Taylor, Brad2014-08-042014-08-04b3579074xhttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/11935This thesis by papers uses rational choice theory to consider the relative performance of individual exit and collective voice in politics, as well as the causal relationships between exit and voice as individual strategies and institutionalised means of controlling government behaviour. Following the methodological approach of Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, the papers of this thesis are examples of ‘revisionist public choice theory,’ retaining the broad framework of rational choice while relaxing one or more of the standard assumptions generally made by economists. In particular, the papers of this thesis consider otherregarding preferences, non-instrumental preferences, dispositional choice, epistemic rationality, non-efficiency evaluative standards, and non-equilibrium dynamics. By taking a revisionist approach, I am able to steer a path between the excessive abstraction of much public choice theory and the insufficient rigour of much normative political theory. Jointly, the papers of this thesis contribute to broad debates over the relative value of exit and voice in political settings, with relevance to questions of democracy versus the market, centralism versus localism, and bureaucracy versus market-like modes of governance. Though I cover a range of diverse topics in this thesis, I generally argue for a strongly revisionist approach to political analysis which sees significant behavioural differences between individual and collective decisions while grounding all action in common motivational assumptions.en-AUpublic choicerational choicerevisionist public choice theory201410.25911/5d73928bdbc2f