, over the years United States policy makers have cited world communism, the economic disintegration of Europe, Red China, North Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, terrorists, drug smugglers, and so on. None of these sources poses a threat in terms of political science or, in the case of the CIA, economics. When surveyed about the long-range influence of various communities, academia was rated second (behind colleagues and other government departments). Despite some concern that academic studies were not directly applicable to their work, they did believe that "academic studies [were] useful in providing an overall perspective from which to view international events." The list of influential scholars identified by these people included (in 1980) Kissinger, Morgenthau, Keenan, Brzezinski, Hoffmann, Marshall Shulman, Samuel Huntington, Raymond Aron and Thomas Schelling. The most influential journals were Foreign Affairs (read by two-thirds of the sample) and Foreign Policy (read by one-half). When presented with a list of ten phrases that represented theoretical approaches to International Relations, respondents favored one of four phrases, all derived from an image of international affairs that privileges the sovereignty/anarchy dualism: "balance of power", "interdependence", "geopolitics", or "protracted conflict"; with the first two accounting for about one-half of the responses. See Sallie M. Hicks, Theodore A. Couloumbis and Eloise M. Forgette, "Influencing the Prince: A Role for Academicians?", Polity 15 (1982), pp.279-94.

64. An excellent account of this is Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised", International Security 7 (1982/83), pp.111-38. Evangelista demonstrates that the various assessments of Soviet military capabilities - which noted their postwar demobilization and poor logistical support - never led to a revision of the general view that the Soviets harbored aggressive intentions towards Western Europe.
a traditional calculus of power, and none of them can be reduced solely to the Soviet Union. All of them, however, are understood in terms of their location in an anarchic realm.

The above review of the foreign policy discourse suggests that the absence of order in the international system is considered a basic problem for U.S. foreign policy. NSC-68 was explicit in this regard, noting that the United States would have to be concerned with promoting a "healthy international environment" even if there was no Soviet Union. Similar themes were enunciated by Kennedy when he maintained that the U.S.-Soviet conflict was one of "two conflicting ideologies: Freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny." But again, it was the concern for order that was prominent in much of the Kennedy administration's policy - the desire to see "the societies of Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America develop along lines broadly consistent with our own concepts of individual liberty based on consent" that will avoid the situation whereby the United States would find itself "a beleaguered island in a totalitarian sea." The understanding that United States' interests are ensured when order prevails remains a constant organizing principle of U.S. policy. As Brzezinski has recently argued, "Given the fact that the international system cannot operate on the basis of sheer goodwill and spontaneity alone but needs some center of cooperative initiative, financial control and even political power, it follows that the only alternative to American leadership is global anarchy and international chaos."65

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An example of the operation of the anarchy problematique as the problematization of U.S. foreign policy can be provided by considering the existence of critiques from within official policy circles. Paul Nitze has argued that in the early cold war period "The entire national security community in Washington felt that the Soviet Union posed the main threat to the United States. The debate over Soviet intentions was not significant." Such an interpretation conflates two issues. There was a debate over Soviet intentions that was bureaucratically significant. Throughout the drafting of NSC-68, one of the State Department's senior Soviet specialists (Charles Bohlen) argued that the characterization of the Soviet Union as desiring world domination and having a master plan to achieve it was seriously mistaken. What is significant about this debate (and it was regarded as serious enough to be thought of as contributing to the alternatives to containment being discussed in the State Department) is that for all Bohlen's insistence that there was a major difference between himself and Nitze, he never disputed that the Soviet Union constituted a threat and that the Truman administration's plans for a defence build-up were essential. In other words, the critique accepted most of the elements of its object of attack.

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68. For Bohlen's arguments see Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), Washington, April 5, 1950, FRUS 1950, Volume I, pp.221-225; The Counsellor (Bohlen) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), Washington, July 28, 1951, FRUS 1951, Volume I, pp.106-109; and Memorandum by the Counsellor (Bohlen)
This co-opting of critiques - a result of the operation of the problematization - can be demonstrated by other historical examples. During the Johnson administration's debate over whether or not to commit one hundred thousand troops to Vietnam, the arguments against the proposal by George Ball were defeated by Dean Rusk and others largely because Ball's argument presupposed the same basis - the issue of the credibility of the United State's commitment to its allies - as the arguments in favor of the troop deployment.\(^6\) In the 1970s debate over the "window of vulnerability" - that Soviet ICBM developments threatened a first-strike capability that could destroy the U.S. ICBM force - critics such as Jan Lodal had less success than advocates such as Paul Nitze because they refused to challenge the assessment of the Soviet Union that was the basis of Nitze's argument.\(^7\)

The power of the anarchy problematique in U.S. foreign policy was such that even allies of the United States did not escape inclusion as sources of threats. In the immediate postwar period, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Patterson told Secretary of State Marshall that the effective implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere

\(^6\) This argument is made in David Sylvan and Hayward Alker, "Foreign Policy as Tragedy: Sending 100,000 Troops to Vietnam", Paper prepared for the XIVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, August 28 to September 1, 1988.

meant that:

we [the U.S.] not only refuse to tolerate foreign colonization, control, or the extension of a foreign political system to our hemisphere, but we take alarm from the appearance on the continent of foreign ideologies, commercial exploitation, cartel arrangements, or other symptoms of increased non-hemispheric influence...The basic consideration has always been an overriding apprehension lest a base be established in this area by a potentially hostile foreign power.\textsuperscript{71}

The United States, Patterson noted, must have "a stable, secure, and friendly flank to the South, not confused by enemy penetration, political, economic, or military."\textsuperscript{72} But it was not the Soviets who were the original focus of this apprehension. As Leffler states:

Patterson, Forrestal, and Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower initially were impelled less by reports of Soviet espionage, propaganda, and infiltration in Latin America than by accounts of British efforts to sell cruisers and aircraft to Chile and Ecuador; Swedish sales of anti-aircraft artillery to Argentina; and French offers to build cruisers for both Argentina and Chile. To foreclose all foreign influence and to insure United States strategic hegemony, military officers argued for an extensive system of United States bases...\textsuperscript{73}

Examples of the discourse such as this suggest that the problematization which has made U.S. foreign policy historically possible is predicated on the making 'foreign' of some events and objects. The constitution of the 'foreign' is based upon the disciplining of the ambiguity and contingency of global politics into inside and outside, self and other, via the inscription of the boundaries of the state. The problematization that gives rise to U.S. foreign policy discourse is thus

\textsuperscript{71} Quoted in Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security", p.354.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p.355.
"governed by a historically developed representational practice which is primarily geopolitical and...this has combined a way of constituting the Other, which places that other in a lesser moral space."74 In the examples above, the acceptance of the basic geopolitical premises of the anarchy problematique provides a common discursive framework for proponents of different policy options, and forces critics into a secondary position.

As a geopolitical practice, where security is formulated through the spatial terms of identity and difference, it privileges the territorial enclosure of political space at the expense of temporal, historical, or social relations.75 As a consequence, "it tends to make us treat existing patterns and relations as if they were permanent and universally valid."76 The ambiguity and contingency of international politics is disciplined in such a way that any social and political content, let alone any prospect for change, is expunged from consideration. International relations are therefore experienced as constituting a realm of necessity.

74. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation, p.123. The record of postwar U.S. national security policy is replete with geopolitical references. Kennan first proposed containment on the basis that the United States could not remain secure if an aggressive power gained control of "Eurasia". The Reagan administration recently declared that "the United State's most basic national security interests would be endangered if a hostile state or group of states were to dominate the Eurasian landmass - that area of the globe often referred to as the world's heartland." See Reagan, National Security Strategy, p.1. Academic analysis of national security policy has seen a resurgence in geopolitical thought. See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to Conduct the US-Soviet Contest (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986) and Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower.


To this point, the argument has considered the functioning of a problematization by the operation of disciplinary power and its various effects - the inscription of the boundaries of inside and outside, for example. While it has been argued that this leads to the construction of political identity in terms of self and other, it now needs to be demonstrated how the construction of self and other operates in the specific site of United States foreign policy. While arguing that U.S. foreign policy has been made possible by the operation of the anarchy problematique, its actual operation - the character of the Other and the character of the self that result - cannot be specified outside their historical circumstances.

The remainder of the chapter will, therefore, seek to demonstrate how "U.S. foreign policy" is a practice constitutive of the "United States". This involves considering the particular construction of 'man' that has been enframed by the drawing of the boundary of domestic society and the inscription of danger; the differences within U.S. society that are transformed into the differences between the U.S. and other societies; and how the operation of these practices of statecraft is hidden in the U.S. context.

ENFRAMING UNITED STATES 'MAN'

A striking feature of the above review of foreign policy discourse is that assessments of threat regularly begin with considerations that more traditional analyses might regard as epiphenomenal: culture,
ideology, and general reflections on United States society. NSC-68 is the most striking example of this, but it is far from being the only one. It declares that the United States' fundamental purpose ("to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual") automatically places it in conflict with Soviet Union (being the embodiment of the "idea of slavery"). The debate concerning defense appropriations in the Eisenhower administration was conducted on the basis that the defense budget should not create a burden so great that it would destroy the very system it was supposed to defend - a system of freedom of choice for individuals, democratic procedures for government, and a private enterprise economy. For the Kennedy administration, the preservation of "Freedom under God" and the spreading through modernization of the principles of individual liberty were guiding tenets. The Carter and Reagan administration's pursuit of "human rights" is a further instance of the U.S. concept of the self, given that the concept of "human rights" embodies the achievement of freedom through an "institutionalizing [of] a purified notion of individual selfhood." These are arguments which claim universality for particular American values. They are arguments like those of Richard Rorty - whose comments on "Soviet imperialism" opened this chapter - when he maintains that there are major differences between the First and Second Worlds: "We have hope, and they (unless Gorbachev astonishes us all) do not. We have freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, and [free] universities...Such fragile, flawed institutions, the creation of the last 300 years, are

humanity's most precious achievements."78

The constant reaffirmation of the character of U.S. society and the individual in foreign policy discourse suggests, as the argument here wants to maintain, that the practices of foreign policy serve to enframe, limit and domesticate a particular meaning of 'man'. The identity that is thus enframed refers to more than just the characteristics of individuals or national types; the meaning of 'man' incorporates the form of domestic order, the social relations of production, and the various subjectivities to which they give rise. In the context of the United States, 'man' is disciplined by the rhetoric associated with freedom of choice for individuals, democratic institutions, and a private enterprise economy. This serves to reproduce those practices in the face of contradictory and threatening interpretations of 'man'; most obviously, that of a communal 'man' whose interests are served by social planning and the public ownership of property. However, this dichotomy does not exhaust the variety of interpretations of 'man' that can exist. Robert Cox's recent work has demonstrated the numerous alternatives to a liberal capitalist domestic order that have existed - often concurrently - throughout human history. He identifies twelve different social relations of production: subsistence, peasant-lord, primitive labor market, household, self-employment, enterprise labor market, bipartism, enterprise corporatism, tripartism, state corporatism, communal, and central planning.79 The significance of this is that the


disciplining of this myriad of interpretations so as to sustain political identity requires a powerful means of transferring the differences within to the differences between.

The United States 'man' that is enframed by the transfer of differences through U.S. foreign policy is that associated with a liberal capitalist order and its subjectivities. The nuclear family with its male breadwinner, spouse, prosperous children and suburban abode is the norm which many regard as the standard vision of these social relations of production. Founded upon distinct gender roles and economic relationships, the nuclear family is 'man' written in time-honored fashion. But as Elaine May has argued, this enframing of 'man' is an effect of cold war practices. With its "strong domestic ideology, pervasive consensus politics, and peculiar demographic behavior", the nuclear family is distinctive and a departure from past social relations.

The emphasis on domesticity in the postwar era was an effort to contain what one scholar has termed the "dual representations" of American society. Americans in the postwar era "developed a dual collective representation of themselves, nicely rendered by competing

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images of the family."\textsuperscript{82} While the prosperity of the era and the contentment of those in traditional family relationships were celebrated, there was equal concern for anxious, sinful and unfulfilled individuals. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, the same magazines that promoted domesticity "also printed articles repeatedly asking what was 'the trouble with women'."\textsuperscript{83} The representation of domesticity was thus a means of controlling challenges to the subjectivities of liberal capitalism.

Alternative gender relationships had been prominent in the United States prior to the postwar period. For example, in the 1930s, American popular culture, especially Hollywood, offered advice to women to follow their own ambitions even if it put the chances for a happy marriage at risk, but this deemphasizing of the family unit altered in wartime. The emphasis on domesticity arose when more women than ever were in the workforce as a result of the war effort.\textsuperscript{84} The economic independence of women promoted fears of female sexuality as a force that would undermine established social relations.\textsuperscript{85} The nuclear family was,


\textsuperscript{84} May, Homeward Bound, pp.67-68.

\textsuperscript{85} The association of women and aggressive power was evidenced by the usual iconography of sensual women that adorned fighter planes and bombers; the calling of sexy women outside the home "bombshells", "knockouts", or "dynamite"; and the placing of a photograph of Rita Hayworth on the hydrogen bomb dropped on the Bikini Islands. The islands then provided the name for the revealing swimsuit that female "bombshells" could wear - the designer of the "bikini" chose the name four days after the hydrogen bomb was dropped to suggest the extent of the swimwear's impact. Ibid, pp.69, 110-11. The fear
therefore, part of a strategy of domestic containment. Sexuality would be contained through sexual restraint outside marriage and traditional gender roles within.\textsuperscript{86}

The inscription of danger in the postwar era affected other realms of social organization. The suburbanization of the United States, for example, was in part an explicit response to the cold war. The \textit{Bulletin of Atomic Scientists} devoted a 1951 issue to decentralization (being the effective dispersal of targets) as a means of defense in the nuclear age. Congress provided infrastructure for this through the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, which allocated $100 billion to cover most of the cost for 41,000 miles of national highways. Eisenhower declared on signing the bill into law that "[In] case of nuclear attack on our key cities, the road net must permit quick evacuation of target areas."\textsuperscript{87} This suburban growth was, as May argues, neither universal nor

\begin{itemize}
\item of female sexuality was part of a broader relationship between sexuality and national strength. National strength in the cold war era, it was argued, depended upon the ability of strong men to stand up to the threats of communism. In this context, nonmarital sexual behavior became a national obsession in the US after WWII. For example, the Senate issued a report in 1950 entitled "Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government". The major argument was that sexual indulgence and perversion weakens the moral fiber of the individual, making them susceptible to temptation by outside forces. It stated that "One homosexual can pollute a Government office." Ibid, pp.93, 95.
\item The use of sexual norms to maintain a patriarchal, family-centered society was not unique to the postwar period. White domination through slavery in the southern United States was made possible by the construction of a black sexual threat to white women. Not only did this define a racial relationship; in reversing the actual direction of interracial sexual exploitation (it was white men who exploited black women), it reinforced a patriarchal relationship amongst whites. See Michael Regin, \textit{Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp.51-52.
\item Ibid, p.169.
\end{itemize}
inevitable. In Europe, the centralization of living space was the norm.88

Controlling challenges to the subjectivities and social relationships of liberal capitalism was not something that could be achieved within the domestic realm. Establishing and maintaining the dominance of a particular enframing of 'man' required the transfer of the differences within to the differences between. The foreign policy practices of the cold war thus served to enframe 'man' as the nuclear family. But the focus on the family, while important, was only one instance of a wider effort. As will be discussed below, the representation of domesticity was integral to the reinscription of social relations of production rendered problematic by the depression and the war. Before proceeding to that, however, it is important to note that the practices of statecraft associated with the cold war, though historically specific, were not established de novo in the postwar period. They invoked earlier instances of the paradigm of sovereignty in the constitution of American political identity.

FROM LIMINAL GROUPS WITHIN TO THREATS BETWEEN

The domain in which 'man' is enframed (the state) is regarded as a sovereign realm, a rational and well-ordered unity, standing in opposition to the anarchic realm of the outside. However, the arbitrary nature of the practices which serve to inscribe the meaning of 'man' indicate that the inside is as much an arena of ambiguity and

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indeterminacy as the outside from which it is distinguished. The status of the inside as sovereign depends, therefore, on the double exclusionary practice. The differences found within a society must be transformed into differences between societies, a process that serves to construct political identity through the demarcation of 'self' and 'other' via the inscription of boundaries.

The demarcation of 'self' and 'other', as discussed in Chapter Four, is not a simple process that establishes a dividing line between the inside and the outside. It is a process that involves liminal groups in a society, those who can be simultaneously self and other; outsiders who exist on the inside. In the constitution of United States society, women, (American) Indians, workers, Chinese, Japanese and others have, at various historical junctures, been liminal and thus central to the creation of American political identity.

The status of women as a liminal group in the constitution of a patriarchal, capitalist society has been suggested in the above discussion on the enframing of United States 'man'. Their liminality is a product of the norms, conventions, and laws relating to marriage and sexuality. As Norton has remarked, "[Women] are at once the agents and the objects of structure - as mothers instructing children in social forms, and a group commonly subject to exceptionally stringent behavioral constraints...The constitution of each regime is written on the women's body."89 In terms of United States society, however, it was

the Indians who constituted the first group that represented anarchy within.

The dispossession of Indians has been a continual process in American history, a series of actions that was repeated as the frontier moved west, which resulted in the remaining tribes being defined (as they continue to be in American law following the 1831 case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*) as "domestic, dependent nations" within the United States. Most importantly, the dispossession of the Indians helped construct the United States in terms of what came to be known as "Manifest Destiny": "It defined America from the beginning as a settler society, an expanding, domestic, imperial power. Expansion guaranteed freedom, so it was believed, protecting Americans from the crowded conditions and social class divisions of Europe." 

The state violence perpetrated against the Indians was rationalized by discursive practices akin to "orientalism." Indians were described in terms that combined the themes of the noble savage (pride,

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91. Regin, Ronald Reagan, p.49.

independence and indifference to wealth) with qualities akin to the
those who lived in a Hobbesian state of nature (violence, lawlessness,
irrationality). Both of these traits combined to stress the Indian's
antipathy to "civilization" and order. That these characterizations
ignored the elaborate social structure of the Indian nations is not the
main issue.93 Constructing the Indians as 'other' and occupants of a
lesser moral space served to define white Americans as rational,
civilized, and superior.94

The "orientalist" mode of handling the Indians provided a typology
for later encounters with the internal differences of the United States.
The series of "red" (Communist) scares that erupted in the United
States in the period between the 1870s and the 1920s had their roots
in the original "red" (Indian) scares.95 The "hostile reds" of the
American frontier were linked with the "Red Spectre of the Commune"
in American cities, shifting the rhetorical battle between savagery and
civilization from Indian conflict to class war.96 The ensuing repression of
workers and labor movements violated civil rights, marked a major role
for the regular army, and stigmatized entire ethnic groups.97

95. Ibid, p.50.
96. Ibid, p.63. See also Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.115; and
Richard Slotkin, The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age
97. Rogin, Ronald Reagan, pp.64-68. On workers as liminal groups because
of their easy identification as a class and resulting potential as a symbol of
divisiveness, see Norton, Reflections on Political Identity, pp.78-79.
The "red scare" of the postwar era - which involved some 20% of the labor force in loyalty tests and saw the FBI maintain 430,000 files on domestic "subversives" - marked its role in constructing political identity through the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). Contrary to the traditional understanding of the postwar era, the genesis of domestic repression was prior to the cold war inscription of the Soviet threat. HUAC was established in 1938 and represented an older anticommunist tradition that was evidenced in the "red scares" after World War I. It derived its strength from Anglo-Saxon small businessmen hostile to unions and the new culture of the cities, and was prominent in the domestic debates surrounding the New Deal in the 1930s.

The collapse of the corporate order in the depression led to the government adopting interventionist policies and changing the nature of the social relations of production. With the advent of the Second World War, many businessmen who opposed the New Deal saw an opportunity to reinstate the laissez-faire policies of the pre-depression era. Such men had continually invoked anticommunist rhetoric to oppose the economic policies of Roosevelt's Democratic administration, and with the

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President forming a bipartisan war cabinet and inviting "dollar-a-year" business executives to come to Washington to run federal agencies, they seized their opportunity. When Roosevelt proclaimed that "Dr New Deal" was making way for "Dr Win the War", the agencies that had been the vanguard of liberal change in the New Deal were dismantled. Most important was the National Resources Planning Board which symbolized the use of long-range planning for the reconstruction of society. When it published two pamphlets on full employment and security during the war, it was denounced by the Wall Street Journal as a tool of socialism advocating a "totalitarian plan" to reshape U.S. society.101

One such businessman, Eric Johnston, the head of the Motion Picture Producer's Association (MPPA), wrote in a 1946 article that the Depression and the New Deal had given rise to politicians who generated a "nightmare" of "class rhetoric". Johnson, who headed the MPPA after a period as president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, had argued in a 1944 book (America Unlimited) that "to create full production and abundance, the people needed to put aside 'foreign' ideas of class conflict and build an international order rooted in anticommunism and defense against the Soviet Union."102

The concern for the character of the international order, however, was a consequence of the "clear and present" domestic danger that

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existed at the end of the war. The corporate desire for a return to pre-depression social relations of production was being resisted by labor. Throughout the war, unions had been forbidden to strike. Although real income had increased 53% during that period, it was largely a consequence of overtime rather than improved remuneration. However, immediately after the war, corporate profits reached record highs while real wages declined by 12%. At the same time, prices rose dramatically, with the consumer price index increasing 28% in the first sixteen days of July after the removal of price controls.

In this environment, labor militancy was on the increase. A wave of strikes began toward the end of 1945. General Motors, for example, had 225,000 auto workers, followed by 174,000 electrical and 800,000 steel workers, go on strike. Within a year after VJ Day, some five million workers had walked off the job in the largest industries, causing a loss of 120 million work days. With the possible exception of 1919, such militancy was unheard of in the U.S. And just as the events of 1919 had helped create a "red scare", so did those of 1945.

For example, in 1946 the magazine Nation's Business stated that "whoever stirs up needless strife in American trade unions advances the cause of Communism." When women in New York fought for the retention of day-care programs that had been established during the war to allow them to work for the war effort, the New York World

Telegram alleged that "the entire program of child care was conceived by leftists operating out of communist work cells. The campaign for day-care centers, the newspaper declared, had 'all the trappings of a Red drive, including leaflets, letters, telegrams, petitions, protest demonstrations, mass meetings, and hat passing.'"105

The common feature of the liminal groups in United States society is that they threatened the social relations of production associated with liberal capitalism: family, property and, hence, national identity. The strategy for dealing with liminal groups was to identify them with the foreign, and usually the enemy.106 What was operating was a conjunction of external coercion and internal influence as means of domesticating the American 'self'. In the "red scare" after 1945 prominent citizens took to combining external threats with the internal disorder. Billy Graham talked about "barbarians beating at our gates from without and moral termites from within"; J. Edgar Hoover declared there was a "force of traitorous communists, constantly gnawing away like termites at the very foundation of American society"; and MacArthur noted that while the Soviet Union had a bomb, "New


106 Norton, Reflections on Political Identity, p.55. As Ralph Miliband has noted; "...anti-communism is an essentially conservative stance, which uses the experience of Soviet-type regimes as a further means...of combating as utopian, absurd, dangerous and sinister any transformative project which goes beyond the most modest attempts at 'piecemeal social engineering'." See Ralph Miliband and Marcel Liebman, "Reflections on Anti-Communism", in The Socialist Register 1984, ed. Ralph Miliband, John Saville and Marcel Liebman (London: The Merlin Press, 1984). p.3.
Dealism is eating away the vitals of the nation."\textsuperscript{107}

This is the first part of the double exclusionary practice at work: the shifting of differences within to differences between. Thus, while we remember the cold war era as being preoccupied with external threats, it was a time dominated by the domestic witchhunts and suppression of the threat from within being linked to a foreign source.\textsuperscript{108} As Chafe notes of the late 1940s, "the Cold War at home loomed even larger than the Cold War abroad."\textsuperscript{109} But this was not the first occasion of such linkage in U.S. foreign policy - the notion of "manifest destiny" identifies such a linkage from the nineteenth century. The foreign policy practices of the postwar era had been scripted previously.

With the domestic frontier of the United States effectively closed from the latter half of the nineteenth century (at least insofar as most Indian nations had been repressed, and the British, French and

\textsuperscript{107}. Ibid, p.109. Consider, also, the example of the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War following the declaration of "Civilian Exclusion Orders". Over two-thirds of the internees were legally United States citizens, and their European "enemy counterparts" were not subject to the same treatment: no German-Americans or Italian-Americans were imprisoned. See John Hersey, "Behind Barbed Wire", New York Times Magazine, September 11 1988. The bureaucrat responsible for the War Relocation Authority which ran the internment program would later head the Bureau of Indian Affairs, making him, in the words of one scholar, the keeper of American concentration camps. See Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).


Mexican territories of Oregon, Louisiana and California had been acquired, the imperial expansion which was considered essential to the maintenance of liberty at home was extended to Asia and the Caribbean. The Spanish-American War of 1898 saw the gaining of Cuba; Hawaii was annexed while American forces were sent to occupy Puerto Rico, Guam and the Phillipines; and a series of notes demanding open-door status to China culminated in U.S. participation in the force to suppress the Boxer rebellion. All these overseas adventures were justified in the same terms that had rationalized the oppression of the Indians and others at home: the need to civilize, educate and look after primitive peoples. It was a practice that culminated in the war in Vietnam and continues to be deployed towards countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua. Its effectiveness derives, in part, from the fact that "Foreign policy could...supply a sense of national continuity that the domestic sphere was less and less able to sustain.”

The boundaries of the American state had thus long been the result of domesticating the ‘self’ through the transfer of differences within society to the inscription of differences between societies. This has to be understood as a process more complex than either the intentional use of foreign threats to contain internal subversion or the creation of myths

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110. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.29; and Rogin, Ronald Reagan, p.50.


112. Rogin, Ronald Reagan, p.50.

of identity through foreign adventures. It is a process whereby, out of all the interpretive possibilities, the presence of community and anarchy within both (what we come to know as) the state and the international realm is disciplined so that community comes to exist exclusively on the inside, threatened by the anarchy of the outside. This is a process excluded from view, producing a naturalized order in terms of the anarchy problematique. It is a process which achieves this by the replication of the 'heroic practice' in the site of U.S. foreign policy.

THE HEROIC PRACTICE

The power of the anarchy problematique as the problematization which makes international relations historically possible and, in specific historical circumstances, makes U.S. foreign policy possible, is derived in large part from its replication of the heroic practice. As discussed in Chapter Four, the heroic practice operates on a simple sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy where the former is the higher, regulative ideal to which the latter is derivative and inferior, and a source of danger to the former's existence.

It is this practice that the anarchy problematique invokes whenever uncertainty is encountered. It works by recurring to the ideal of a sovereign presence or foundational point from which ambiguity can be disciplined. This privileging of identity over difference is constitutive of many of the practices of modernity, particularly in the form of positing a self, a sovereign "I", as the center of reference for modern life.
The centering of the individual is a prominent theme in the foreign policy discourse of the United States, particularly in terms of what constitutes the fundamental purpose of the United States. This produces a situation where the discourses of modernity and the practice of "international relations" are bound into a self-affirming whole. The heroic practice and the anarchy problematique privilege sovereignty over anarchy while the foreign policy discourse centers the individual. This serves to naturalize the United States and its understanding of global life. As Kolb has argued:

Questioning the ultimacy of modern distanced subjectivity also questions the often held assumption of the natural superiority of American institutions as typically modern. The American way of living is thought to be more natural because it corresponds to the pure individuality that is the true reality of every person.  

There are powerful historical reasons for this. Geoffrey Hawthorn has argued that the American conception of self as the individual derives in part from the character of the American revolution. Without the kind of old order that was being criticized and attacked in Europe - no equivalent of the European estates or the established church - American society was "merely individuals, with or without property, and government." One important consequence that reverberates throughout all the sites of politics (particularly "international relations") in the United States was that there developed in America a very special sense of time. Whereas for Europeans, hope lay in the future and the prospect of a new order, for Americans, having established their social

and political order through a revolution that secured what had already begun in an historical vacuum, "The past had been consolidated in a future whose integrity lay in remaining as much like the present as possible."\textsuperscript{116}

The consequence of this is that \textit{space} is more central to American identity than \textit{time}. The territorial enclosure of political space (and its expansion) is privileged over temporal, historical, or social relations. This points to the nexus between American identity and the understanding of global politics in terms of the anarchy problematique. The presence of sovereign states in an anarchic realm, marked by the absence of a central agency of power, is a spatial conception that privileges a geopolitical reading of global politics. Equally, American identity is constituted geopolitically, through the securing of a particular space. A geopolitical reading is thus more than an economical means of interpreting the ambiguity of global life. Geopolitical representational practices are practices of statecraft central to the constitution of the 'United States'.

CONCLUSION

The particular American conception of self is enframed by the inscription of total dangers from the anarchic realm that stands on the outside of the sovereign entity: total dangers that are constructed as threats to "individuality", "freedom", "democracy", "private enterprise",

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, p.194.
"family" and so forth. It is in this way that the threats can be inscribed and located in many and varied sites, often in conjunction with nation-states that embody different conceptions of the self (the Soviet Union, Cuba, Nicaragua), but just as often in conjunction with nation-states or "transnational" forces that represent the threat of anarchy in contrast to the sovereign (Libya, terrorism, drug-smugglers). The practices of modern statecraft in the United States thereby correspond to practices of modern mancraf through their constitution of the "United States". United States foreign policy is, in the terms of this argument, not simply a policy that responded to potential foreign threats. It was and remains, as Bradley Klein has argued, "part of a much broader postwar strategy of securing the spheres of social reproduction required for maintaining the American - and Western - way of life..."\textsuperscript{117}

The domestication of the variety of possibilities of enframing 'man', the containment of alternative ways of structuring social relations, that was an effect of the cold war came under challenge in the 1960s and 1970s. As Chapter Six will show, these challenges came from both the inside and the outside. The promise of cold war liberalism to continue to deliver economic prosperity and social harmony was undermined as continued economic growth in the industrialized countries failed to ensure employment and economic security for all. In addition, the economic practices of cold war liberalism began to be a source of

threats to society, most obviously in terms of environmental
degradation. Meanwhile, the disastrous war in Vietnam and the
international developments associated with the rise of new actors and
issues in global politics complicated the construction of the American
social order by the displacement of threats to other domestic societies.
It was a time thought to constitute a legitimation crisis of the state.\textsuperscript{118}
Evident in this period were challenges, such as feminism, to the
enframing of 'man'. It was not an idle coincidence that those in the
United States who claimed that the Vietnam War was "lost" also
blamed feminism for the undermining of family values. Nor was it a
coincidence that in the wake of feminism and other social movements of
the 1960s, the New Right emerged in the 1970s and 1980s with a
platform that combined the revival of cold war practices with the
reassertion of the domestic ideology of the nuclear family.\textsuperscript{119} It was an
attempt to reinstate the enframing of 'man' associated with the nuclear
family by the reaffirmation that the threats to "United States man"
were to be located in the Soviet Union. It was in this context that the
Carter administration's rewriting of security was caught.

\textsuperscript{118} See Jurgen Habermas, \textit{Legitimation Crisis} (London: Heinemamm, 1975);
James O'Connor, \textit{The Fiscal Crisis of the State} (New York: St. Martins Press,
1973); Manuel Castels, \textit{The Economic Crisis and American Society} (Princeton:

\textsuperscript{119} May, \textit{Homeward Bound}, pp.224-225.
INTRODUCTION

United States foreign policy in the postwar period was a political practice that enframed the United States as a liberal capitalist society and leader of the "free world" through the inscription of danger in other domestic societies. However, as an ensemble of practices, the cold war was possible only so long as it could underwrite prosperity at home and thus legitimate its international dimension. Beginning in the mid-1960s, a series of developments challenged each of the fundamental principles behind cold war liberalism. Changes in the global political economy produced economic conditions which limited the growth of the welfare state, demonstrated the power of Western Europe and Japan, and hampered cooperation between the industrialized nations. The United State's superiority in strategic nuclear indices was giving way to essential equivalence with the Soviet Union. And the Vietnam War vividly demonstrated the limits of American power and contributed to the world's economic dilemmas. Moreover, dissent within the power blocs surrounding the superpowers - the Sino-Soviet split, France's withdrawal from NATO, and West Germany's Ostpolitik - combined

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with the assertion of sovereignty and rights by the so-called Third World, suggested to many that the easily understood bipolar configuration of global politics in the postwar era was coming to an end. ²

It is in this context that the foreign policies of the Nixon and (particularly) the Carter administrations need to be located. The period 1945 to 1965 saw the political identity of the state constituted via a foreign policy that disciplined the range of interpretations of ‘man’, so that the nuclear family and economic and social relationships of cold war liberalism were dominant. Security was written in terms of dangers to this interpretation of ‘man’ being inscribed and located in other domestic societies. When cold war liberalism came under pressure, in part because the dangers to ‘man’ could no longer be located in other domestic societies (international economic disorder, environmental degradation and other issues were predominantly transnational), security had to be rewritten if the interpretations of ‘man’ were to be limited and the political identity of the United States controlled. The rewriting of security in terms of interdependence while reproducing the basic features of American society was the challenge facing U.S. administrations from the mid-1960s on.

This was a challenge for both the theory and practice of international politics. The proliferation of new perspectives on

international relations that emerged in the late 1960s has been discussed in Chapter Three. The development of new foreign policy practices for the United States was a task that initially befell the Nixon administration.

THE END OF THE POSTWAR ERA

The familiar trinity of the 1960s crises in international relations (changes in the global political economy, the strategic balance, and the defeat in Vietnam) were, for the United States, not simply an instance of a changing international environment demanding policy adjustments at home. The 1960s crises in international relations were intimately connected to the domestic crises in the United States. Although centered in the economy, the crises were not of economic problems alone. United States' hegemony had been sustained by the maintenance of strong conditions of capital accumulation in the domestic economy, rather than by its preeminence in world trade or financial relations. The fact that until 1970 only 8% of U.S. gross national product circulated in the world market was symptomatic of this. The implication of this, as Davis notes contrary to much contemporary scholarship on the issue, is that any shrinkage in the United States' share of world production is not incompatible with continued U.S. dominance in the global political economy. Only a crisis in the internal

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coherence of the American economy could lead to decline and the associated ramifications for international organization.\textsuperscript{5}

The crises of the 1960s were, therefore, the result of challenges to the collective identity of the United States brought on by disruptions to the nature of social relationships underlying capital accumulation.\textsuperscript{6}

The growth coalition that had sustained cold war liberalism began to unravel in the 1960s. The postwar political consensus had been founded on the need for economic growth, with the result that social conflict had been deferred or avoided among the governing elites, and was instead relocated to the streets and outside formal politics. But once economic growth began to falter, the political coalition on which it was based could no longer be secure. The economic indices demonstrated the magnitude of the social change that was underway. Although the decline in the United State's world economic position was relative, the decline in (for example) the per annum rate of productivity growth in the private sector - from 2.4\% (1965-1972) to 1.6\% (1972-1977) to 0.2\% (1977-1982) - indicated that the economic resources were no longer going to be freely available to overcome social conflict.\textsuperscript{7}

"Without the glue of economic growth, political unity in the United States disintegrated."\textsuperscript{8} While the Vietnam War is most often cited as

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, p.7.


\textsuperscript{7} Kennedy, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers}, p.434.

the major reason behind the dissolution of the elite policy consensus in the United States, it was the economic consequences of the war rather than its foreign policy (de)merits which transferred social conflict from the streets to the elites. The welfare state liberalism of the growth coalition could not be sustained in the face of increasing demands which resulted from the changing social relationships involving women, blacks and minorities, largely because of the declining share of national resources available given the Johnson administration's insistence that the Vietnam War would not be funded through increased taxation.

The election of the Nixon administration in 1968 coincided with the open rupture of the policy elite in the wake of the Tet offensive in Vietnam earlier that year. Alongside international upheavals (the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the domestic French struggles being just two), the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, the violence surrounding the Democratic Convention in Chicago, and the continuing protests of the civil rights, antiwar and womens movements, there seemed to be a major crisis facing the American polity. A new consensus about the dissensus emerged: "There was a widely recognized need for a postgrowth approach to domestic policy and a less ambitious imperial strategy, but few were

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10. See Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp.434-435.

sure how to develop one. A unified and articulate elite...was nowhere in evidence. The growth coalition had collapsed, and it was unclear what would replace it."\textsuperscript{12} It was a situation which one observer characterized as "disorder within, disorder without."\textsuperscript{13} The story of the Nixon administration (and later of Carter) is the story of an attempt to reorganize the American political system which ultimately failed.\textsuperscript{14} A detailed analysis of the Nixon administration's record and ultimate failure is beyond the scope of this chapter.\textsuperscript{15} The following section aims, however, to indicate the administration's foreign policy response to these changed circumstances as a way of considering the context which the Carter administration came to confront.

NIXON AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE 'COLD WAR SYSTEM'

Richard Nixon declared in a 1970 report to Congress that "The postwar period in international relations has ended."\textsuperscript{16} Noting that Western Europe and Japan had recovered economic strength; that new nations were proliferating and shunning communism; that the international communist monolith was no more; and that the U.S.

\textsuperscript{12} Wolfe, America's Impasse, pp.43-44.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p.37.

\textsuperscript{15} For a discussion see Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

nuclear monopoly had ended with the Soviet Union and China acquiring nuclear weapons, the Nixon administration sought to put together a new strategy that would allow for a different form of international organization to meet the changed circumstances while preserving the basis of the cold war system.17

Through the concept of detente, the Nixon administration sought to give containment new life with Kissinger's notion of a "stable structure of peace".18 This involved the aim of "global equilibrium", a form of the balance of power, to be achieved through the process of "linkage".19 The intention was to move away from a zero-sum understanding of international order by having a more flexible approach to United States interest so long as the overall balance of power was preserved.20

This less rigid approach to the United State's global interests was enshrined in the "Nixon Doctrine". While declaring that the U.S. would keep all treaty commitments and continue to provide a "nuclear umbrella" to vital allies, Nixon's intention was to reduce U.S. commitments by seeking greater self-reliance from allies. Although Nixon maintained that in the face of aggression the U.S. would still provide economic and military aid in accord with treaty obligations, the

17. Cox, "From Detente to the New Cold War", p.266. These themes were repeated as the starting point for all the Nixon administrations subsequent reports to Congress.


nation directly threatened would be expected to bear the primary responsibility for the manpower and other resources necessary for its defense.21

For all the declarations of a new era, the primary focus of international order in the Nixon years remained the superpower relationship. Kissinger has argued in his memoirs that "To foreclose Soviet opportunities is...the essence of the West's responsibilities. It is up to us to help define the limits of Soviet aims."22 This was attempted by a return to Kennan's notion of five centers of power that should not be under the control of a hegemon, and adoption of the concept of "trilateralism" to bring Europe and Japan into closer alignment with the United States.

Above all, it was the policy of detente which became the centerpiece of the Nixon administration's efforts to reorder U.S. foreign policy. In Nixon's words, detente was a means "to involve Soviet interests in ways that would increase their stake in international stability and the status quo."23 Detente was at one and the same time an aberration in U.S. foreign policy and a continuation of containment. It was an aberration in so far as it granted the Soviet Union the status of superpower and sought their cooperation on a range of issues. It was a continuation of containment in that the general aim of the Nixon administration was to preserve the fundamental elements of the cold war system by lowering


22. Quoted in Smith, Realist Thought, p.208.

the cost to America and involving others in the maintenance of this form of international organization. Rather than direct confrontation, detente sought to devise a system of "self-restraint" for the Soviet Union through economic inducements and their linkage to international behavior.\textsuperscript{24}

Detente as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy was relatively short-lived. While the crises of the late 1960s demanded a fundamental reordering of policy, detente's dual nature - its reaffirmation of the Soviet threat combined with its calls for superpower cooperation - left it in an ambivalent position at home. Combined with the almost autarkic policies of the "Nixon shocks" in foreign economic policies, detente became a target for multiple constituencies.\textsuperscript{25} It sought to pave the way for a new era in international relations yet continued to preserve the basic features of the cold war system. The latter was important because American society was constituted in large part by cold war practices. As Michael Cox has argued:

For over twenty-five years the struggle against communism and the Soviet threat had shaped the basic structure of American society. America had become, in effect, a Cold War system whose electoral politics, economy and even basic ideology had been defined by anti-communism...The Cold War thus developed an extraordinarily wide economic and political base in America...\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{26} Cox, "From Detente to the New Cold War", p.272. For Kissinger's assessment of some of the forces behind the challenge to detente see Henry Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval} (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), Ch. 22.
As a consequence (and stated in conventional terms), detente failed to legitimize itself in the United States. The failure, however, was more than a tactical problem of policy implementation. As Chapter Four argued, seeking to engender cooperation from states that have been inscribed as adversarial in order to constitute one's domestic base is a task fraught with contradictions. Unless security can be rewritten in terms that do not require threats to be located in other domestic societies, cooperation will succumb to confrontation in order to preserve the resources that have been invested in a certain ordering of domestic social relations. The social investments in cold war practices were sufficient to provide substantial opposition to detente. They were not, however, sufficient to overcome some redirection of U.S. foreign policy and reinstall an overtly cold war foreign policy. At least, not yet.

The Nixon administration marked a period of ambiguity in American foreign policy as a consequence of the crisis in collective identity. It was a period that resembled Gramsci's definition of political crisis: a time when the old is dying and the new cannot be born. The world economic crisis of 1973 and after seemed to be a threshold potentially marking the transition from one world order and form of international organization to another. Detente had been an attempt at the new

27. Williams, "Detente and U.S. Domestic Politics."


29. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.400. One indicator of the changing nature of the global political economy was the decline in world industrial output. While the two decades (1953-1973) had seen growth that equalled that of the previous century and a half (1800-1953), the period
without being a departure from the old. With a fractured policy elite and an escalation of the economic problems, the declarations of a new era in international relations reached a growing audience but did not achieve orthodoxy over cold war interpretations. Both perspectives had committed adherents but neither was fashioned into a dominant discourse that could garner enough support to unambiguously direct policy. Grappling with changed circumstances but restrained by inflexible interests, no clear future direction was emerging. As Secretary of State Kissinger stated in a 1975 interview:

I feel we are at a watershed. We're at a period of extraordinary creativity or a period when really the international order can come apart politically, economically, morally. I believe with all that dislocation we now experience there also exists an extraordinary opportunity to form, for the first time in history, a truly global society carried by the principle of interdependence. And if we act wisely and with vision, I think we can look back to the turmoil as the birth pangs of a more creative and better system. If we miss the opportunity, I think there is going to be chaos.30

With the crisis having been generated by the neoliberal order and its changing social relations of production, retaining the status quo was not an option. Change was required, but the advantage lay with those who sought a reinvigoration rather than a reformation of the American polity and its identity. In this environment of ambiguity, a period "marked by confusion, frustration, and an overwhelming feeling that America had lost its direction", those who sought to reimpose traditional perspectives on domestic and international politics were

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after 1973 saw a decline in the growth of world output from 6% per annum to 2.4%. See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p.414.
active in promoting their cause. The discourse of American policy was becoming increasingly neoconservative.

THE NEOCONSERVATIVES

In the context of the ambiguity and disorder that characterized the American polity in the late 1960s and 1970s, there were many sources of opposition to the excesses of the period. Conservatives in the United States, building upon the tradition of opposition to monopolies and state intervention in the economy prevalent in the immediate postwar period (and discussed in Chapter Five), were by conviction hostile to the increasing domestic expenditures of the welfare state in the 1960s. However, given the complex nature of the domestic and international crises that the United States seemed to face, already established constituencies were unable to mobilize discourse around their proposals. This made possible a new source of critique which sought order out of chaos by appeals to past virtues. The neoconservatives, former liberals who retained a commitment to capitalism with some moral vision but were cognizant of its contemporary problems, were an amorphous group who noted the failures of the Great Society, criticized the affirmative action programs designed to remedy inequality, and became impatient with the inability to use American force abroad.31

Traumatized by the sixties, the neoconservatives regarded the

"counterculture" of that era as an onslaught against tradition and authority, a veritable "consecration of disorder." Ignoring the changing political economy or the performance of political elites as factors in the polity's problems, the neoconservatives focused on cultural explanations for the various crises. It was, they maintained, the lack of bourgeois constraints for liberal capitalism that had precipitated the problems of public policy. The English neoconservative Paul Johnson maintained that "civilized societies require institutions which restrain our passions and supplement our shortcomings. The three principle ones are the family, organized religion and the state..."

For the neoconservatives, sexual and racial conflict, poverty, and economic disorder were functions of what one exponent called "the twilight of authority." Nisbet argued that "the giant political apparatus of the modern state, part war machine, part welfare machine, complete bureaucracy", presides over a wasteland with "the littered remains of authority, political community, family, religion, moral values and cultural excellence." This litany of revolution was a consequence of the radical opposition of the 1960s, and outgrowth of


33. Quoted in Edgar, "The Free or the Good", p.76.


what Samuel Huntington termed the "democratic distemper."36

Huntington regarded the democratic activity of the 1960s as a general challenge to systems of authority, public and private. The result of expanding education, among other factors, this democratic surge made demands on government that could no longer be fulfilled. The Great Society programs designed to achieve a measure of social justice after a period of sustained economic growth were a result of these demands, which could not be met by a fiscally constrained state trying to pay for the Vietnam War without raising taxes. There was thus a gap between expectations of the government and its performance at the same time as there was a disjunction between the extent of governmental activity and its authority. This "excess of democracy" was the greatest threat to democracy, according to Huntington:

The vulnerability of democratic government in the United States thus comes not primarily from external threats, though such threats are real, nor from internal subversion from the left or the right, although both possibilities could exist, but rather from the internal dynamics of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society.37

The neoconservative critique was a declaration about the state of political identity in the United States. Concerned with the demise of Enlightenment thinking about progress and problem solving, it was alarmed at the 'spreading mediocrity' of American society and attitudes.


With its cultural focus and concern for "faith", "nerve", and "will", the critique did not distinguish between domestic and international domains, but linked the crises at home with the inability to act abroad. As Daniel Bell lamented, "Today, the belief in American exceptionalism had vanished with the end of empire, the weakening of power, the loss of faith in the nation's future."\(^{38}\) In his terms the prospects for the future were not bright: "...despite a common culture, there is no common purpose, or common faith, only bewilderment."\(^{39}\)

For some, like Norman Podhoretz, the diagnosis was equally bleak but salvation was possible with a redirection of foreign policy. Podhoretz argued that like Britain in the wake of the First World War, the United States in the wake of Vietnam was cultivating a "culture of appeasement."\(^{40}\) In the same spirit as his colleagues' denunciations of the anti-authoritarianism of the sixties, Podhoretz saw the cultural crisis at home as precipitating a security crisis abroad: "This malevolent legacy of the war in Vietnam, this combination of pacifism, anti-Americanism, and isolationism...[is] all working against American resolve to resist the forward surge of Soviet imperialism."\(^{41}\) The "strategic retreat" of the Nixon Doctrine, he argued, had allowed "Soviet proxies" in the form of Cuban troops to occupy Angola and led the

\(^{38}\) Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism", The Public Interest 41, Fall 1975, p.197.

\(^{39}\) Ibid, p.211.


\(^{41}\) Ibid, p.76.
United States to look on while various nations had fallen to factions supported by or loyal to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{42}

Podhoretz argued, however, that there was an historical precedent for turning America around, overthrowing the "culture of appeasement", and advancing domestic and international prosperity. Taking the cold war to be a period of struggle against an unambiguous Soviet threat, he maintained that in pulling together to combat this threat the American people "experienced a surge of self-confident energy" that had provided the prosperity and harmony characteristic of the dominant understanding of postwar American society.\textsuperscript{43} Although writing in the final days of the Carter period, Podhoretz's strategy for renewal was part of the neoconservative agenda at the end of the Nixon-Ford years. With order precarious at home and abroad, the neoconservative strategy was the pursuit of a stable, unified society at home through an emphasis on the communist threat and the Third World's rejection of liberal values abroad as a means "to generate the requisite national allegiance and discipline."\textsuperscript{44} With the New Left and the "counterculture" no longer the easily identified enemies of neoconservatism by the mid-1970s, foreign affairs became a preoccupation. As Steinfels argues, "Their determination to find an overseas opponent, whether Idi Amin, Fabian socialism, Eurocommunism or Soviet power, seemed constant

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, pp.38-39. Podhoretz listed Laos, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Cambodia as among those nations.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, p.22.

\textsuperscript{44} Steinfels, The Neoconservatives, p.60.
Despite the vast difference in geopolitical and military factors. In this context, international developments became less important for their impact on United States security "than as markers of how far America has fallen from the necessary strength of will."46

In the crisis of authority that was afflicting the United States, the neoconservatives argued, no factor was more important than challenges to the family. As argued in Chapter Five, foreign policy is a practice which serves to discipline the (in principle) limitless ways of organizing social relationships. In the American context, the inscription of danger through foreign policy has privileged the nuclear family of cold war liberalism. Throughout the 1960s, pressure from social forces on the inside and the outside, loosened the nexus between cold war practices and the nuclear family. Now the neoconservatives argued that it had to be reinstated and reinvigorated to arrest the social decline and moral decay of the United States. The impetus behind this was not any necessity of the international arena but the role of traditional nuclear family to economic and social well-being in a largely capitalist society.47

The neoconservatives maintained that the crisis of liberalism was brought on by the changed nature of the relationship between the family and the state. Because of economic pressures arising from the increasing demands (associated with the "excess of democracy") on the

45. Ibid, pp.68-69.

46. Ibid, p.69.

welfare state, taxes had to be raised, inflation increased, and the sole male breadwinner was no longer able to sustain his family. As a consequence the married woman had been pulled into the labor force to make up the shortfall, thereby destroying the patriarchal family and, in their terms, the moral order of society. Irving Kristol argued that the welfare state was responsible for having made "the child fatherless, the mother husbandless, the husband useless." 48 The 'problem of the family' for the neoconservatives was that the husband had lost patriarchal authority to the working wife. 49

The economic dimension of the nuclear family involves more, according to neoconservatives, than the containment of female sexuality and traditional economic relationships discussed in Chapter Five. In the influential economic text Wealth and Poverty (Ronald Reagan distributed copies to his cabinet in 1981), George Gilder argued that the family also contains male sexuality in aid of the economy. Marriage for Gilder creates a sense of responsibility that forces men to channel their sexual energies toward the economy: "A married man...is spurred by the claims of family to channel his otherwise disruptive male aggressions into his performance as a provider for wife and children." 50 According to Gilder, it is "familial anarchy", not capitalism or its


malpractice, that causes poverty.51

No matter how implausible the neoconservative argument on the cause of the crisis of liberalism might appear, two points need to be born in mind. First, valid or otherwise, the neoconservative lament of declining moral standards, the destruction of the traditional family, and a loss of will at home and nerve abroad came to dominate public discourse in the late 1970s. The consequences of this for the Carter administration’s foreign policy and attempt at rewriting security cannot be overestimated. Second, and more importantly, the neoconservatives had correctly understood the potential for societal transformation posed by the changing social relations of production, particularly as they involved working mothers. With increasing numbers of females in the workforce pressing for affirmative action and economic justice, notions of equality and fairness important to the public manifestations of American identity were invoked. The inability of the state to deliver the social goods exposed the domination of capitalist patriarchy in the United States and contributed to the crisis of liberalism.52

The neoconservative diagnosis of the crisis of liberalism exonerated the political elites who had taken the United States into Vietnam and financed the war without raising taxes. With this focus, the neoconservative solution to the crisis argued that the family should be stabilized by the reassertion of patriarchy and the removal of women


from the work force. To achieve this taxes and inflation had to be reduced so as to ease the economic imperative for a mother to be employed. But taxes were to be reduced by cutting back on the welfare state, not on the military. With this diagnosis, domestic politics in the United States throughout the 1970s saw a revolutionary mobilization of the middle-strata of society in suburban protests. Bound by the themes of deregulation and the curtailment of Great Society programs, the antibusing movements, landlord and realtor protests against rent control and public housing, and the tax revolts akin to California's Proposition 13, formed a network that was central to the neoconservative and neoliberal strategy. While reducing domestic state spending, however, neoconservatism called for an increase in military spending as a demonstration of resolve and a means of confronting the danger reinscribed in the external realm. It is a solution that Robert Cox has termed "hyperliberalism" because of its return to nineteenth century economic liberalism and a rejection of the attempt to ameliorate the social consequences of economic liberalism - the function of the welfare state which the neoconservatives argued had usurped the family. This restructuring of the social relations of production confronts the coalition from which the welfare state was constituted, and involves a political struggle which requires the disenabling of political opponents and the marginalization of alternatives. This is achieved by the reinscription of danger.

53. Davis, "The Political Economy of Late Imperial America", pp.32-34.
In economic terms, the neoconservative strategy was one of "reindustrialization" for America, exemplified by a special issue of Business Week.\textsuperscript{55} Noting the economic decline of the United States, the magazine maintained that the restoration of America's productive capacity called for more than the (albeit necessary) managerial and technological reforms. Instead, the promise of reindustrialization rested on a "new social contract" among the constituents of the polity. While not denying the existence of injustice against minorities, the new social contract would have to be premised on the notion that "restoring economic growth overrides other conflicting interests."\textsuperscript{56} All other interests and claims would have to be subordinated to this one goal.

The neoconservative diagnosis of the crisis of liberalism, although increasingly dominant in the period leading up to and including the late 1970s, was not unopposed. It is important to recognize that on the issue of family policy, the Carter administration adopted a position that, although inspired by an understanding of a crisis in American family life, recommended a course very different to that advocated by the neoconservatives. Upon election, Carter told his Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (Joseph Califano) that he wanted a social policy that was both pro-family and pro-work.\textsuperscript{57} However, in a much publicized

\textsuperscript{55} "The Reindustrialization of America", Business Week, June 30, 1980. Alan Wolfe noted that it was the best example of the new conservative consensus on America's ills. See Wolfe, America's Impasse, p.6. For a discussion of the political implications of such a strategy see William E. Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), Ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{56} Business Week, p.86.

\textsuperscript{57} Erwin Haregrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), p.55
White House Conference on Families held in 1978, the policy options put to the administration from a broad advisory group that involved organizations as diverse as official church groups and the National Gay Task Force (but excluded fundamentalist groups and provided them with a target) involved an upgrading of government-provided social services.\(^58\) In other words, the solutions were part and parcel of what the neoconservatives considered the problem. The report emerging from the White House Conference recommended, upon accepting that a plurality of family forms was the appropriate starting point for public policy, increases in social welfare and income maintenance programs, various flexible work arrangements to accommodate working mothers, and a national employment policy to legally enforce the right to a job.\(^59\) This approach, as the next chapter will conclude, was not unrelated to the Carter administration's foreign policy strategies.

CONCLUSION

The era characterized as the end of the postwar period of international relations was, for the United States, one marked by ambiguity in which the disorder within was related to the disorder without. The relative decline of the United States' international position and the domestic upheavals combined in a way that raised basic questions about the American identity and its future. Three major


strategies emerged as ways of promoting order out of the chaos. The Nixon administration implemented a redirection of foreign policy to account for the global changes, but opted for a policy (detente) that attempted to account for them without unsettling the investments (financial and otherwise) in the social relations of production associated with cold war practices. Even this minimal redirection of U.S. foreign policy encountered substantial opposition, leaving the ambiguity undisciplined - if not actually increased by Watergate - by the time the Nixon administration was driven from office. The neoconservatives diagnosed the ambiguity of the period as a cultural problem brought on by the anti-authoritarianism of the sixties. Any attempt to account for the new global issues was an inappropriate extension of domestic notions of equality and egalitarianism to an arena resistant to reform. Concentrating on the changing relationship between the family and the state, the neoconservatives sought to control the proliferating forms of the social relations of production through a return to traditional modes of authority. The neoconservatives believed that greater domestic discipline could be achieved through a reinscription of danger that would repeat the self-confidence of the cold war era and reinstate a particular understanding of the family at the center of the domestic order. Broadly speaking, this was the path followed by the Reagan administration. How the reinscription of danger associated with cold war practices occurred at a time of greater recognition of global issues is the concern of Chapter Eight. The third strategy was that associated, initially at least, with the Carter administration. The next chapter discusses its content and implementation.
Chapter Seven

The Carter Administration: Rewriting Security

INTRODUCTION

The 1970s were a period of ambiguity in global politics, with a range of potential world orders possible.¹ The three strategies (outlined in the previous chapter) articulated in the United States to discipline this ambiguity can be differentiated in terms of their understanding of the relationship between American identity and U.S. foreign policy. The Nixon administration sought to stabilize the cold war identity of the United States by accommodating global developments in a strategy that pursued different means to similar ends. Security was to be reformulated but not fundamentally altered. The neoconservatives regarded the cold war identity of the forties and fifties as having been undermined by the counterculture of the sixties. They sought its reimposition by a return to cold war foreign policy practices. Security was to be reimposed by a return to past practices. The Carter administration, as this chapter shall argue, recognised that American identity had been undermined by the struggles of the sixties, but regarded the rigid cold war practices that had resulted in Vietnam and

¹ See Robert W. Cox, "The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s", International Journal 35 (1980), pp.388-389. Cox identified the three most prominent alternatives as a "reconstructed political directorate for the world economy" in the form of trilateral relations, the fragmentation of the international economy into autarkic blocs, or the Third World vision of autonomous national development free from dependence.
Watergate as responsible. For the Carter administration, to return to cold war practices would thus have been to perpetuate the excesses of applying dogma in an inherently complex and differentiated world, thereby retracing the path to the present crisis. Equally, to follow the Nixonian path of accommodation would not have provided a clear enough break with past practices and would have thus failed to differentiate the administration's own identity without addressing the problems of America's malaise. Security was thus to be fundamentally rewritten.

However, the story of the Carter administration, as Chapter One made clear, is the failure of this process of rewriting and the abdication of strategy to the neoconservative impulse to reimpose an earlier order. In this process of change - this struggle between differing interpretations seeking to discipline the ambiguity - American foreign policy practice in the Carter years was a site in which fundamental issues central to American identity were aired in the guise of a concern for security and the United States role in international affairs. Whereas previous periods had seen the domination of cold war practices, the (initial) Carter period "brought multiple currents more visibly into conflict than at any time since the United States became a world

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2. One commentator noted of the Carter administration: Although it is not unusual for a new president to want to asset an identity of his own in foreign policy, the attempt was made this time with a determination and a thoroughness that had not been seen since the John Foster Dulles years, at least." Simon Serfaty, "Waiting for Reagan", SAIS Review 1 (1981), pp.23-24.

3. Osgood has written that; "The history of the Carter administration's foreign policy was one of the steady abandonment, reversal, or muting of every component of this hopeful design for 'world order politics' as the priority of familiar cold war politics reasserted itself." See Robert E. Osgood, "Carter Policy In Perspective", SAIS Review 1 (1981), p.16.
The explanation for the final victory of cold war practices over the initial Carter strategy to rewrite security cannot be found in the personality struggles of the administration, for they represented more than individuals. Aside from the critiques of pregiven subjectivities discussed in Chapter Two, the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski "was merely a surface manifestation of the deeper unresolved conflict within the entire administration and, beyond that, within all of modern American foreign policy." Nor can the explanation be found in 'the structure' of the international system or claims of a realm of necessity. To do so would be, for the reasons outlined in Chapters One and Two, to privilege structure over agency and seek recourse to an 'external' realm which is never distinct from the process of understanding.

The changes in the Carter administration's foreign policy have to be seen as the outcome of political struggles central to the (re)construction of American political identity. As Cyrus Vance noted, "[a]mbiguity, contradiction, and change surrounded America's foreign policy choices in the 1970s." Security had to be rewritten in one form or another. The issue was whether it would be in accord with the new understandings which saw the period as a potential watershed between the traditional practices of the postwar era and an emerging era of interdependence.


5. Ibid, p.43.

and globalism, or whether the old order would be reinvigorated to the extent that it could prevent the birth of the new. The initial Carter period was an attempt at rewriting security in terms of the new. What follows in this chapter outlines the discursive strategies of that attempt.

The Carter administration's attempt at rewriting security was defeated by two factors. First, establishing a new interpretation of security requires the concomitant disenabling of the old. That task is made difficult by the considerable social resources invested in the form of identity associated with cold war practices, as outlined in Chapter Five. Although problems - often economic in source but not just economic in nature - challenged the established order, that order would not be reconstructed without a political struggle. As Alan Wolfe notes:

A political coalition that had been as successful as the growth network does not roll over and play dead merely because the economy turns downward, however. While Carter may have understood the need to move in a new direction, there existed sufficient obstacles in the form of residues from the era of unreconstructed economic growth to prevent him from understanding it too well.7

The second major factor contributing to the overcoming of the Carter administration's attempt at rewriting security was that, although the administration made the most concerted attempt to establish something new in the understanding of U.S. security in the postwar period, such a judgment is relative to previous administrations. The Carter administration was not (understandably) able to completely break out of the mould of previous U.S. policy. Although staffed by

people who had previous experience in the foreign policy establishment but were critical of their predecessors, the administration was nonetheless largely dependent upon already established discourses for its policy conceptions. These discourses not only limited the range of interpretation and political action, but it can be argued that they were insufficient to the challenge of rewriting security. As one scholar has noted, "Jimmy Carter was the first modern Democratic president to face the dearth of ideas in the Democratic policy agenda."8 This limitation of the discourse, itself a product of the continuing ambiguity and indeterminacy of the period, meant that any attempt at employing new discursive strategies always had to give some ground and legitimacy to the old. In consequence, as the following discussion highlights, the Carter administration's attempt at rewriting security contained many built-in tensions and ambiguities that were to become the focal points in the political struggle between the competing interpretations.

This chapter will situate the Carter administration amidst the discursive networks of the period by explicating the self-understandings observed during the presidential campaign of 1976, the themes of the wider discourse of the fragmenting foreign policy establishment, and the way these themes were articulated by Carter appointees, especially Zbigniew Brzezinski.

CARTER AND THE 'NEW ERA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS'

Carter came to office with an electoral strategy in foreign affairs which combined strident criticisms of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years with enthusiastic declarations (akin to Nixon's) that a new era of international relations was at hand.

Carter's criticisms of his predecessors included the charge that recent foreign policy activities had been contrary to the American character. Carter maintained that it was necessary for the United States to restore its principles in order to regain world respect and leadership. This had been forfeited because the United States "[is] looked on as a warmonger. We are looked on as a liar. We are looked on as an intervener in the internal affairs of other countries." The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years had, Carter alleged, been characterized by "military adventurism and covert manipulation", the favoring of "short-term considerations over long-term interests, bilateral diplomacy over multilateral institution-building, and military responses over economic and scientific cooperation." Moreover, the conduct of U.S. policy had been by "a kind of secretive 'Lone Ranger' foreign policy - a one-man policy of international adventure." To this litany, Watergate was an


Another criticism was the shifting emphasis of U.S. policy in the preceding years. While the Nixon period had begun with an appreciation of the new developments in global politics that challenged the cold war orientation, it had ended in a preoccupation with great power relations. Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, faulted Nixon and Kissinger for not giving enough attention to the new forces and actors in global politics:

A flaw in our foreign policy during this period was that it was too narrowly rooted in the concept of an overarching U.S.-Soviet "geopolitical" struggle. Obviously, such a conflict did exist and it was of major dimensions. But our national interests encompassed more than U.S.-Soviet relations. New crises unrelated to competition with the Soviet Union had and would occur around the globe with increasing frequency. We are living in a rapidly changing world. Many developments did not fit neatly into an East-West context. I was convinced - as I believe Henry Kissinger was by the end of his tenure - that not only had the bipolar focus of the postwar period given way to a more complicated set of relationships in which power was more diffuse, but also it had become essential for the United States to grapple with the North-South issues - the interwoven problems of the industrialized and nonindustrialized nations. Global interdependence, once a fashionable buzzword, had become a reality, and our future was inextricably entwined with the economic and political developments of a turbulent Third World.

Such attention, Vance believed, "required a broader American conception of security interests and of the scope of our foreign policy than merely the U.S.-Soviet or East-West geopolitical competition."

While the OPEC- instigated oil price rise, the conflict in southern

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15. Ibid, p.23.
Africa, the October 1973 war in the Middle East, and the 1974 Indian explosion served to demonstrate that "[t]he polarized world of the 1950s, already giving way to the diversity and the diffusion of power in the 1960s, became the interdependent, multipolar world of the 1970s," the appropriate response was not an abandonment of traditional security concerns. Vance declared that "[a]fter 1973, the United States had to shift much of its attention to grappling with these problems, both in the East-West context and as a manifestation of what was coming to be recognized as an increasingly diverse and interdependent world."17

Vance's assessment of the two dimensions of U.S. policy required in this new period highlights the tension between the two perspectives on international organization (North/South, East/West) that had bedeviled the Nixon period and were to be at the center of the Carter administration's dilemmas. As Gaddis Smith argues, the division of East/West versus North/South "ran like a fault line through the Carter administration." The fault line, however, was not one that ran between policy makers or distinct bureaucracies. It was a fault line within the administration's strategic thought. In some of Carter's campaign statements there seemed to be a repudiation of one set of issues in favor of the other. Speaking in March 1976, Carter declared that:

...our policies should be aimed at building a just and peaceful

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17. Ibid. Emphasis added.

world order, in which every nation can have a constructive role. For too long, our foreign policy has...[been] based on the assumption that the world is a jungle of competing national antagonisms, where military supremacy and economic muscle are the only things that work and where rival powers are balanced against one another to keep the peace. Exclusive reliance on this strategy is not in keeping with the character of the American people, or with the world as it is today. Balance of power politics may have worked in 1815, or even in 1945, but it has a much less significant role in today's world. Of course, there are rivalries - racial, religious, national, some of them bitter. But the need for cooperation, even between rivals, goes deeper than all of them...That is why we must replace balance of power politics with world order politics.19

In the second 1976 presidential debate against Gerald Ford, Carter stated that:

Under the [Ford] administration, we've had a continuation of so-called 'balance of power politics' where everything is looked on as a struggle between us on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other. Our allies, the smaller countries, get trampled in the rush. What we need is to try and seek individualized, bilateral relationships with countries regardless of their size and establish world order politics...20

Some of the campaign statements, however, opted less for the abandonment of East-West concerns than for their supplementation by the newer issues:

The maintenance of a global balance of power is obviously essential to the survival of the United States. Equally essential, however, is the building of a stable world order which can give our children and grandchildren safe passage into the twenty-first century. The time has come, therefore, to supplement balance of power politics with world order politics.21


The late campaign and transition phase advice to Carter from his senior foreign policy officials, notably Vance and Brzezinski (both of whom were campaign advisers before their appointment to administration positions), contained both the East-West and North-South interpretations of U.S. policy.

In an October 1976 memorandum to the candidate, Vance wrote that while the U.S. should maintain its military strength and protect its interests, a new approach to U.S. foreign policy would mean that:

U.S./Soviet issues will not be permitted to so dominate our foreign policy that we neglect other important relationships and problems. The new administration will bring a new sensitivity, awareness and priority to the vast complex of issues clustering around the relationships between the industrialized and unindustrialized world, and the new set of global issues that are emerging, such as energy, population, environment, and nuclear proliferation.22

Brzezinski wrote in an early memorandum (that he co-authored during the transition with Henry Owen and Richard Gardner, and then up-dated with Samuel Huntington in early 1977 before presenting it to the President in April 1977), that U.S. policy needed not a new anti-Communist coalition, nor an updated Atlanticism, and certainly not an isolationist or protectionist stance. He stated that "[i]t requires a broad architectural process for an unstable world organized almost entirely on the principle of national sovereignty and yet increasingly interdependent socially and economically."23

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This internal ambivalence and ambiguity within the administration's strategic thought, a blending of North/South and East/West perspectives and issues, represented in part a conscious effort to avoid dogma and doctrine in the setting of foreign policy agendas. The very idea that sets of issues could be neatly categorized or subordinated to others was anathema to some of the major policy makers in the administration. Nonetheless, it was to open the way for future criticism of incoherence and implicitly granted legitimacy to a range of neoconservative criticisms.

**THE DISCOURSE OF THE 'NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS'**

With the fundamental premises of the cold war system undermined by developments in the mid-1960s, there was a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the future course of U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s. One course, however, was not favored by any part of the establishment, new or otherwise. There was a strong desire on the part of all to avoid a

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retreat into isolationism for fear that this would create a global power vacuum and result in anarchy.²⁶ This led to the development of a liberal internationalist interpretation of U.S. foreign policy, which served to accommodate the critiques of American policy from the Vietnam period while preserving America's global role.²⁷ Carter set out this position in a campaign speech:

While the American people have had their fill of military adventurism and covert manipulation, we have not retreated into isolationism. We realize that increased anarchy will not only reverse the progress toward peace and stability that we have made, but also strengthen the hand of our adversaries. That is why we must replace balance of power politics with world order politics. The new challenge to American foreign policy is to take the lead in joining the other nations of the world to build a just and stable international order.²⁸

Although it shared with its conservative counterpart the internationalist dimension, the liberal position had a focus that gave greater credence to the North/South axis; downplayed, but did not ignore, East/West concerns; and highlighted the new issues that were important in considerations of security. While arguing for a maintenance of a favorable balance of power for the United States, the liberal interpretation concentrated on fostering international cooperation


to solve the myriad of shared problems such as energy, pollution and food supplies. On the other hand, the conservative internationalism was more traditionally cold war in its orientation, retaining a concern for communism and Soviet military power as its focus.29

To portray the 'new era' as developing alternatives for a fundamental reorientation of U.S. policy is misleading. Both the liberal and the conservative positions shared a number of important and basic assumptions. Most obviously, by accepting an internationalist role for the United States both perspectives continued to reproduce a division of global political space between the West and the East. For this reason, Stanley Hoffmann noted that "Like so many past American great debates, this one turns out to be not quite so great after all: it is all in the family - two ways of preserving pride of place."30 Nonetheless, these interpretations of U.S. foreign policy have been variously represented in dichotomous terms as the "modernes" versus the "classiques",31 "planetary humanism" versus "power realism",32 or balance of power versus world order.

For those who adopted the conservative interpretation of America's role, the "new political sensibility" being propounded by the discourse of the 'new era' was an illegitimate transfer of the concerns of domestic

equality to global politics. The end of the American domestic liberal consensus in the 1960s, with the continued development of black consciousness and struggle, the rise of feminism and the alienation of youth, produced a concern with equality as the starting point for political analysis and action. It also spawned a counter-critique - what came to be termed neoconservatism - that questioned this "new egalitarianism" and the dangers thought to be posed to social stability by demands for social justice. The neoconservatives had a concomitant global logic. In the Inequality of Nations, Robert Tucker argued that the liberal perspective was a post-cold war outlook that substituted interdependence for hegemony, and gave priority to issues of equality and justice over the traditional concerns with power and order. This constituted, for Tucker, a new political radicalism because the belief in interdependence and its argument that cooperation was imperative and equality an issue on the international agenda was a break with the established interpretation of global politics. As protagonists of the "new political sensibility", Tucker singled out the Trilateral Commission

33. See, for example, Robert W. Tucker, "Egalitarianism and International Politics", Commentary 59 (February 1975), pp.38-50.


and its one-time director, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Given the Commission and Brzezinski's pivotal role in the Carter administration, it is worth examining some of the Commission's statements and Brzezinski's earlier writings to consider their approach to the United States' role in a period of ambiguity and uncertainty.38

Trilateralism and the Discourse of the 'New Era'

When candidate Carter declared in 1976 that "[t]he time has come for us to seek a partnership between North America, Western Europe and Japan...We seek not a condominium of the powerful but a community of the free",39 he was articulating a fundamental tenet of the new discourse on international relations and the raison d'etre of the Trilateral Commission. The concern to avoid the potential for isolationism in the ambiguity surrounding foreign policy options in the early 1970s stemmed not only from a concern with the liberal critiques of the United States' global role, but also the consequences of the foreign economic policies of the Nixon administration. Along with organizations such as The Atlantic Institute, the Trilateral Commission was a response to the "belligerent and defensive unilaterlism"


advocated by Nixon's Treasury Secretary John Connolly. While the
trilateralists accepted that the relative decline of the United States
meant that it could no longer single-handedly dominate the world
economy, they feared that unilateralist responses would only trigger
defensive reactions that would be against the West's interests. The
task they set themselves was to prepare responses that could handle
the disintegration of the "neoliberal historic bloc" by fashioning a new
doctrine that would define the task of states in the relaunching of
capitalist development.

The Trilateral Commission's efforts to reinvigorate the international
order were almost exclusively directed at what it perceived to be the
crisis of, or threats to, world capitalism in the 1970s. It was an
orientation that Richard Falk described as the "geoeconomics of the
multinational corporation." The Commission argued that forces outside
the trilateral area of the United States, Western Europe and Japan
posed the most serious threat to international order since the Second
World War. These threats, however, were not those privileged by a

Affairs 55 (1976), p.3.

41. Ibid, p.4. For a well-known statement of this position see Mariana v.N.
Whitman, "Leadership Without Hegemony: Our Role in the World Economy",
Foreign Policy 20 (1975), pp.138-60. See also Robert O. Keohane, "U.S. Foreign
Economic Policy Toward Other Advanced Capitalist States: The Struggle to
Make Others Adjust", in Eagle Entangled, ed. Oye, Rothchild and Lieber.

42. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the

43. Quoted in Stephen Gill, "From Atlanticism to Trilateralism: The Case
of the Trilateral Commission", in International Relations: British and American

44. Gill, "From Atlanticism to Trilateralism", pp.204-205.
cold war calculus of power. Principally, they were threats to the liberal international economic order in the form of the Third World's demands for greater economic justice, arising from the economic inequities of the postwar period. For example, the period between 1952 and 1972 had seen the doubling of per capita income in the developed world, while that of the developing world had only increased (in 1973 dollars) from $175 to $300. Moreover, as a proportion of the developed world's per capita income, that of the Third World had declined from 9% to 8%. It was understandings such as these that prompted the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The newly perceived threats also included the prospect of unrestrained population growth, resource depletion, and the spread of military technology in the Third World.

A conjunction of events in the mid-1970s contributed to a Western perception of a more unstable and assertive Third World: the October 1973 war; the independence of Portuguese colonies in 1974; the Vietnam victory in 1975; the intensification of struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa; the peasant revolt in Ethiopia; and the

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47. For the argument that the Third World's claims were more political than economic in their inspiration see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1985).
popular movements in Benin and Madagascar. Compounding this were developments in southern Europe: the instability in France and Italy with the rise of the Eurocommunists; and in Greece, Portugal and Spain with the collapse of dictatorships. As Samir Amin noted; "The coincidence of all these events with the economic crisis provoked a veritable 'panic atmosphere' with the seeming disappearance of United States' hegemony and talk of the disintegration of Europe. This was the atmosphere in which the non-aligned group...defined the theme of a new international economic order."  

These threats, the Commission and others argued, required new contingencies.  Under the labels of the "management of interdependence" and the search for cooperation, a strategy of world order was developed upon the premise that the world had witnessed the end of the postwar era of international relations. A major Trilateral Commission report stated:

The public and leaders of most countries continue to live in a

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mental universe which no longer exists - a world of separate nations - and have great difficulties thinking in terms of global perspectives and interdependence.50

World politics is a mix of conflict and cooperation; thus the international system can be viewed from two perspectives. One approach is in terms of the cleavages which divide nations of the world. Most serious is the gulf between East and West... The North-South cleavage is different... The second approach is to look at world politics and the international system in terms of the expanding linkages of interdependence... Both cleavage and linkage perspectives are valid and necessary for a complete picture. This report is concerned mainly, however, with the implications of interdependence, and therefore treats the cleavages or divisions primarily as obstacles to cooperation.51

Underpinning the trilateral approach were normative commitments to the liberty of the individual, representative government, the market economy, "an international [economic] order that encourages efficiency and equity through specialization and trade, and "an international political order based on national self-determination and evolution."52

This meant that the industrialized nation's response to the demands of the NIEO was to compromise on a number of specific and marginal issues but avoid any major changes to the rules and norms of the liberal international economic order.53 As one critic noted, this managerial response resulted in an even more pervasive form of realpolitik than that associated with the cold war, representing a global convergence of elites based on a conscious role for capitalism,54 and

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52. Gill, "From Atlanticism to Trilateralism", pp.204-205.

53. See Krasner, pp.135-136.

perpetuating but another form of hegemony in its commitment to the progressive nature of capitalism.\textsuperscript{55}

The use of the "world order" label by the trilateralist strategy was a means of legitimizing its aim of restructuring the international order through the cooption of a radically different discourse on world order.\textsuperscript{56} By appropriating the globalist and humanist concerns of this discourse, the trilateralist strategy was appealing to the widespread dissatisfaction with U.S. policy. As Carter stated in his campaign:

A stable world order cannot become a reality when people of many nations of the world suffer mass starvation; when the countries with capital and technology belligerently confront other nations for the control of raw materials and energy sources; when open and discriminatory [sic] trade has become the exception rather than the rule; when there are no established arrangements for supplying the world's food and energy nor for governing, control, and development of the seas; and when there are no effective efforts to deal with population explosions or environmental quality.\textsuperscript{57}

The strategy was to embark on trilateral cooperation to achieve economic development and growth so that those societies are "the strong and stable inner core around which world cooperation, prosperity and peace can develop."\textsuperscript{58} The result would be "to give each country a


\textsuperscript{57} New Approach to Foreign Policy", \textit{The Presidential Campaign Volume One, Part One}, p.70.

\textsuperscript{58} "Our Foreign Relations", \textit{The Presidential Campaign, Volume One, Part One}, p.114.
sufficient stake in the international order so that it feels no need to act as an outlaw."59

Carter's trilateral themes and critique of containment were representative of, and contributed to, the discourse of the 'new era'. They drew upon the discursive network that emerged in the wake of the fragmentation of the foreign policy establishment. Those who opposed the liberal interpretation of U.S. foreign policy characterized this discursive network, despite the basic assumptions it shared with the conservative position, as constituting a new foreign policy establishment. It was from among the ranks of this 'new establishment' that the Carter administration was staffed.

Carter and the 'New Foreign Policy Establishment'

To speak of a 'new establishment', however, was somewhat misleading, for it was not so much a new group as one part of the establishment emerging from the trauma of Vietnam with a new political character.60 As Osgood noted, "The assumptions that President Carter and his advisers brought into office were born out of the American liberal's delayed response to the trauma of Vietnam."61 The trauma was very real for them as many had been directly involved in the Vietnam War during previous service in the foreign policy


establishment. As a consultant in the 1960s Brzezinski favored U.S. involvement in the "twilight zone" of limited wars. Cyrus Vance, who had been Deputy Secretary of Defense, argued that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was an unprovoked attack. Harold Brown, as Secretary of the Air Force, was an advocate of the benefits of sustained bombing against the North Vietnamese. Theodore Sorenson (Carter's first nominee for CIA Director who was rejected for being too liberal) was the major writer of the Kennedy rhetoric that supported the war. Joseph Califano, Carter's Secretary for Health, Education and Welfare had worked in both the Pentagon and the White House under Johnson, while Charles Schultz, the new Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, was Johnston's budget director overseeing the war expenditures.

The 'new foreign policy establishment' (such as it was) centered around the journal Foreign Policy and included writers such as Paul Warnke, Leslie Gelb, Richard Holbrooke, Anthony Lake and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Significantly, all were to attain senior foreign policy appointments in the Carter administration. As an institutional outlet, Foreign Policy was established, according to its first editors, so that the basic purposes of American foreign policy could be redefined "with a keener awareness that an era in American foreign policy, which began in the later 1940s, has ended."

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Carter's adoption of trilateral themes as important for his security strategy, although a product of his membership of the Trilateral Commission, was largely a result of the influence of the 'new establishment' and, in particular, of Zbigniew Brzezinski's role as his senior foreign policy advisor in the campaign. However, the strategic writings of Brzezinski were neither responsible for, nor single-handedly representative of, the administration's position, let alone the 'new political sensibility' in the post-Vietnam era in the United States. Nonetheless, they were undoubtedly a major source of the discursive resources available to the Carter administration in its efforts to rewrite security. The following section examines the major themes of Brzezinski's public writings prior to becoming Carter's national security advisor.

Brzezinski and the 'New Political Sensibility'

Brzezinski's articulation of the liberal internationalist interpretation of American foreign policy was developed, as was the Carter administration's policy, in contradistinction to the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policies. Although having begun his academic career as an analyst of Soviet affairs, he came to argue at the end of the 1960s that "A new pattern of international politics is emerging. The world is ceasing to be an arena in which relatively self-contained, 'sovereign', and homogenous

nations interact, collaborate, clash, or make war.\textsuperscript{65} This situation meant that a new framework for international politics, one that created a basis for cooperation via a community of advanced nations, needed to be developed if the crises facing both the industrialized world and the Third World were to be dealt with.\textsuperscript{66}

Although he endorsed the Nixon administration's general priorities in its first two years in office, Brzezinski argued that for all its recognition that containing communism was no longer the sole reality of global life, the Nixon administration was deficient in its handling of the new actors and issues that posed a threat to the United States. The Nixon Doctrine, Brzezinski maintained, was insufficiently concerned with what was probably the major threat to international stability in the next decade - "the contagious spread of global anarchy."\textsuperscript{67}

It is true that international stability, as well as mankind's general progress, depend in the first instance on the successful resolution of the [superpower and geopolitical] problems identified as the Nixon Doctrine's principal concern. But it is also true that progress on the "higher" priority must be supplemented and accompanied by a wider conceptual recognition of the increasing interdependence of the world, of the growing transformation of what used to be international politics (conducted by distinct nation-states) into a highly intimate global process, permeated by a highly sensitive global nervous system.\textsuperscript{68}

Later criticisms of the Nixon administration were more


\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, pp.274, 293. For his assessment of the old international order, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War was Played", \textit{Foreign Affairs} 51 (1972), pp.181-209.


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, p.11. Emphasis added.
comprehensive, arguing that the administration deserved to be judged poorly for its indifference to the less well developed nations, its handling of alliance relationships, and the question of the historical relevance of the balance-of-power approach to world affairs in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, Brzezinski argued, it was the Nixon administration's continued perception of a world order based on several powerful states that created the problems for the United States, by ignoring the transformation from an international politics to a global politics in which states, though remaining crucial, were losing some of their centrality and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{70}

Brzezinski continued to argue that there had been a major transformation in foreign affairs since World War II, from a situation where the political, security and economic sectors of international politics had been relatively isolated from one another to a new global politics "in which political, security and economic issues are intermeshed and in which the distinction between the domestic and the foreign aspects is increasingly blurred."\textsuperscript{71} His response to these transformations varied in its emphasis. Identifying "power realism" (a conservative approach, wedded to stability and preoccupied with the traditional concerns of international relations) and "planetary humanism" (a global approach that sees the planet beset by common social and economic problems demanding cooperation) as the two strains

\textsuperscript{69} Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus", p.717.


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, p.719.
of international thought in the United States,\textsuperscript{72} Brzezinski oscillated between adopting one over the other or some mixing of the two. At some junctures he seemed to suggest the latter should predominate over the former, arguing that "[t]he politics of interdependence...are beginning to overshadow the politics of confrontation with the Communist world..."\textsuperscript{73} At others (albeit in the same article) he noted that:

The power realists have a strong case when they argue that the downgrading of national might, of diplomacy, and of the more traditional tools of international behavior could jeopardize the chances for peace by promoting international stability. They are also right when they argue that an exclusive orientation on the planetary issues, though morally much more appealing, ignores the reality of a world of nation-states, of a world of national rivalries, of national armies, and ideological hostilities...\textsuperscript{74}

The appropriate policy response advocated by Brzezinski seemed to be, therefore, a mixture of both the liberal and conservative approaches:

How to deal with the Communist world remains a key problem for U.S. foreign policy but it may no longer represent the central problem. The power realists, moreover, have been dealing with it effectively...But the other two major problems confronting U.S. policy - namely that of the less-developed countries and that of the alliance relationships among the advanced countries - cannot be effectively tackled on the basis of the power-realist approach. The condition of the less-developed countries, indeed of the planet as a whole, requires greater concentration on the issues raised by the planetary humanists, while the question of alliance relationships calls for a creative blend of both approaches.\textsuperscript{75}

The underlying theme, however, was not the creation of a new

\textsuperscript{72} Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy the Search for Focus", p.712.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, pp.719-720.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, p.718.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, p.721.
international order but, rather, the "restructuring and rebuilding" of the old.\textsuperscript{76} Central to this reconstruction was the pursuit of cooperation amongst the industrialized societies so that the United States can "create a stable core for global politics, on the basis of which a more sustained response to the traditional threats of war, or to the new danger of social fragmentation brought about by poverty, or to the broader image of collapse of the global eco-system, can be undertaken."\textsuperscript{77} The recourse to a stable core was necessary because the new global politics did not have as yet a defined character: it might result in increased global responsibility and interdependence or, as an alternative to be avoided, it "might become characterized more and more by anarchy, social fragmentation, intensified racial, ethnic and ideological conflicts, with even the older rivalries surfacing in a new form."\textsuperscript{78} As a consequence, the active promotion of trilateral cooperation had to become the central priority of U.S. policy. Brzezinski came to identify the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy as marking the end of the post-World War II era. It was a position summarized in his well-known statement that the acrobatic policies of the Nixon era had to be replaced by a major architectural effort to restructure international order.\textsuperscript{79}

On the eve of his joining the Carter administration, Brzezinski recalled a number of themes central to American foreign policy in the

\textsuperscript{76} Brzezinski, "The Deceptive Structure of Peace", p.54. In his "Recognizing the Crisis", \textit{Foreign Policy} 17 (1974-75), p.69, he explicitly rejects the call for a new international order.

\textsuperscript{77} Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus", p.723.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, p.722.

\textsuperscript{79} Brzezinski, "The Deceptive Structure of Peace", p.66.
postwar period to reinforce his prescriptions for a new form of American leadership. Noting that an isolationist America would only create a vacuum that would be filled less by a single power than by "escalating chaos", Brzezinski declared that whatever the talk of a relative decline of power, "it is vital to remember that ultimately it is only America that has the power to shape a hostile world for itself."80 And the world was hostile. While the American experience had demonstrated, Brzezinski argued, that liberty was ensured by a pluralistic society rather than a social order based on a single ideological model, such pluralism was threatened at the global level because "the traditional American values of individualism, free enterprise, the work ethic, and efficiency are contested both at home and even more abroad by statism, emphasis on the collective (national or societal), on social equity, and on welfare."81 Trilateralism's response to these challenges would, however, only exacerbate the problem.

THE DISCOURSE OF THE 'NEW ERA' AND POLITICAL IDENTITY

While the industrialized nations' response to the demands of the NIEO resulted in marginal changes to the international economic order, the trilateralist strategy of cooperation amongst the countries of the North posed significant problems for their own domestic orders. This was recognized by the Commission's report on renovating the international system:


81. Ibid, pp.73, 94-95.
Interdependence, despite its many benefits, complicates the management of the modern welfare state - it creates disturbances, interferes with national priorities and policies, and transmits problems from other systems. Conversely, conflicting national priorities of modern welfare states inevitably complicate the problem of managing a system of interdependence...Interdependence among welfare states, therefore, inherently poses a sharp dilemma: Tariffs, export subsidies, industrial policy, privileged treatment and so forth, the very instruments used to implement social policy nationally, inherently threaten the systems of interaction and interdependence which are a source of prosperity in the industrial world and a precondition for meeting and surpassing minimum human needs in the developing countries.82

Established as a means of overcoming the changes to the social relations of production that had precipitated the era of ambiguity in U.S. foreign policy, the trilateralist strategy was problematic for two reasons. As the quote above notes, it directly confronted the basis on which the growth coalition in the United States had been founded. In that sense, it shared something in common with the neoconservatives' hyperliberal strategy outlined in the previous chapter. Where it differed from the neoconservative strategy, however, and where it encountered additional problems in disciplining ambiguity, is that it offered no inscription of danger capable of converting the differences within the domestic realm to differences between sovereign domestic societies. While the neoconservatives' hyperliberal strategy confronted the growth coalition in the same way, it did so by reinvoking the inscription of danger associated with cold war practices as a means of containing the domestic dissent. The globalization of threats in the trilateral strategy defied such location in a single or easily identifiable source, thereby creating a situation where alternative conceptions of identity

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proliferating in the domestic realm could not be limited and controlled by the invocation of a threat from the external realm.

The prevalence of domestic ambiguity despite the implementation of parts of the trilateral strategy by the Carter administration is best illustrated by reference to Carter's "crisis of confidence" speech delivered in July 1979. Written initially to deal with the energy crisis and the need for policy changes to meet that threat, it was in actuality a lament for the social relationships of the cold war era that resonated with neoconservative critiques. Parts of the speech are worth quoting at length:

...I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy...The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.

The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America. The confidence that we have always had as a people is not simply some romantic dream or proverb in a dusty book that we read on the Fourth of July. It is the idea that founded our Nation and has guided our development as a people. Confidence in the future has supported everything else - public institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very Constitution of the United States...

In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns...

The symptoms of the crisis are all around us...there is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions...These changes did not happen overnight. They've come upon us gradually over the last generation, years that were filled with shocks and tragedy.

We were sure that ours was the nation of the ballot, not the bullet, until the murders of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. We were taught that our armies were invincible and our causes were always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a place of
honor until the shock of Watergate.

We remember when the phrase "sound as a dollar" was an expression of absolute dependability, until 10 years of inflation began to shrink our dollar and our savings. We believed that our Nation's resources were limitless until 1973, when we had to face a growing dependence on foreign oil.

These wounds are still very deep. They have never been healed...we must face the truth, and then we can change our course. We simply must have faith in each other, faith in our ability to govern ourselves, and faith in the future of this Nation. Restoring that faith and that confidence to America is now the most important task we face. It is a true challenge of this generation of Americans...83

This collapse of the Carter administration's attempt to rewrite security was made possible by the tensions to be found in the discourse of the 'new era of international relations.' However, while the neoconservative tone of Carter's "crisis of confidence" speech is indicative of the administration's inability to rewrite security, it was not a development that emerged only late in the administration's life. Two of the more commonly quoted foreign policy speeches given by Carter in 1977 and 1978 are illustrative of the tensions present in the administration's early days and can be considered as precursors to the ultimate capitulation of the administration's attempt at change.84

CONCLUSION

The discursive network of the 'new era' of international relations,


amidst which was the Carter administration, embodied a series of tensions in its efforts to overcome ambiguity. It sought to make understandings of the international arena more complex, but had to reproduce an uncomplicated American identity. It had to make East/West relations less central, yet could not focus on certain global issues without invoking them. And it tried to highlight North/South perspectives and portray global issues as the threats that they were, but could not locate them in a single, identifiable source. In contributing to this discursive network, the Carter administration found itself replicating these tensions.

Such a perspective on the Carter administration is contrary to the usual interpretations of its success or failure, which see a gradual shift from one perspective to another throughout its four years as a result of either the demands of the international system or the pressure of personality conflicts. What this perspective suggests is that there was no shift from one perspective to another, but a continual struggle between two not very different perspectives that sees the conservative interpretation achieve ascendency by the time Carter leaves office in 1981. This ascendency, however, is not achieved by the elimination of the liberal interpretation, which survives through to the end of the administration's life.\footnote{Evidence of this is to be found in Carter's farewell address to the nation where he returns to the global issues through which he asserted his administration's identity four years earlier. See Address by the President (Carter) to the Nation, January 14, 1981, "Farewell Address", Document 25, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents. Another example is to be found in Vance's 1980 testimony to Congress, where he gives global issues the same prominence as in his 1976 campaign memorandum to Carter. See Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., on A Comprehensive Statement of U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, March 27, 1980 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,}
is achieved in the process of the political struggles central to the (re)construction of American identity in the late 1970s. How these struggles were played out within official circles is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Eight

The Carter Administration's Inscription of Danger

INTRODUCTION

The Carter administration's approach to foreign policy was the outcome of an attempt to rewrite security so that the threats to the United States derived from the North/South axis as much as the traditional East/West orientation. This broader conception of security was portrayed as a radical shift in policy focus, downgrading the established fixation with U.S.-Soviet relations and creating a more complex understanding of the issues and actors confronting the United States. The previous chapter outlined the discursive strategies employed by the President and his senior advisors in their public writings on these issues. This rewriting of security was unsuccessful, being unable to withstand a return to cold war practices at the end of the administration's four years in office. Chapter Seven argued it did not succeed because of the relationship between the inscription of danger, the writing of security, and the construction of American political identity. In a period of ambiguity, securing the boundaries of American identity was more easily achieved by a return to cold war practices than the construction of a new interpretation involving the restructuring of the domestic polity and its self-understandings. Moreover, the Carter administration provided legitimacy to the reassertion of cold war practices. Partly because of the intertextual
nature of U.S. foreign policy, and partly because of the restricted stock of signs that give public policy an ideological depth and complementary status with identity, the Carter administration found itself unable (as well as ultimately unwilling) to make a clean break with the established discursive resources.

This chapter examines in greater detail the administration's rewriting of security by focusing on the foreign policy and national security documents in which the strategy was scripted, the context in which challenges to this scripting were mounted, and the discursive strategies of those challenges. Although most if not all of these documents remain highly classified and unavailable for public scrutiny, leakage of their contents to public sources, combined with the public writings of administration officials and interviews, allows a piecing together of the way in which the major arguments were presented.

THE TEXTS OF STATECRAFT

The theoretical premise that gives rise to concern for the discursive strategies of foreign policy texts was the subject of Chapter Four. Given the lack of an ontological basis for unity and order, meaning and value is established via interpretive and representational practices which construct identity through the demarcation of the boundaries between the inside and the outside, domestic and international, self and other. All these practices (ranging from the writing of fiction, through public policy discourses, to national security policy) are 'practices of statecraft', responsible for disciplining the ambiguity of global life in such a way
that they enframe domestic entities, give them an identity, and establish the parameters of social and political conduct. While no single reality is arrived at, a number of 'reality principles' are constructed, accepted and defended.

The foreign policy texts - the most overt texts of statecraft - of a United States administration are but one site that could be examined to disclose the representational practices employed. But they are a particularly important site because they are the site nominated within our knowledge-related discourses as legitimate. As Michael Shapiro has argued; "...because we live in a world in which danger is institutionalized, persons interested in relating their fears to situations of danger have to become consumers of representations from institutions that have the legitimacy to produce interpretations of danger." The granting of legitimacy does not mean, however, that the agents of these institutions - the policy makers of the national security bureaucracy - have privileged access to reality. In many instances, policy makers find themselves in situations where there is a considerable gap between their experience and the reality they are purporting to interpret, analyze and act upon. This is particularly the case in crises, where time factors prohibit anything approaching experiential understanding, but is present in all instances of foreign policy making, where (by definition) policy makers are "apart from" the

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subject at hand.²

THE TEXTS OF STATECRAFT IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

The major foreign policy text of the Carter administration is the document known as Presidential Review Memorandum-10 (PRM-10). Although but one of a number of Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM), it attained an importance above and beyond that of its counterparts.

Presidential Review Memorandum-10 was an attempt to do for the Carter administration what NSC-68 had done for the Truman administration (and its successors): script a global strategy that would guide U.S. foreign policy in a contested era and mobilize support for the actions proposed.³ However, instead of the sense of urgency and consensus that NSC-68 was able to generate in its context, PRM-10 embodied the contention and struggle over competing interpretations of United States security that were the hallmark of the Carter period. The marginalization of alternatives, the bureaucratic battles, and the

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reliance on established discursive resources that marked PRM-10 were symptomatic of the struggle over rewriting security in the Carter administration.

The genesis of PRM-10 was in a suggestion that Carter made to Brzezinski, on the day of the President's inauguration, for an overall review of United States security policy and possible alternatives. The request for the interagency review was formally made on February 18, 1977 with the National Security Council (NSC) directing the study through to its completion in June 1977. After final negotiations among the bureaucratic players in July 1977, PRM-10 was completed and implemented in the form of Presidential Directive-18 (PD-18) of August 1977.  

President Review Memorandum-10's mandate was for a net assessment of the global balance in the broadest terms, with prospects and proposals for alternative U.S. policies. The result, however, was less bold and ambitious than the hoped for grand strategy. As one report noted, "The document treats the Soviet-American relationship as the overriding issue of American diplomacy and military strategy, and makes few if any concessions to the vision of a new international order that Carter evoked in his presidential campaign and in rhetoric since January 20." A participant in the study was quoted as saying that "Carter came to office proclaiming the Cold War had ended... but...[the]


latest draft says instead that we are now in 'Era Two' of the Cold War."\(^6\)

Brzezinski's intention was for PRM-10 to be a "broadly-gauged review of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance."\(^7\) Brzezinski placed a colleague, Professor Samuel Huntington, in the NSC as Director of National Security Planning and responsible for overall coordination of the study after Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had turned down Huntington for a similar job in the Defense Department.\(^8\) Huntington was chosen because, in Brzezinski's terms, the review was to be wide-ranging: "not only a narrowly focused accounting of the relative military strength of the two countries but a more sophisticated appraisal of the relative performance - military, political, economic, and ideological - of the two competing systems."\(^9\)

Brzezinski's plans for NSC control of the review were strenuously opposed by both the Departments of Defense and State for fear that the control of foreign policy objectives and overall strategic planning was being supplanted by the White House. The compromise that met these objections involved splitting the study, with the net assessment of the global balance being divorced from the review of force postures. The former was coordinated by the NSC Special Coordinating Committee's Net Assessment Group (chaired by Huntington) while the latter was controlled by an inter-agency group.

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\(^6\). Quoted in Ibid.

\(^7\). Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p.177.

\(^8\). Kaiser, "Disputed Memo Assesses U.S., Soviet Strength."

handled by the NSC's Policy Review Committee and chaired by the Defense Department.\textsuperscript{10} The division of labor and emphasis was reflected in PRM-10's formal title; "Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review."\textsuperscript{11}

The logistical effort for PRM-10 was enormous, with a total of 12 task forces employing 175 people for a period of 6 months undertaking the work.\textsuperscript{12} The force posture review had five interagency task forces examining potential areas of confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These included NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict in central Europe, East-West war outside Europe, possible conflicts in Asia, all out nuclear wars, and what were termed "notional wars", those that the U.S. entered by choice in defense of an ally or interests. This eventually produced over two hundred alternative force packages that finally were reduced to six or so.\textsuperscript{13} Annex C of PRM-10, the strategic nuclear forces study, connected policy proposals to force structure and budgetary requirements, thereby establishing a base from which arms control proposals could be assessed.\textsuperscript{14}

A number of officials inside and outside government were hoping


\textsuperscript{13} Kaiser, "Disputed Memo Assesses U.S., Soviet Strength."

\textsuperscript{14} Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III", p.86.
that, just as NSC-68 was designed to bludgeon the senior policy makers of the Truman administration into a fanatical concern for the Soviet threat, PRM-10 would be a document "that would scare the Carter administration into greater respect for the Soviet menace." An early draft that went through the bureaucracy seemed destined to do just that, arguing that Soviet superiority in conventional forces meant that they could easily win a war in Central Europe. Considerable resistance, particularly from the State Department, forced a revision, the outcome of which meant the review ranged from being sanguine to optimistic about the United States' ability to meet a Soviet military challenge. While Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives at interagency meetings were critical of such optimism, civilians in both the State Department and the Defense Department were reported as calling the conclusions "fair and balanced." One participant noted: "It sets a middle course. You don't have to panic with the Russians, but you do have to have some real growth in our forces." Some reports suggested that PRM-10 had found that the rate of Soviet expansion in strategic forces, naval deployment, and conventional forces along the Central European and Chinese frontiers had slowed and were offset by the U.S. and its allies, while others maintained that the review was more pessimistic on conventional arms balances in Europe and Korea than it was about the strategic nuclear balance.


17. Ibid.

The general conclusion was that the United States was superior to the Soviet Union in political and economic capabilities and equivalent in military strength. Although U.S. economic viability and technological supremacy combined with Soviet economic problems to produce a positive correlation of forces for the United States, there was concern that a trend towards an unfavorable military balance was emerging. Nonetheless, officials argued that a new era ("Era 2") of superpower relations, different from both the pessimism of the cold war and the optimism of the early period of detente, was emerging. This era was one in which the competition of the cold war and the cooperation of detente were merging.

Presidential Review Memorandum-10 involved a number of paradoxes. Despite the Carter administration's avowed intention to rewrite security to include global issues and North/South concerns, a document intended as a broad assessment of alternative U.S. postures failed to address these themes. Although only one of seventeen PRM's commissioned in the administration's early days, it came to achieve a dominance in debates over national security, seemingly overshadowing (for example) PRM-8 on North/South strategy. Even in the context of superpower relations, PRM-10 reduced the many dimensions of the relationship to a preoccupation with the military hardware required for


certain force postures, something evident in its implementation through PD-18. However, although PRM-10 reduced U.S. security to a fixation with superpower (military) relations, it embodied some ambivalence on the relationship of this issue to others, noting "that while the relationship with Moscow is still the central concern of American foreign policy, it is no longer the overwhelming concern that it had been earlier."21

PRM-10 was a text in which (albeit equivocally) the balance of power preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy was reproduced at the expense of Carter's world order intentions. As the previous chapter argued, the sacrificing of the latter to the former was in part a product of the studied ambivalence of the discursive network amidst which the Carter administration was situated and to which it contributed. It was also a product of the limitations of discourse in which global issues could not be framed in terms other than national security.

The major obstacle that the Carter administration faced in its attempt to rewrite security was the difficulty in fashioning the global issues into a single, over-arching strategy. Although partly a result of official reluctance to establish a restrictive doctrine which would predetermine policy, this obstacle was mainly a function of the issues resistance to the inscription of danger. While the traditional issues of cold war practices had an appeal that was the result of their continual (re)production over a long period of time, their salience derived from

their inscription as dangers emerging from a single, identifiable source. Able to be located in another domestic society, cold war threats could be inscribed in such a way that enabled a single strategy to be written. The global nature of the threats associated with world order issues defied such inscription. These threats had to be located over and above domestic societies because strategies to effect their resolution depended upon cooperation among diverse nations. Even when these issues could in some way be identified with particular contexts, their multiple and varied natures resisted their being written as threats the magnitude of which required a concerted effort. For example, despite the preoccupation of PRM-10, most of the Carter administration's initial concerns and decisions involved issues outside an exclusive East/West geopolitical framework. Four of the first five PRMs dealt with predominantly North/South issues that required U.S. action: PRM-1 (Panama), PRM-3 (The Middle East), PRM-4 (South Africa and Rhodesia), and PRM-5 (Cyprus and the Aegean). In addition to PRM-8's focus on the economic dimension of the North/South dialogue, the administration certainly addressed - in line with its commitments and intentions - many world order issues. However, PRM-10's (albeit

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23. This concern with global issues was often on a case-by-case basis. For example, Anthony Lake formed and chaired an interagency group to develop policies for clean water in the Third World as integral to U.S. foreign policy. Interview with Anthony Lake, Worthington, Massachusetts, April 19, 1989. For the administration's general approach on these issues see Hearings before the Committee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International Development, United States House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Rethinking United States Foreign Policy Toward the Developing World, October 12 and November 1, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977). For an example of continued concern on issues such as deforestation at the highest level see Memo, President Carter to Cyrus Vance, 8/2/79, File No. FO-6 Exec., Box FO-39, WHCF-Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library.
sometimes ambivalent) focus on East/West relations as the foundation of U.S. national security was able to take advantage of the conceptual vacuum left by the global issues resistance to the inscription of danger and thus frustrate the rewriting of security.

The eventual domination of the conceptual vacuum by East/West perspectives was not simply a result of deficiencies within the policy making circles of the Carter administration. The greater influence of PRM-10 and its reductionist view of U.S. security was achieved in part by the existence of resistances to the rewriting of security outside the Carter national security bureaucracy. No administration has a clean slate to work with when it writes or rewrites security. Aside from the intertextual nature of the enterprise and the established stock of signs that make only some alternatives legitimate, the importance of the inscription of danger to the construction of political identity means that those whose investments in the cold war structure of U.S. society could be threatened by a rewriting of security are going to engage in a variety of practices to reproduce the cold war inscription of danger. Such efforts were prominent in a wide-range of sites when the Carter administration came to office. The focus of the next section is on the resistances to be found within the wider national security community.

RESISTANCES TO THE REWRITING OF SECURITY

The mid-1970s was a period in which the public discourse of the United States was becoming increasingly (neo)conservative and an anxiety about U.S. security was growing. These changes were reflected
in the national security community, where a renewed concern with the Soviet threat was being witnessed in the formulation of intelligence assessments.

The national security bureaucracy's understanding of the Soviet threat is codified in the annually produced text, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-3/8. Although only one of a number of estimates written by the intelligence community, NIE 11-3/8 is the one concerned with the assessment of Soviet objectives and capabilities. Through a process of negotiation and compromise among various elements of the intelligence community, the document comes to reflect a broad consensus among the disparate agencies, although dissent is often contained in footnotes to the main text. A number of NIE's have become the subject of considerable contention among various branches of the national security bureaucracy as they struggle over differing interpretations of the Soviet threat and the conclusions that can be drawn for differing conceptions of security. In the early 1970s the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) method of analyzing Soviet defense spending as an indicator of the Soviet threat was questioned by a variety of sources. Among these was the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a group of individuals appointed by the President to provide some oversight and accountability to the intelligence community's assessments. Since 1969 PFIAB had been


making annual assessments of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance independent of the NIE process and arriving at considerably more pessimistic conclusions than the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{26} In particular, the views of Major General George Keegan, the head of Air Force Intelligence until January 1977, were influential in pushing the harder line on the Soviets.\textsuperscript{27} As a result of PFIAB's lobbying over a period of years for an examination of the CIA analyses, two courses of action that embodied the resistance to any deviation from cold war practices, and which would profoundly affect the Carter administration's attempt at rewriting security, were embarked upon.

The first was when Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby established in 1975 a special study group, consisting of analysts from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to review the NIE's assessments of Soviet defense spending since 1960. The CIA employed the "building block" approach whereby observable military production was costed in rubles where possible and U.S. dollars where not, with a total made available after conversion of the ruble estimates

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, p.249.

\textsuperscript{27} Keegan had been arguing since 1972 that the Soviets were preparing for an offensive nuclear war with the United States. His views were extreme by any measure. Keegan maintained that the "missile gap" of the late 1950s was real with the Soviets having some 3500 ICBMs by 1960. Although they only had a few launch facilities, he argued that the surplus were stored in shelters above ground near the silos. See his comments in California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, "Impact of Reconnaissance Data in Formulating National Policy", 13 May 1977, photocopy. When he retired from Air Force Intelligence to argue his case in public he claimed that the Soviets had somewhere between 500 and 3000 ICBMs that were not counted in the strategic balance but which were available for refire. See the report of one of his lectures to the Washington media in "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat", Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 28, 1977, pp.38-48; and an interview with him in David Binder, "US General Fears Soviet has Won Military Superiority", New York Times, January 3, 1977.
to dollars. This procedure left (and continues to leave) plenty of room for ambiguity. Ruble prices are available for only one-half of the observables that make up the estimates. The cost of the remaining half had to be estimated by pricing Soviet hardware and personnel at U.S. rates, a procedure which the CIA admits inflates the Soviet defense spending estimate. The exaggeration stems from the differentials in technological quality and capability of U.S. and Soviet weapons. By using the closest similar U.S. weapons system to estimate what a Soviet weapons system would cost, the CIA assumes that the Soviet system has the features that the U.S. system possesses, when the latter is most likely to be considerably more sophisticated (and therefore expensive) than the former. Such estimates also assume that Soviet industry has the same rate of efficiency as U.S. industry and thus requires the same level of inputs for a similar level of outputs. The problems with this (e.g., assuming that a conscripted Soviet solder with minimal training costs the same as a professionally trained U.S. volunteer) are numerous and have led one analyst to conclude that "the method of calculation is not only based on an extremely fragile structure of evidence but also has built into it an upward bias because of the worst case assumptions applied to the unknowns in the estimating process."29


Since 1970, however, the DIA had been highly critical of the CIA's estimating procedure for Soviet defense spending, alleging that it had seriously underestimated the totals, and had refused to use the CIA's figures in DIA estimates. The DIA argued that a range of important categories had been excluded from the defense equation, thereby ignoring the military dimension of many civilian projects. As a consequence of this argument, the joint CIA-DIA task force to review past estimates completed a report (CIA Report No.76-10053) in 1976 that substantially revised the dollar estimate of Soviet defense spending and doubled the percentage of Soviet GNP that defense consumed, from 6-8% of GNP to 10-15%. This report was interpreted as evidence of the growing Soviet threat and the need for a sustained U.S. response. As Professor Richard Pipes, himself prominent in the resistance to rewriting security, noted: "This radically revised estimate not only made the Soviet threat loom much greater, but cast fresh doubt on the quality of intelligence assessments." A former head of the DIA wrote in 1976 (in a paragraph that privileged the percentage of GNP spent on


Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.247. The use of a proportion of GNP to indicate defense spending often occurs without the important caveat that the Soviet Union's GNP is considerably smaller than that of the United States. For example, figures in U.S. dollars for 1979 indicate that the Soviets spent an estimated $114 billion on defense. With a GNP of $1,067 billion, this meant defense was 10.7% of GNP. The United States spent $122.3 billion on defense in the same year. But with a GNP of $2,375 billion, this higher absolute figure on defense was disguised by the fact this amounted to only 5.2% of GNP. See Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1982, p.27.

defense in going beyond the new estimates, equated the Soviets with Hitler, and correlated high defense expenditure with aggressive intentions):

The Soviets are spending twenty percent of their GNP on their armed forces and civil defense; Adolf Hitler's Germany was spending somewhat less - fifteen percent for armaments in 1938 just prior to the outbreak of World War II. Can the United States continue to deter the growing Soviet military threat with a grudging 5.4% outlay on defense?32

The new estimates of Soviet defense spending could not sustain the pessimistic conclusions being drawn from them. As Prados states: "The revised budget estimates did not mean that the Soviets were stronger than before - the number of 'observables' counted by intelligence did not change at all, but only the cost of these items to the Soviet economy and the burden of defense spending within that economy."33 Such conclusions were recognized within the national security bureaucracy. Andrew Marshall of the Department of Defense's Net Evaluation Group wrote in an October 1975 memorandum that the new estimates indicated that Soviet defense industry was only half as efficient as previously thought.34 The CIA itself noted that "This [doubling] does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the Soviet economy has increased - only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. It

32. Daniel O. Graham, "The Soviet Military Budget Controversy", Air Force Magazine, May 1976, p.37. For a critique of the oft-stated comparison between the military build-up under Hitler and the Soviet Union's defense expenditures, see Les Aspin, "What Are the Russians Up To?", International Security 3 (1978), pp.30-54. As Aspin argues, there have been a number of military build-ups since World War II which have been far greater than the level of Soviet defense spending, none of which have matched Nazi Germany's build-up in the 1930s.


34. Ibid, p.248.
also implies that Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed." As one former CIA analyst noted, the conclusions drawn from the evidence were contrary to the most reasonable interpretation: "What should have been cause for jubilation became the inspiration for misguided alarm."

The contention over Soviet defense spending was both symptom of, and contributing factor to, the general dissatisfaction with detente in the mid-1970s. The resistance to alternative conceptions of security which it fuelled was equally evident in the second course of action resulting from PFIAB's lobbying for a reassertion of cold war practices and interpretation. This was the formation of a competitive analysis of Soviet strategic objectives during the writing of NIE 11-3/8 in 1976.

In August 1975 the Chairman of PFIAB wrote to President Ford suggesting that, because of the continuing discrepancy between the assessments on Soviet strategic capability and intentions of the NIE's and PFIAB, a competitive analysis involving CIA officials and outside experts be established to draft the 1975 NIE. The President, on DCI Colby's advice, refused, preferring to wait to see the outcome of the analysis then underway. PFIAB remained critical and again sought a


36. Ibid. Cox notes another factor that is often left out of interpretations of these assessments. The Department of Defense estimated that in the period 1964-1977 over 20% of the increases in Soviet defense spending (increases that Aspin put at a steady 3% per annum in line with general economic activity) were attributed to the build-up in the far east against China. In addition to lowering the military capability said to threaten the U.S., these assessments may have been underestimated because of the high construction costs in Siberia. Ibid, p.22. See Aspin, "What are the Russians Up To?"
competitive analysis after George Bush's appointment as DCI at the end of 1975. By that stage, President Ford was the subject of criticism from the right wing of the Republican Party for continuing to put too much faith in detente. When this opposition to detente increased in 1976 with the candidacy of Ronald Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination, PFIAB found a more compliant White House and DCI. George Bush and William Hyland, Ford's deputy national security advisor, selected a panel of outsiders to work alongside the CIA. The outsiders, who came to be known as "Team B" (the CIA was "Team A") had to be "mutually agreeable to the advisory board [PFIAB] and to Mr Bush and that they hold more pessimistic views of Soviet plans than those entertained by the advocates of the rough parity thesis." That a "Team C", a group of analysts who might have been even more 'liberal' than the CIA, should be established to provide a full range of opinions was not considered.

In actuality, there were three Team B's. Beginning work in late


39 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.250-251. There were critics in Congress who tried to make the Carter administration aware of more liberal interpretations. See Letter, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Congressmen Bob Carr, Thomas J. Downey, and Robert L. Leggett, 2/15/77, File No. CO-165, Box CO-57, WHCF-Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library.
August 1976 the selected outsiders divided into task forces that were to examine the accuracy of Soviet strategic missiles, the penetrability (or otherwise) of Soviet air defenses, and overall Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives. A fourth task force on Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities was strenuously opposed by the Navy for fear of compromising security. It was the third task force on strategic capabilities and objectives that came to dominate.40

The ability of the Team B analysis to influence the NIE process stemmed in large part from the significance attached to the number of strategic missiles (ICBMs) that each superpower possessed. While most members of the foreign policy establishment believed that in accord with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and agreement of 1972 the Soviet Union would not pursue strategic superiority over the United States, those who came to be increasingly critical of detente and distrustful of the Soviets argued that the CIA had continually underestimated the size of the Soviet rocket forces. Just as the levels of defense spending had come to signify malevolent intentions, the number of missiles were the sign that such intentions could (and would) be carried out. The fear was not so much of an actual preemptive Soviet strike on the United States, as of developing a situation where increases in Soviet force levels and missile accuracy would make the U.S. Minuteman ICBM force vulnerable, thereby undermining the retaliatory credibility of the U.S. and making it susceptible to political

intimidation. Objections to this line of argument are numerous, but the continued invulnerability of the other legs of the Triad, even if the concerns about ICBM vulnerability were valid, is one means of refutation.

The assessment of Soviet ICBM force levels was not an unambiguous process. The interpretive constrictions involved in the gathering, sorting and analysis of intelligence data have been noted in Chapter Four. A number of public sources of data indicate that the Soviet military expansion is more complex than the image of an inexorable build-up surpassing the United States and continuing regardless. The period from the early 1960s through to 1980 saw the Soviets inferior to the United States in terms of numbers of missile launchers until 1969-1970.


42. The U.S. deliberately developed the Triad for its nuclear forces so that a threat to one leg would not be a threat to all. To suggest, therefore, that Soviet ICBMs, comprising the bulk of their strategic forces, were more numerous than those of the U.S. and posed a threat is somewhat disingenuous. For an example of such criticisms see Jan Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternate View", Foreign Affairs 54 (1976), pp.462-481.

43. On Soviet missile levels see International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: IISS, 1960-). A comparison of US and Soviet ICBM levels shows the following:

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>USSR</th>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>424</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>834</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>460</td>
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highest in 1975 but declined in the subsequent five years. What increases did occur in the 1960s and 1970s were never beyond the highpoint of the CIA's worst case assumptions.44

Most importantly, while the number of U.S. missiles remained static throughout the 1970s this did not indicate that the U.S. was neglecting to improve (as often charged) its strategic forces. The number of missile launchers is but one indicator of strategic force levels. If warhead numbers are taken as the indicator, a completely different picture emerges. The United States expanded its strategic forces dramatically throughout the 1970s by modifying its ICBM's to carry multiple warheads in independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This meant that the number of warheads deliverable by missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) for the United States increased from 2402 in mid-1970 to 7274 in mid-1976. In comparison, Soviet warhead numbers increased in the

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<th>Year</th>
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same period from 1580 to 2980. These multiple ways of assessing the 'threat' were often overlooked by those seeking to paint the worst possible picture of the United States position. While Richard Pipes, in defending the Team B process, focused on the USSR's deployment of eleven new strategic systems as an indicator of the threat, he minimized U.S. technological changes that profoundly affected the balance, noting, for example, "the only subsequent upgrading of U.S. strategic forces was the introduction of MIRV's..." Aside from the deliberate silence on the impact of this one change on the number of nuclear warheads that could be launched, Pipes overlooks a considerable range of other strategic developments throughout the 1970s.

The debate over Soviet intentions and capabilities that was embodied in the Team B process, and included the question of Soviet defense spending, was more than an assessment of evidence and facts. As one CIA official who was part of the competitive analysis stated,


47. Although overall missile numbers remained static, there were qualitative changes that included 550 new MIRVed Minuteman III missiles, 496 new MIRVed Poseidon SLBMs, and 216 new MIRVed Trident I SLBMs. For these and other strategic modernization details see Ken Booth and Phil Williams, "Fact and Fiction in U.S. Foreign Policy: Reagan's Myths About Detente", World Policy Journal 2 (1985), p.508.
"There was disagreement beyond the facts." The Team B process was indicative of the resistance to any rewriting of security that threatened cold war practices which were the basis of American identity. In a situation marked by developments that were at best ambiguous and at worst contrary to what they claimed, Team B relied not so much on empirical referents as on established representational practices and prescripted assessments to pursue their objections to U.S. policy.

The immediate outcome of the Team B process was the naturalization of the belief that the Soviets were undertaking a program to achieve strategic superiority over the United States. Team B combined a suspicion of past CIA estimates, with its own assessments of the meaning of Soviet civil defence initiatives and the increasing accuracy of Soviet ICBMs, to argue that the Soviets were building a strategic force intended to have a first-strike capability against the U.S.'s land based ICBMs. As Senator Daniel P. Moynihan noted in a Senate Intelligence Committee report on the competitive analysis, "The notion, that the Soviets intend to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gone from heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy." 

The impact of the Team B process on the actual NIE process, and

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48. Quoted in Binder, "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviets Seek Superiority in Arms."

NIE 11-3/8-76 in particular, is less certain. Although the effort was one episode of the general shift in the boundaries of the strategic debate in the United States towards greater anxiety about the Soviet Union, there are conflicting reports as to its direct impact on CIA estimates.\(^5\) The competitive analysis did not involve the two teams working on the same document. Team B had access to the same raw data and intelligence as did Team A, but the latter was responsible for the drafting of NIE 11-3/8-76. Team B's potential influence came in sessions where each group of analysts reported their assessments to forums at the CIA and debated the issues. Each group wrote its own report in the aftermath of this and then defended its conclusions to PFIAB in December 1976. After that, the CIA issued the NIE for 1976. Team B participants claim that their arguments turned the NIE "around 180 degrees" towards a much more hardline assessment of Soviet strategic objectives, while the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA officer in charge of Team A, Howard Stoertz, disagree.\(^6\)

Whatever the direct impact of Team B on the 1976 NIE, there is no doubt that it was a more pessimistic document than anything the CIA had produced in the previous decade. As one military officer who had seen the estimate commented: "It was more than somber - it was very grim. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the

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\(^5\) Freedman, *US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*, p.xvii.

\(^6\) For the Team B views see Binder, "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviets Seek Superiority in Arms"; and Pipes, "Team B". For the contrary view see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode*; and Howard Stoertz, Letter to the Editor, *Commentary* 83, 3, March 1987, pp.18-19.
aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it.52 Sources from the intelligence community noted that there were always people inside the intelligence community who took a dim view of Soviet strategic objectives, but they had been a minority until NIE 11-3/8-76.53

The Team B process was criticized by the Senate Intelligence Committee's inquiry into the episode. The main thrust of their criticism was that the process was deliberately biased. The Senate report stated that the contributions of Team B were "less valuable than they might have been because...the exercise had been so structured by the PFIAB and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that the B Team on Soviet objectives reflected the views of only one segment of the spectrum of opinion..."54 But the most important point in their criticism pertained to the entire NIE process as well as the Team B episode. The Senate Committee noted that there was an unwarranted fixation on a reductionist view of security:

A weakness in both the NIE and the B Team report is their lack of expressed sensitivity to the fact and the significance of world developments other than those directly related to the U.S.-Soviet arms race...By design, in neither the NIE nor the B report are U.S.-Soviet strategic matters set within the wider framework of other dynamic world forces, many of which are essentially the creatures of neither U.S. nor Soviet initiative or control.55

52. Binder, "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviets Seek Superiority in Arms."

53. Ibid.

54. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode, p.2.

55. Ibid, p.4.
In other words, the NIE process and the Team B episode took a position on security that was contrary to that of the Carter administration. Even the studied ambivalence of the Carter administration's complex interdependence strategy of 'Era 2' was more sensitive to world developments outside the superpower relationship. If the Carter administration's rewriting of security, such as it was, was going to succeed, then the administration was going to have to take on and disenable the rigid interpretation of those who sought to reinvigorate cold war understandings. Aside from the difficulties arising from within the Carter position for such an endeavor, the administration exhibited a reluctance for confrontation when such occasions presented themselves. The chances for the success of the rewriting strategy were also undermined by Carter administration efforts that actually contributed to the resistant interpretation.

CARTER AND THE RESISTANCES TO REWRITING SECURITY

The Carter administration came to power at an historical juncture in debates concerning United States security. Presented with the 1976 NIE and the Department of Defense Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1978 (both of which were overtly pessimistic about Soviet intentions) in its first few days of office, the administration confronted an emerging consensus in the national security bureaucracy that was hostile to its plans for world order politics in place of the balance of power perspective. Detente was held in deep suspicion by those who wished

56 Donald Rumsfeld, the Ford administration's outgoing Secretary of Defense, noted in the FY 1978 posture statement that "the Soviets give evidence of moving toward a fundamental shift in the 'correlation of forces' that would given them peacetime and crisis leverage over the United States."
to reinvigorate cold war practices, yet those global issues that required
the cooperation of the Soviet Union and seemed to be a match for them
in terms of threat remained prominent on the international agenda. No
clear direction for the writing of United States security seemed
apparent. The Carter response was twofold.

The administration dealt with the increasingly respectable view that
the Soviets were attempting to gain nuclear superiority by ordering an
analysis that would be more sophisticated in its understanding of the
global balance.57 That was PRM-10. Administration spokesmen used
early opportunities to publicly discount the idea that the Soviets were
moving beyond nuclear parity.58 And Carter abolished PFIAB.59

On the other hand a number of initiatives indicated that the
administration wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with those
seeking a reinvigoration of cold war practices. These forces were
growing with the public declarations of the newly formed Committee on
the Present Danger (CPD), an elite group which subscribed to, and
involved many of the same personnel as, the Team B prognosis of the

The trends, he argued, were adverse "to those who believe in freedom and self


58. Harold Brown stated in his Senate confirmation hearings that while the
Soviets had built up their forces the dynamics of interpretation were such that
"we are going to have to live with ambiguity" in answering the question as to
whether or not this was a drive for superiority. See Hearing before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st sess., on
Nominations of Harold Brown to be Secretary of Defense and Charles W.
Duncan, Jr. to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 11, 1977 (Washington,

Soviet threat. Carter met with the CPD executive in early 1977 to hear their arguments (the occasion was marked by rancor), while Brzezinski received a briefing on Soviet military programs from Major General Keegan in January 1977. Moreover, PRM-10 was not a writing of security in world order terms but, rather, an equivocal statement that sought to allow greater complexity in the understanding of U.S. security but gave ground to the major assumptions behind cold war positions. In September 1977, Professor Huntington of the NSC had met with the Executive Committee of the CPD to discuss the strategy contained in PRM-10 and PD-18. In responding to a letter from the CPD reporting on those discussions, Brzezinski noted that:

...the President's directions in PD-18 provide the framework and guidance for our long-term competition with the Soviets and set forth programs and policies which I think you and your associates should find congenial. We do not intend to be caught with our guard down and we will not permit erosion in the current military balance. The President's commitment to 3% annual increases in real spending for defense underlines this commitment. In addition, we are making major efforts to improve our ability to respond flexibly and effectively to potential threats to our security interests wherever these may occur.

Nonetheless, advocates of a return to cold war practices were not

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62. Binder, "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviets Seek Superiority in Arms."

63. Letter, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Professor Eugene Rostow, 10/11/77, Box CO-58, WHCF-Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library. The reference to flexible response came from PD-18s establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force.
satisfied from the start with the Carter administration's foreign policy. In Republican senators, for example, charged that "The Carter foreign policy is a patchwork quilt without continuity. It is frequently changed at a whim with a glaring absence of toughness and firmness." In their view the threat to the United States was clear and unambiguous, and the Carter administration was guilty of negligence for not recognizing it:

The Soviet Union continues to be the major threat to peace and stability in the world. Despite talk of detente, we believe the Carter administration incorrectly interprets the intentions of the Soviet Union and its commitment to achieve conventional military and nuclear superiority to secure wide-ranging geopolitical goals.

Such criticisms, however, were not cognizant of a range of initiatives that the Carter administration had begun in secret, and which accepted many of the concerns harbored by those suspicious of the Soviet Union. These initiatives were in the realm of nuclear strategy. Even with the administration's inability to write security in terms of world order issues and global threats, the initial position was one of complexity (relative to earlier scripts) in U.S.-Soviet relations that allowed for cooperation as well as confrontation. The developments in nuclear strategy, however, came to subvert that lingering ambivalence and made possible a reassertion of cold war practices in the administration's own policy at the end of its four year term.

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64. An early example of criticism can be found in "Carter's Foreign Policy: Jimmy in the Lions Den", Time, August 8, 1977.


NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THE REWRITING OF SECURITY

Of all the practices of statecraft that serve to discipline the domestic entity in whose name they operate, few are as central to the maintenance of identity as nuclear strategy. At first appearance, nothing could seem to be more real than the construction and deployment of weapons of mass destruction in the defense of the nation. Military strategists and nuclear planners pride themselves on their 'realistic' understanding of inter-state conflict and the means to assure security. Yet few domains are permeated with textual and interpretive practices in the service of reality principles to the extent of nuclear strategy.67

Nuclear weapons have always posed a major dilemma for the understanding of war and peace, making it difficult to even talk about the subject. According to the theory of deterrence, the function of nuclear weapons is that they are not to be used; rather they are to prevent themselves from being used. Instead of fighting wars, the military establishment endowed with nuclear weapons is supposed to deter wars.68 But the traditional role of the military establishment in


fighting wars has produced a creative tension in debates over the role of nuclear weapons, between those who favor a reliance on their deterrent capability and those who regard them as militarily viable.69

Contrary to the professed realism and concrete nature of these debates, few undertakings embody a greater gap between empirical referent and argument than nuclear strategy. Nuclear strategy is the hyperreal ("the generation by models of a real without origin or reality...")70 par excellence. As one scholar has noted of nuclear strategy; "There is no reality of which they speak. Or, rather, the 'reality' of which they speak is a world of abstractions...Questions of correspondence to observable reality were not the issue."71

With nuclear weapons (fortunately) having ever only been overtly used on two instances, the paucity of empirical referents for nuclear strategy requires it to become self-referential and textual.72


72 Ian Clark has demonstrated how taking the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as analogs for nuclear war (as nuclear strategy in the United States has done) produces misleading assumptions and questionable reasoning. See Ian Clark, Nuclear Past, Nuclear Present: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Contemporary Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
Brodie has identified this characteristic in the following terms:

All sorts of notions and propositions are churned out, and often presented for consideration with the prefatory words: 'It is conceivable that...'. Such words establish their own truth, for the fact that someone has conceived of whatever proposition follows is enough to establish that it is conceivable. Whether it is worth a second thought, however, is another matter. 73

It was a sentiment repeated by the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fred Ikle) during Senate testimony in 1977:

"...when we talk about 'deterrence', 'stability', or 'unacceptable damage', we are not talking about physical realities. We are talking about ideas - our ideas - which may or may not influence the actions of the adversaries we wish to influence." 74 But nuclear strategy is more than just the power of ideas. Its textual nature was identified by a Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Senator Frank Church):

It is ironic, if not tragic, that the ever present danger to the world of nuclear holocaust is so often cast in terms of abstract, even obtuse, arguments and terminology, that major analyses and decisions are embedded in national security studies memoranda, national security decision memoranda and now, finally, Presidential directives. What is not generally appreciated is that these arcane documents have a power of their own to drive budgets, to create both the appetite and justification for


74. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st sess., on The National Security and Arms Control Implications of Current United States Strategic Options, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions, January 14, 19 and March 16, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), p.11. Ikle also noted on the Team B issue that "On intentions we have large uncertainties. The right way to look at it is matter of uncertainty. It is in some sense foolish to try to go for a single prediction." Ibid, p.34.
weapons systems and on occasion to provide the martial drum to lead a nation.\textsuperscript{75}

The only other empirical referent for nuclear strategy was the Vietnam War, insofar as it involved the principles of limited war, counterforce, and flexible response. The Vietnamese victory over the United States defied the traditional power calculus and ran counter to the central principles of those who argued for limited nuclear options. Notwithstanding this, the strategic nuclear debates since the late 1960s have come full circle and are a rerun of the limited war debates of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{76} The persistence of nuclear strategy debates in the face of what limited evidence is available, and the ability of strategists to maintain internal contradictions concerning the question of the viability of nuclear weapons,\textsuperscript{77} indicates more is at stake in nuclear strategy than the weapons and their potential use.

What is at stake in the debates over nuclear strategy is the maintenance of the 'reality principles' associated with the dichotomy of sovereignty and anarchy. Nuclear strategy is a practice of statecraft pivotal to the enframing of the state in whose name it acts, and thus


pivotal to international organization in East-West terms. In constituting the international realm as anarchic, strategic discourse constructs "global political space in ways that privilege the freedom of the major powers to manipulate violence and threaten war as legitimate instruments of policy." State action is thus the power to make the world with the help of nuclear weapons.

In this context, what deterrence 'deters' is the historicization and politicization of identity. The making of the world through nuclear weapons is not achieved by actual war or the direct use of force, but is conducted as an "imaginary global war" through representational practices. Given the ambiguity surrounding the potential use-value of nuclear weapons, deterrence was intended to prevent a future war by serving as a permanent reminder of the last war. The spread of the global nuclear infrastructure, and the textual and interpretive practices upon which it is dependent, was a means of codifying a bipolar world

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78. The replication of cold war assumptions in the strategic debates can be seen by reference to Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. In the preface, the Council on Foreign Relations Study Director Gordon Dean wrote: "Abhorrent of war but unwilling to accept the gradual enslavement of other peoples around the world, which we know will eventually lead to our own enslavement, we are forced to adopt a posture that, despite Russian military capabilities and despite their long-range intentions, freedom shall be preserved to us." Ibid, p.vii. Similar examples can be found in Osgood, Limited Nuclear War, pp.4-5. and Kaufmann, ed, Military Policy and National Security, p.3.


and making Europeans and others dependent on American support, without engaging in actual war. Fighting the "imaginary global war" would thus ensure that whatever challenges and changes might take place, the central position and identity of the United States would be ensured.

The renewed emphasis on nuclear warfighting in the strategic debates since the late 1960s is one practice among many intended to cope with the ambiguity of the end of the postwar era in international relations. The "emphasis on nuclear and conventional warfighting was a way of reinvigorating the imaginary global war." In a bid to reproduce the rigid bipolarity of cold war practices, the nuclear warfighting debates refocused concern on the military power of the Soviet Union and argued that nuclear parity or Soviet superiority endangered United States security. The imaginary global war needed to be continually fought, but the strategies by which it was conducted had to be changed. Deterrence was still the key, but it was no longer thought to be credible without an avowed willingness to use nuclear weapons. The desire for victory had to be claimed but not actually be pursued beyond preparation.

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82. For the extent of the global nuclear infrastructure, see William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985).


From its inauguration, the Carter administration was an active participant in the nuclear warfighting debates. By the time Carter left office, United States nuclear strategy had codified warfighting as central to the imaginary global war to an extent greater than any of its predecessors. At the same time as the administration was rewriting security in terms designed to remove East-West relations from their privileged position in U.S. foreign policy, its efforts to reinvigorate the imaginary global war were serving to contradict this intention by reinscribing the bipolar rigidity of the nuclear conflict that had to be planned for but could not be fought.

REINVIGORATING THE IMAGINARY GLOBAL WAR: NUCLEAR STRATEGY DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Initial assessments of the Carter administration's likely course on nuclear strategy were that it would shift away from the nuclear warfighting posture of the Nixon-Ford years enshrined in National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242). This directive was the outcome of a Department of Defense interagency study (the Foster panel) based upon RAND Corporation studies from the mid-1960s. Carter and key officials like Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had opposed nuclear warfighting strategies in campaign statements, and the President-elect had even proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (much to

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86 The RAND study, Rationale for NU-OPTS (meaning "nuclear options"), was authored in 1968 by then RAND director of strategic studies James Schlesinger. Schlesinger was to become Nixon’s secretary of defense - and, later, Carter’s energy secretary - and gave his name to NSDM-242 (the ‘Schlesinger doctrine’). The Foster panel was headed by Seymour Weiss of the State Department, later a member of Team B. See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp.338, 357-358, 368-370.
their horror) that the United States security might be met with a minimum deterrence posture involving as few as 200 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In early 1977, however, Brown was briefed by Foster panel members and consulted William Kaufmann on the desirability of having nuclear options, while Brzezinski started requesting Defense Department studies on nuclear strategy as a means of promoting a more flexible nuclear strategy. As a consequence, nuclear warfighting strategy became intertwined with the studies of PRM-10, just as it had been central to the Team B/CPD critique of existing U.S. policy.

Brzezinski's interest in nuclear strategy came from his acceptance of the belief that the Soviets were developing a genuine nuclear warfighting strategy with enhanced command, communications, control and intelligence structures (C3I), as well as changes in military doctrine that were interpreted as supporting such a posture. Brzezinski asked Brown on March 31, 1977 to provide the President with three items: a statement on existing nuclear strategy; an outline of procedures for conducting nuclear war beyond the initial stage, especially the location

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of the President and C3I deficiencies; and a statement of the basic objectives to be achieved through limited nuclear options, including military and political assumptions. Brzezinski hoped "that these memoranda would spur within the Defense Department a broader review of our strategic doctrine and also interest the President himself in this difficult and complicated issue."\(^89\) The strategy worked, with the President engaging in command post exercises (CPXS) to test the C3I capabilities in the event of a crisis. The initial exercises were, according to one NSC official who was involved, "a nightmare, just a complete disaster."\(^90\)

PRM-10's impact on the nuclear strategy debates came in the form of the assumptions about U.S. forces it made. Accepting that the Trident SLBM, Minuteman Mark 12A warhead, and MX missile would be developed and deployed (all potentially counterforce weapons), the study did not argue against the development of the technical capability necessary for the exercise of nuclear options. However, PRM-10 found that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would have an advantage in striking first because, at a minimum, a nuclear exchange would kill 140 million Americans and 113 million Soviets, and destroy nearly three-quarters of their respective economies. One of the major outcomes of PRM-10, and written into PD-18, was a directive to the Pentagon to review six aspects of strategic policy: nuclear targeting, the definition of strategic forces, the continuation (or otherwise) of the Triad, U.S.

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\(^89\) Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.456.

counterforce needs, civil defense requirements, and the interrelationship with allies vis-a-vis strategic weaponry. PD-18 affirmed that in the absence of further guidance, NSDM-242 was to continue as U.S. policy. Moreover, it declared that the reviews were to proceed in the context of ensuring that the U.S. be able to inflict "unacceptable damage" even if the Soviets struck first, and that U.S. nuclear forces should be strong enough so that nuclear war could end on terms favorable to the U.S. This was an acceptance of the concerns about Minuteman vulnerability that Carter's critics were emphasizing, concerns that Carter repeated from time to time.

The review that had the greatest impact on nuclear strategy was the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR) conducted by Leon Sloss in the Defense Department. Sloss employed dozens of consultants to report on various aspects of strategy: a history of U.S. targeting plans; Soviet and Chinese views on nuclear war and nuclear weapons

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92. Ball, "The Development of the SIOP", pp.75-79.

93. Carter wrote to the Senate majority leader in 1979 stating; "I am deeply concerned about the threat to our security and to strategic stability posed by the increasing vulnerability of our Minuteman ICBMs. I am committed to maintaining the essential equivalence of our strategic forces by an appropriate program for modernization of our strategic forces." See Letter, President Carter to Senator Robert C. Byrd, 6/4/79, File ND 18 Exec., Box ND-51, WHCF-Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library.

employment policy; targeting Soviet economic and political recovery assets; regionalization of the USSR (a euphemism for ethnic targeting in the Soviet Union);95 the C3I constraints on escalation and control; and the question of war termination.96

One of the people Brzezinski picked to work on the review of strategic doctrine under Sloss was Jasper Welch, the Air-Force general and Team-B member who was an MX advocate. As Welch noted, "PRM-10 was done by one group of Carterites. PD-59 was done by an entirely different crowd."97 Brzezinski wanted the new doctrine to go beyond the vagueness of NSDM-242. But that vagueness had been deliberate. As Welch recalled: "Most of NSDM-242 did not require you to have any particular view of what a Russian was like. The whole point of it was not to lock future leaders into this particular leadership's view of the Russians, because we hoped to learn more about them over time." But the B-Team report, Welch noted, "had finally settled the question of the Russians".98

The NTPR led to the development of a highly complex matrix of targeting "packages" or "building block" options favoring Soviet military

95. Brzezinski was reportedly in favor of developing strategies for targeting the "Russian" Russians who managed the Soviet "empire", thereby unleashing nationalist rivalries in a post-nuclear war Soviet Union. See Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III", p.86.


97. Herken, Counsels of War, pp.296.

targets and psychologically important assets that could be flexibly combined to suit particular war scenarios. The NTPR was delivered to Brown in December 1978, and Brzezinski noted in his journal that Brown "has now become much more interested in greater flexibility and is clearly moving away from a rigid deterrence posture", although Vance remained "concerned and sceptical." At a meeting on May 15, 1979 Brzezinski argued that a new document codifying the review and its implications for nuclear strategy was needed. Brown strongly agreed, but the State Department and some civilians in the Defense Department were opposed. The plan was shelved for over a year, but early in 1980 Brzezinski instructed William Odom to develop a draft of the new doctrinal statement. Ready for submission to Carter in mid-May 1980, it was eventually signed and became PD-59.99

Although by far the most famous of Carter's PD's on nuclear strategy, PD-59 was accompanied by others. For example, PD-53 (15 November 1979) had as its principal goal the ability for the National Command Authority (the President or his successor) to communicate with nuclear forces after a nuclear attack in order to support flexible options. PD-58 (30 June 1980) was concerned with maintaining the continuity of government after a nuclear attack. The Defense Department was required to select parts of the government from the president down that could better withstand a nuclear attack by evacuation, hardened shelters, improved communications and computers,

and better early warning.\footnote{Ball, "The Development of the SIOP", pp.78-79.}

The shift in the administration's position on nuclear strategy was opposed by former officials such as Vance (who resigned as Secretary of State in April 1980) and Paul Warnke. Warnke in particular thought that the development of PD-59 and its leaking to the press (it was the only PD on nuclear strategy to be made public in any form) just prior to the Democratic Convention in an election year was more than just fortuitous; he regarded it as a text of American and, specifically, Carter's resolve in the face of increased concern about the Soviet threat.\footnote{Herken, \textit{Counsels of War}, p.302.}

\section*{CONCLUSION}

The anxiety over United States security which existed in the mid-1970s, and which was exacerbated during the period of the Carter administration, was indicative of the continuing ambiguity surrounding American identity. Although the debates fixed on issues such as Soviet defense spending and missile development as signs of a growing threat to the United States, the evidence that could be mustered in support of such concern was mixed at best. More was at stake in these debates than just the issues at hand. Uncertain propositions were thus fashioned into statements of orthodoxy in the service of limiting and controlling the challenges to identity that were proliferating in
American society. The erosion of authority at home and abroad that the neoconservatives abhorred was attributed to the appeasement of radicalism, regardless of whether it was in the form of Marxist guerrillas in Angola or single working mothers in the Bronx. In this context, foreign policy required a clear and bold writing of security which either bowed to those who sought a reinvigoration of cold war practices or challenged them head on with an alternative that restructured American identity. The Carter administration offered neither.

Building on the discursive network of the 'new era' in international relations, the Carter administration took an ambivalent position on the threats to United States security that neither replaced the old nor fashioned the new. The Soviet Union was considered to be both adversary and partner, engaged in competition and yet necessary for cooperation. As Carter continued to state after leaving office:

...everybody has to ride two horses on policy as it relates to the Soviet Union. You can't put your total investment in confrontation and belligerence toward the Soviet Union. This might be politically popular, but it's counter-productive for our nation. The best approach...is, co-operate whenever you can ...and compete with them when you have to - which suited me fine.\textsuperscript{102}

Carter's campaign statements equivocated between bold declarations of world order policy and the merging of global issues with a traditional policy focus in recognition of a complex world. The latter formulation was codified in PRM-10 which asserted that a new era of neither the cold war nor detente was at hand. Global issues were

\textsuperscript{102} Quoted in Charlton, \textit{From Deterrence to Defense}, p.79.
deferred to management in other areas, thereby reinstating East/West concerns at the center of U.S. security considerations. The studied ambivalence of this position was a feature of the administration until the end, though varying degrees of emphasis were placed on the elements. Vance embodied the stream of thought which continued to focus on the complexity of global politics even in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan:

In a world of extraordinary and growing complexity, a world in which our interests are diverse, we cannot escape choices which in their nature are the stuff of controversy...Can we say that our security is more threatened by the growth of Soviet military power or by the strains we can foresee in the international economy; or by the prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of additional nations, or by the prospect of social and political turmoil in many regions of the world? The hard fact is that we must face each of these and other challenges simultaneously.\(^{103}\)

The problem with such an approach was twofold. The managerialism of the liberal internationalist posture appeared tentative and circumspect in the face of global developments highlighted by those who sought a return to the discipline of the cold war. As Sanders argues, "It was a difficult proposition to sell a semi-threat. A posture that waxed and waned between cooperation and hostility was hardly the stuff of mass mobilization and willing sacrifice."\(^{104}\) Secondly, by adopting a "semi-threat" posture, the administration legitimized those who wanted to talk of a threat but handicapped itself by entering into a debate in which it could neither agree with nor refute its opponents. By granting that the subject of the neoconservative's criticisms was worthy of

\(^{103}\) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A Comprehensive Statement on U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives, pp.10, 12.

debate, and, especially in the case of nuclear strategy, accepting many of their arguments, the administration was in an impossible position. Hoffmann recognized this in 1978 in a prescient observation:

The Carter administration can never win a contest of cold war rhetoric. A Jackson, a Nitze, a Luttwark, a Wattenberg always will be a more convincing anti-Communist than Carter or members of his crew - even Brzezinski, who has spent years putting a 'progressive' coat of paint on his old instincts. If the administration borrows too many leaves from the book of the new right, it will only find itself increasingly summoned to prove, by new flings of rhetoric or new stands...that it is not part of the 'defeatist consensus'.

This discursive bind that the administration helped create for itself was replicated in many specific instances. The next chapter outlines one such instance, the debates over U.S. policy towards Africa in the context of alleged Soviet intervention. As with the issues of defense spending and the missile build-up, the debates over Africa policy indicate that more was at stake than the issues being discussed.

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105. Richard Pipes has written: "The responsibilities of office quickly cured the Carter administration of its glib and uninformed opinions on Team B...Carter's national security advisor commissioned a number of studies on the Soviet strategic threat and potential US responses. This work, carried out quietly to avoid the kind of public controversy that had followed the A-B Team public controversy, promptly led to the conclusion that Team B had been correct in its assessments: the Soviet Union was indeed developing a first-strike capability." Pipes, "Team B", p.39.

106. Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions." Foreign Policy 29 (1977-78), p.23. A good example of the administration's efforts to continually deflect criticism that it was part of the 'defeatist consensus' can be found in the briefing book prepared for pro-SALT II speakers by the State Department. It notes that while people may not have heard much about the details of SALT II or the strategic balance, "They have, however, heard a great deal about America's role in the world, and may have an uneasy feeling that we are somehow losing influence, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It is important not to dismiss such notions out of hand, but to recognize them as legitimate concerns..." See Memo, Matt Nimetz [State Department Counsellor] to Jody Powell, 10/12/78, "SALT II -Briefing Book for SALT Speakers, 10/12/78", Box 78, Jody Powell's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.
A consideration of how the assumptions embedded in the Carter administration's inscription of danger were brought to bear on a policy issue will serve to further demonstrate the intimate relationship between representational practices and public policy. This chapter focuses on aspects of the Carter administration's Africa policy as an example of the inscription at work. However, to talk of the relationship between the inscription of danger and policy towards a specific region is not to invoke the dichotomy of theory versus practice. It is a means of illustrating that, given the multiple ways in which ambiguity can be disciplined, the outcome of the process of understanding is as much a consequence of the 'reality principles' intrinsic to political identity as it is of the issues and events in the area under consideration.

The multiple dimensions of Africa policy mean that the Carter administration's policy towards some African issues offers a particularly good example of the inscription at work. The administration gave Africa a prominence not seen in United States foreign policy since the Kennedy administration as a consequence of its increased focus on
North/South issues and the emphasis on human rights.\textsuperscript{1} The Carter administration actively promoted the cause of majority rule and the end of racial domination in South Africa and (as it then was) Rhodesia, sought independence for Namibia, and hoped for an improvement in the economic conditions of the continent.\textsuperscript{2} Focusing on the indigenous conditions of conflict and change, the Carter administration was making a major break with previous U.S. policy towards Africa, which had seen Africa as a chessboard of sorts upon which the superpower confrontation of the cold war would be variously played out. This was particularly true of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger period, where, for example, the consensus had been to favor engagement with the white minority regimes of southern Africa instead of increasing the potential (so it was argued) for Soviet intervention via support for nationalist liberation forces.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} For a discussion of the competing claims of North/South and East/West interpretations in Africa, see Helen Desfosses, "North-South or East-West? Constructs for Superpower Africa Policy in the Eighties", Journal of International Affairs 34 (1980/81), pp.369-393.


\textsuperscript{3} On the Nixon policies, see Anthony Lake, The 'Tar Baby' Option: American Foreign Policy Toward Southern Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); and Mohamed A. El Khawas and Baring Cohen (eds.), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1976). Kissinger undertook the beginnings of a shift in U.S. policy when he visited Africa for the first time in April 1976. In a major speech in Lusaka he indicated that U.S. policy was undergoing a reorientation away from a concern with foreign threats to an emphasis on pursuing self-determination and equal rights. There was some speculation that although welcome, this reorientation was directed at the domestic black constituency needed for President Ford's upcoming election campaign. See Franklin H. Williams, "Towards an African Policy", Africa Report 21 (July-August 1976), pp.2-6.
U.S. policy towards Africa is usually characterized as being regionalist or globalist in orientation. Where the former privileges the indigenous forces and local context, the latter emphasizes the place of African nations in the geopolitical struggle between the superpowers. Usually considered as two discrete perspectives, the regionalist and globalist orientations share many fundamental assumptions. Most importantly, just as the Carter administration's inscription of danger involved a studied ambivalence towards the relative importance of U.S.-Soviet relations in world order, the regionalist orientation on Africa does not involve a complete repudiation of East/West considerations in the formulation of U.S. policy. Although the regionalist versus globalist orientation appears to be but one more articulation of the struggle between the liberal internationalist and cold war interpretations of the United States global role, the common ground between the two makes them capable of incorporation into the liberal internationalist position. While the cold war orientation gives no credence to context-specific factors in its interpretation of policy, the liberal internationalist

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5. This is evident in Vance's summary of the rationale of Carter's Africa policy: "Like the previous administration after its conversion, we recognized that identifying the United States with the cause of majority rule was the best way to prevent Soviet and Cuban exploitation of the racial conflicts of southern Africa. But our decision to break sharply with the policy of the past did not merely reflect concern about Soviet influence or revolutionary movements. We were committed to majority rule, self-determination, and racial equality as a matter of fairness and basic human rights. If the United States did not support social and political justice in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself, Africans would correctly dismiss our human rights policy as mere cold war propaganda, employed at the expense of the peoples of Africa." Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.257.
approach - as Chapter Seven detailed - seeks to integrate both strands of thought, relatively downgrading East/West concerns in order to accommodate new issues and actors. This accommodation means that the appearance of a major break in, and redirection of, U.S. foreign policy thus disguises important continuities that undermine any momentum for change.

This chapter will show how the place of regionalist and globalist interpretations of Africa policy in the Carter administration's inscription of danger helped contribute to the general reinvigoration of cold war practices in U.S. foreign policy. Although Africa policy is only one site among many in which these representational struggles occurred, the studied ambivalence of the liberal internationalist position made possible its undermining by a cold war perspective in the service of the reconstruction of American political identity because the regionalist orientation was overpowered by globalist considerations.\(^6\)

The shift in the Carter administration's Africa policy from a predominantly regionalist to a globalist emphasis was, therefore, both an instance of the struggles over the inscription of danger discussed in the two previous chapters and a source of those struggles. The importance of Africa policy as a site of significance is derived from its place amidst the discursive network that marked the broader changes in Carter policy. As both Vance and Brzezinski noted in their respective

memoirs, it was over aspects of Africa policy that their first and most fundamental disagreements emerged.7 The wider ramifications of Africa policy are captured in Brzezinski's statement that the SALT II treaty "lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden";8 by which he sought to signify that the failure to adopt a globalist interpretation of African events earlier in the administration later undermined U.S.-Soviet relations.9

The struggle between the regionalist and globalist interpretations that results from the Carter administration's inscription of danger will be illustrated in this chapter by reference to the Angola issue of 1975-76, the incursion/invasion of Zaire by Katanganese forces in 1977 and 1978, and the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (in what is termed the "Horn of Africa") in the period since 1977. The purpose of recounting details of these conflicts is not to counter one set of 'facts' with another. It is, rather, to employ a range of established interpretations to problematize the secure meaning ascribed to events and issues by the globalist interpretation of events in Africa. This counter-narrative demonstrates that what was at stake in the interpretation of these events was the enframing of identity through the


9. Brzezinski stated in an interview: "I have said that 'SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden', because I do feel that our under-reaction at the time emboldened the Soviets to be more assertive, thus creating in time a strong U.S. public reaction which eventually precluded the ratification of SALT." See George Urban, "A Long Conversation with Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski", Encounter 65 (May 1981), p.28.
disciplining of ambiguity, and not a simple case of being forced to respond to an unproblematic realm of necessity.

ANGOLA AND THE DEMISE OF DETENTE

The demise of Portugal's African empire created the situation in which Africa became a concern for United States foreign policy. Although the Portuguese colonial occupation of Angola and Mozambique had been the impetus for a revolutionary situation in southern Africa, and the subject of an internal Portuguese debate about the end of that country's "African mission", it was not until after the April 1974 coup in Portugal that the "Vietnam-riveted, global strategists" of the Nixon-Kissinger administration saw a potential problem. As Kissinger told a 1975 press conference:

We were prepared to accept any outcome in Angola, before massive arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the introduction of Cuban forces occurred. We are not opposed to the MPLA as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola, and we would never have given assistance to any of the other factions, if other great powers had stayed out of it.

The presence of Cuban troops and Soviet supplies in support of the MPLA in Angola accelerated the negative U.S. assessment of Soviet intentions, led President Ford to drop the word "detente" from his campaign rhetoric, and presented the Carter administration with a

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challenge when it came to office. Kissinger's globalist interpretation of these events and issues, however, involved both a forgetting and a rewriting of history. Kissinger's narrative privileged an ahistorical and spatial understanding of the Angolan civil war that omitted, silenced and refigured the dynamics of the situation to accommodate a cold war orientation. It is not that the 'facts' self-evidently demonstrate the inaccuracies of the Kissinger understanding but, rather, that the situation was complex, dynamic and open to other plausible interpretations. By presenting his analysis in a vacuum, Kissinger in effect demonstrated that the defense of certain 'reality principles' was at stake in his perspective. It was a process of understanding akin to Kissinger's that was to overcome Carter's Africa policy.

A more complex understanding of the Angola situation demonstrates that both the United States and the Soviet Union had played roles in Angola long before the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 accentuated the chaos and violence. The nationalist forces in Angola were split into three factions: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The Soviets had aided the MPLA since the 1960s and,

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according to the State Department, had supplied over $60 million in various forms of aid up until 1974. Soviet support had waned, however, after 1972, and had ended in April 1974. It resumed via the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam some months later, but did not become direct again until 1975. In the meantime, the MPLA was assisted by a variety of sources, including the Scandinavian countries. The United States had engaged in the situation via direct and indirect support for the Portuguese authorities throughout the 1960s, as well as providing the FNLA with "modest" amounts of weapons and finance since 1962. With the tilt towards incumbents in the Nixon administration's southern Africa policy after 1969, that CIA support was ended. The FNLA continued to receive substantial aid from Zaire, China, Rumania and South Africa (including the presence of regular Zairean and South African forces in combat), and the CIA recommenced funding in 1974.

The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974 left no internal authority preeminent in Angola, and the revolutionary situation deteriorated into civil war. The three nationalist factions reached agreement in January 1975 to hold elections prior to independence in

November 1975, and to establish a transitional, coalition government.  

The government collapsed and the MPLA - the militarily superior and better organized faction - declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola. The U.S. decided to step up support for the FNLA, with Kissinger approving a covert assistance plan in July 1975 that transferred aid valued between $30 million and $100 million in 1975 alone. In contrast, Soviet aid to the MPLA in 1975 amounted to $80 million. U.S. covert assistance was ended by congressional amendment in 1976 after the Angola program's existence was revealed.

Cuban military advisors began arriving in Angola in the Spring of 1975 to train MPLA forces, which by that time had secured the capital Luanda as their base and were receiving international recognition. Originally numbering 230, another 200 arrived in August 1975 and served as counterparts to the 200 Chinese advisors aiding the FNLA. The number of Cubans, and the introduction of Cuban troops, increased dramatically after October 1975. The intervention of a South African armored column in the service of UNITA had brought those forces to within a couple of hundred miles of the capital, while FNLA forces had pressed the MPLA from the north. Originally numbering between 1,100


23. For an account of the covert program see Stockwell, In Search of Enemies; and Roger Harris, "The Proxy War in Angola: Pathology of a Blunder", The New Republic, January 31, 1976. Harris was Kissinger's aide on southern Africa.
and 1,500, a massive Cuban airlift beginning in November increased
the size of the Cuban military in Angola to 7,000 by late 1975 and
10,000 to 12,000 by early 1976. Cuban assistance was not limited to
the military, however, with civilian technicians and professionals
training Angolans in construction and health care. Continued Zairean
support for the FNLA and South African support for UNITA (in
addition to the regular forces of both nations fighting inside Angola
against the MPLA and Cubans) have been used to justify increases in
Cuban troop levels in Angola.

The presence of Cuban troops in Angola was the principal cause of
increased American anxiety about the Soviet Union's intentions. The
United States had not opposed Mozambique's struggle for independence
in 1975, despite the provision of Soviet assistance to the Marxist forces
of FRELIMO in that former Portuguese colony. Many argued that the
Cubans were surrogates acting under instructions from the Soviet
Union, but there is strong evidence that it was an independently taken
though cooperatively implemented decision. It was in Angola, however,

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27. Kissinger maintained there had been no "outside intervention" in
Mozambique, while Senator Clark maintained that there had been "generous
U.S. Policy", p.17.
Leo Le Grande, Cuba's Policy in Africa 1959-1980 (Berkeley: California
Institute for International Studies, 1980). For an African perspective that is
critical of the United State's hypocrisy in criticizing only troops from non-
Western nations, see Julius Nyerere, "Foreign Troops in Africa", Africa Report
that the seeds for what some regarded as the "arc of crisis" - a Marxist-inspired trajectory of disorder - were planted. Arguing in globalist terms that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of a weakness in Western resolve to ferment revolution, challenge Western interests, and implement a grand strategy of domination, advocates of the "arc of crisis" refused to consider local conditions as anything other than legitimations for a new form of Soviet imperialism. This position was far from the Carter administration's original policy intentions in 1977, but it was to this position that Carter policy travelled by 1980 after a struggle between the administration's regionalists and the globalists. Although evident in the administration's refusal to recognize the People's Republic of Angola throughout its four years in office despite its expressed intention to do so, this struggle was most obvious in the administration's reactions to the crises of Shaba I and Shaba II, and the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.

CARTER AND SHABA

The event known as Shaba I was the Carter administration's first


30. See the critical analysis of this argument in Fred Halliday, Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982).

31. Vance notes in his memoirs that "Carter was of two minds about Angola. His instinct was to work with the Angolans to help them reduce the insecurity problems that had caused the introduction of the Cubans into Angola and that now served to justify their retention...But politically Carter was sensitive to Cuban activities and the impact they would have at home if we appeared too soft in dealing with them." See Vance, Hard Choices, p.275. For an indication of the President's position see Carter, Keeping Faith, p.205.
foreign affairs crisis and the first implementation of its inscription of danger. In the major administration announcement on Africa policy, the regionalist emphasis of Carter's Africa policy was pronounced:

We proceed from a basic proposition: that our policies must recognize the unique identity of Africa. We can neither be right, nor effective, if we treat Africa simply as one part of the Third World, or as a testing ground of East-West competition...the most effective policies toward Africa are affirmative policies. They should not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise. Daily headlines should not set our agenda for progress. A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban forces in Africa would be both dangerous and futile. Our best cause is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention.32

From the beginning, the tension between regionalist and globalist emphases in the Carter inscription was pronounced. In addition to directly addressing the issue of Soviet and Cuban aid, inspired by the events of Angola and the Horn, Vance stated:

We are aware of the African concern that we have sometimes seemed more interested in the activities of other outside powers in Africa than in Africa itself. They know that some argue we should automatically respond in kind to the increase in Soviet arms and Cuban personnel in Africa. We cannot ignore this increase - and we oppose it. All sides should be aware that when outside powers pour substantial quantities of arms and military personnel into Africa, it greatly enhances the danger that disputes will be resolved militarily rather than through mediation by African states or by the OAU.

This danger is particularly great in the Horn, where there had been an escalation of arms transfers from outside...We will consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisers on their border, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa. But we hope such local arms races and the consequent dangers of deepening outside involvement can be limited.33

Vance's statement was more than just a personal position; it was part of an administration-wide consensus in 1977 that accommodated both regionalist and globalist concerns but relied on the overall inscription of danger to balance them. As Carter stated in the 1976 campaign:

...the Russian and Cuban presence in Angola, while regrettable and counterproductive to peace, need not constitute a threat to United States interests; nor does that presence mean the existence of a Communist satellite on the continent.34

The State Department's Director of Policy Planning directly addressed the tension in a speech in late 1977:

[Regionalism] does not mean we are unconcerned about the presence of Cuban troops in Africa or the flow of Soviet arms there - on the contrary. But I am convinced that we do more harm than good by dramatizing the East-West factor...When we look at African questions as East-West rather than African in their essential character, we are prone to act more on the basis of abstract geopolitical theorizing than with due regard for local realities.35

In responding to the first invasion of Zaire by armed emigres from the Shaba province based in Angola, the Carter administration acted in accord with its regionalist inclinations. But the place of "abstract geopolitical theorizing" in this inscription made possible a completely different interpretation when the events were repeated the following year.

The Shaba province of Zaire (formerly known as Katanga) was then

rich in resources, supplying ten percent of the world's copper, sixty percent of its cobalt and thirty percent of its industrial diamonds. With private U.S. investment totalling $1 billion in 1977 it occupied an integral part of an otherwise decrepit economy. Its economic importance to Zaire was matched by its political instability. Immediately after Zaire (then known as the Congo) attained independence in 1960, Shaba was declared to have seceded as an independent state but, first opposed by a militia supported by Belgian companies, the Katanganese rebels were defeated by United Nations troops in 1963. They fled to Angola where they fought alongside the MPLA in the Angolan nationalist struggle.

In early March 1977 a force of up to 4,000 Katanganese - known as the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) - crossed into Zaire in an effort to take over Shaba and overthrow President Mobutu. Mobutu, alleging a Soviet-Cuban plot, called for an international response. Aid was forthcoming with Belgium, France, China, South Africa, Egypt, Sudan and Uganda promising or delivering military supplies, but the United States refused to send more than $2 million of already promised, nonlethal material. With the Zairean army, regardless of its superior numbers, being unable to defeat the FNLC, the French airlifted 1,500 Moroccan troops into the province to provide support and guidance. As a consequence, the FNLC was repelled by


38. "Zaire Conflict Grows."
May of 1977.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the fact that the FNLC had received Cuban training for its part in the Angolan conflict, the Carter administration declared that there was no "hard evidence" of Cuban involvement in the invasion and was resistant to Mobutu's urging for more assistance, declaring an African solution to be the priority.\textsuperscript{40} Vance recalled:

I wanted the crisis resolved before it provided an opportunity for Soviet or Cuban meddling in Zaire, which could turn the affair into an East-West 'test of strength'...The strategy I urged to contain the incursion and restore political stability was to deal with the Shaba invasion as an African - not an East-West - problem.\textsuperscript{41}

There was little talk of any major disagreements among the administration's senior policy makers about the response.\textsuperscript{42} Many observers felt that the Angolan authorities, although not directly implicated, had allowed or not interfered with the FNLC invasion as a response to Zaire's continued support for the FNLA in its conflict with the MPLA government in Angola.\textsuperscript{43}

While the Carter administration found no evidence of a Cuban role


\textsuperscript{41} Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, p.70.

\textsuperscript{42} Richard Deutsch, "Carter's Africa Record", \textit{Africa Report} 23 (March-April 1978), p.47.

\textsuperscript{43} "Shaba War Fades but Zaire Still Has Problems"; Bender, "Angola", pp.14-16.
in the 1977 Shaba invasion, they claimed to have proof of their complicity in the 1978 invasion - what came to be known as Shaba II. The FNLC repeated the events of 1977 in May 1978 and once again took a considerable portion of the province, this time capturing some of the European population. They were confronted by French and Belgian forces as well as 2,000 troops from Francophone Africa. The Belgians wanted the United States to participate in a multinational but Western force to provide internal and external security for Mobutu, but Carter emphatically refused. Nonetheless, the United States took a more active role, providing air transport for these outside forces to fight the FNLC in Zaire. Zaire also recruited 2,000 Western and South African mercenaries to defend the mining interests of the province.

Nothing changed between the 1977 and 1978 invasions of Shaba except the United States interpretation of the event. While State Department officials looked hard for the "smoking cigar" that would implicate the Cubans, they found nothing conclusive. Castro had in fact informed Washington three days after the invasion began that he knew of the FNLC plans and had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the invasion. Despite this, Vance told the Cuban Vice President in New York on May 25 that "our information indicated that Cubans had supported the Katangan incursion." But as Vance noted, "we did have

44. Vance, Hard Choices, p.90.


46. Interview with Anthony Lake, Worthington, Massachusetts, April 19, 1989.

some ambiguous and, as it turned out, not very good intelligence to this
effect."48 Vance's view was that "Simplistically blaming the situation on
Moscow and Havana was pointless...[but] some in the administration
persistently argued that we should 'increase the cost to the Cubans'."49
Indeed, officials on the National Security Council managed to convince
the President that the Angolans and the Cubans had played a role, and
both Carter and Brzezinski publicly claimed that the Cubans bore
responsibility for the Katanganese invasion.50 Excerpts from an
interview with Brzezinski illustrate this position:

Q. Castro says the Cubans were not involved in the invasion of
Zaire. President Carter says they were...What can you tell us
about the evidence?

A. ...we have sufficient evidence to be quite confident in our
conclusion that Cuba shares the political and the moral
responsibility for the invasion...

Q. Is the evidence clear and specific that the Cubans were
directly involved in the invasion of Zaire or is it, as some U.S.
officials have suggested, ambiguous, open to several
interpretations?

A. I think there is a difference between direct involvement and
responsibility. Direct involvement would mean direct
participation, direct participation in the fighting, in command
and control, presence on the ground, and all of that. We are
talking about responsibility, responsibility for something which
should have not taken place, which is a violation of territorial
integrity, which in fact is a belligerent act. We believe that the
evidence sustains the proposition - more than that, sustains the

50 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.626-629. Neither Carter nor
Brzezinski give much attention to the issue in their memoirs. Carter notes in
passing that "...the Cubans aided Katangan rebels in an invasion of Zaire... ",
while Brzezinski stated that before his departure for Beijing he was able to
ensure U.S. assistance for the French in Zaire: "We in fact took this action in
response to major unrest in Zaire, apparently fermented with some Angolan
and probably Cuban assistance." See Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs
of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p.222; Brzezinski, Power and
Principle, p.209.
conclusion that the Cuban Government and in some measure the Soviet Government bear the responsibility for this transgression, and this is a serious matter. This is a matter which is not conducive to international stability nor to international accommodation.51

Vance tried to counter the East-West interpretation of Shaba II at a press conference that followed the Carter and Brzezinski announcements.52 But the proposition of Cuban involvement had little to do with the case at hand. As one observer noted of the differing interpretations: "The allegation of Communist involvement...seems to owe more to a general concern over Soviet and Cuban penetration elsewhere in Africa than to any hard evidence of involvement in the Shaba incidents."53

Such influences were built into the administration's position and made possible by the studied ambivalence of the regionalist interpretation to globalist emphases. This is well indicated by the briefing notes the NSC prepared for a meeting with the Speaker of the House of Representatives on Shaba II in June 1978. The briefing incorporates both elements:

We approach Africa under two headings: (1) As one element of the North-South relationship; Africa is important politically because of its many UN votes and, economically, because of its resources. (2) As a continent that should stand on its own; we want to see Africans solve African problems and for our part, we are trying to pursue African policies that reflect African desires.


However, we cannot look at Africa in isolation. Despite our great restraint (shown in Shaba I and Somalia) the Soviets and the Cubans appear to see its as an area of competition. We do not want to overrespond to this in the way that some previous administrations have done. Nonetheless, if we cannot cope with the Soviet and Cuban challenge, we will be unable to pursue our long-range policies...Zaire is a potentially rich country, very attractive to U.S. and European traders and investors. It is one of the potential powers in Africa... Last year we largely stood back at the time of Shaba I, hoping that such restraint would be reciprocated. Our much more active response this year reflects the fact that this did not occur. We are not choosing to "draw the line" in Zaire; clearly, however, we have to respond in at least a limited way.\textsuperscript{54}

There were many factors involved in bringing about the different U.S. understanding of the second Shaba invasion. Aside from the efforts to reinvigorate cold war practices in other domains (for example, the issues of defense spending and missile vulnerability, as discussed in Chapter Eight), there was considerable congressional support for the white minority regime in Rhodesia and its opposition to British and U.S. efforts to include the nationalist groups of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, who had received aid from, among others, the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{55} Above all, though, it was the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 'Horn of Africa' that was providing sustenance to the globalist interpretation.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} Memo, Tom Thornton to David Aaron, 6/5/78, "O'Neil Briefing", File CO-177 Exec., Box CO-87, WHCF-Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{55} Vance noted that "...Smith's supporter's in Congress were painting a simplistic picture of an embattled multiracial, anti-Communist Executive Council under attack by a Communist-supported, radical Patriotic Front, and this was increasingly difficult to counter." Vance, Hard Choices, p.290.

\textsuperscript{56} See Vance, Hard Choices, p.272.
Ethiopia and Somalia had been in conflict as states since Somalia's independence in 1960.\(^{57}\) As with all other African nations, they were formed by reference to colonial boundaries that bore little resemblance to ethnic or social identity. The inviolate nature of colonial boundaries has been, however, an unquestioned principle of postcolonial Africa and is a central part of the OAU's founding charter.\(^ {58}\) The immediate source of the conflict in 1977 that entangled the Carter administration was Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, a region which had been the continual subject of irredentist claims by Somalia since 1960. The linkage of the superpowers to the area was complicated by the changing nature of the alliances of which Ethiopia and Somalia had been a part.

Ethiopia under the Emperor Haile Selassie had been the United States major ally in Africa during the postwar era. As the major recipient of U.S. aid and host to an enormous intelligence facility, Ethiopia was regarded as an important element in U.S. strategy (for example, Israel had used Ethiopian airfields to launch a surprise attack

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\(^{57}\) The conflict, of course, predates independence, but was conducted by different entities. For overviews of the area and its conflicts see Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1977); Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, 2nd ed. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979); Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger, 1982); and David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

on Egypt in 1967). The royal authority of Selassie ended during a revolution in 1974 which saw a Marxist-oriented military council come to power. Although not welcomed by the United States, there was no effort on Washington's part to use its potentially considerable leverage in Ethiopia to influence the outcome. The United States maintained diplomatic relations, kept its intelligence base open until 1977, and did not withdraw a Military Assistance Advisory Group until the same year. The revolution itself had not been coordinated beyond the military leadership, leaving the administration and reform of the country as a whole in a state of chaos and violence for three years as "Ethiopia seethed with regional revolt." The internecine struggles of the ruling military council prevented a coordinated effort until Lt-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the sole leader following a "palace coup" in February 1977. The United States reacted by cancelling military aid because it alleged gross human rights violations, but left military credits and economic aid in place.

While Ethiopia was transformed from a feudal monarchy allied with the United States into a socialist republic without clear external

60. Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, Ch.5.
63. Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p.18.
64. Ibid, pp.16-17.
alliances, Somalia was undergoing an upheaval that propelled it in the opposite direction. Unlike Ethiopia, however, Somalia’s struggle was not the product of internal revolution, but the result of shifting allegiances by its leadership seeking to expand its frontiers.

The Soviets had been aiding Somalia since 1962 after the United States had refused to provide assistance because of its alliance with Ethiopia. With some three hundred Soviet advisors in Somalia, the USSR financed the building of a 14,000 troop army and provided military hardware.66 Cubans were also in Somalia, reaching a peak of 750 advisors in the early 1970s.67 Prior to 1969 Somalia was a democratic republic with more political parties per capita than any other country except Israel. The fragmentation of Somali politics was one of the reasons behind a military coup in October of 1969 that saw the National Assembly abolished, a Supreme Military Council established, and a "scientifically socialist" state come into existence.68 Soviet support for Somalia remained strong until the beginning of the Ogaden war in 1977.

The Ethiopian revolution had raised the possibility that Somalia could take advantage of the internal chaos to press its claims for the

66. Laitin and Samatar, Somalia, p.78.


68. Ibid, pp.69-81.
Ogaden region. 69 Beginning in July 1977, Somalia deployed its Soviet hardware and regular troops in an invasion that took most of the Ogaden and threatened the collapse of Ethiopia. 70 Somalia had been aiding the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in its aim of defeating the Ethiopians in the Ogaden for some time, and had given direct assistance to them from February 1977. The WSLF claimed to have control of sixty percent of the territory when the Somalis deployed their regular armed forces in aid of the WSLF at the end of July 1977. 71 By September, the combination of the Somali and WSLF forces controlled more than ninety percent of the Ogaden (itself one-third of Ethiopian territory), killed or captured roughly one-third of the Ethiopian army, and destroyed two-thirds of the air force. 72 An Ethiopian advance to Washington in the same month for spare parts for their U.S.-equipped military was rebuffed. 73

Having begun aiding Ethiopia with defensive weapons via a secret agreement at the end of 1976, 74 the Soviets found themselves in a bind; not wishing to lose Somalia as an ally, yet not wanting to be thought

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73. "Rebels Threaten Ethiopia's Collapse."

of as contributing to a blatant act of aggression in Africa that would be (and was) condemned by the OAU. The Soviets had invested some $285 million in aid to Somalia after the 1969 coup and had 1,700 military advisors in the country as of 1977. In return they had the use of substantial naval facilities, particularly in the port of Berbera that they had constructed. They had counselled the Somalis against an invasion and proposed instead the diplomatic establishment of a socialist confederation among South Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia. Both the Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny and the Cuban leader Fidel Castro travelled to the Horn in early 1977 to mediate between the two sides and argue for the confederation in place of conflict, but without success.

With the failure of its nonmilitary efforts to curb the Somali invasion, the Soviets began deviating from their position of neutrality between the two protagonists and started to favor Ethiopia. Although arms shipments from the Soviets to Somalia continued until the end of August 1977, Soviet announcements began to be openly critical of the Somalis actions. In November 1977 the Somalian ruling party ordered all Soviet and Cuban military advisors to leave the country within a week, abrogated the treaty of friendship that Somalia had signed with the Soviet Union in 1974, and refused Soviet access to Berbera.

75. Raymond L. Thurston, "The United States, Somalia and the Crisis in the Horn", *Horn of Africa* 1, 2, April-June 1978, p.17.


78. "USSR and Cuba Step Up Their Diplomatic Offensive in Africa", p.32.
Diplomatic relations remained with the Soviet Union, but ties with Cuba were severed.\textsuperscript{79}

A small contingent of Cuban military advisors (fifty) had been in Ethiopia since June 1977 training a people's militia,\textsuperscript{80} but with their expulsion from Somalia, Soviet and Cuban advisors were present in Ethiopia in large numbers and paved the way for a massive arms shipment to the ruling military council to prevent its collapse. Negotiations between Ethiopia and the Soviets for an increase in military aid had begun in April 1977. Signed in Moscow in May of that year was a schedule for deliveries through to 1981. The airlift of arms from that began in November 1977 and continued until January 1978 - involving some $1 billion in material - comprised weapons involved in the earlier agreement, but with the 1979 deliveries speeded up and made in 1978.\textsuperscript{81} Ethiopia had also been negotiating with Cuba for increased assistance in October of 1977. The expulsion from Somalia was the final impetus that led to the deployment of Cuban troops in the Ogaden. Some 2,000 Cubans had been airlifted to Ethiopia by January 1978; their number increased to nearly 15,000 by March of 1978.\textsuperscript{82} With these commitments of material and personnel, combined with the aid of up to five Soviet generals and the Cuban defense

\textsuperscript{79} Porter, The USSR in the Third World, pp.184-185.

\textsuperscript{80} "Ethiopia Steps Up Campaign to Knock Out Rebels", Africa Report 22 (July-August 1977), p.29.


\textsuperscript{82} Porter, The USSR in the Third World, pp.198-199, 204.
minister in command, and 1,500 Soviet advisors, the Ethiopians were able to defeat the combined Somali and WSLF forces in the Ogaden by the spring of 1978. The United States was concerned that Ethiopia's success in the Ogaden would lead to an invasion of Somalia, but the Soviets assured the Carter administration that Ethiopian forces would not (as they did not) cross the Somalian border.

CARTER'S AFRICAN INSCRIPTION:
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALISM IN THE HORN

The United States response to the conflict in the Horn of Africa precipitated by Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden was originally in line with regionalist principles. Vance characterized the Horn as a "complex and shifting political situation" which required that the U.S. maintain influence in Ethiopia, strengthen relations with Somalia and seek to limit the Soviet's role. He rejected the notion that the U.S. should embrace Somalia; to do so, he argued, would be to "find ourselves inadvertently on the wrong side of Africa's most cherished principles - the territorial integrity of the postcolonial states" and "provide in African eyes the same justification for Soviet and Cuban military


84. "Soviet Union Promises Ethiopia Won't Invade Somalia", Africa Report 23 (March-April 1978), p.23. Vance noted: "High-level information from the Soviets indicated that restraining the Ethiopians and ending the crisis was the course they were trying to follow." Vance, Hard Choices, p.86. The sources included Mengistu who was visited by David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor, in mid-February 1978. Thurston, "The United States, Somalia, and the Crisis in the Horn", p.18.

85. Vance, Hard Choices, pp.72-75.
presence in Ethiopia as South African intervention in Angola in 1975 had done.\textsuperscript{86}

The Somalis started seeking out U.S. military aid early in 1977 and made a direct request for assistance after the Soviets and the Ethiopians signed an arms deal in May of 1977. But the President approved Vance's suggestion that the U.S. not provide even defensive weapons to Somalia until the Ogaden affair was resolved or Somali aggression ceased, and that the lines to Mengistu in Ethiopia be kept open.\textsuperscript{87} After increasing pressure from Somalia, the U.S. agreed to seek out allied support but declined to offer direct assistance. This agreement was held in abeyance once Somali regulars were identified in the Ogaden in July. Throughout July and August various U.S. officials informed the Somalis that no assistance could be forthcoming - direct or indirect - while its forces remained in the Ogaden. The Somalis denied their regular forces were there "and painted in vivid colors the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the growing Cuban presence in Ethiopia."\textsuperscript{88} The Carter administration continued to press for the Somalis to accept OAU mediation and, in concert with West European allies, refused to assist Somalia further. When the Soviet airlift of military supplies was underway in December the U.S. engaged in a major diplomatic effort to get African and Middle Eastern

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p.72.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, p.73; Garthoff, \textit{Detente and Confrontation}, p.633.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, p.74.
countries to provide condemnation, but none was forthcoming.89

The beginning of 1978, with increasing numbers of Cuban troops, Soviet advisors, and military materials from both countries in Ethiopia, saw the emergence of the first serious disagreements within the administration on Africa policy. The disagreement centered on how to interpret Soviet actions in the Horn and, later, the second invasion of Shaba by the FNLC. For Vance and the State Department saw the issue as:

a textbook case of Soviet exploitation of a local conflict. In the long run, however, we believed the Ethiopians would oust the Soviets from their country as had happened in Egypt and the Sudan...We believed that in the long run Ethiopian-Soviet relations undoubtedly would sour and Ethiopia would again turn to the West.90

Brzezinski, on the other hand, argued that Soviet and Cuban actions were part of a larger strategy unrelated to local conditions. He saw the events as "Soviet-sponsored" and encouraged the President and others in the administration to take a public stand in opposition to the Soviet-Cuban presence.91 With the President's approval he began briefing the press on the growing Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia. Brzezinski notes in his memoirs: "...by mid-November 1977 articles started

89. Ibid, p.74. For an example see Letter, President Carter to President Josez Lopez Portillo, 2/13/78, File ND 18 Exec., Box ND 50, WHCF-Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library. In the letter Carter writes: "I particularly appreciated your co-operation in relaying our concerns to Cuba about the developments in the Horn of Africa. Recent reports indicate that the Cubans have begun to fly bombing missions for the Ethiopians, and that the number of Cuban military in Ethiopia continues to grow. I am deeply concerned..."

90. Ibid, pp.74-75.

appearing, registering the growing escalation of the Communist military efforts. For example, the New York Times produced on November 17 a front page report, including a map, detailing the growing Soviet-sponsored Cuban military activity on the African continent.\textsuperscript{92} It was an action that Vance saw as self-defeating: "It is true there was growing public and congressional concern about Soviet international behavior. But I felt that much of it arose from background press sessions held by staff members of the national security advisor and was self-inflicted."\textsuperscript{93}

Brzezinski recognized that the Somalis had been the aggressors in the Ogaden, but for him this was not important when the issue was one of global competition. As he contemptuously declared in his memoirs: "...even if one allowed what seemed to me to be a preposterous notion, namely that the Soviets were acting out of some sort of strange territorial legalism, their presence so close to Saudi Arabia was bound to have strategic consequences, whatever the Soviet intent may have been."\textsuperscript{94} Brzezinski's interpretative principles were thus geopolitical. As he declared in one interview; "I think the question whether individual African countries are strategically important is not determined by whether the Cuban's go into them, but by the nature of location or resources of these countries."\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p.180; Garthoff, \textit{Detente and Confrontation}, pp.646-647.

\textsuperscript{93} Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, p.84.

\textsuperscript{94} Brzezinski, \textit{Power and Principle}, p.186.

\textsuperscript{95} "Interview: National Security Adviser Brzezinski on 'Meet the Press'', p.28.
With this in mind, Brzezinski strongly advocated a military dimension in the U.S. response, and argued for the deployment of an American aircraft carrier task force in the Indian Ocean near Somalia to "provide more tangible backing for our strong words." Carter had also begun to express stronger sentiments on the issue. In November 1977 Carter called the Cubans a "threat to the permanent peace in Africa." In early 1978 he declared in his State of the Union address that the Soviet activities in Ethiopia were "unwarranted" and had broader strategic implications.

The flux in U.S. policy was the subject of a series of meetings of the Special Coordinating Committee of the NSC in early February 1978 where Brzezinski's military option was rejected. After the conflict in the Ogaden ended with the Somali withdrawal in March 1978, the NSC commissioned a presidential review memorandum to try and resolve the conflict between the globalists and the regionalists in the administration. PRM-36 on Africa policy predominantly supported the regionalist interpretation:

This exhaustive government-wide study led most participants to reject the 'grand design' interpretation of Soviet policy. It concluded that Soviet policy in Africa could best be described as an exploitation of opportunity, an attempt to take advantage of African conflicts to increase Soviet influence. This view did not, of course, make Soviet behavior any more tolerable, but it did suggest that we should deal with each problem in its own

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96. Ibid, p.182.


context and not as a local battle in a global East-West geopolitical struggle.\textsuperscript{100}

At an NSC meeting in October 1978 to review Africa policy and PRM-36 Vance and Brzezinski argued as to the interpretation codified in the document. Brzezinski maintained that there were only two choices for policy: make the Soviet-Cuban actions a major issue in superpower relations, or reduce U.S. involvement. The President, however, concluded that a third and desirable option was to continue policy as it had been enunciated; remain concerned about the Soviets in Africa but do not base policy on a reaction to their presence.\textsuperscript{101}

One impetus for Carter's concern about the Soviet Union in Africa, despite his reluctance to embrace a globalist interpretation, was the mobilization of conservative forces at home around the issue, and their success in the mid-term congressional elections.\textsuperscript{102} Republican Senators had declared in May 1978 that:

In Africa, Moscow poured one billion dollars in arms into Ethiopia and Soviet officers directed the combat operations of more than 17,000 Cuban troops against Somalia. The Carter administration's feckless handling of the Ethiopian-Somalian conflict opened the way for the Soviets to carry out their naked geo-political power play. This imposing presence in the Horn of Africa, coupled with their presence in Iraq, creates a pincer movement around our vital sources of Middle East oil and threatens the sea lanes over which it is delivered. Encouraged by their successes in Ethiopia and Angola, further Soviet aggression

\textsuperscript{100} Vance, \textit{Hard Choices}, p.91.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p.92.

\textsuperscript{102} For an analysis of the impact of these elections that notes but does not overstate the conservative successes and the implications for Africa policy, see Richard Deutsch, "After the Polls", \textit{Africa Report} 24 (January-February 1979), pp.49-51.
is mounting in southern and central Africa.103

These critics employed geopolitical premises to undermine the sensitivity to indigenous factors that had been the intention of the regionalist interpretation of Africa policy enunciated by the Carter administration. That interpretation sought to accommodate globalist emphases rather than dispense with them. This meant that the process of understanding in Carter’s Africa policy was susceptible to the struggle between cold war practices and a desire to reorient foreign policy that was the hallmark of the administration’s inscription of danger. With cold war practices reinvigorated, geopolitics was reasserted at the core of U.S. policy towards Africa.

CONCLUSION: GEOPOLITICS REASSERTED

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is usually cited as the motive behind the Carter administration’s abandonment of its attempts to rewrite security. What this chapter demonstrates is that abandonment, codified in the ‘Carter Doctrine’ of January 1980, was imminent in the administration’s original inscription of danger and made possible after a struggle in which the cold war practices intrinsic to American identity were reinvigorated. And although the events surrounding the fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1979 helped the globalists overcome the

regionalists, the effort towards a reassertion of geopolitical premises had begun earlier.

This conclusion can be reinforced by a consideration of Brzezinski's pursuit of a geopolitically-inspired regional security framework for the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf. The loss of Iran as an ally was interpreted in the geopolitical terms that were becoming more prominent in Carter administration texts. By early 1979, Brzezinski had been working for some time on the concept of a "new security framework" for U.S. forces in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. In a memo to Carter in February of that year, as events in Iran were still far from clear, he called for a security framework to cover the area he had begun designating as "the arc of crisis".104

At the same time, Brzezinski had begun a campaign within the national security bureaucracy to focus attention on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He instructed the DCI to generate more intelligence on the nature and extent of Soviet involvement, and began raising the issue in his daily briefings with Carter, highlighting the potential of the Soviets gaining access to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan and Pakistan.105

Brzezinski was candid in his geopolitical bias, stating in his memoirs that "My own inclination was to make judgments about


105. Ibid, p.941.
geopolitical and strategic stakes involved and then to derive from such conclusions the needed action."\textsuperscript{106} But there was considerable resistance within the administration to Brzezinski's geopolitical urgings. Vance and Warren Christopher of the State Department did not accept the premises of the grand design strategy that he was advocating. Brzezinski, however, "persisted" in holding a series of meetings throughout June 1979 of the NSC's Special Coordinating Committee in which getting the decisions he wanted was (in his terms) "like pulling teeth".\textsuperscript{107} Progress on these issues was summarized in a memo to Carter on June 3 1979 entitled "Persian Gulf Security Framework", and led to Brown and other U.S. officials touring the Middle East seeking support for an increased military presence.\textsuperscript{108}

The result of all this was that "the idea of the regional security framework was already quietly being fleshed out by the time the Afghan crisis had erupted."\textsuperscript{109} The administration had prepared the way for Afghanistan to be a major issue. At an NSC meeting on December 4 1979, prior to the full-scale Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the administration approved a military response to the "arc of crisis". The Soviet action thereby served to crystallize the threat and justify the reaction, but it was in terms of interpretive practices that had been developing for some time.\textsuperscript{110} The victory of geopolitical

\textsuperscript{106} Brzezinski, \textit{Power and Principle}, p.47.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, p.447.

\textsuperscript{108} Deutsch, "Carter's Africa Policy Shift", p.15.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, p.450.

\textsuperscript{110} Garthoff, \textit{Detente and Confrontation}, p.665.
Geopolitical practices privilege a spatial reading of security and marginalize temporal, social and historical concerns. They are integral to the construction of international relations in terms of a "realm of necessity" to which policy makers must respond. They exclude alternative formulations of politics and favor certain policy responses. In the case of Africa and the Middle East, the policy responses of the Carter administration after early 1979 - such as the decision to provide the Somalis with considerable military aid regardless of their intentions concerning the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and the deployment of facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force - were made possible by their interpretive force.

The power and economy of geopolitical practices in U.S. foreign policy comes, however, not from the 'reality' they illuminate in any particular issue or region, but from their place as an integral part of American political identity. Space, as Chapter Five argued, has always been more integral to the American understanding of the 'self' than time. The reassertion of geopolitics was thus part of the reinvigoration of American political identity. The image of the 'other' was made in terms central to the 'self'. Soviet activities certainly aided this
interpretation, but they did not give rise to it. In fact, it was the domination of geopolitical representational practices that gave the activities of the Soviet Union meaning and identity.
Conclusion

The analysis in this thesis derived its impetus from three ‘windows of opportunity’ present in current debates. The first was the opening made possible by the wide-ranging and interdisciplinary debate over the nature of social and political inquiry. The second, both an instance of and response to the first, was the theoretical confusion that currently exists in the discipline of International Relations. The third was the confusion that exists in the literature of International Relations concerning the reasons behind the Carter administration's foreign policy 'failure'. These three openings were brought together in an account that reconceptualized foreign policy in light of the interdisciplinary debate over the nature of social and political inquiry, offered a reinterpretation of United States foreign policy in the postwar era, and then sought to account for the Carter administration in these new terms.

The interdisciplinary debates across the social sciences which have created the space for the adoption of a critical stance towards practices of representation, and made possible a reconceptualization of foreign policy, demonstrated that forms of social and political inquiry dependent upon dichotomies have been the subject of extensive criticism. These interdisciplinary debates have not resulted in the emergence of a single grand-theoretical position from which social and political inquiry can proceed. On the contrary, they have, in their disparate ways and using their divergent sources, sought to undermine the notion of ahistorical foundations or Archimedean points upon which action and analysis are (purportedly) unproblematically grounded. This
has most obviously been the case in the philosophy of science debates, where the 'hard' sciences have been characterized as more hermeneutical than positivist.

The interdisciplinary debates have had a two-fold consequence for a discipline like International Relations. Firstly, it is no longer possible to proceed innocently maintaining the 'objectivity' of one's scholarship by recourse to the 'facts' of the 'real world'. Secondly, there has been a space created for the pursuit of research strategies with metatheoretical commitments that might have once been perjoratively labelled 'subjectivist' or 'idealist'. Within this space there are many alternatives that could be pursued; no single research strategy is mandated as the correct and legitimate course to follow. The argument made here proceeds from that opening to maintain that the attitude of inquiry associated with a postmodern or poststructuralist approach - with its concern for textuality - offers the discipline of International Relations an important means of considering the pivotal role of interpretation in the understanding of global politics.

The argument in this thesis has been predicated upon the recognition that meaning and identity are constituted through a series of exclusions. The imposition of an interpretation upon the ambiguity and contingency of social life always results in an 'other' being marginalized. Meaning and identity are, therefore, always the consequence of a relationship between the 'self' and the 'other' which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own
preestablished identity. In this context, the focus of social and political analysis is on how human beings problematize who they are, what they do, and the world in which they live. The problematization that emerges in any historically specific location allows 'being' to offer itself to be thought, makes possible certain problems, and mandates a range of solutions.

Taking the poststructuralist injunction to regard theory as practice as a starting point, the discipline of International Relations was analyzed in terms of its role in the making of 'the world' (hence regarding the discipline as an object of analysis) rather than being simply a window to the world and a tool for analysis. Considering the methodological self-understanding of the discipline of International Relations, it was argued that the appearance of theoretical conflict and confusion disguises an historical continuity in the tradition of International Relations brought on by shared positivist metatheoretical commitments. These give form to a problematization (termed the "anarchy problematique") which incorporates a subject/object dualism, reduces contingencies to the 'secure' grounds of agency, structure or other pure presence, and privileges a reading of global politics in terms of the presence of sovereign states in an anarchic realm. It was this problematization which made possible the interpretations of the Carter administration's 'failure' reviewed in Chapter One, and the dominant understanding of postwar United States foreign policy detailed in Chapter Five.

The effectiveness of the anarchy problematique was argued to be a
result of its replication of wider cultural practices central to modernity; practices (such as the "heroic practice") which are understood as part of the "paradigm of sovereignty." The paradigm of sovereignty operates on a simple sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy where the former is the higher, regulative ideal to which the latter is derivative and inferior, and a source of danger to the former’s existence. It is this problematization that the anarchy problematique invokes whenever uncertainty is encountered. It works by recurring to the ideal of a sovereign presence or foundational point from which ambiguity can be disciplined. Following a mode of inquiry genealogical in intent, the fourth chapter was concerned with how, in this context, meaning and identity in global politics is created and maintained through boundary-setting procedures which construct social space. This argument focused on how the categories of time and space are disciplined; how the state is a particular resolution of those categories; and the role the boundary-creating practices associated with the construction of the state play in the constitution of political identity through the demarcation of ‘self’ and ‘other’.

In focusing on the concept of identity it is important to emphasize that the delineation of inside from outside which gives rise to the state is more than a spatial move. This boundary also establishes the dichotomy of community on the inside and anarchy on the outside. By creating a ‘domestic’ realm of community in contradistinction to the ‘international’ realm of anarchy and dangers to community, this boundary goes beyond merely locating individuals and endows them with an (individual and collective) political identity. The ‘other’
associated with the anarchic provides a point of differentiation against which the 'self' is defined and thus given identity. In other words, 'self' and 'other', 'domestic' and 'international', 'state' and 'system' are all constituted via an interpretive relationship and do not exist prior to that relationship.

The consequence of this for understanding global politics is the recognition of the 'state' as an effect of practices of differentiation derived from the paradigm of sovereignty, rather than as an entity that exists prior to politics and history. Foreign policy thus needs to be seen as a political practice which domesticates 'man' (i.e. establishes political identity) by constructing his problems, fears, and dangers. The fears and dangers to 'man' are externalized and totalized through an inscription of danger (or writing of security) which transfers the differences within a society to differences between societies. Foreign policy operates, therefore, not in terms of a pregiven domestic society, but as a political practice through which the boundary between (what comes to be known as) the 'domestic' and the 'international' is drawn and redrawn.

Chapter Five brought the general argument for the reconceptualization of foreign policy to a consideration of United States foreign policy, and how it might be thought of as a political practice which constitutes the 'United States.' It was argued that the cold war was constructed on the basis of inscribing danger in other domestic societies as a means of controlling the proliferating alternatives to political identity in the United States, thereby enframing a dominant
conception of 'man'. This understanding was not, however, just the end result of applying metatheoretical insights concerning the nature of social and political inquiry to United States foreign policy. Through a deconstructive analysis in the first half of Chapter Five, it was demonstrated that the foreign policy texts of the postwar period were very often concerned with the affirmation and reaffirmation of the character of United States society in relation to external danger. Moreover, the shifting characterization of the threat to United States security in the postwar period - covering, as it did, countries ranging from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua - suggested that there was more to the inscription of danger than a simple response to a realm of necessity.

In the second half of Chapter Five, an argument drawn from American historiography demonstrated that long before the Soviet Union was inscribed as the major threat to the United States, concern about communism had been prominent in political debates, and had been a means of disciplining the threat to identity brought on by challenges to the social relations of production and subjectivities of liberal capitalism. The "red scares" of 1919-1920, for example, had seen the use of anti-communist rhetoric as a means of discrediting the labor militancy of the period. Similar techniques were to abound in the period subsequent to the depression in the 1930s and the Second World War in the 1940s. The House Committee on Un-American Activities, often identified as a prominent instance of the domestic cold war in the United States, was actually established in 1938 as a response to labor unrest in Hollywood, and was not a consequence of the threat normally
thought to be posed by the Soviet Union in the postwar period.

Labor was not the only group to have been subject to repression in the service of constructing American political identity. Other liminal groups - including Indians, women, and ethnic communities - have been marginalized and excluded as 'others' through a process in which a 'self' is propagated. The common feature of these liminal groups in United States society is that they were, at various times and in various ways, constructed as threatening the social relations of production associated with liberal capitalism: family, property, and hence, national identity. The strategy for dealing with liminal groups was to identify them with the foreign, and usually the enemy. What was operating was a conjunction of external coercion and internal influence as means of domesticating the American 'self'.

The construction of American political identity via a series of exclusions was not just a feature of the twentieth century. The imperial expansion of United States authority to Asia and the Caribbean in the nineteenth century (what is usually referred to as "manifest destiny") was made possible in the same terms as had justified the earlier repression of the Indians in the expansion of the domestic frontier of the United States: the need to civilize, educate, and look after 'primitive' peoples. The boundaries of the American state had thus long been the result of domesticating the 'self' through the transfer of differences within society to the inscription of differences between societies.
This has to be understood as a process more complex than either the intentional use of foreign threats to contain internal subversion or the creation of myths of identity through foreign adventures. It is a process whereby, out of all the interpretive possibilities, the presence of community and anarchy within both (what we come to know as) the state and the international realm is disciplined so that community comes to exist exclusively on the inside, threatened by the anarchy of the outside. This is a process excluded from view, producing a naturalized order in terms of the anarchy problematique.

This process achieves its naturalized status by the replication of the heroic practice in the site of U.S. foreign policy. The heroic practice operates, as part of the paradigm of sovereignty, on a simple sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy where the former is the higher, regulative ideal to which the latter is derivative and inferior, and a source of danger to the former's existence. This privileging of identity over difference is constitutive of many of the practices of modernity, particularly in the form of positing a 'self', a sovereign 'I', as the center of reference for modern life.

The centering of the individual that follows from the operation of the heroic practice is a prominent theme in the foreign policy discourse of the United States, particularly in terms of what constitutes "the fundamental purpose" of the United States. This produces a situation where the discourses of modernity and International Relations are bound into a self-affirming whole. The heroic practice and the anarchy problematique privilege sovereignty over anarchy while the foreign
policy discourse centers upon the individual. This serves to naturalize the United States and its understanding of global life.

As Chapter Five concluded, there are powerful historical reasons for this. The character of the American revolution - its being posited against no established order - meant that there developed in the United States a very special sense of time. Having established social and political order through a revolution that secured what had already begun in an historical vacuum, "The past had been consolidated in a future whose integrity lay in remaining as much like the present as possible.1

The consequence of this is that space is more central to American identity than time. The territorial enclosure of political space (and its expansion) is privileged over temporal, historical, or social relations. This points to the nexus between American identity and the understanding of global politics in terms of the anarchy problematique. The presence of sovereign states in an anarchic realm, marked by the absence of a central agency of power, is a spatial conception that privileges a geopolitical reading of global politics. Equally, American identity is constituted geopolitically, through the securing of a particular space. A geopolitical reading is thus more than an economical means of interpreting the ambiguity of global life. Geopolitical representational practices are practices of statecraft central to the constitution of the 'United States'.

Chapter Six argued that this is the context in which the foreign policies of the Nixon and (particularly) the Carter administrations need to be located. The period 1945 to 1965 saw the political identity of the state constituted via a foreign policy that disciplined the range of interpretations of 'man', so that the social relations of production and subjectivities of liberal capitalism, including the nuclear family, were dominant. Security was written in terms of dangers to this interpretation of 'man' being inscribed and located in other domestic societies. When cold war liberalism came under pressure, in part because the dangers to 'man' could no longer be located in other domestic societies (international economic disorder, environmental degradation and other issues were predominantly transnational), security had to be rewritten if the interpretations of 'man' were to be limited. The political identity of the United States had to be controlled in accord with that form of identity in which social resources had been invested. The rewriting of security in terms of interdependence while reproducing the basic features of American society was the challenge facing U.S. administrations from the mid-1960s on.

The Nixon administration was the first U.S. administration to face this period of ambiguity. Its strategy, first in proclaiming a "new era in international relations", and then in embarking upon the policy of detente, was to construct a different form of international organization in response to perceived changes in international reality. It was to be a form of international organization, however, that did not attempt to challenge the basis of the cold war system that constituted U.S. society
and formed its identity. The subsequent demise of detente was more than a tactical problem of policy implementation. Seeking to inscribe new threats, trying to avoid locating them in the Soviet Union, and not wishing to engage in a reconstruction of American political identity, the Nixon administration found itself in a dilemma.

As Chapter Four had argued, seeking to engender cooperation from states that have been inscribed as adversarial in order to constitute one's domestic base is a task fraught with contradictions. Unless security can be rewritten in terms that do not require threats to be located in other domestic societies, cooperation will succumb to confrontation in order to preserve there sources that have been invested in a certain ordering of domestic social relations. The social investments in cold war practices were sufficient to provide substantial opposition to detente. They were not, however, yet sufficient to overcome some redirection of U.S. foreign policy and reinstall an overtly cold war foreign policy.

Attempts at disciplining the ambiguity that was present in United States' politics throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s were not restricted to official action and strategy. An amorphous group, widely designated as "the neoconservatives", developed an agenda and critique of politics that focused on cultural explanations for various crises in the American polity. Arguing that the country was witnessing a "twilight of authority", the neoconservatives looked for ways to reestablish the power of the (traditional) family, religion, and the state.
The neoconservative critique was a declaration about the state of political identity in the United States. Concerned with the demise of Enlightenment thinking about progress and problem solving, it was alarmed at the 'spreading mediocrity' of American society and attitudes. With its cultural focus and concern for "faith", "nerve", and "will", the critique did not distinguish between domestic and international domains, but linked the crises at home with the inability to act abroad. Indeed, the neoconservatives recognized that a disciplining of the domestic ambiguity required an inscription of danger which located the 'threat' to American society in another domestic society. The success of the neoconservative critique in redirecting the boundaries of public discourse in the United States was achieved, at least in part, by their support for foreign policy practices which inscribed danger in the Soviet Union as a means of disciplining domestic ambiguity in favor of the social relations of production and subjectivities of liberal capitalism.

The significance of the neoconservative success for the argument being made here is that it demonstrates what both the Nixon and Carter administrations did not appreciate: the necessity of linking the inscription of danger in one's rewriting of security with a concomitant form of identity. The Nixon administration addressed only half of the equation. By attempting to put another form of international organization in place while preserving the ('domestic') cold war system, it removed the inscription of danger necessary for the cold war system to control the challenges it faced, but did not seek to construct a form of identity compatible with its rewriting of security.
The Carter administration, as Chapter Seven argued, sought to follow a strategy distinct from that of both the Nixon administration and the neoconservatives as a means of disciplining the ambiguity in global politics it encountered on coming to office. Each of the three strategies articulated in the United States to discipline the ambiguity of the mid-1970s (those of Nixon, the neoconservatives, and Carter) can be differentiated in terms of their understanding of the relationship between American identity and U.S. foreign policy. The Nixon administration sought to stabilize the cold war identity of the United States by accommodating global developments in a strategy that pursued different means to similar ends. Security was to be reformulated but not fundamentally altered. The neoconservatives regarded the cold war identity of the forties and fifties as having been undermined by the counterculture of the sixties. They sought its reimposition by a return to cold war foreign policy practices. Security was to be reimposed by a return to past practices. The Carter administration recognised that American identity had been undermined by the struggles of the sixties, but regarded the rigid cold war practices that had resulted in Vietnam and Watergate as responsible. For the Carter administration, to return to cold war practices would thus have been to perpetuate the excesses of applying dogma in an inherently complex and differentiated world, thereby retracing the path to the (then) present crisis. Equally, to follow the Nixonian path of accommodation would not have provided a clear enough break with past practices and would have thus failed to differentiate the administration's own identity without addressing the problems of America's malaise. Security was thus to be fundamentally rewritten.
Carter's rewriting of security was initially (and is conventionally understood as) a refiguring of space so that North/South and global issues were to take precedence over traditional East/West concerns. Given the Nixon administration's experience and the neoconservatives critique, such a rewriting of security required a reconstruction of political identity so that the inscription of danger associated with East/West issues was no longer required to discipline the proliferating range of domestic alternatives. But as Chapter Seven demonstrated, the actual rewriting of security that the Carter administration undertook equivocated between the priority accorded to North/South and East/West issues. This in-built tension of its discursive strategies was both an instance of, and a major contribution to, the discourse of the 'new era' in international relations dominant in the post-Vietnam foreign policy establishment of the United States. This discourse, akin to that detailed in Keohane and Nye's *Power and Interdependence*, sought to accommodate both North/South and East/West perspectives, downgrade the role of force in international relations, and heighten awareness of the nonmilitary and global issues. Associated with the Trilateral Commission, the "new foreign policy establishment" centered around *Foreign Policy*, and personified in the 1970s writings of Zbigniew Brzezinski, this discourse did not appreciate the important nexus between the inscription of danger and the enframing of 'man' in domestic society.

Established as a means of overcoming the changes to the social relations of production that had precipitated the era of ambiguity in
U.S. foreign policy, the discourse of the 'new era' was problematic for two reasons. It directly confronted the basis on which the postwar growth coalition in the United States had been founded and, in that sense, shared something in common with the neoconservatives' strategy. Where it differed from the neoconservative strategy, however, and where it encountered additional problems in disciplining ambiguity, is that it offered no inscription of danger capable of converting the differences within the domestic realm to differences between sovereign domestic societies. While the neoconservatives' strategy confronted the growth coalition in the same way, it did so by reinvoking the inscription of danger associated with cold war practices as a means of containing the domestic dissent. The globalization of threats in the discourse of the 'new era' defied such location in a single or easily identifiable source, thereby creating a situation where alternative conceptions of identity proliferating in the domestic realm could not be limited and controlled by the invocation of danger from the external realm.

Chapter Seven concluded, therefore, that the discursive network of the 'new era' of international relations, amidst which was the Carter administration, embodied a series of tensions in its efforts to overcome ambiguity. It sought to make understandings of the international arena more complex, but had to reproduce an uncomplicated American identity. It had to make East/West relations less central, yet could not focus on certain global issues without invoking them. And it tried to highlight North/South perspectives and portray global issues as the threats that they were, but could not locate them in a single,
identifiable source. In contributing to this discursive network, the
Carter administration found itself replicating these tensions. Moreover,
it found itself vulnerable to a neoconservative critique.

Such a perspective on the Carter administration is contrary to the
usual interpretations of its 'failure', which sees a gradual shift from
one perspective to another throughout its four years as a result of
either the demands of the international system or the pressure of
personality conflicts. What the argument here maintains is that there
was no shift from one perspective to another but, rather, a continual
struggle between two not very different perspectives in which the
conservative interpretation achieved ascendency by the time Carter left
office in 1981. This ascendency, however, is not achieved by the
elimination of the liberal interpretation, which survives through to the
end of the administration's life. The ascendency of the conservative
interpretation is achieved in the process of the political struggles
central to the (re)construction of American identity in the late 1970s.

How these struggles were played out within official circles was the
subject of Chapter Eight. In a period of ambiguity, securing the
boundaries of American identity was more easily achieved by a return
to cold war practices than the construction of a new interpretation
involving the restructuring of identity. Moreover, the Carter
administration provided legitimacy to the reassertion of cold war
practices because it found itself unable (as well as ultimately unwilling)
to make a clean break with the established discursive resources.
Chapter Eight examined in greater detail the administration's rewriting of security by considering the foreign policy and national security documents in which the strategy was scripted, the context in which challenges to this scripting were mounted, and the discursive strategies of those challenges. Focusing on the assessment of the Soviet threat through the National Intelligence Estimate, the issue of Soviet defense spending, and concern over the Soviet ICBM program throughout the 1970s, Chapter Eight argued that none of these issues was constituted through an unproblematic reading of the 'facts'. Aside from the inherent ambiguity associated with the textual nature of each of these issues, it is possible to employ a range of established interpretations to problematize the secure meaning ascribed to the events and issues by the neoconservative critique of U.S. foreign policy. The counternarrative on the issues of threat assessment, defense spending, and missile build-up that Chapter Eight detailed needs to be seen, not as one set of 'facts' in contradistinction to those underpinning the neoconservative critique, but as marginalized history, the recovery of which undermines the assured nature of the neoconservative critique. In particular, what this counternarrative demonstrated is that the concern with reinscribing the Soviet Union as the principal threat to United States' security was prior to Afghanistan or any other external event. This means that there was more at stake in the reinscription of danger underway in the United States in the 1970s than a simple response to a realm of necessity. What the argument here maintains is that this reinscription was associated with a reconstruction of American political identity along cold war lines.
This reinscription was made possible by the established nature of cold war practices and the studied ambivalence of the alternative inscription associated with interdependence, trilateralism, and the Carter administration. This was clearest in the Carter administration's principle text of statecraft, Presidential Review Memorandum-10. Most importantly, the success of the reinscription was a consequence of the central role a spatial conception of security, and geopolitical representational practices, have had in constructing and maintaining American political identity. The ability of neoconservative critiques to call on geopolitical discursive strategies enabled them to draw upon the restricted stock of signs that give public policy an ideological depth and complementary status with American identity.

In addition to the studied ambivalence of the Carter administration's discursive strategies for rewriting security, its ultimate position of support for a limited and controllable nuclear war strategy in Presidential Directive-59 helped the reassertion of geopolitical representational practices that was underway in other areas. The renewed emphasis on nuclear warfighting in the strategic debates since the late 1960s is one practice among many intended to cope with the ambiguity of the end of the postwar era in international relations. In a bid to reproduce the rigid bipolarity of cold war practices, the nuclear warfighting debates refocused concern on the military power of the Soviet Union and argued that nuclear parity or Soviet superiority endangered United States security. These debates maintained that although deterrence was still the key, it was no longer credible without an avowed willingness to use nuclear weapons.
The reassertion of geopolitical representational practices, and their role in overcoming the Carter administration's initial attempt to rewrite security, was further detailed in Chapter Nine's consideration of the Carter administration's inscription of danger as it related to Africa policy. As with the issues covered in Chapter Eight, Chapter Nine presented a counternarrative with respect to administration policy on Shaba I and Shaba II, and the conflict in the Horn of Africa. It was a means of illustrating that, given the multiple ways in which ambiguity can be disciplined, the outcome of the process of understanding is as much a consequence of the 'reality principles' intrinsic to political identity as it is of the issues and events in the area under consideration.

In each instance of Africa policy, Carter administration policy succumbed to the regionalist interpretation's inability to completely break with the East/West assumptions of the globalist or geopolitical perspective. Having been unable or ultimately unwilling to dispense with a spatial conception of security, the administration's attempt to incorporate temporal, historical, and social considerations into Africa policy was slowly undermined. This meant that the process of understanding in Carter's Africa policy was susceptible to the struggle between cold war practices and a desire to reorient foreign policy that was the hallmark of the administration's inscription of danger. With cold war practices reinvigorated, geopolitics was reasserted at the core of U.S. policy towards Africa by early 1979. As with the issues discussed in Chapter Eight, this was a development that preceded the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. That latter event came to be interpreted via the interpretive practices which Brzezinski codified in the "new security framework" that he developed throughout 1979 as a means of coordinating policy towards the "arc of crisis."

Geopolitical practices privilege a spatial reading of security and marginalize temporal, social, and historical concerns. They are integral to the construction of international relations in terms of a "realm of necessity" to which policy makers must respond. They exclude alternative formulations of politics and favor certain policy responses. The Carter administration's reversion to policies it had originally sought to dispense with was made possible by their interpretive force.

The dominance of geopolitical practices in the discursive economy of U.S. foreign policy comes, however, not from the 'reality' they illuminate in any particular issue or region, but from their place as an integral part of American political identity. Space has always been more integral to the American understanding of the 'self' than time. The reassertion of geopolitics was thus part of the reinvigoration of American political identity. The image of the 'other' was made in terms central to the 'self'.

Given the centrality of geopolitical representational practices to American identity and foreign policy, and their ability to overcome elite efforts such as those of the Carter administration to rewrite security, it is worth concluding with some brief reflections on whether or not a redirection of U.S. foreign policy away from a spatial conception of
security is possible. First, however, it is necessary to briefly consider the issues that are raised in any consideration of change in global politics.

The issue of transformation in global politics is usually posed in terms of the persistence of states or the overthrow of the state-centered international order. This dichotomy severely limits the ways of thinking and acting about the political possibilities for change in global life. It is a dichotomy dependent upon the constitutive role of sovereignty in modern life, and the way we think about modern life. The operation of the "paradigm of sovereignty" in the consideration of change means that politics is thought of as only occurring within enclosed spaces and via a particular conception of time. There is thus an equivalence imposed on the concepts 'modern political life', 'political identity', and 'community'. All occur in terms of the state, in terms of sovereignty, or against the state and sovereignty. However, this mode of argumentation inverts the issue at hand. The very capacity of the state to mobilize the resources to effect political enclosure (i.e. to establish sovereignty) is taken to be proof of its claim to sovereignty and political priority.

Such is the position of the traditional perspectives within the discipline of International Relations. But if the critiques of rationalism and subjectivity outlined in this thesis - critiques which argue the end

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of unitary subjects, homogenous social agents, or unproblematic states -
are brought to bear upon the question of change and political
possibilities, a new perspective is possible. It is a perspective that
refuses to see change in terms of a grand clash between sovereign
presences akin to (in Gramscian terms) a "war of manoeuvre." Instead,
we have something like a "war of position" in which "a postmodernist
politics must complete the Gramscian move to extend the political into
all spheres, domains and practices of our culture. Everything is
contestable; nothing is off-limits; and no outcomes are guaranteed."3

Such a proposition is inherently unsettling to a discipline that has
aspired to develop a social scientific and policy relevant understanding
of global politics, not least because it does away with the "universal
intellectual" who writes policy manifestos for the prince. But this
perspective on repoliticization and the overcoming of the theory/practice
dichotomy recognizes that change in global life is always already
underway. Such a position focuses on the activity rather than the
enclosure of politics and reveals the often concealed character of social
transformation.

This already present status of social transformation is usually
written off by traditional perspectives as either inputs into the state or
prepolitical civil society. However, when the activity of politics is the
focus of attention, a number of developments in global life that explore
new political space, novel political practices, and different ways of

3. Andrew Ross, "Introduction", in Universal Abandon? The Politics of
knowing and being, come into sight. Whether these developments be the increasing globalization of capital or what have been termed "critical social movements", what they are effectively achieving is the dissolution of questions of sovereignty into questions of political community. In other words, they particularize sovereignty as but one form of community.

The character of these developments that effectively rearticulate political space makes a democratic theory which might account for them and offer insights as to their potential for effecting transformation an inherently problematic task. Such an approach would have to resist any essentialist claims for political identity, and focus instead on their plural, impermanent, inchoate, inclusive, and unbounded nature. The task that lies ahead for the discipline of International Relations (among others) is thus a formidable challenge.

This means, however, that the potential for change is unlikely to come from 'the top'. The experience of the Carter administration suggests that it is not until new political practices which rethink geopolitics and refuse the dichotomy of identity and difference come into being, that security outside of a spatial conception will be possible. Elites are unlikely to be able to effect such practices, given that their identity (both personal and as agents of a state) is bound up with

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spatial conceptions of security. Nor will such transformation be capable of being planned and implemented in a coordinated way, because to do so would be to effect an imposition upon the plurality of cultural presences which give rise to ways of thinking and acting free of the restrictions of identity and difference. Not until 'domestic' society can handle the differences within, without transferring them into differences between, will security and identity be unfettered by spatial considerations. Transformation in that direction is already underway. What is required of those who claim for themselves the task of analyzing global politics is the willingness to appreciate these new developments, and the ability to refuse the arrogance of those who demand instant and concrete solutions to the questions of human community that confront us.
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